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Foreword
Jack Barbalet
The notion of modernity as a summary term for a distinctive form of society and a 
corresponding set of experiences, including emotional experiences, is now com-
monplace in sociological discussion. Indeed, the association of modernity with 
emotions is similarly established through a number of different but converging 
routes (Dixon 2003; Stearns 1994; William 1998). In an earlier specification of 
modernity, Berman (1982, pp. 16–17) indicates a periodisation of three phases: 
first, from the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century; second, the period 
of revolution from 1790 to the end of the nineteenth century; and, finally, the 
twentieth century. It is not entirely clear what unifies these periods as variant 
forms of modernity in Berman’s account, except that one historically succeeds 
the other. The final stage of modernity is described by Berman (1982, p. 17) as 
both global in its reach and comprising a public that ‘shatters into a multitude of 
fragments’. These two elements, conjoined and complimentary, are now widely 
regarded as forming the constitution of late modernity (Giddens 1990; Bauman 
2000; Beck & Beck-Gensheim 2002), and although Berman himself projects no 
further than the twentieth century these conditions are widely held to uniquely 
characterise the present period of the twenty-first century as well.
Although the description of late modernity in terms of globalisation and 
individualisation is widely accepted, the idea that globalisation typifies the social 
world from the mid-twentieth century ignores the fact that forces of world inte-
gration have operated over a much longer time span (Bhambra 2007; Hopkins 
2002). Similarly, the idea of modernity ‘as a release of individuality and a search 
for (or despair of) an authenticity made possible by this foundation’ (Luhmann 
1998, p. 4) cannot be confined to a period from the late twentieth century, nor 
even from the sixteenth century, to go back to the beginning of modernity in 
Berman’s scheme. There is evidence that the ‘majority of ordinary people in 
England from at least the 13th century were rampant individualists’ (Macfarlane 
1978, p. 163) and literary evidence from China shows that individuals interested 
in their own identity and agents of their own concerns existed from the sixth 
century bc (Elvin 1985, p. 159). With apologies to Bruno Latour (1993), it 
might be said on this basis that we have always been modern. A specification 
of late modernity and its attendant emotions therefore requires closer attention.
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The notion that individuation is a dominating form of sociality in the 
twenty-first century has been qualified in interesting ways. Acknowledging 
that late modernity can be characterised for the vast majority of individuals 
in terms of increasingly personalised, individualised and privatised life experi-
ences, two texts can be mentioned here which show that this state of affairs, 
paradoxically, does not detract from an essential sociality, and they do this in 
different ways via the emotions. Maffesoli (1996) argues that marketisation 
and consumer culture not only atomise individuals from their prior social 
bonds, but at the same time reassemble them into identity tribes, an out-
come achieved by what he teasingly calls an ‘affectual nebula’. In this way 
Maffesoli harks back to Durkheim’s (1995) ‘collective effervescence’ and 
points forward to Collins’ (2004) ‘interaction ritual chains’ and their ‘emo-
tional energy’. A quite different approach is developed by Lawler et al. (2009), 
who argue that in a depersonalised world, social commitments nevertheless 
persist. The argument here is not that individuation leads to a rights-based 
solidarity, as with Beck, but instead holds that individualised commitments 
derive from emotional experiences. In their social interactions, persons adjust 
their own behaviour in terms of the behaviour of others; such interaction 
leads to emotional experiences that have behavioural consequences insofar as 
positive emotions are enjoyed and people seek to repeat or locate interactions 
that provide them, though they dislike negative emotions with corresponding 
consequences. According to this argument, then, these positive and also nega-
tive emotions are understood by those who experience them with reference 
to the social units within which these emotions are had, and in this way an 
individual’s social commitments are formed.
These and similar approaches encourage us to appreciate the importance 
of emotions in late modernity and the ways in which individuation is a 
form of sociality, rather than its denial. They also implicitly say something 
about the type, quality and range of emotions that are likely to be associ-
ated with late modernity, namely emotions related to personal identity and 
individual satisfactions – what might be called ‘ego’ emotions. These have 
always existed, of course, but it is important to appreciate that late modern 
individuation not only encourages a particular type of emotional formation 
and experience, but also tends to diminish others. Rather than elaborate this 
point, which has been discussed elsewhere (Barbalet 2001, pp. 171–6), a 
related matter will be indicated that allows us to understand the nature of the 
collectivities that are associated with late modern individuation drawn to our 
attention by Maffesoli, Lawler and others. It is important to show, as these 
authors and others have, that individualised persons may aggregate to col-
lective forces through emotionally generated solidarities. But these accounts 
can only form one part of any endeavour to indicate the nature of emotions 
in late modernity.
It was noted above that we have always been modern in the sense that 
human society, no matter how constraining the institutions comprising it, is 
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made up of persons who experience themselves through their own needs or 
interests (see Barbalet 2012; 2013; 2014). One significant distinction between 
what might be called pre-late modernity and late modernity is not the fact of 
individuation, which is common to both, but the direction of the relation-
ship between the individualised person and the collective aggregation that 
their emotions-sponsored solidarity generates. In pre-late modernity, persons 
individuated through labour market commodification formed industrial com-
binations, unions, designed to protect and advance their interests as workers. 
In late modernity, on the other hand, it is difficult to identify similar instances 
of individuals aware of their interests as vulnerable persons who can form 
representative solidarities of their own. In late modernity, such individuals are 
more likely to turn to a Donald Trump or a Nigel Farage to serve as a proxy 
representative of their interests, as they perceive them, and also possibly turn 
to social media to identify a common cause, but neglect to generate a leader-
ship and a membership of an enduring collectivity through this means.
The difference here is one of authentic as opposed to careless representa-
tion, but it is much more than this. The key to these concerns is the scope 
and content of the emotional engagements that are involved. In the late 
modern patterns described by Maffesoli and Lawler, for instance, the collec-
tives of identity and commitment respectively are incidental consequences 
of social processes. The emotions involved reflect the feelings individuals 
experience in their relations with markets or social organisation, and at the 
same time express the way in which the individual relates to the subsequent 
collective as a resource they may utilise for individual satisfactions. The 
purposively formed collectives of pre-late modernity, on the other hand, 
include emotional attachments to the collective that not only transcended 
ego-emotions, but may also contradict them. Trade unions express the 
interests of their individual members collectively, but they can do so effec-
tively only when the individual interests of their members are subordinate 
to the interests of the collectivity. This latter requires individual discipline 
and sacrifice when the collective is involved in strike action, say, and this 
involves emotions such as loyalty overriding narrower ego emotions.
The suggestion here, then, is that in specifying the nature of late modernity 
and its associated emotional patterns, it is necessary to not simply notice the 
apparently paradoxical mix of individuation and social solidarity, but more 
importantly to pay attention to the scope and direction of emotional appraisal. 
In late modernity, the predominant emotions are not simply individuated, 
but reflect an institutional context that can be described as neoliberal. It could 
be held that the term neoliberal more exactly captures late modernity and its 
emotional patterns than any other. It is not simply that neoliberal governance 
shifts the focus from the public to the private sector; indeed, neoliberal gov-
ernance is an instrument of public institutions and is not market promoting, as 
usually assumed, so much as market destroying, in the broad sense. Neoliberal 
governance favours corporations and aligns them with political power; ego 
Foreword xxiii
emotions of the privileged sponsor this move, which has the consequence of 
promoting ego emotions of self-preservation in the disadvantaged, and both 
emerge in a social formation in which corporate privilege guides social as well 
as economic policy and colours the prospects of everyone.
These remarks are not intended to be either exhaustive of or prescriptive for 
reflections on late modernity and its attendant emotions and their forms. One 
thing that emerges from a dominance of ego-emotions is self-reflection, a per-
son’s consciousness of their emotional reactions to their own emotions. This, in 
turn, provides a sense of both emotional complexity and also of emotion man-
agement, that persons have proprietorial and thus instrumental relations with 
their own emotions. These, and many other aspects of emotional experience in 
late modernity, are explored in the chapters to follow. Indeed, Emotions in Late 
Modernity is a cornucopia of insight, analysis and exploration of emotions, emo-
tions studies and reflections on emotions from the perspective of sociological 
and allied disciplines. From different theoretical perspectives and from within 
different institutional and organisational contexts, emotions in their variety 
are considered and related to processes and outcomes that make up the social 
world. Emotions in Late Modernity is indeed an invaluable resource for anyone 
with an interest in the present time and its emotional complexions.
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Introduction
Roger Patulny, Rebecca E. Olson, Sukhmani Khorana,  
Jordan McKenzie, Alberto Bellocchi and Michelle 
Peterie
We live in highly emotional times. This statement might seem prosaic, 
obvious or contestable, given that emotions have always been fundamental 
to the human experience. Indeed, the social turmoil and conflict of previ-
ous centuries might make the early twenty-first century seem comparatively 
banal. However, a contradiction worth considering is that while we live in 
a period that thrives on rational and technocratic principles – where there is 
more education, surveillance, (digital) information, measurement, calculation 
and expert-driven decision making than ever before – we also live in a world 
teeming with displays of emotion in everyday communication, interaction and 
decision making. Contemporary scholars point to the role of emotions such as 
anger and fear in the election of populist demagogues (Rico et al. 2017), in the 
empathic or shameful treatment of refugees (Goodman 2009), in public anxiety 
around climate change (Hamilton 2010), in the transformation of intimate rela-
tionships and love in the era of online dating (Illouz 2012; Hobbs et al. 2016) 
and in the rise of the ubiquitous ‘happiness’ industry (Davies 2015; Ahmed 
2010). They also demonstrate that emotions now need to be carefully managed 
in a multiplicity of contexts, including at work (Hochschild 2012), in schools 
(Tomas, Rigano & Ritchie 2016), in hospitals (Erickson & Grove 2008) and in 
courtrooms (Bergman Blix &Wettergren 2016).
It is not our intention, in pointing out such contradictions, to pit emotion 
against reason or rationality. Such simple (and tired) dichotomies are charac-
teristic of past debates that cast emotions as simple motivators of human and 
social action, or else as destructive forces that undermine superior thinking and 
‘rational’ social organisation. These ideas dominated the early modern periods 
that Simon Williams (1998) described as ‘display[ing] an “irrational passion for 
dispassionate rationality” (Rieff 1979), the contradictions of which are only 
now becoming fully apparent’.
Rather, it is our intention to reveal the complex emotional dynamics that are 
recognisably present in so many social spheres in contemporary times, and to 
look for the common social themes that connect them. Sociological research 
on emotions has grown enormously in the last few decades (Olson et al. 2017), 
and a recent review of this body of work by Bericat (2016) identifies various 
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social qualities of emotions: their appraisal value, signalling and marking social 
events as important or threatening (Brody 1999); their attributions, in chang-
ing emotional responses dependent on the perceived (self/other) cause of the 
emotion (Lawler et  al. 2008); their sensitivity to social expectations (Turner 
and Stets 2006); their validation of personal identities (Stryker 2004); their 
capacity to be shared and magnified collectively (von Scheve & Salmela 2014); 
their communicative and expressive function (Marinetti et al. 2011); and their 
culturally derived labels (Thoits 1989).
It is timely to bring holistic sociological theories about contemporary society 
to the study of emotions, and likewise consider emotions as a necessary com-
ponent of any such sociological ‘grand theory’. It is particularly apt that we 
revitalise a key concept of extreme relevance to an increasingly individualised, 
commercialised and reflexive age: late modernity. The idea of late modernity 
derives from Anthony Giddens’ (1991) argument that the citizens of devel-
oped societies live in an era that is distinctly different from those of the past. 
Further to the widely discussed globalised and consumption-oriented economic 
relationships that characterise the neoliberal era, Giddens (1991) argues that 
the conditions of late modernity have produced people who are increasingly 
individualised and reflexive (Elliott & Lemert 2006) and favour individual choice 
and freedom – but also self-responsibility – over adherence to traditional forms 
of authority (church, state, family etc.) (Davis 2008; Archer 2012). Such theo-
ries are central to many contemporary sociological ideas. According to Archer 
(2012, pp. 64–5), the unprecedented pace of contemporary change prompts 
‘variety to spawn more variety’, and continuous self-reflection and ‘self-revision 
[is] now necessary’. Bauman (1996, p. 18) similarly notes that in a fluid and pre-
carious world, reflexively driven revision of one’s identity becomes essential: ‘If 
the modern “problem of identity” was how to construct an identity and keep 
it solid and stable, the post-modern “problem of identity” is primarily how to 
avoid fixation and keep the options open’.
Such theories further suggest that modern lives are becoming more tightly 
bound into the constraints of neoliberal globalised capitalistic production, 
consumption and commodification (Bauman 2004), and are increasingly medi-
ated through technology, particularly digital communication (Turkle 2011). 
Transitions of this kind have many consequences for the experience, structur-
ing and management of emotions in social contexts, and could constitute an 
entire change in emotional regime, or in the experience and allowable displays 
of emotions in our times (Reddy 2001). While the ‘late modern’ concept 
might be contestable, it forms a useful shorthand for capturing many real and 
important social changes in our times (at a minimum), and its impact on the 
experience of emotions is well worth exploring.
We note as well that a great range of humanities scholars are now engaged in 
the study of emotions, and there are overlaps and interactions that can be gained 
by contrasting their work against that of the sociology discipline. Although this 
book primarily focuses on sociological concerns related to emotion and affect 
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in late modernity, it includes works from disciplines such as history, cultural 
studies, literature studies, education and legal studies. It reflects the porous 
boundaries of sociology and the benefits of its ‘parasitic’ tendencies (Urry 
2005), in terms of the cross-fertilisation across disciplinary divides that has seen 
concepts, such as affect, take root in many fields simultaneously. In this edited 
collection, we offer a selection of chapters that exemplify a range of positions 
both for and against our suppositions on late modern emotions.
The framing chapter for the collection, by Roger Patulny and Rebecca 
E. Olson (Chapter 1), identifies five main emotional themes emerging in 
connection with late modernity: i) an increasing awareness and experience 
of emotional complexity; ii) the tension between collectivised and individu-
alised emotions; which are iii) increasingly privately consumed emotions; iv) 
an increasing mediation of emotions through primarily digital technology; 
and v) an increasing propensity to manage and re-interpret emotions at both 
the micro-individual and macro-social scale. These issues are revealed in 
various contemporary sociological examinations of emotions, yet they have 
not been adequately integrated within a comprehensive, overarching theo-
retical framework as such – one that we argue can be provided by the late 
modernity concept. Given the strong interconnection between the second 
and third themes – individualisation and private consumption – we collapse 
them together to arrive at four major themes worth considering, and divide 
the book into sections that speak to each of these four themes.
The first section of the book examines the complexity of late modern emotions, 
and presents a series of chapters that speak in some way to the theme of 
emotions as non-dualistic, complex phenomena, with new emotions – such as 
intimate ‘pure relations’ and ambivalence – emerging. It begins by tackling 
the emotion-rationality dichotomy head-on. Åsa Wettergren (Chapter 2) 
challenges the status of legal, objective, instrumental rationality in law and 
migration courts by arguing that rationality and emotion are intertwined 
rather than dualistic – that emotions are recognised and managed depend-
ing on whether they are conscious/unconscious objects that support/disrupt 
legal action. She also notes that micro-interactions in the legal sphere main-
tain the strong divide between rationality and emotion, as a requirement to 
‘cynically’ maintain the illusion of reason.
The other chapters in the first section go on to reveal both the complexity 
of late modern emotions, and the more complex understandings of emotions 
in late modernity. Alberto Bellocchi and Jonathan Turner (Chapter 3) show 
the contextual complexity and multi-dimensionality inherent in emotions by 
critiquing the Western philosophical basis that supports a conventional ‘posi-
tive/negative’ dichotomy of emotional valence. Jordan McKenzie (Chapter 4) 
examines sociological and philosophical perspectives on emotion and moral-
ity, to develop common ground between the disciplines and emphasise the 
significance of emotion in moral judgements in modernity. Kathryn J. Lively 
(Chapter 5) looks at gender and emotion in the USA, and the usefulness of affect 
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control theory for bridging the gap between sociology and social psychology. 
Nick Hookway, Barbara Barbosa Neves, Adrian Franklin and Roger Patulny 
(Chapter 6) examine how loneliness and love are changing in late modernity. 
They look at how loneliness in particular is conceived, managed and resisted 
in a variety of contexts and by various means, including in everyday intimate 
relationships, in new online digital connections and in the embodied closeness 
of human-animal relationships.
The second section of the book presents chapters that speak to the ten-
sion between emotions as collective versus individualised phenomena, and between 
emotions as public or private responsibility and consumption practice. The first 
two chapters argue that there are numerous situations in which collectivised 
emotions dominate. Susanne Karstedt (Chapter 7) gives an overview of the 
theory and research on the tension between reason and emotion in the legal 
context, and contrasts the emotional regulation and emotion sharing frame-
works for dealing with this tension. She notes how the sharing of emotion 
helps the regulation of emotion both privately and collectively, and notes that 
courtrooms enable and legitimate – and even expect – victims to share trauma 
emotions, but discourage perpetrators from sharing ‘self-conscious’ (guilt, 
shame) emotions. James P. Davis and Alberto Bellocchi (Chapter 8) extend 
Collins’ interaction ritual theory, where emotional energy is conceived as 
both an individual and collective phenomenon, by theorising and modelling 
undramatic emotional energy.
The other chapters in this section describe emotions as the more individual-
ised private responsibility of citizens. Sarah Sorial (Chapter 9) uses examinations 
of anger from social psychology and cognitive science to argue that anger is a 
‘trainable’ emotion that does not constitute an adequate self-defence as a loss of 
self-control in criminal justice cases; the implication from her research is that 
anger can be moral or dispositional, and that individuals (particularly males) 
should hold more responsibility for managing dispositional anger in a number 
of legal contexts. Reinhard Pekrun (Chapter 10) notes that evidence on teach-
ing practices shows that individualised ‘achievement emotions’ are central to 
both individual and collective productivity, and investigates their individual 
and social derivations in the teaching sphere.
The third section of the book presents chapters that deal with the idea that 
emotions are increasingly mediated by mass (passive) broadcasting and micro (interactive) 
social-media networks. Scholars from the history of emotions open with the impor-
tant point that emotions have, to some extent, always been mediated. Andrew 
Lynch (Chapter 11) analyses historical literary text to describe the gendered emo-
tional regime characteristic of medieval England, and in so doing demonstrates 
that emotions have always been mediated. Elizabeth Stephens (Chapter 12) 
develops the idea of an ‘affective genealogy’ approach to understanding the 
historical fascination and fear with the machine-human interface, and describes 
emotions as having been historically mediated not just through written text, but 
through records of embodied affective experiences and sensations.
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The other chapters in this section highlight dramatic changes in the way 
emotions are mediated, through the rise in digital media in educational, cultural 
and political circumstances. Kathy A. Mills, Len Unsworth and Georgina Barton 
(Chapter 13) note that there has been a huge surge of interest in emotions in dig-
ital media and teaching, and the broad reach of digital texts throughout globally 
networked learning environments affords new meanings and new bodily ways 
to express and convey emotion. They argue that the mediation of emotion 
has clearly changed, digitally and in an embodied/multi-sensorial way. Jennifer 
Harding (Chapter 14) notes that media technology has changed the speed and 
way in which vast numbers of people and their collective/shared emotions are 
mobilised, and points to the role of affect in events such as the 2011 London 
riots. She notes that emotions are collectively mobilised, but then also take 
on new collective, affective forms; she navigates a space between theories of 
emotional atmosphere and collective emotions. E Deidre Pribram (Chapter 15) 
argues, with reference to the films Saving Private Ryan and American Beauty, 
that whilst various screen texts are subject to systemic content analysis, their 
emotional content is less well examined. She details how mediated storytelling 
can encompass the pleasures of felt recognition for the audience. In effect, her 
chapter is a contribution to how mass-mediated affective experiences are vital 
to the late modern period. And Sukhmani Khorana (Chapter 16) analyses the 
use of refugee-themed documentaries in evoking empathy in audiences as a 
point of departure to understand the formation of emotional communities. She 
argues that the performance of emotion in certain contexts is a defining feature 
of late modernity.
The final section of the book presents chapters that argue that emotions 
now require continuous reflexive monitoring, feedback and management, as part of 
the process of crafting individual identities, and ‘macro-reflexively’ defin-
ing and contesting emotive global phenomena (for example, terrorism). The 
first chapter in this section points to how late modern emotions are reflex-
ively managed at the micro level. Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack 
(Chapter 17) look at the work practices undertaken by judicial officers to 
manage their own and others’ emotions whilst trying to remain committed 
to impartial decision-making; management is now a careful and complex part 
of legal working life. Rebecca E. Olson and Ann Dadich (Chapter 18) note 
that healthcare involves interpersonal emotion management, not only of the 
feelings of patients and families, but also of colleagues within and across health 
professions and hierarchies. They argue that emotion management and reflex-
ivity are now integral to health work.
The final chapters in this section reveal how late modern emotions are also 
‘macro-reflexively’ managed (see Patulny and Olson, Chapter 1) in defining 
and contesting emotive global phenomena (e.g., friends and enemies, terrorism, 
risks and threats). Michelle Peterie (Chapter 19) highlights the ‘politics of fear’ 
that surrounds irregular migration in late modernity, but also shows how gov-
ernment discourses and policies can inspire counter-emotions and thus inform 
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political dissent. Her work demonstrates that there are power disparities in rela-
tionships of care and compassion, such as those between citizens and asylum 
seekers, but that these relationships also present new opportunities for reflexivity 
and solidarity. Christian von Scheve and Nur Yasemin Ural (Chapter 20) iden-
tify recent inequalities that have opened up in the way we treat others on the 
basis of race, particularly in the rising persecution of Muslims, and notes that the 
contemporary secular subject is associated with ‘passion and devotion’, whilst 
the religious subject is associated with ‘outrage and anger’. Their work shows a 
new, clearly structural divide between secular and non-secular, and discusses the 
impact on freedom of public speech. And Thomas Bristow (Chapter 21) uses 
theories of emotion and affect to examine how models/narratives of science 
and climate engender a public, collective commitment to climate change action 
beyond scientific fact. Engaging notions of empathy, understanding, hope and 
catastrophe, he shows that emotions and the values they link can transcend 
rational facts, and posits this as a reaction to ‘toxic capitalism’.
In all, this collection will serve both to illuminate the major emotional 
dynamics present in contemporary times, and also serve to make the character 
of the times themselves much clearer. Emotions have always been fundamental 
to human experience, but their relegation to a secondary status behind reason 
and rationality has obscured their important role in the functioning of late mod-
ern society, and in surviving its contradictions. Our hope is that this collection 
will help to correct this imbalance, and inspire further research into emotions, 
encouraging a better understanding of the consequences of late modernity for 
emotions – and of the consequences of emotions for late modernity.
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Chapter 1
Emotions in late modernity
Roger Patulny and Rebecca E. Olson
Introduction
Over the past four decades, sociologists have argued the myriad of ways in which 
emotions are relational and socially constructed. Socialisation, varying across 
cultures, teaches us how to attribute names to feelings and how to ‘calibrate’ 
our expressions accordingly (Burkitt 2012; Robinson 2014; Smith & Schneider 
2009; von Scheve 2012). In recognising this, sociologists (see Lupton 1998; 
Thoits 1989) have pushed for more expansive conceptualisations of emotions. 
To individual-centric definitions of emotion – centred on (i) bodily feelings, 
(ii) expressions, (iii) physiological changes and (iv) motivations to act (Fridja 
2000) – sociologists add socially and culturally shaped factors. These include 
(v) situational cues, (vi) social labels (e.g., happy, sad, envious, jealous or lonely), 
(vii) rules about which emotions should be felt and displayed in which social/
relational situations and (viii) the work required to manage one’s own and oth-
ers’ emotions to meet socio-cultural and organisational expectations (Hochschild 
1983). These additions imply that social relations in any given historical era have 
a powerful impact upon emotions. For example, most professional (middle-class, 
white-collar) and service jobs now require a basic mastery of the ‘soft’ skills of 
emotional awareness and management, and the regular exercise of emotional 
intelligence (Nickson et al. 2011) – skills that were rarely recognised by (let alone 
demanded of) their industrial, factory-working predecessors.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the unique characteristics of 
emotional experiences in the present, contemporary period, which has been 
described by Anthony Giddens (1991) as the late modern era. This is an imperfect 
label; it captures a time period with multiple alternative titles (liquid modernity, 
post-modernity, post-industrial society etc.), potentially porous boundaries and 
no definitive date separating it from the previous, modern period. We acknowl-
edge that the flow of history is often divided artificially and retrospectively into 
any number of schisms. However, we also recognise that history can cohere into 
identifiably stable periods, characterised not just by unique social, economic and 
cultural conditions, but also by observably different codes of emotional conduct and 
expectation. Compare ‘cheerfully informal yet professional’ twenty-first-century 
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office workers with angry, striking, nineteenth-century industrial factory work-
ers and fourteenth-century medieval peasants shamelessly relieving themselves 
in the street. Historian William Reddy (2001) would describe such phenomena 
as indicative of emotional regimes: social codes for allowable emotional expressions 
and repression in a particular historical space. We argue that the late modern era 
is characterised by a unique emotional regime, with emotional dynamics that 
differ substantially from prior periods.
We acknowledge that the geographical scope of this collection does not 
extend much beyond the Western-centric Global North (within which we 
include culturally similar countries such as Australia), and that the alternative 
‘multiple modernities’ thesis (Eisenstadt 2000) characterises many parts of the 
Global South. Despite this, several chapters here deal with diversity within 
OECD nations, and immigration (for humanitarian or economic reasons) cannot 
be understood without taking into account the broader forces of globalisation 
that are not entirely one-directional or Eurocentric. Moreover, this collection 
is global in its approaches to studying emotions and affect, applying the work 
of scholars who are working in vastly different social and cultural contexts. We 
hope that this can lead to more comparative and collaborative work between 
sociology of emotions researchers in the Global North and the Global South.
Our focus on late modernity reflects core concerns within sociology. 
Following Giddens (1991) and numerous other key authors (Bauman 1990; 
Archer 2012), we identify how contemporary social conditions have changed in 
critical ways in the late modern era, beginning with the decline in industrial pro-
duction and institutions in the 1970s, and accelerating with the rise of a flexible 
service economy and the Digital Age into the new millennium. Collectively, 
scholars characterise late modern life on the basis of continuous and increasingly 
rapid social, cultural and technological change; de-traditionalisation; individu-
alisation; mediated interaction; and rampant consumerism. We argue that such 
phenomena also permeate how feelings are experienced today.
To identify the emotional characteristics of late modernity, it is necessary 
to distinguish it from previous times. Although there are several candidates for 
potential analysis – Classical Greek, Roman, medieval Christian, Renaissance 
and modern industrial times (see Lynch, this volume, Chapter 11 and Stephens, 
this volume, Chapter 12) – we argue that it is particularly important to distin-
guish and understand the Modern Industrial period out of which late modernity 
(and, for that matter, sociology) flowed. Many of the changed conditions in late 
modernity represent accelerations (or digital extensions) of distinctly modern 
phenomenon, such as the individualisation and commodification of feelings, 
and the scientific civilising of bodies and emotions. To properly render the 
modern era, we need (in turn) to distinguish it from prior periods, but the scope 
of the present study allows for only a brief look at a few important phenomena 
across a large and diverse time period. We use the term ‘classical/pre-industrial’ 
as shorthand for these prior eras, and make no claim to definitively analysing or 
capturing all the rich and complex dynamics that characterise them.
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We therefore examine three broad time periods with notably different 
emotional regimes that can be discerned in Western history:1 i) the pre-
industrial/modern classical era; ii) (industrial) modernity; and – picking up 
sociologically from where historical research on emotion often leaves off – 
iii) late modernity. We examine key aspects of the emotional regimes of these 
three broad historical eras to reveal how the conditions of late modernity 
have led to five key emotional changes related to the i) complexity, ii) individu-
alisation, iii) commodification, iv) mediation and v) reflexive management of social 
emotions in late modernity.
Emotions across history
Classical emotions
By ‘the classical era’, we mean the time before industrial capitalism, characterised by 
two particularly noteworthy emotional features: i) dualistic conceptualisations 
of mind and body, reason and emotion; and ii) the internalisation of socio-
emotional norms, initiated by etiquette manuals.
The idea of dualism, or the separation of mind from body/emotion, has its 
origins in Ancient Greek thinking. The Greeks respected the influence of emo-
tions in their veneration of the body (soma), but had schools of thought ranging 
from materialist beliefs in the power and importance of emotions and bodies 
in human action (e.g., Hippocrates, Hedonists, Epicureans, Aristotle) to ascetic 
beliefs in the supremacy of mind over body and feeling (e.g., Socrates, Plato, 
Orphists; see Synnott 1993). It was Plato’s philosophy – famously characterised 
by his suggestion that ‘The body is the tomb of the soul’ (Plato 1963, p. 437) – 
that largely persuaded classical scholars that the body and its discordant emo-
tions were an ‘imperfection, constantly interrupting, disturbing, distracting and 
preventing us from getting a glimpse of the truth’ (Plato 1963, p. 66).
This dualistic hierarchy was affirmed in Roman society through Stoic philoso-
phy (Synnott 1993, pp. 83–4), and amongst medieval Christians who engaged in 
‘religious denunciation of the slimy desires of the flesh’ (Williams 1998, p. 753), 
and sought to position the soul (mind) above body (temptation) (Reddy 2001). 
This duality continued into the Renaissance times (Williams 1998), and was 
most famously reified by Descartes’ ‘Cogito, ergo sum’ (Stearns 1994), which 
argued that without thinking, there is no soul, and that to not think – that is, to 
be undone by emotion (Barbalet 1998) – is akin to self-destruction.
The importance of dualism lies in the impetus it gives to conceiving of emo-
tions and the body as inferior, disturbing entities that needed to be controlled 
with appropriate social comportment and etiquette, often prescribed and mediated 
through written discourse. The Christian Bible, for example, contains parables 
and commandments concerning the containment of lust, greed, wrath and envy. 
During strictly puritanical times, satisfactions were subject to (preferably) indefi-
nite delays (Carleheden 2008), and envy and greed were condemned as sin. 
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Much of the impetus towards bodily/emotional control, however, was likely 
driven by a general religious fear of God’s punishment, which manifested in the 
many plagues, wars and famines that afflicted people during this time (Beaglehole 
& Bonita 2004).
A more systematic attempt to mediate emotions emerged during the later 
medieval period, with the rising popularity of etiquette books. In The civilising pro-
cess, Norbert Elias (1982) analysed historical ‘manners books’, which prescribed 
changing standards of bodily behaviour amongst notables in the medieval ages. 
These treatises demonstrate a deliberate attempt towards the end of the classical 
era to change fairly simple emotional responses into more complex, internalised 
feelings. They point to an evolution of simple or ‘basic’ feelings, such as fear and 
disgust, into more complex social forms. ‘Self-reproach’ emotions (Lively 2008, 
p. 927) such as shame, guilt and embarrassment started to become more important 
for maintaining collective social and moral order, and were grafted onto a shared 
etiquette on the comportment of bodies and awareness of the appropriateness 
of feelings. The consequence of this change is unmistakeable today in the dis-
gust and embarrassment experienced by modern readers learning of medieval 
persons’ lack of shame in the way they comported their bodies: urinating or 
defecating in public, or at the dinner table (Dunning & Hughes 2013, p. 90).
Modern emotions
By ‘modernity’, we refer to the period characterised by the rise and con-
solidation of industrial capitalism, where a more complicated experience of 
emotions emerged. Williams (1998) notes that modernity is characterised by 
the simultaneous experience of – and tension between – stability and change, 
and identifies this tension in modern depictions of emotions, whereby the 
‘fetish’ for rationality starts to give way to a more emotionally based order (a 
process we argue is fully realised in the late modern period).
In modernity, the original mediation of emotions through devices such as 
manners-books expanded into a more general acceptance of the need for indi-
viduals to control and manage their bodies and emotions according to different 
social contexts. As Synnott (1993, p. 2) notes, while the Renaissance marked 
a reversion to admiration of the body and saw the beginning of secularisation 
and personal control of bodily functions, it also started a movement away from 
the body as ‘enemy to the soul’ towards the body as ‘private responsibility’.
These changes accelerated during the Industrial Revolution. This period 
was characterised by political revolutions and change, the application of new 
technologies (steam, gas, coal, electricity), the rise in capitalism and a shift 
in economic thinking from the collectivist ‘moral economy’ of ‘getting by’ 
to the more individualist ‘supply-and-demand’ cycle of competing, building, 
reinvesting and consuming a surplus (Polanyi 2001). It also saw the rise in mass 
production using Taylorist and Fordist techniques, factories and a division of 
labour paid for in wages (Manning & Holmes 2014).
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Such transformations brought great changes to the prevalent emotional 
regime in Western societies (Reddy 2001), and an acceleration of the 
‘civilising’ process. Increasing market competition and class-based interde-
pendence reinforced an ever-more elaborate system of manners and emotion 
norms (Wouters 1991, 1995). This interdependence, Wouters asserts, led 
to greater mutual identification, sympathy towards suffering and aversion 
toward dangerous symbols (such as the use of hunting knives at the dinner 
table, or the slaughtering of animals in plain sight before food preparation). 
Into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Wouters (2007) argues, the 
reinforcement of manners and emotions increasingly became the responsi-
bility of the individual, rather than an external Other (or God).
The modern era also saw a shift towards the scientific investigation of most 
phenomena, including emotions (Lupton 1998). Granted, this line of modern 
scientific investigation was shaped by a positivist tradition that ‘neutralised 
the values and emotions of its disembodied practitioners’ (Williams 1998, 
p. 749). Nevertheless, modern scientific investigations into emotions started 
to break down the strict binaries separating mind and body. Evolutionary 
and psychodynamic aspects of emotions provide examples: Darwin’s theories 
about the evolution of human emotions; Freud and James’ early psychologi-
cal conceptions of the subconscious role of emotions in human action.
There was also greater scientific and institutional interest in understanding 
the complexities of emotions for the purposes of managing them. Stearns (1994) 
argues that a more restrained, dispassionate form of behaviour emerged in the 
twentieth century, characterised by Taylorised work practices. Furthermore, 
the groundwork for the sociological study of emotions was laid in the mid-
twentieth century, with the emergence of theories about the development of 
the self in social interaction with others. Mead’s (2000) and Cooley’s (1998) 
conception of a self formed by interacting socially with others – reflecting back 
upon those interactions and imagining how others see oneself through the 
well-known ‘looking glass’ metaphor – formed a prelude for understanding 
changes characteristic of late modernity, flagged much later by Giddens (1991). 
Being able to understand how others perceive us in society and adapt our 
actions accordingly – or being socially aware – becomes increasingly important 
in a social world characterised by change and decreasing reliance on tradition.
Late modernity
We use late modernity to describe the present period of globalised and net-
worked capitalism: the post-industrial era beginning in the late twentieth 
century and continuing into the early twenty-first century, which we argue 
is characterised by an emotional regime comprised of complex, individual-
ised, mediated, reflexively managed and commodified emotions. We argue 
that there have been several important social changes that distinguish this era 
from its modern predecessor: a global economy, increasing distrust of – but 
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reliance on – science and technology, de-traditionalisation and rapid change, 
the increasing secularisation of Western society and a growing reliance on a 
more autonomous form of reflexivity.
Social changes in late modernity
Modern capitalism was characterised by production-based economies that were – 
to differing extents – moderated by governments; the current global economy is 
characterised by deregulation, consumption and service orientation. This ‘global’ 
economy, often conceived as a singular construct, is more pervasive than any of 
the national economies that preceded it, with Bauman (2004, p. 6) noting that 
the ‘processes of the commodification, commercialisation and monetisation of 
human livelihoods have penetrated every nook and cranny of the globe’. This 
has seen a shift away from the factory-based mass production of the industrial 
era to service-oriented ‘micro-production’ in de-centred (increasingly informal, 
often home-based) workplaces, with more flexible work production schedules 
(Kugelmass 1995).
With these changes has come a paradoxical rise in citizens being both more 
distrustful of and simultaneously more reliant on science and technology. Beck 
(1992) notes that the optimism of modernity has been replaced by sentiments 
of risk and uncertainty. As public faith in science and technology to resolve 
collective problems (e.g., poverty, climate change) is diminishing, late modern 
citizens seem to place more trust in science and technology to solve individual 
problems. There is greater reliance on experts within the social sciences – 
especially psychology and sociology – to resolve (inter)personal troubles 
(Hochschild 2012; Manning & Holmes 2014; Poder 2008), and many aspects 
of human health, wealth and social interaction have become mediated by text- 
or screen-based applications (Lupton & Jutel 2015). Digital technology and 
social media are embraced, facilitating exposure to an even greater number of 
ideas, peoples and cultures at a speed that has profoundly altered perceptions of 
time and space (Davis 2008).
Under such circumstances of rapid change and interconnection, late modern 
citizens are increasingly left to craft their own identities through informed intro-
spection into and modification of their individual practices. Western societies in 
particular are becoming increasingly individualised and reflexive. While acknowl-
edging that people in all eras have reflected on their circumstances, we argue 
that this process has become commonplace, continuous and more internal in 
late modernity. Whether cast as liberating (Giddens 1991) or atomising (Bauman 
2005), late modern citizens favour individual choice, change, freedom and ulti-
mately self-responsibility rather than compliance to (but also support from) 
traditional authorities (e.g., church, state, family) (Davis 2008; Archer 2012). 
Reflexivity has taken on a new form and importance for late modern individu-
als (Giddens 1991; Hazleden 2003), in that it is more (i) individually oriented, 
(ii) continuous, (iii) mediated by technology and consumption and (iv) oriented 
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to navigating ‘the novelty of their circumstances’ (Archer 2012, p. 1), rather than 
reinterpreting and clarifying tradition, as it was in earlier periods.
Such changes, however, can be emotionally unsettling, and often require 
reassurance from scientific experts (Campain 2008). Late modern reflexives 
consult career counsellors, take Myers-Briggs tests and regularly seek help from 
psychologists and counsellors about their family, sexual and relationship diffi-
culties, trying to tap into a vast array of expert research and literature (Giddens 
1990). The market is a source of advice (and comfort) (Riggs & Turner 1997) 
but also inequality; ‘market-mediated’ reflexivity is, of course, only available to 
those who can afford it (Blackshaw 2008, p. 117).
Overall, the characteristics of late modernity point to a society that has 
accelerated in many ways. We now look at the profound and far-reaching 
impact these changes have had on the contemporary emotional landscape.
Emotions in late modernity
We argue that emotions and their social dynamics have changed substantially 
from the classical to the late modern era in five important ways. (i) Emotions 
are more complex. Conceptualisations have moved beyond dualistic notions of 
emotion and reason, to acknowledge the centrality of emotional motivations 
and awareness to reasoning. New emotional constructs, such as late modern 
intimacy and ambivalence, evidence this complexity. (ii) Emotions are viewed as 
more individualistic. With traditional social structures dissolving, emotions are 
perceived to be an individual’s private responsibility (and expense). (iii) Emotion 
and consumption are intertwined more intimately now than at any other point in 
history. (iv) Instead of religious texts or etiquette books, emotions are now medi-
ated through mass media and interactive social media digital platforms. (v) Emotions 
in this context require continuous reflexive monitoring, feedback and management – a 
process of central importance to that other key individual responsibility of late 
modernity: crafting identities. And, as a society, we reflexively use emotions to 
define late modernity, in applying emotional labels to widespread social phe-
nomena (e.g., the War on Terror).
Complexity of emotions, and newly complex emotions
Understanding of the complexities of emotions has expanded in late modernity. 
A critical inversion has been the realisation of the interrelatedness of – rather 
than opposition between – emotion and reasoning. Illouz (2018) writes of 
the centrality of reasoning and rationality, especially through consumption, 
to intimate emotional pursuits. Research from neuroscience (Damasio 1994; 
Davidson 2012; Feldman-Barrett 2017) shows that brain processes surrounding 
emotion and reason are intimately connected, and that emotions motivate and 
‘tag’ cognitions. Barbalet poses a ‘critical’ view emphasising the important role 
of emotion within the reasoning process:
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If emotions distract persons from their purposes, then, at the same time, 
emotions establish afresh what their purposes are to be. Viewed from this 
perspective, emotions need not oppose reason so much as give it direction. . .
(Barbalet 2001, p. 31)
Late modern emotional complexity also manifests in multifaceted and some-
times completely new emotions that emerge as combinations of others. Ekman 
(1999) identifies a limited number of ‘basic’ emotions in all cultures based on 
unique facial expressions: fear, anger, sadness, happiness, disgust and surprise. 
While neuroscientists have challenged this claim (Feldman-Barrett 2017), 
sociologists have suggested that basic emotions combine in socially consti-
tuted ways to form more complex emotions, such as shame and guilt (Kemper 
1987; Turner 2000), and even distinctly new emotions. These include feelings 
such as ambiguity (Burkitt 2002), disconnected ambivalence (Bauman 2000; 
Sennett 1998), and the playful creation of new emotional labels, such as frub-
bles, referring to the joy experienced by poly-amorous persons in one’s partner 
finding another partner (Ritchie & Barker 2006). New research investigates 
more general and less-structured forms of emotional and feeling experience, 
such as affect. von Scheve (2018) identifies the overlap between contempo-
rary views of emotion as discretely labelled entities, and conceptions of affect 
in psychology and post-turn cultural studies. He identifies that while affect is 
a broader, embodied, non-discrete and more unconscious feeling phenom-
enon than emotion, it shares social ‘relational’ qualities in common, in that it 
manifests in the social interrelationships between bodies; it is the ‘raw material’ 
(p. 55) from which more discrete emotions and their labels are shaped.
Another complex emotional experience is the transformation of intimacy and 
love described by Giddens (1992) and Illouz (2012; 2018), associated with indi-
vidualisation in late modernity. While Giddens (1992) asserts that emancipatory 
‘pure’ relationships – characterised by intimate internal-love, rather than tradi-
tional external-material rewards – are becoming more common in late modernity, 
others point to the temporary nature of relationships amongst late modern citi-
zens, and the disconnection and loneliness this implies (see Hookway et al., this 
volume, Chapter 6). Bauman (perhaps cynically) reconceptualises this as love 
being replaced by lust cast as just another ‘sensation’ for ‘gathering’ (Bauman 
2005, p. 105). Additionally, there is rising research interest in the highly complex 
emotion of ambivalence, the sensation of experiencing too many feelings at once or 
not understanding what one is feeling or why. Junge (2008) asserts that this emo-
tion defines late modernity. Faced with so many identity-making opportunities, 
feelings of ambivalence characterise the uncertain path forward (Archer 2012).
Individualised emotions
Given an inability to change a world characterised by temporary, seasonal, 
insecure contract employment and issues of security and terror, late modernity 
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has witnessed a refocus on the micro aspects of the self. Emotions have taken 
on renewed significance as pathological diagnoses and are treated as a pri-
vate responsibility. School children labelled as emotionally at-risk are offered 
training in emotional literacy and mindfulness (Reid 2009; Mendelson et al. 
2013). Having ‘poor emotional well-being’ (or, worse, ‘emotional issues’) may 
offer a temporary excuse from the requirement to maintain and manage one’s 
emotions (Ecclestone 2011, pp. 98, 105); overall, good (emotional) health is 
generally viewed as a ‘personal responsibility’ (Lupton 2013, p. 240). Self-help 
books promote hyper-vigilance over pathological emotions, instructing people 
to master negative emotions as a pathway to greater control over themselves 
and their relationships (Hazelden 2012).
This ‘practice of psychologising social problems’, ‘transform[s] political and 
economic fragility’ into a personal, emotional responsibility (Ecclestone 2011, 
p. 107), and is sold as an ‘opportunity’ to take control of one’s life. The rise 
in ‘The Happiness Industry’ is a case in point (Davies 2015), whereby late 
modern citizens are ‘promised’ happiness through individual efforts at exer-
cise, diet, medication, accumulation and lifestyle (Ahmed 2010). This industry 
propels ongoing reflexive examination of individual feelings and satisfaction, 
and is intrinsically linked to an increase in consumption oriented to this task 
(McCarthy 2002), in ignorance of the social class and privileges that constrain 
or enable ‘happy’ pursuits (Ahmed 2010).
Commodified emotions
De-traditionalisation and individualisation have opened a space for identity, 
lifestyle, comportment and, consequently, emotion to be formed by consump-
tion patterns. Giddens (1991) notes that in late modernity ‘the consumption 
of ever-novel goods becomes in some part a substitute for the genuine devel-
opment of the self’ (p. 198). Emotions fuel this process and are thus more 
commodified now than in any other era. Late modern consumption has 
opened endless opportunities to pursue emotions as commodities, such as 
risk and excitement (Illouz 2018; Poder 2008; Zinn 2006). Paradoxically, 
boredom, as Barbalet (1999) asserts, has become endemic. Though many still 
rely on ‘ordinary’, non-commercial relationships (Brownlie 2014), people 
can now outsource oversight of emotional aspects of their private lives to 
therapy, care and self-help industries, and have created new careers not only 
in the fields of health, learning and wellbeing (as noted above), but in a vast 
array of new consumption areas; wedding planners, scrapbook makers and 
‘rent-a-friends’ can all be hired (Hochschild 2012).
In an era of consumption-driven ‘sensation-gathering’ (Bauman 2005), 
emotions stem increasingly from how well (pride, esteem, happiness) or poorly 
(shame, envy) people consume. Emotions such as envy and greed – once 
condemned as sin associated with avarice – are now socially approved and 
encouraged for the contribution they make to economic growth (Fiske 2011). 
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Late modern feelings are increasingly classed along lines of ‘emotional capital’ 
(Reid 2009), with those less able to consume re-cast as emotionally vulner-
able or emotionally irresponsible. The failure to craft an identity and capitalise 
on the plethora of consumption opportunities late modernity provides has 
been tied to narratives of ‘fractured reflexivity’ (Archer 2012) or a failure to 
consume (Blackshaw 2008). The shame that is central to this narrative has 
even been linked to suicide (Fullagar 2003). Interestingly, thrill-seeking has 
been linked to engagement in petty theft, a deviant act (Katz 1989), which 
may reflect new forms of emotional resistance to the emotional hegemony of 
capitalist late modernity.
We recognise that the individualisation and commodification theses – and 
by extension the idea of individualised and commodified emotions – have their 
critics. Smart and Shipman (2004), for example, reject the homogenising and 
sometimes ‘apocalyptic’ (p. 493) depictions of rampant individualisation with 
regards to the family, by noting that a continuum of motivations for marriages 
exists across different cultures and religious groups, ranging from traditional kin-
based to individualised self-actualisation. And the collection by von Scheve and 
Salmela (2014) describes the various ways in which collective, rather than indi-
vidualised, emotions manifest in contemporary times. However, we argue here 
that the extension of the market and commodification into so many everyday 
emotional experiences and aspects of identity provides clear evidence of the 
widespread commercially driven individualisation of feelings in Western society 
today. This could be translated into a slow shift towards the individualisation 
end of Smart and Shipman’s continuum (at least in Global North countries) and 
provides a counterpoint to explain the rise in collective, deviant emotions, as a 
protest against a ‘blasé’, individualised and commercialised affective world.
Mediated emotions
In late modernity, corporate media (whether mass television or digital micro-
social media) has displaced and replaced traditional institutions shaping our 
emotions. The 24-hour mass media and entertainment cycle – accompanied 
by the echo chamber of trending social media – forms a background to many 
current emotions. Emotions increasingly exist only for the purpose and dura-
tion of the experience (Mestrovic 1997; West-Newman 2008, p. 107), which 
is nowhere more evident than in the million ‘liked’ moments that flow through 
the social media worlds of Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Snapchat. At the 
same time, digital technologies are shifting civic engagement from the public to 
the private realm (Papacharissi & Papacharissi 2010). Further, Papacharissi’s influ-
ential work in this area argues that such media should be gauged not on the basis 
of how effective they are, but on the basis of their affective intensities (2015). 
In other words, while mediated emotions are more prevalent in late modernity, 
they have also changed the nature of political participation, and of everyday 
life and private consumption. The flood of images and advertisements leaves 
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modern consumers ‘weighed down’ by ‘delightful purchases’, too distracted by 
their excitement (Blackshaw 2008, p. 125) or overwhelmed by their anxiety 
(Hamilton 2010) to feel sustained anger about political, economic or environ-
mental injustices. Instead, anger associated with wars on terror and insecurity 
becomes prevalent and serves to divide national sentiment (Holmes 2004).
Micro-interactive social media has also changed our emotional relations. 
Face-to-face interaction is decreasing in favour of more digitally mediated 
forms of social interaction (Patulny & Seaman 2017; and see Hookway 
et al., this volume, Chapter 6 and Pribram, this volume, Chapter 15). New 
technologies open up novel forms of intimacy between geographically 
separated couples (Holmes 2014) and enable emotional support through, 
for instance, online message boards for people facing chronic illnesses 
(Godbold 2015). New digital platforms create new emotional connota-
tions and etiquette (e.g., emphasis based on CAPITALISATION or the 
appropriate use of emoticons ), but also open new avenues for control 
and emotional manipulation. The Facebook 2012 Emotion Manipulation 
Study (Glance 2014) demonstrated the ability of a large corporation to 
directly manipulate the emotions of hundreds of thousands of late modern 
users/consumers/citizens, as well as Facebook’s questionable ethics and 
disturbing potential to generate population-level emotional contagions.
Reflexively managed emotions
The requirement to reflexively construct an identity and manage emotions to 
keep up with an ever-changing society is the final key aspect of late modern 
emotional life. Though earlier conceptualisations of reflexivity overlooked the 
affective dimensions of this process, emotions have now been identified as 
imperative to reflexively managing one’s concerns and pathway – amidst the 
many and changing possibilities – through the contemporary era (Burkitt 2012; 
Deslandes & King 2006; Holmes 2010).
We argue that emotions and reflexivity are now interlinked in three ways. 
First, emotions aid the reflexive process itself by serving as a vital heuristic device 
for navigating late modernity. In a world where the demands of keeping up 
with an ever-expanding knowledge-base require specialist training – and sys-
tematic, rationalised assessments based on evidence and reviews of the literature 
is time-intensive and often fraught – emotions serve as our ‘moorings’ or 
‘touchstone’ (Manning & Holmes 2014; McCarthy 2002, pp. 40, 43). They 
offer a comforting and consistent source of information on what we feel and 
how we should choose to position ourselves in an overly complex world. Being 
reflexive involves interpretation and judgement, and engenders ‘self-reproach’ 
emotions – pride, shame – that are increasingly internalised as an individual 
responsibility in late modernity (Scheff 2003; Probyn 2004; Burkitt 2012).
Second, we are increasingly reflexive about our emotions. The requirement 
to monitor and adjust our emotions to suit the workplace (Hochschild 1983) 
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is a well-recognised facet of late modernity. However, late modernity is also 
characterised by a therapeutic culture (Illouz 2008) and a Happiness Industry 
(Ahmed 2010; Davies 2015) that sells the desirability – and ultimately the 
obligation – to manage our feelings to be positive regardless of our social and 
life circumstances. Late modernity obligates us to manage emotions as individual 
consumers, healthy citizens and parents (Montgomery 2008).
Third, we put forward the idea of ‘macro-reflexivity’ – that we are reflexive 
about emotions (and emotional in our reflexivity) on an individual, and a larger 
social, scale. Collectively, we use emotions to label the great challenges of late 
modernity, and reinforce or resist the primary anxiety-based emotional regime 
of our age. Terms such as ‘Risk Society’ and the ‘War on Terror’, propagated 
by journalists and commentators sensationalising the latest issue, emotionally 
define phenomena, producing a ‘culture of fear’ (Furedi 2002) and leading a 
continuous ‘low grade, niggling anxiety’ and widespread perceptions of vul-
nerability (West-Newman 2008, p. 110) which characterise late modern life. 
This macro-reflexivity can erode the collective empathy we feel for others, as 
we manage collective feelings into an allowable set of ‘post-emotional’, pre-
packaged forms (Mestrovic 1997, p. 150) and create:
a neo-Marcusean society of ‘happy consciousness’ [where] feeling 
becomes separated from action, and ‘compassion fatigue’ looms large: 
a ‘viscerated compassion’ churned out by the culture industry which is 
really more like pity.
(Williams 1998, p. 755)
However, we note that macro-reflexivity also allows for the creation (as well as 
undermining) of new forms of connection, sympathy and empathy with stran-
gers, as can be seen in the mixed attitudes to the plight of refugees and asylum 
seekers around the world (see Khorana, this volume, Chapter 16 and Peterie 
this volume, Chapter 19).
Conclusion
In sum, there is growing anxiety, loneliness and ambivalence in late moder-
nity, created by societies in endless flux where social and political problems are 
pushed back onto individuals to manage. Continuous reflexive management is 
becoming the norm, with policies and a popular culture dedicated to positive 
psychology even while those with more ‘emotional capital’ are better posi-
tioned to manage this private responsibility. Furthermore, we have moved into 
a digitally mediated era, where interactions and their concordant emotions are 
more public, fleeting and vulnerable to corporate manipulation (Kramer et al. 
2014). Online communication and the international exchange of information 
is also more rapid, speeding up the pace of change and the rate at which we 
must respond and adapt to new emotional climates and cultures.
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The sum of these examinations shows that new emotional dynamics char-
acterise late modernity. We have arrived at an extraordinary time marked by 
many new constraints but also many new opportunities to be reflexive and 
change not only our thoughts and actions, but our feelings as well.
Note
1 The focus here is on emotions in Western history and in contemporary Western society. 
There are substantial differences in the way emotions have been conceptualised histori-
cally across Asian and European societies. Brevity dictates that we narrow our focus.
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Emotional complexity and 









In spite of recent growing interest in emotions in popular and scientific discourses 
(Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1), the perception of emotion and reason 
as strictly separate still dominates in late modernity. The aim of this chapter is to 
argue that instead of emotion and reason as separate phenomena in social science 
we need to understand them as entwined and inseparable (see also McKenzie, this 
volume, Chapter 4). If we do so, we will be able to better understand and explain 
the social phenomena we study. I will begin by discussing some general differ-
ent perspectives on the relationship between reason and emotion. Thereafter, I 
will present a model that serves as a theoretical framework in my own empirical 
research on the role of emotions in bureaucratic and legal decision making and 
courtroom practices. In the discussion of the model I will draw on examples from 
my research on the Swedish courts. I will then revisit an old study of mine on 
the Swedish Migration Board to further illustrate how the framework functions.
Emotion and reason
The conventional perspective on the relationship between emotion and reason 
seems to be deeply rooted in the process of Western thinking (see Patulny & 
Olson, this volume, Chapter 1). It postulates emotion and reason as opposites, 
one oppositional pair among many in the binary discursive conceptualisa-
tion of the world, so typical of modern classificatory systems (Foucault 1971; 
Jacob 1988; von Wright 1986). Emotion is sorted along with female, nature, 
body and private, and reason is sorted along with male, civilisation, mind and 
public.1 Reddy’s (2001) historical analysis of emotional regimes in France in 
1700–1850 corroborates this argument as his findings demonstrate the shift in 
emotional regime from sentimentalism to ‘a new democratized code of honour 
[. . .] to create a new male sphere of public endeavour and private enrichment’ 
(2001, p. 327).
Furthermore, by the turn of the twentieth century, as noted by Laclau in 
his book On Populist Reason (2005), theories of the crowd associated collective 
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action (the crowd) with emotional contagion, pathology and irrationality, 
while the individual became associated with rationality and normality. In this 
way, emotional control was emphasised as an individual faculty, as if collectives 
were inherently emotionally unstable. Linguistic studies, like Kövecses’ (2000) 
inquiry into emotions and metaphors in different languages, further accentu-
ate the focus on control in the Western world. Kövecses thus suggests that the 
cross-cultural use of the metaphor of anger as a hot fluid in a container (the 
body) points to a universal experience of anger-emotions. But he also points 
out that the metaphorical association of emotions with control, difficulty or harm 
seems to pertain uniquely to ‘the general Western emphasis on controlling 
emotion and regarding emotions as things that are harmful to the proper func-
tioning of the Western ideal of a rational person’ (Kövecses 2001, p. 48).
The strict separation of reason and emotion has been increasingly challenged 
over the past four to five decades, in both scientific and popular knowledge. The 
critique of the conventional separation between emotion and reason tallies with 
an interest in the instrumental use of emotions as conducive for the purposes of 
capitalism and the market in late modernity, as noted, for instance, by Hochschild 
(Baumeler 2010; Hochschild 1983; Hochschild 2003; see also Mestrovic 1997; 
Stearns 1994). This ‘critical approach’ (Barbalet 1998, p. 38) questions the 
assumption that emotion is necessarily opposed to reason. Some emotions may 
be uncontrollable and harmful, namely the primary emotions (fear, anger, sadness 
etc.; see Ekman 1999). Secondary (social) emotions (see Damasio 1994) instead 
may support rationality and may also be subject to cognitive regulation or con-
trol. According to Barbalet, the critical perspective still maintains the idea that 
there are purely rational – or unemotional – phenomena, for instance, instrumental 
rationality. Even if scholars admit emotion as sometimes supportive of rationality, 
and loosen up the idea of emotions as forces of nature not to be trusted in order 
to maintain rationality, emotion is still seen as separate from reason.
Contrasting the conventional and the critical perspective, Barbalet (1998, 
p. 45) coins ‘the radical approach’, that is, the understanding of emotion and 
reason as continuous, entwined and inseparable. Demonstrating how emotion 
conveys information that human beings would not be able to collect, compile 
and to assess merely by cognition (see also Damasio 1994), Barbalet argues 
that emotion is necessary for all action. Emotions assess information about the 
landscape in which we move in order for us to act wisely in this landscape 
(Hochschild 1983; 1990). Instrumental rationality is thus also emotional.
In order to perform instrumental tasks effectively, human actors must not 
only be committed to the purposes intrinsic to them, but also commit-
ted to avoiding extrinsic and distracting purposes. Thus in addition to 
the particular facilitating emotions which function to motivate instrumen-
tal action, such as pride in one’s expertise and skill, satisfaction in one’s 
work, distaste for waste of material and time [. . .] there is also a need for 
emotional distance from potentially disruptive emotions which a wider 
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involvement with others might bring. That is to say that in instrumental 
rationality there is a need for what Simmel called the blasé feeling.
(Barbalet 1998, p. 60)
In this quote, emotions of commitment (pride, satisfaction and distaste) and 
emotional distance (blasé feeling) are suggested to motivate and orient the 
very performance of instrumental reason. These emotions do not disturb, but 
rather inform, rational action. Barbalet discusses these emotions as calm and 
quiet, just below consciousness (Barbalet 2009) and labels them backgrounded 
emotions (Barbalet 2011). Backgrounded emotions ‘function by giving atten-
tion to external but not internal objects of emotional apprehension’ (Barbalet 
2011, p. 39). This is to say, they are there and they are fundamental to the task 
in which we are involved, but as they are conducive to the task, they do not 
become an object of cognitive reflection.
Based on the radical perspective, I argue that rational action is emotional but 
linked to a particular performance and management of emotions. This perspec-
tive also brings to the fore the notion of emotions about emotions, as suggested 
in the quote above that the blasé feeling is a filter against distracting emotions. 
This is to say that we can feel that we do not want to feel a particular thing (see 
Morton 2013, pp. 53–5) and adapt our emotive-cognitive orientation accord-
ingly. I suggest that emotion is not unitary in its action-orientation; different 
emotions pertaining to mutually exclusive actions may be experienced simultane-
ously. We can harbour a good deal of contradictive emotions at the same time, 
but we cannot physically engage in more than one action at a time, unless we 
deplete our focus and with that our emotional commitment.
Collapsing the separation of emotion and reason thus opens up for consid-
eration the emotionality of actions and dispositions that are not conventionally 
seen as emotional. It also dismisses the rather fruitless effort to categorise and 
sort discrete emotions into positive versus negative emotions, or primary versus 
secondary, and instead considers emotion’s relation to action and action out-
comes (Barbalet 1998). This is not to say that some specific rational emotions 
are conducive to the rational type of action; at stake is instead the intensity and 
orientation of the emotions informing action.
Emotion’s relation to action has been discussed in numerous studies across 
social-scientific disciplines and perspectives; for instance, emotion is practice 
(Scheer 2012), emotion is relation (Burkitt 2014), emotion produces sur-
faces and boundaries between bodies, emotions move and stick to bodies 
and thereby orient action and reaction between bodies (Ahmed 2004), emo-
tion assesses and evaluates action (Archer 2000). Emotions induce – motivate, 
orient – action (Collins 1993). Considering then emotion’s relation to action, 
our moral evaluations (positive/negative, controllable/uncontrollable) pertain 
to the thrust, interpretation and outcome of action, our physical involvement 
in the world, not to the emotions that fuel and inform the action (Barbalet 
1998). All emotions may be conducive to rational action, just like all emotions 
30 Åsa Wettergren
may also be disruptive. And all emotions can be backgrounded as well as fore-
grounded. Meanwhile, we almost always have the capacity to self-govern 
what we feel, because feeling is so fundamentally tied to behaviour, and 
thereby to behavioural norms and social recognition. Turning this argument 
around, behind every behavioural norm there are assumptions and norms 
about emotions, what we should feel and how to express it. In the following 
section, I will suggest a model for how to combine action, reason, emotion 
and emotion work (regulation of emotions).
Emotion, action and emotion work
Figure 2.1 (below) visualises the basis of the theoretical framework that I 
work with to conceptualise how emotion and reason intertwine yet some-
times collide in relation to a specific action/task. It is a synthesis of primarily 
Hochschild’s (1983) theory of emotion work (feeling/display rules) and 
Barbalet’s (1998) backgrounded/foregrounded emotions. Hochschild’s 
(1979; 1983) theory of emotion work should be familiar to most readers 
as it has been groundbreaking in sociology and related disciplines and the 
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Figure 2.1 Emotion, action and emotion work
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emotion work instead of emotion management as the former, in my view, is more 
generic and refers to the regulation of emotions in all settings and in relation 
to all types of emotional regimes, be it that of the workplace, the peer-group 
or the family.
The vertical axis represents the degree of emotion’s conduciveness versus dis-
ruption in relation to a specific action/task. The horizontal axis displays the degree 
of consciousness of the emotion, going from the foreground – where emotion 
itself becomes the object of action – to the background – where emotion is con-
ventionally ignored. If emotion is action and emotions orient our attention (and 
thus action) then we might say that emotions that are conducive to our present ongoing 
action are likely not noticed (Box 1), while emotions that call our attention to a differ-
ent action will potentially be experienced as disruptive (Box 4). Then again, we may 
attempt to perform multiple tasks simultaneously and we often move between 
arrays of different ongoing tasks without necessarily reflecting on what we feel, so 
obviously these emotive-cognitive shifts between different actions can also take 
place in the background (Box 2). Sometimes we need to consciously evoke a 
particular emotion in order to get the energy and motivation to perform a specific 
action (Box 3).
To clarify, let me give some examples from the project Emotions in Court 
(Bergman Blix & Wettergren 2018).
Box 1) The judge in the Swedish court acts on calm background emotions 
when she chairs a hearing and listens to the parties, keeping her attention 
on the process and its rules. Her background emotions are (among others) 
interest, self-confidence and professional pride, and they are conducive to her 
task as an attentive chair.
Box 2) The judge is startled when she notices that the accused is star-
ing at the victim while telling his version of the story. She then tells 
the accused to not look at the victim but at her (the judge), and keep 
talking. The background emotion leading to this shift from listening to 
correcting the accused is emotional apprehension (worry) that confron-
tation between the accused and the victim might flare up emotions and 
disturb the court process. The preventive measure she takes momen-
tarily disrupts her act of listening, but she can then reassume the task 
without further ado. In an interview, she would be highly unlikely to 
recall this event as emotional, which is characteristic for background 
emotions.
Box 4) The accused gets worked up and quite noisy and rude while he is 
talking. The judge gradually becomes aware of her own feelings of irritation 
and anger at the accused’s lack of appropriate demeanour and deference. 
The emotional regime of the Swedish court rules out all emotional expres-
sions by professionals, particularly by judges. The judge therefore focuses on 
her display – keeping it neutral – and on averting her growing emotions of 
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contempt and anger in order to not be disturbed in her (impartial) listening. 
She becomes aware of her own disruptive emotions and she is consciously 
working on them in relation to the regime’s feeling and display rules. But she 
is, simultaneously, also [. . .]
Box 3) [. . .] working up her conducive emotions of (non-judgemental) 
calm and interest to continue perform the listening (she tries to stay focused). 
In the Swedish context we have seen that in this situation a sometimes dis-
ruptive emotion reported by judges is the insecurity they feel around the 
decision to act/not act on their irritation by reproaching the accused.
A less complex example of Box 3 is as follows: prior to a very ordinary and bor-
ing small trial, the judge chitchats with the three lay judges to summon curiosity 
and direct their focus towards interesting aspects of the case at hand. Just before 
opening the trial s/he cheerfully shouts ‘Alright?! Is everybody on board? Then 
let’s roll!’ In this example the judge counteracts disinterest and boredom that 
may be attached to this type of trial (called grey-hearings in Swedish), trying to 
evoke instead a good-humoured curiosity in petty crime.
Assumptions and implications of the model
The model in Figure 2.1 is – as models tend to be – static. Some of its 
underlying assumptions and inherent consequences therefore need to be 
explicated. First, it should be clear that we are always emotional; there is no 
such thing as an unemotional (living) human being, as emotions constitute 
the condition for being in the world. We feel because we have bodies and 
our bodies are inserted into the physical world and convey information to us 
through emotions (Damasio 2000).
Second, what I call background emotions are undefined – they are bun-
dles of emotions or emotional processes, or what Reddy (2001, pp. 102–105) 
would call ‘thought material’. They are at the outskirts of consciousness. It 
is only when we reflect upon them that they become emotions with distinct 
cultural labels, norms and beliefs attached to them (Thoits 1989). Whether we 
reflect upon them or not, they fuel and orient our actions. Third, it follows 
that we feel many things at the same time but when we reflect upon what we 
feel we settle the emotion with the help of culturally available language and 
knowledge. The emotion word we settle for is performative – that is, it helps 
in creating the emotion we express. This is essential to Reddy’s theory about 
‘emotives’ (Reddy 2001, p. 128; see also Hochschild 1983).
Fourth, emotion work takes place in relation to a social context and its feel-
ing and display rules, which are often just tacit norms, and just like every other 
norm-conforming behaviour it is sanctioned by feelings of shame and pride. In 
other words: we feel about what we feel. So we can feel that we do not want to feel 
a particular thing. For example, Bergman Blix and I (Wettergren & Bergman 
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Blix 2016) have argued that prosecutors’ empathy is a prerequisite for their pro-
fessional and objective work but that their empathic scope is limited by what 
we call the emotive-cognitive judicial frame (see below), preventing them from 
being overwhelmed (and disrupted in their professional tasks) by the tragedy 
and horror of crime. The orientation of the emotive-cognitive judicial frame in 
this regard is performed by feeling. The prosecutors feel aversion against feeling 
outrage, sorrow, sympathy, horror and pain every time they read the protocol 
about a murder or child abuse. And they certainly feel aversion against feeling the 
weight of guilt when the case cannot be prosecuted due to lack of evidence (see 
Törnqvist 2017). None of these feelings would be conducive to performing the 
prosecutors’ work. Aversion to these feelings is built into the emotive-cognitive 
judicial frame, enabling prosecutors to navigate around these feelings. When they 
talk about, reflect upon, their feelings – for example, in an interview – they 
use emotives (Reddy 2001) to create desired feeling-states of professional pride 
and satisfaction (Törnqvist 2017). Furthermore, the narratives they draw from 
circulate in collective emotion management at the prosecution office, that is, 
an ongoing dialogue and exchange of emotions in interactions with colleagues, 
under the auspices of the emotive-cognitive judicial frame.
Fifth, through primary and secondary socialisation – through the repetition 
and training of child-rearing, education, re-education – we habituate emotion 
work. This brings us to the interesting conclusion that emotion work can also 
become backgrounded – and, therefore, habituated. In other words, emotional 
regimes – learnt feeling and expression rules – become natural. They become 
embodied and internalised. Bergman Blix (2010) has shown in detail how 
habituation takes place in stage actors’ repetition of a character – in the end 
mere cues such as standing on a particular spot on the stage evoke a particular 
emotional expression. Similarly, when experienced judges put on the costume, 
take seat in court and open the trial, their faces become sternly neutral – equal-
ling no emotional expression. As stated by Monique Scheer (2012, p. 205) in 
her article about emotional practice: ‘The habitus specifies what is “feelable” in 
a specific setting, orients the mind/body in a certain direction’.
Emotional regime vs emotive-cognitive frame
The examples discussed in relation to the model above mention the concepts 
emotional regime and emotive-cognitive frame and imply a difference between them. 
As defined by Reddy (2001, p. 129) an emotional regime is ‘a set of normative 
emotions and the official rituals, practices, and emotives that express and incul-
cate them’. In earlier work, I have defined an emotional regime as ‘the set of 
tacit and explicit knowledge about emotion, including when certain emotions 
are appropriate and how they should be displayed, embedded in behavioural 
norms pertinent to given social groups’ (Wettergren & Jansson 2013, p. 426). 
In our research on the Swedish courts, we have worked with ‘judicial emo-
tional regime’ as an overarching concept (Bergman Blix & Wettergren 2016) 
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similar to Maroney’s script of judicial dispassion (Maroney 2011). An emotional 
regime in this regard may be something one consciously moves in and out 
of, while regulating emotions accordingly; it does not need to be embodied. 
Through our empirical analysis, however, emerged a need to further emphasise 
both that emotion and cognition were inseparable, and that the norms govern-
ing thoughts, feelings, expressions and behaviour in our participant judges and 
prosecutors were indeed embodied. The emotion work of shifting between 
different contexts at work associated with stricter or laxer alignment with the 
dispassionate emotional regime was entirely backgrounded.
The notion of frame derives from Goffman (1974) and in his later writing 
refers to something deeper and more internalised than norms (see also Bergman 
Blix & Wettergren 2018). A frame consists of social constraints.
These [social constraints] are not rules that people have learned to carry 
around in their heads, but are ways in which situations unfold, so that partici-
pants feel they have to behave in a certain way, or make amends for not doing 
so. It is the frames that are the constraints. Even when they are broken, the 
situation that emerges remains constraining in a predictable transformed way.
(Collins 1988, p. 57)
Bergman Blix and I (2018, p. 22) thus argue that ‘the emotive-cognitive judi-
cial frame is [. . .] a restricted behavioural script or habitus for law profession-
als’. The notion of emotive-cognitive captures the entwined emotional and 
cognitive process of habituating and sustaining the frame; it is not merely a 
process of learning to feel but simultaneously learning to think in particular ways 
(and the reverse). In the case of legal professionals, they have been implicitly 
trained, for years and years, how to feel and how to perform their professional 
emotions by explicitly learning how to think – therefore, by focusing merely 
on learning the cognitive skills of judicial encoding and judicial expertise.
In the next section I will revisit my work on the Swedish Migration Board 
(Wettergren 2010) in order to illustrate this theoretical framework with a case 
in which the emotive-cognitive judicial frame has not been habituated as pro-
foundly as in the case of the Swedish law professionals.
The Migration Board: procedural correctness
The Swedish Migration Board is a public bureaucracy and part of the Swedish 
law enforcement system in the sense that it is occupied (among many things) 
with the implementation and effectuation of the Aliens’ Act. In this sense the 
board is governed by an overall emotional regime of bureaucratic dispassion 
pertinent to legal institutions. As we will see, however, the emotive-cognitive 
judicial frame does not really apply here.
The case officers in my study worked at the department of asylum assess-
ments, and their work was to investigate asylum applications and present a 
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proposal to the decision maker – usually a senior employee at the department. 
I did ethnographic field work at one of the departments for the assessment 
of asylum applications in 2007 (for more information on method and mate-
rial, see Wettergren 2010; 2013). The staff at the department were relatively 
young, and most held degrees in various social-scientific disciplines, with 
the rare exception of holding a degree in law. This is important because the 
habituation of the emotive-cognitive judicial frame begins in law school (see 
Flower 2014), and although it takes many years of additional training before 
the professional emotion work of lawyers actually becomes habituated and 
backgrounded, graduates from law school have habituated a sense of pride in 
judicial skills and an aesthetic pleasure in the method of legal evaluations that 
were rather superficial in the young case officers working at the department.
Nevertheless, my findings suggested that officers collectively upheld the idea 
of the perfect law (the Aliens Act), allowing them to feel that it was possible to 
carry out the assessment of asylum applications in a good and just way, if only 
the officers adhered to the law and to procedural correctness (compare Weber 1948). 
Thereby, they could preserve their sense of being good people. That they had to 
struggle to make ends meet in this regard had to do with i) lacking the habituated 
emotional orientation of legal expertise, and ii) the fact that the migration board 
is not a court and the assessments of the case officers were not purely concerned 
with the application of the law, even if they argued so (see below).
Emotions were said to have no relevance at all for their decisions – their work 
was strictly regulated by the law. But in my observations at the department (includ-
ing the officers’ hearings of asylum seekers) and in interviews with the officers, 
there was ambiguity. The adaptation of formal legal paragraphs to the complex-
ity of asylum seekers’ situation had to be done by the officers themselves. Most 
applications had to begin with an assessment of the individual asylum seeker’s 
trustworthiness; only after facts like identity and country of origin were proven 
(e.g., with identity documents) could the story of the asylum seeker be assessed in 
relation to the law. The story itself had to be credible and the burden of evidence 
was on the asylum seeker, who often had very little or rather vague evidence to 
support an application (see also Wettergren & Wikström 2013).
The participant officers in my study said that most of the time the work was 
routine (and, as they saw it, unemotional). But they also told of occasions when 
it felt really bad to deny someone asylum because they felt sympathetic to that 
person. Paradoxically, these were occasions when they truly felt that they acted 
professionally because they consciously had to put their regret and sympathy 
aside, so these were proud stories mixed with regret. In these cases, officers 
talked about how they imagined that the procedural correctness of the asylum 
assessment ought to comfort the rejected asylum seeker; he or she would feel 
that the process had been fair, that he or she was treated respectfully and that 
the decision was transparent and logical. They also told of situations when 
their gut feeling of distrust in someone had put them on the track to expose 
him or her as a false asylum seeker; these were stories of proud professionalism 
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where emotions had been conducive to acting professionally. Most interesting 
was that participants also told of occasions when ‘grey-zones’ in the law had 
enabled them to argue in favour of someone they felt really should have the 
right to receive asylum. These were stories of joy because they were stories 
of professional satisfaction and personal sympathies united (Wettergren 2010).
In terms of the theoretical framework presented earlier, it is these foreground-
emotional incidents that are of interest (the background emotions pertain to the 
‘un-emotional’ routine) because they highlight the conscious effort to align with 
the feeling rules of the dispassionate emotional regime at work.
I argue that even when emotions are silenced because they are perceived as 
unprofessional, the very performance of this professional script requires emo-
tion work in order to silence emotions. In the department studied, part of this 
work was performed individually, but there were also numerous meetings and 
workshops when the staff was trained in how to apply the law and how to 
behave in the hearings, client treatment and so on. Even if these meetings did 
not mention emotions, they tacitly conveyed emotion norms of professional 
behaviour and procedural correctness.
The fact that emotions continued to orient the work even when – according 
to the participants – there were no emotions was seen in the assessments of 
trustworthiness of asylum seekers. The ‘gut feeling’ mentioned above can be 
seen here as a way to speak about the background emotion of accumulated 
experience (Damasio 2009) – the sense that an asylum seeker’s story requires 
further investigation. Yet reflecting on the gut feeling makes it a foreground 
emotion, an emotion that disturbs and thus calls for conscious reflection. The 
gut feeling was heeded and allowed to orient further investigation because it 
was conducive to professional goals.
Although the migration board staff emphasised that emotions were not 
involved in their assessments, we see that this emotive-cognitive frame of the 
workplace was barely habituated and emotions surfaced in the ways described 
above. This may be due to the fact that none of the staff had been working for 
more than a couple of years with asylum assessments.2 It was fairly easy to observe 
the laborious conscious effort to hide emotion behind an unemotional façade or 
stone-face in the hearings with asylum seekers. The officers also easily described 
or displayed emotions in interviews and as we have seen they admitted feeling 
ambivalent in relation to many of the rejections they made; they felt both profes-
sional pride and regret. In this sense, the emotion work they needed to do was 
still conscious and foregrounded. As they clung to the idea of procedural correct-
ness, it could be seen more as a comfort to them than to the asylum seekers. That 
it was really essential for the officers to believe that procedural correctness made 
a difference is illustrated in the quote below, about evidence to the contrary.
The strength of the idea may be illustrated by an incident retold by one 
officer, where an asylum seeker who he had rejected telephoned to say that 
he was about to commit suicide. The officer was ‘completely shocked!’ 
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and engaged in a desperate effort to talk the applicant out of it by means 
of explaining the law: ‘Has it not been explained to you? Then I want to 
do it now’. The incident ruined the officer’s weekend and though he was 
confident that the local social welfare office was dealing with the case, 
he did not want to know the end of the story: ‘I could have found out 
what happened after that but, I don’t know, I didn’t. I just [snaps fingers] 
blocked it there and then’.
(Wettergren 2010, pp. 409–10)
The blocking in this quote represents emotion work in order to not feel the 
emotions that might follow from realising what rejection meant to the asylum 
seeker, regardless of procedural correctness. We also gather that it was a fore-
ground effort; the fact that the weekend was ruined is telling of how focus was 
shifted from things the officer had planned to do to the conscious and laborious 
effort of controlling and adapting his disruptive emotions.
Conclusion
In late modernity there is a growing awareness that the sharp distinction 
between emotion and reason – fundamental to Western modernity – does 
not really hold. There is also a growing interest in the study of emotions in 
social science. The perspective that I have embraced here asserts that emo-
tions are fundamental to all human action, be it rational or irrational, and 
my contribution consists in emphasising that they are learnt and habituated 
through continuous interactions with specific social contexts or frames. With 
inspiration from emotion-sociological theories, I presented a model arguing 
that foreground emotion can be experienced both as conducive and as dis-
ruptive to rational goal-oriented action, depending on whether the emotion 
is internal or external to the desired action. In both cases, it demands con-
scious emotion work. However, in the former, an emotion is consciously 
summoned to help a desired action; in the latter it is consciously put aside or 
changed to not interrupt a desired action. Importantly, both conducive and 
disruptive action can be backgrounded as well. In the former case, emotion 
goes unnoticed as a background emotion, and in the latter the disturbance is 
contained enough to be managed by habituated emotion work. This is where 
my model attempts to make a contribution to existing theory and research; 
not only emotions but also emotion work becomes trained and, over time, 
embodied and backgrounded.
When this habituation (embodiment and backgrounding) takes place, we 
are likely to feel that our emotive-cognitive behaviour is ‘natural and spontane-
ous’ (for instance, the emotive-cognitive frame of private life) or ‘self-evidently 
professional’ – even ‘objective’, as is the case with the legal professionals and 
the emotive-cognitive judicial frame. In contrast, I argued that the case offic-
ers at the migration board struggled to acquire an emotive-cognitive frame 
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pertaining to the overall regime of judicial dispassion. In the example of the 
migration board officers, both emotions conducive to professional behaviour 
and those disruptive of it were still in the foreground.
In this chapter I have argued for doing away with the separation of emo-
tion and reason altogether. This is arguably difficult in practice due to – among 
other things – the fact that the bifurcation of emotion and reason is deeply 
embedded in Western conceptual thinking, in philosophy and science as well 
as in everyday language and practice. The emerging critique of this Western 
thinking, seen in late modernity, moreover seems to go different ways. For 
instance, as some emotions become recognised as conducive to some action, 
there is a widely spread idea – in therapeutic contexts, in self-help literature 
and so on – that by an instrumental attitude to their emotions, individuals can 
alter their life chances and influence their own health. This critique of the 
separation between emotion and reason feeds into processes of governing and 
responsibilisation fundamental to the radical individualism (Mitchell 2005) of 
late modernity. The approach to emotion and reason suggested in this chapter 
avoids such neoliberal co-optation by undoing the categorisation of emotions 
into useful versus non-useful emotions, instead focusing on the intensity and 
orientation of emotion as it fuels and informs action.
Notes
1 In the history and philosophy of ideas, the scientific revolution is considered to be the 
origin of the thought patterns that subjected nature, body, femininity and eventually 
emotions to civilisation, mind, masculinity and reason (von Wright 1994, pp. 44–65; 
Jacob 1988, pp. 31–6, 54–72; see also Barbalet 1998, pp. 11–20). René Descartes is 
seen as the most influential thinker in this vein, particularly, as noted by Damasio 
(1994), for the juxtaposition of emotion and reason. But he was preceded and accom-
panied by many others, most notably Lord Francis Bacon, who was among the first to 
advocate induction as a scientific method. On the domination of nature as a woman, 
von Wright writes about the foundation of the scientific academy The Royal Society 
(established in 1660), which was inspired by Bacon’s ideas.
It is striking that the language on which both Bacon himself and the founders 
of The Royal Society describe their program is permeated by sexual symbolism. 
Nature is the woman that the man of science shall subject. He shall systematically 
unveil Mother Nature, expose her secrets, penetrate her womb and thereby force 
her to complete subjection. The new scientific attitude is thereby given a strong 
masculine image from the beginning.
(von Wright 1999, p. 65, author’s translation from Swedish)
The subjection of emotion is tied to the subjection of women, as femininity accord-
ing to this logic becomes associated with sentimentality and the private sphere, while 
masculinity is associated with reason and the public sphere (Jónasdóttir 1988).
2 According to the participants in the study, employee turnover was rather high at 
the department and they emphasised that this was good as it prevented them from 
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becoming ‘cynical’ (Wettergren 2010, pp. 404–405). There were stories circulating 
about case officers at other asylum assessment departments who had worked too long 
and who had stopped listening to the asylum seekers, believing that most of them 
were liars (Wettergren 2010; 2013). It may be that the emotive-cognitive frame of the 
migration board asylum investigation officers was in fact a cynical one, but this would 
need further investigation.
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Chapter 3
Conceptualising valences in 
emotion the ories
A sociological approach
Alberto Bellocchi and Jonathan H. Turner
Conceptualisations of emotional valences
Psychological notions of valence focus on everyday linguistic usage of posi-
tive and negative valence (i.e., anger is negative, happiness is positive), their 
everyday effects (a painful emotion is negative) and the use of emotion in 
evaluating a situation or object as negative or positive (e.g., ‘that’s disgusting!’) 
(cf. Kristjánsson 2003). Philosophical perspectives include whether or not an 
emotion is morally justifiable, and whether an emotional disposition (e.g., 
showing one’s anger in public) is morally justified (ibid.). Sociological ideas 
about valence seem to have been influenced by the psychologist Plutchik, who 
theorised emotions as having both valence and polarity, or opposites (Thamm 
2007). Scholars in psychology (Charland 2005; Colombetti 2005; Solomon 
& Stone 2002) and philosophy (see de Sousa 2014; Kristjánsson 2003) have 
challenged the view that valence is an intrinsic property of emotion and affect. 
Notwithstanding the insights from these critiques, directions for improving 
existing constructs of valence are not presented. In this chapter, we summarise 
key critiques of valence constructs before proposing a revised perspective for 
informing sociological understandings of human emotional dynamics. Drawing 
on the sociology of emotion, we develop a working definition that enables us 
to explain valence dynamics, which takes into account a diverse range of fields 
and contexts of emotion research. Our conceptualisation of emotional valence 
is consistent with a late modern recognition by researchers that emotions are 
highly complex phenomena (see Chapter 2, this volume).
What is an emotional valence?
Scholars have contemplated what exactly is meant by valence for some time 
(Charland 2005; Colombetti 2005; Kristjánsson 2003). Etymological roots 
of valence from Latin offer a different meaning from the present meta-
phor of positive and negative charges (Colombetti 2005). Valence derives 
from valentia, meaning strength or capacity, which is in turn drawn from 
valentem, meaning strong, stout, vigorous, powerful (Harper 2001–2016). 
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During the 1930s, psychologists used valence synonymously with posi-
tive or negative charge (Colombetti 2005). An English translation of the 
German Aufforderungscharaktere, which refers to the attractive and repulsive 
forces exerted by objects that ultimately shape behaviour, appears to be the 
source of this meaning. This make-do English translation, however, was 
not capable of capturing the German meaning. A more direct translation 
of Aufforderungscharaktere would be the ‘affordance character’ possessed by 
an object (Colombetti 2005). Even within these broad guidelines, concep-
tualisations of what is important about valence have varied historically and 
continue to influence contemporary conceptions about emotional valence, as 
we will show next. We consider a range of conceptualisations of valence by 
addressing hedonicity, polarity, solidarity, health and biology.
Valence and hedonicity
Hedonicity or hedonic tone presents one lineage of valence in Western 
philosophy (Charland 2005). Hedonicity refers to the pleasure or displeasure 
raised by a feeling. Distinguishing between the first-order phenomenological 
aspects of an emotion and second-order awareness, Charland (2005) argues 
that emotional valence is a property of second-order awareness. When we 
attend to our feelings through second-order awareness, we evaluate them 
as either pleasant or unpleasant; hedonic tone is not an inherent property 
of an emotion. Affect, the general sense of feeling we experience daily 
(Feldman-Barrett 2017), is indeed characterised by pleasant and unpleasant 
valences. What may have happened historically in the study of emotion is 
that this understanding of affective valence became conflated with ideas about 
emotional valence. Although different emotions can indeed feel more or 
less pleasant or unpleasant, there is no way of fixing positive and negative 
valence such that a particular emotion is only ever positive and a different 
one negative. This enables us to explain that, in any investigation or experi-
ence of emotion, one is always required to elicit or conduct an appraisal of 
some object, person, situation or an emotion. When this evaluative judge-
ment is made, and when contextual features of an emotional experience are 
accounted for, an experience may then be labelled as having a positive or 
negative hedonic tone.
An experience of anger can be either pleasant or unpleasant depending on 
the context in which it occurs (cf. Kristjánsson 2003). For example, if a mob 
of protesters wants to achieve their goal of breaking down a police barrier 
in order to drive their point across to a politician (see Yang 2005 for related 
examples), their angry outbursts may lead to a pleasant outcome for the mob 
if they achieve success. However, from the police officers’ point of view, the 
mob anger is an unpleasant experience because it could lead to harm for others 
or for the officers.
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Valence and polarity
Solomon and Stone (2002) argued that the origins of valence and polarity were 
derived from the field of ethics, where every virtue was considered to have an 
opposing vice. This view can be found in Aristotle and within works of medi-
eval Christian scholars (cf. Pope Gregory). Further in history, Plato, Socrates and 
Heraclitus also offered ideas of valence (Gardiner et al. 1936). These perspectives 
were concerned with aspects of pleasure, pain and passion, holding distinctly 
biological views of these matters as they pertained to health. At the time, few 
philosophers had specified the conditions, nature and effects of pleasure and pain, 
leading subsequent schools of thought to begin this process (Gardiner et al. 1936). 
The Cynics for example, classified pleasure as negative because it was taken to rep-
resent the end or negation of pain (ibid.). Debate was fuelled on the exact nature 
of pleasure and pain, with the Cyrenaics refuting the Cynics and instead arguing 
that pleasure was always good (i.e., positive) and pain always bad (i.e., negative).
In late modern terms, the above propositions are based on normative expe-
riences of pleasure and pain. Drawing on wider discourses and subcultures, 
such as practitioners of bondage, discipline and sado-masochism (BDSM; see 
Glick & Meyers 1988; Herron & Herron 1982; Tamir 2016), or sporting cul-
ture (e.g., ‘no pain, no gain’ mantra; de Sousa 2014), it is understood that there 
is a fine line between pleasure and pain and whether they constitute positive 
or negative experiences. As Tamir (2016) speculates, if sado-masochists can 
experience physical pain as pleasant, then some people may experience emo-
tional pain as pleasant. BDSM practices help to understand that any specific 
emotion experienced by its practitioners can have both a physiological pain 
element (that some experience as sexual pleasure) and it may also have a cul-
tural element where practitioners learn how to feel. Based on the rules of BDSM 
communities, the same practices that are experienced as physically painful by 
non-practitioners may be considered pleasurable by practitioners.
The examples of BDSM and sporting contexts help in deconstructing the 
historical view of valence that draws on moralistic accounts of the goodness 
(i.e., positive) or badness (i.e., negative) of an emotion, and the account pre-
sented earlier pertaining to hedonic tone. Moralistic and hedonic views arose 
again more recently, in the works of Hume, Spinoza and Frijda, for example, 
demonstrating the long-standing legacy of moralistic conceptions of emo-
tional valence (Solomon & Stone 2002). Examples such as BDSM and sporting 
culture are consistent with a trend towards conflicting values and alternative 
feeling structures that characterise modern to late modern sociological under-
standings of emotion (Eyerman 2005) and, as we argue, emotional valence.
Valence and solidarity
Examples from the activities of protesters offer further scope for clarifying the 
valence construct (cf. Yang 2005; Eyerman 2005). If a mob formed because of 
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shared anger at government policy, then an individual member’s anger is one 
of the precursors for the formation of solidarity to protest against the policy. 
The anger of individuals that becomes the mob’s anger has the positive ben-
efit of establishing solidarity within the protesting group, which may assist the 
group in staging a protest in the short term, and potentially in the long term, 
to succeed in overturning a policy.
Whether or not the policy makers’ emotions are considered negative or posi-
tive depends on how individuals act on those feelings or how observers appraise 
those actions (cf. Yang 2005). Factions within a government may form through 
shared experiences of shame/anger/frustration directed at the unpopular policy 
linked to the faction that brought it to fruition. Through solidarity, the rival fac-
tion may work against the governing faction that had developed the offending 
policy. If the rival faction overturns the governing faction to lead government, 
then this is a positive outcome for the rival faction (probably leading to satisfac-
tion, happiness, joy, relief) and a negative outcome for the governing faction. 
In this way, we can see that spirals of positive and negative outcomes of different 
actions, fuelled by various emotions, can go on for extended periods of time, 
serving as antecedents of new situations and new emotional experiences. We 
cannot say that the mob’s anger was negative for the mob or the rival faction, 
but it may have had negative consequences for the governing faction (e.g., loss 
in popularity, shame/embarrassment). Again, this interaction among what are 
seemingly opposed valences – anger and solidarity, based on the perspective 
we are developing – are only understandable by viewing the larger context 
in which these emotions are involved and how appraisals, attributions and, at 
times, defence mechanisms shift the polarity of the emotions from having a 
negative effect to having a positive effect on collective action. This shift can flip 
back and forth, and it is one of the reasons that crowd behaviour is not only 
unpredictable but also frequently dangerous as appraisals and attributions cause 
a re-mixing of emotional valences.
Valence and health
Studies have established connections between negative emotions and negative 
health effects (Consedine 2010; Turner 2015). The most researched examples 
include longitudinal effects of anger, anxiety and depression on cardiovascular 
disease. The reverse has been shown to be the case, with positive emotions 
having benefits for different aspects of health. In this context, emotions 
such as anger and anxiety may be classed as negative emotions and emotions 
including happiness and joy classed as positive due to their respective negative 
and positive health effects. Health effects associated with different emotions 
reinforce, theoretically, that we appraise valence depending on health out-
comes for individuals and groups, and not from some inherent property of 
the emotion.
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Valence and biology
Although the line of argument presented in most preceding sections illus-
trates the constructed nature of valence, it under-emphasises the biological 
dimensions. Our aim here is to illustrate examples of valence based on human 
evolution, and to explain how conscious appraisals (Charland 2005) are possi-
ble in humans. Our position stands in contrast to pure forms of constructionist 
arguments. In our eclectic view, valences not only involve social construc-
tions, but also varying states of emotional arousal caused by the activation of 
key biological systems in humans: the autonomic nervous system, muscu-
loskeletal system, neurotransmitter system, neuro-active peptide system and 
more general body hormonal system (Turner 2007; 2015). To deny these 
neurological systems and to assert that neocortical processes of thought (e.g., 
appraisal) somehow are more important is simply to ignore biological reality. 
What we propose is that valences also shift and change as biological responses 
are appraised, as social context is assessed, as causal attributions are ascertained 
and as biological and social defence mechanisms are activated.
Emotions have been associated with action tendencies of organisms such as 
fighting, fleeing, feeding and procreating (Turner 2007). The ancient centre 
for flight (aversion-fear) and fight (aggression-anger), the amygdala, was the 
first emotion system evolved from the terrestrial amphibious vertebrates, from 
which reptiles/birds and mammals evolved separately. Early vertebrates did not 
have a neocortex, but they possessed other brain systems, probably including 
the emotion system revolving around fear and anger. This system may have 
assisted early reptiles to avoid danger and engage in defensive aggression. For 
reptiles, actions tendencies, designated fear and anger, were always directed at 
achieving positive outcomes, enabling reptiles to survive, but reptiles do not 
experience anything close to what we would consider to be positive emotions 
in mammals; reptiles do not make such attributions.
Mammals also appear to have inherited this system from early vertebrates 
(for a critique, see Feldman-Barrett 2017) and, like reptiles, early mammals did 
not have a neocortex. The neocortex had to evolve, and it is currently unclear 
how or when this process of evolution was initiated. Part of the initial growth 
was probably in the emergence of the cingulate cortex, a layer of semi-cortical 
tissue surrounding the older subcortex, and where new emotions appear among 
mammals, such as those in the anterior sections of the cingulate gyrus that are 
associated with play (commonly associated with happiness), those associated 
with bonds to mothers (separation cry) and perhaps the first evidence of emo-
tions like sadness in the posterior part of the cingulate. Once the neocortex 
developed, more cognitive processes like conscious appraisals and attributions 
became possible, thus enabling humans to interpret fight and flight responses 
as ‘positive’ if, for example, they lead to survival or safety. In this way, there 
are positive outcomes (survival, safety) for the individual, and if the encounter 
is a predator-prey relationship, the species benefits from the success of the 
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individual, who may survive an encounter and thereby pass on genes to future 
generations. From the perspective of the loser in this predator-prey interaction, 
their own aggression or anger has no positive outcome if they die or lose the 
contest for food, territory or, in the case of procreation, a mate.
As our examples show, it is not possible to consider non-human animal 
behaviour associated with anger as inherently positive or negative, because the 
valence changes with the standpoint of individual outcomes and the observer. 
Fear, an emotion commonly associated with the flight response, may also 
freeze the individual on the spot and lead to their death (cf. Bouton 2005). 
Depending on the context and perspective taken to interpret such encounters, 
fear can be regarded as both beneficial (positive) and detrimental (negative).
Clarifying emotional valence for 
a sociology of emotions
Having canvassed examples that lead us to problematise the valence as charge met-
aphor and the fixed valence view of specific emotions (i.e., anger is negative), 
we now offer a new conceptualisation of emotional valence. This is achieved 
by outlining broadly the conditions in which particular kinds of appraisals – or 
valence-labelling and discourse – can lead individuals and groups, including 
researchers and non-researchers, to reconstruct emotional experiences and, 
thereby, shift the valence of any given emotion. First it is necessary to specify 
what constitutes an emotion. We accept that emotions involve biological and 
physiological phenomena that have an evolutionary history, and some human 
emotions, which can be called primary, are elicited through activation of brain 
centres shared with non-human ancestors (Turner 2007). Our approach also 
considers that any effort by researchers and non-researchers to account for their 
emotional experiences implies consciousness (Charland 2005).
Through second-order awareness (cf. Charland 2005), the social context 
shapes a person’s expression and conceptualisation of the valence(s) attributed 
to specific emotions, or emotional experiences. We also acknowledge that 
management of emotional expressions involves a great deal of emotion work 
(Hochschild 2012), as individuals try to manipulate emotions in their presen-
tation of self to others (Goffman 1969) and to themselves (Hochschild 2012; 
Turner 2002; 2007). Emotional displays, whether conscious or spontaneous, 
will be appraised during interactions, and valences are likely to be attributed, 
either during the event, or later when it is recounted.
The reason that managing emotions is so much work is that humans are 
regularly in conflict with their biology as they try to manage emotions for 
presentation within a social context. How, then, should we conceptualise 
what occurs as humans work at adjudicating their biological arousal within the 
sociocultural context? Figure 3.1 outlines some of the key dynamics involved. 
Temporality is represented initially by moving from left to right across the 
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complex shifts in valence that can be appraised over time. From a sociologi-
cal perspective, all human action, behaviour and interaction occurs within a 
societal-level structural and cultural system.
The most important properties of societal structures are the levels of dif-
ferentiation, individualisation of action and mediation of actions. For culture 
within a society, key properties include the existence of emotion ideolo-
gies about what emotions people should experience in diverse situations, 
emotion rules about what persons should feel, what emotions they should 
display to others in a situation, the clarity of emotion labels for cognitive 
reflection and discourse about emotions that a person is experiencing in a sit-
uation (Hochschild 2012). When differentiation, individualisation of actions 
and mediation by technologies is high, as it is in late modern and capital-
ist societies, the level of self-reflexivity is high (Turner 2002; 2007). That 
is, individuals are always thinking about self, vis-à-vis others in situations; 
while such is always the case, the number of versions of self and identities 
that people present in late modern societies is much greater than in simpler 
societies (Patulny & Olson [Chapter 1], this volume). The result is that the 
variety of situations and the identities tied to each type of situation are very 
complex, presenting novel challenges in efforts to verify a particular identity. 
In these situations, negative (i.e., unpleasant/unfavourable) emotions may be 
aroused. When verified, individuals experience positive (pleasant/favourable) 
emotions about self and, to a lesser extent, about others who have verified a 
particular identity. Situations involve sanctioning by others, and when others 
provide positive sanctions for actions and self-presentations, individuals expe-
rience pleasant/favourable emotions about self. Unpleasant/unfavourable 
emotions may be experienced when an individual receives negative sanc-
tions from others. These valancing dynamics are qualified and run through 
the kinds of expectations that individuals had about the situation; therefore, 
the more people’s expectations are met and realised, the more positive the 
emotional valences experienced, whereas, to the degree that expectations are 
not realised, negative valences are attributed to experienced emotions. Thus, 
a person’s initial emotional reaction, even as it seemingly emanates from their 
body, is filtered through definitions of self and how self is expected to be 
treated and through the expectations for how others will sanction, positively 
or negatively, a person’s self-presentations.
An initial emotional valence is not necessarily the final valence along the 
positive-to-negative pole, because of the activation of defence mechanisms 
(e.g., repression, reaction formation, displacement) that change people’s percep-
tions of themselves and their feelings as they try to protect self from emotions 
such as hurt, shame and humiliation. Moreover, people are always appraising 
situational emotions in light of expectations constrained by structural and cul-
tural constraints (Turner 2007). However, activation of defence mechanisms can 
occur simultaneously as initial emotional reactions are being formed, with the 
result that the initial valence of an emotion, such as fear or anger, will often not 
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be fully experienced consciously, even if a considerable amount of appraisal of 
emotions is occurring. Repression of emotions commonly labelled as negative 
(e.g., anger, fear, disappointment) to protect self is basic to human neuroanat-
omy, as we are able to block consciousness of negative feelings about self. The 
most important defence mechanisms are (1) repression of negative emotions 
about self and (2) attributions for the cause of the negative emotions being expe-
rienced. Even without repression of negative emotions, attribution is a basic 
cognitive process that follows from expectations and appraisals; people generally 
attribute a causal source, and whether it is accurate or not is less important than 
making the attribution.
Attribution is also a mechanism that can protect self from negative feelings 
about self. Individuals can always make negative self-attributions about their 
emotional experiences, but there are biases built into this process in human 
neuroanatomy. If individuals make self-attributions for meeting expectations 
and for receiving positive sanctions, they will experience positive valences; 
indeed, there is a proximal bias inherent in humans to do so (Lawler 2002; 
Turner 2002). The converse is true: individuals tend to make external attri-
butions to others, situations and objects in situations (such as ideas in the 
culture and structure of situations), blaming these sources for failures to 
meet expectations or issuing negative sanctions, thereby shielding self from 
experiencing negatively valenced (e.g., shame, embarrassment, humiliation) 
self-related emotions. There is also a distal bias inherent in the activation of 
negative emotions, and/or the hint that a person is responsible for failures to 
meet expectations and for negative sanctions from self.
In addition to, and indeed intertwined among, the dynamics outlined in 
Figure 3.1 and the discussion above, valences are also influenced by the types 
or objects of appraisals. Table 3.1 lists generic types of appraisals; that is, what 
is the nature of the positive or negative valences with respect to varying situa-
tions. In the table, we list situation types (left column), whereby people appraise 
their emotional experiences with respect to social structure, expectations, 
sanctions, morality, ethics, hedonic needs, health and evolutionary considera-
tions. In the appraisal types in Table 3.1, persons generally make reference to 
external objects listed in the far-right-hand column. The valences (represented 
as polarities in the middle column) that emerge are, however, influenced by 
the objects that are attributed to causing a particular emotion; here is where 
the proximal and distal biases outlined earlier become important. If appraisals 
of any situation generate the positive polarities outlined for each appraisal type 
in Table 3.1, then defensive mechanisms are not activated. Individuals can feel 
a generalised emotion such as pride – a highly intensive pleasant/favourable 
emotion about self – as being positive in this context. For example, to meet 
expectations leads to pride in self (favourable evaluation of self), and to other 
such positive polarities like being a supportive person, good and moral person, 
virtuous person, adaptive person, beneficial (to self) person and as having rights to 
experience pleasure.
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Table 3.1 Elaboration of appraisal types in relation to context of emotional experience
Situation 
types

















In contrast, an individual who blames others, situation, social structure or 
culture is likely to experience the negative dimensions of polarity in Table 
3.1. They will see more distal objects as responsible for their emotions arising 
from, for example, a breach in solidarity. For instance, if others or the situa-
tion were blamed, a person would perhaps experience alienation, and so on 
for the other polarities – others in the situation, or the situation itself, could 
be labelled as unfavourable for not meeting expectations. Similarly, those who 
sanction negatively are seen as unsupportive; those who are blamed for moral 
breaches are seen as bad and/or wrong; adopting ethical appraisals, others could 
be seen as unethical and full of vice. If defence mechanisms are activated to 
protect self, then these kinds of appraisals and attributions to others or situ-
ations are almost assured. Conflict often results, because others may not see 
themselves in this negative light and will view the negative attributions being 
directed at them as negative sanctions that, in turn, activate their defences. Yet, 
when an individual makes self-attributions for negative emotional experiences 
and, in essence, blames themselves, the negative valences of emotions about self 
are dramatically intensified, because now one has failed to meet expectations 
of self or other inhering in the broader normative structure and the moral and 
ethical codes of the culture attached to this structure.
As we are suggesting, valences of emotions are very much affected by how 
individuals and researchers view the social context in which emotions are 
experienced. The nature of the positive or negative valences is mediated by 
how a person (1) appraises their (2) physiological arousal against (3) the socio-
cultural context within which this appraisal occurs as it affects (4) generalised 
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expectations; as the appraisal process continues, as (5) defence mechanisms 
are activated and (6) attributions made as to who or what is responsible for 
initial emotions, the emotional valences can shift in light of the (7) distal and 
proximal biases leading to (8) positive or negative polarities being attributed 
to emotions inherent in different situations. There is, then, a lot in play in the 
model outlined in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1.
Yet, the dynamics are somewhat simplified by the fact that individuals gen-
erally engage in appraisals of their arousal relative to the immediate social context. 
Individuals are most immediately influenced by (1) the expectations for what will 
transpire in an interpersonal encounter and (2) the sanctioning of others in the 
immediate encounter. Thus, initial appraisals of emotional arousal will be local, 
revolving around (a) self, (b) others, (c) situation, (d) expectation states of persons, 
(e) the nature of sanctioning that activated or failed to activate (f) defence mecha-
nisms and the (g) distal or (h) proximal biases. When expectations are realised and 
sanctions are positive, the valence of the emotional experiences will generally 
be positive towards self and these positive emotions will also radiate out towards 
others and the situation (Turner 2002). When expectations are not realised and/
or sanctions from others are negative, an individual will appraise the situation as 
negative and target emotions (e.g., anger) at distal sources such as situation, social 
structure or culture. Other persons involved in the encounter may not become 
the target of these emotions because they have the capacity to fight back and issue 
negative sanctions to the individual who is issuing blame. However, if the blaming 
individual has power over the blamed individual, then this person will often also 
blame others for the situation or blame the social structure that gives them power.
The list presented in Table 3.1 may not be exhaustive, and in future more 
appraisal types may need to be included. Our appraisal types also do not imply 
that only one option is used to capture emotional experience. Rather, in recog-
nising that emotions are complex, several appraisal types may describe emotional 
experiences concurrently. In combination with Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1, 
we should emphasise that, although an initial experience may be appraised 
through a moral valence, subsequent iterative cycles could lead to new appraisal 
mechanisms, such as sanctions, ethics and expectations, and may influence sub-
sequent emotional experiences and valence attributions. The iterative process 
represented in Figure 3.1 builds in the complexity of emotional experience 
because it allows us to represent the temporal nature of any single appraisal as 
one loop in the cycle. As the dynamics in Figure 3.1 unfold, redefinition and 
re-perception of the sociocultural context can occur, thus altering expectations, 
emotions, activation of defence mechanisms, appraisals and attributions. Thus, 
valences can be constantly shifting in dynamic social contexts.
Emotions in late modern societies
Some scholars emphasise historical regimes of emotions and that in the late mod-
ern era changes in culture and social structure have made fundamental changes 
in emotional dynamics (see Patulny & Olson [Chapter 1], this volume). Societies 
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have become more complex and differentiated, fracturing the social contexts 
of individuals. Indeed, persons no longer live in a few social contexts; their 
daily lives involve a constant movement across different types of social struc-
tures and cultures. As a result, it is considered that persons have become more 
individualistic as the inclusive power of traditional socio-cultural formations has 
declined (Archer 2012; Davis 2008). Individuals increasingly live in relations and 
group affiliations regulated by markets, which furthers their sense of individual-
ism. Living with markets has brought more dramatic increases in consumption 
than at any other point in history, leading individuals to evaluate each other in 
terms of their patterns and capacities for consumption. Recent changes in com-
munication technologies have increased mediated relations through mass media 
and social media (Hepp, Hajarvard & Lundby 2015). Individualism accompanied 
by shifting identities across varying types of social structures and mediated social 
relations may have also increased self-reflexivity and, as a result, involvement in 
continuous monitoring of emotional experiences, feedback from responses of 
others and emotion management. There are, we believe, some problems with 
these conceptualisations, but the historical trend is clear, even at this cursory 
level of summary.
The more interesting question is this: have these dramatic social transfor-
mations in social structure and culture fundamentally changed the nature of 
emotions in humans and the processes by which emotional valences form and 
change? We think here that arguments about late modernity are overdrawn, 
for several reasons. First, although emotions are very much related to social 
context, they are also biologically formed and activated. Human biology 
has not changed, and so, to the degree that emotions are evolved biological 
mechanisms for adaptation to resource niches, their fundamental dynamics 
have not changed. Because the biology of emotions is interwoven with – 
and dramatically affected by – social contexts, late modernity has certainly 
added more complexity to the flow of emotional valences within persons and 
between persons than previous models of valence can account for.
The modern world involves a constant movement across different types 
of social structures and their attendant cultures, and late modernity certainly 
increases self-reflection and the formation of many different identities tied to 
diverse structural locations and roles constrained by diverse cultural codings. It 
should not be surprising that the valence processes that we have outlined may 
now be considered more dynamic, if not volatile. The nature of the forces in 
play has not changed so much from what we outline in Figure 3.1, but the 
loadings for the forces involved have changed towards more differentiation and 
complexity, more mobility, more individualism, more reflexivity, more iden-
tities to accompany a greater number of roles, more mediated social relations 
and more selling of self in markets (e.g., labour) and quasi-markets (e.g., social 
media, marriage, friendship, clubs).
In such a social world, expectations vary and are constantly changing; initial 
emotional valences shift through constant appraisals and reappraisals, through 
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activation of defences to protect self and identities and through attribution 
dynamics. Life is more work, emotionally, because social contexts vary and 
change, requiring individuals constantly to adjust expectations, appraisals and 
attributions in order to sustain identities in more complex contexts. It may 
be conjectured that individuals in late modernity have taken to texting as a 
substitute for face-to-face interaction (cf. Patulny & Seaman 2016) in which 
emotions are specified through graphic smiles and frowns and where individu-
als do not have to engage in fine-tuned monitoring of each other’s emotions 
and the valences of these emotions. They can interact without the need for 
emotion work represented by the dynamics of face-to-face interactions. 
Alternatively, we could see that upheavals in concepts of valence, beyond those 
offered here, may be on the horizon as shifting socio-cultural factors shape 
appraisals in novel ways.
Chapter summary and concluding remarks
The analysis of emotions in general is difficult and complex because it is affected 
by the evolved biology of humans and by their capacity to create highly 
dynamic societies in constant change. Accounting for biological and social/
cultural forces is very difficult, and such is particularly the case for a subject as 
historically thorny as valence. What are valences and how do they operate? For 
us, a valence is a shift in positive-negative polarity of emotions, but problems 
immediately emerge with this seemingly simple conception. Perhaps the most 
vexing problem is: positive or negative for whom, or for what? Is there not a 
kind of functionalism here, with positive valences being functional and nega-
tive being dysfunctional? Our answer is that if we focus on the mechanisms 
by which individuals activate and channel their emotional responses, we can 
avoid being overly functionalist, and we can sort through the complexity of 
the biological and socio-cultural basis of valenced emotional responses. We 
have outlined a conception of how valences form and change, and this concep-
tion implies a theory of emotions that is not fully developed – but neither is 
it simplistic and crude. It lays out the key dynamics involved and specifies at 
least some of their relationships. With further development, this preliminary 
conceptualisation can increase understanding of how emotions among humans 
constantly shift in their valences, especially under late modern conditions.
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Chapter 4
Emotion and morality




There are paradigmatic differences in the study of morality between the disci-
plines of philosophy and sociology. On the surface, this could be understood as 
a distinction over the study of what ethics are in the former (Prinz 2004b; Rawls 
1971), from what they do in the latter (Bauman 1994; Durkheim 1973; Turner 
& Stets 2006). A similar claim could be made about the study of emotion in 
late modernity in these disciplines, as philosophers have generally focused on 
questions about what emotions are and where they come from, while sociolo-
gists have given greater attention to the impact and role of emotion in matters 
of social interaction, power and identity. When bringing together questions 
about emotions and morality, a number of important genealogical differences 
between sociology and philosophy surface. Enlightenment philosophers like 
Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham have historically treated emotions as an 
encumbrance to ethical theory, as emotionality has been associated with irra-
tionality and clouded judgement. One resulting narrative has treated emotion 
as something to overcome, as an untrustworthy and hot-headed co-pilot to 
the logical and rational mind. While these views were common among the 
Classical and Enlightenment era philosophers, they no longer stand up against 
contemporary understandings of the mind and emotion in late modernity 
(Denzin 1980; Holmes 2010; Prinz 2006).
Although the theoretical literature in the sociology of emotion draws from 
both micro/interactional perspectives (Hochschild 1979; Shott 1979) and macro 
perspectives (Barbalet 1998; Burkitt 2002; Denzin 1984), this chapter contends 
that there is a reluctance to engage with questions of ethics and morality in the 
sub-discipline as a whole. While both sociologists and philosophers have much 
to gain from exploring common ground on emotion, this chapter will focus 
on the sociological benefits of adopting philosophical material on emotion as a 
motivation for moral judgement. Researchers within philosophy and sociology 
of emotion have been eager to demonstrate the inseparability of emotion and 
reason (Cairns 2000; Prinz 2003), and yet the range of work in the sub-discipline 
engaging with the role of emotion in moral judgements is limited. By drawing 
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from the well-developed philosophical literature in the field of emotion in 
moral judgements, this chapter will provide useful insights for sociologists inter-
ested in links between praxis, emotion and morality. This chapter will evaluate 
a number of perspectives on emotion and morality from sociologists (Calhoun 
1991; Denzin 1980; Durkheim 1973; Turner & Stets 2006) and philosophers 
(Greenspan 1995; Prinz 2004a; Smith 2002 [1759]) in order to demonstrate 
common ground and facilitate greater interaction between the disciplines.
Interestingly, William James’ seminal work What is an Emotion? (2003 
[1890]) features as a starting point in both disciplines for a contemporary focus 
on emotion, whereby emotion is embodied and can be intentional or interac-
tional rather than simply reactionary. I argue in this chapter that the literature 
on ethics from the philosophy of emotion deserves greater recognition among 
sociologists, although there are justified reasons for reluctance based on some 
characteristically sociological concerns. The dominant forms of interactionist 
research in the sociology of emotion have arguably led to a field that resists 
philosophical positions that would allow for an analysis of emotional sources of 
moral conduct. This chapter will draw from philosophical literature on moral 
sentiments where the role of guilt, empathy and shame (typically understood as 
social emotions) inform ethical positions.
It is useful to note the practical distinction between morality and ethics at this 
juncture. For Bauman, ethics refers to pure forms of judgement, typically made 
by experts and authorities, regarding ought statements in an ideal abstract sense 
(Bauman 1994). Meanwhile, morality involves the actions, identities and emo-
tions of people in practical, day-to-day social life. There is an almost mathematical 
search for consistency and truth in ethical debates that is impractical at the level of 
moral judgements, which for Bauman are rooted in cultural and social practice. 
An analysis of both ethics and morality is not within the scope of this chapter, and, 
given the relevance of moral judgements to the sociology of emotion, morality 
will be the focus of this analysis. The emotional weight of moral judgements in 
social interaction is an important matter for both philosophers and sociologists, 
and this chapter will shed light on the need for collaboration in this field.
On emotion and morality: philosophy
The study of ethics in philosophy has traditionally sought to remove emo-
tion from logical or rational judgement. From Mill’s Utilitarianism, to Rawls’ 
Veil of Ignorance, to Kant’s Categorical Imperative, philosophers have sought 
to remove emotion from moral judgements in order to maximise fairness, 
consistency and diplomacy over anger, greed and frustration. Meanwhile, 
Epicurean attempts at Ataraxia have aimed to eliminate emotional fluctua-
tions from everyday life based on the inference that intense emotions (positive 
or negative) are not good for the wellbeing of individuals. Finally, a number 
of other perspectives ranging from Plato to the Stoics have aimed to place 
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emotional experiences within the control of the thinking and feeling subject, 
such that individuals decide how or whether to let emotions affect them sim-
ply by focusing on virtue or allowing themselves to be consumed by emotion. 
As a collection, these philosophical claims do not hold a generally favourable 
view of emotion.
In the present day, philosophical perspectives on emotion have become 
rather more progressive. They are noticeably more interdisciplinary than 
their sociological counterparts, yet there remains a shortage of meaningful 
engagement with the social and cultural factors that mediate and influence 
emotion. Meanwhile, more philosophically focused positions might accuse 
sociological/interactionist perspectives of alienating people from the authen-
ticity of emotional actions through an emphasis on performativity, acting 
and learned behaviour. In highly influential studies such as Hochschild’s The 
managed heart (1983), it becomes difficult for the individual to know which 
emotions originate within the self (such as emotions that could be attributable 
to personality) and which emotions are triggered by exchanges with power 
structures, gender roles and commercialisation. Yet arguments regarding sen-
timent and judgement in philosophy can invert these questions. In a line of 
argument tracing from Adam Smith’s Theory of moral sentiments (1759) to Jesse 
Prinz’s Gut reactions (2004), philosophers have argued that there is knowledge 
about moral judgements in emotions.
Smith begins his version of this argument by describing the self-evident 
role of sympathy in moral judgements and emotional experiences, effectively 
supporting altruistic ethical claims about human action. This intriguingly soci-
ological position references the interaction between a perpetrator, a victim 
and an audience that clearly demonstrates sympathy, empathy and compassion 
when immoral behaviour takes place. He writes
The cruelest insult [. . .] which can be offered to the unfortunate, is to 
appear to make light of their calamities. To seem not to be affected with the 
joy of our companions is but want of politeness; but not to wear a serious 
countenance when they tell us their afflictions, is real and gross inhumanity.
(2002, p. 19)
The feeling of disgust one feels when witnessing acts of cruelty connects to use-
able information about justice, and this is not simply a cognitive process, but one 
deeply embedded in our sociality. Furthermore, by relating to the experiences of 
another through sympathy, individuals support and reaffirm the collective moral 
positions between them. There is an important emotional difference between 
conducting immoral acts and witnessing them, yet in both cases useful informa-
tion about the sensibility of moral judgements can be extracted from emotional 
experience. In a similar line of argument to Smith’s explanation of sympathy, 
Prinz (2006) more recently uses the example of an experiment in social psychol-
ogy where able-bodied postgraduate students were instructed to ask commuters 
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on the subway to forfeit their seat to them. This rather simple task turned out 
to be incredibly unpleasant as participants felt ashamed and disgusted by the 
selfishness of the request. The point for Prinz is that ‘It is emotionally taxing to 
violate social and moral rules’ (2006, p. 29) and, in this claim, Prinz sets out an 
important space for sociology and philosophy to collaborate.
As witnesses to morally challenging circumstances, individuals face similar 
kinds of emotional responses. Consider footage of animal cruelty or a sexual 
assault; people feel strong emotional reactions of anger, disgust and shame about 
these violations of basic moral standards. Rather than attempting to reason 
unemotionally in response to cruelty, Smith (2002) argues that the emotional 
response is itself a source of knowledge about ethical judgements and it should 
be utilised to affirm systems of morality and practical ethics. To sympathise with 
the suffering of another is to recognise the wrongdoing that led to an immoral 
act. This common-sense approach to moral conduct is not a simplification whereby 
complex rules are reduced to personal feelings; rather, Smith acknowledges that 
black-and-white moral principles are unsustainable when applied to everyday 
conduct. Moral principles can be developed out of experiences; they are not 
simply applied to experiences.
Barbalet’s macrosociological reading of the Theory of moral sentiments insists 
that by moral, Smith more or less means normal. Moral principles are therefore 
not part of the physical or metaphysical world; they are effectively cultural 
(2005, p. 172). In Barbalet’s terms, Smith’s account of ethics in the Theory of 
moral sentiments is less about determining what ethical principles are, and more 
about unpacking how they function in cultural settings. This is important as it 
defies the distinction between sociology and philosophy set out at the begin-
ning of this chapter, and places Smith in the company of sociologists. According 
to Barbalet, Smith shuns philosophy in this text in favour of ‘playwrights, poets, 
and historians’ (2005, p. 173). The important question here is whether Smith’s 
claim regarding sentiments and the power of sympathy/empathy is more a 
matter of answering the question why be moral? than what should I do in order to 
be ethical?, thereby adopting empathy as a justification or motivation for moral 
principles. Yet this view understates the claims made by Smith in the text. For 
Smith, a moral framework can be construed from human experiences and even 
emotions. This does not mean that there is a golden principle that can serve as a 
foundation for all moral rules (such as a Utilitarian calculation of consequence), 
rather that moral principles are enacted and experienced phenomena.
For Smith, self-love and self-interest are part of the experience of sympathy 
(Smith 2002; Barbalet 2012). Smith’s approach adopts the notion of self-interest 
within the framework of a socially constructed self, and therefore prevents allow-
ing self-interest from becoming anomie – which would effectively nullify the need 
for moral conduct. Rather, the experience of shame that occurs when an indi-
vidual has failed to appropriately empathise with those in need would result in an 
inability to favourably view one’s self, and this is not in one’s best interests. Ergo, 
there is a motivation to empathise with those in need that is driven by self-interest 
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(so long as the self is understood as dependent on interaction). This theoretical 
shift is significant, as it emphasises a distinction between witnessing immoral acts 
and committing them, although the failure to act upon injustice may have similar 
emotional consequences as performing the acts. For Barbalet, this is where Smith’s 
more sociological leanings come to the fore, and where the reputation of his work 
as a justification for individualism and the free market with an invisible hand are 
blatantly false (Barbalet 2012, p. 415). Smith is not advocating morality for the sake 
of self-interest; rather, he insists that being moral and feeling moral are intrinsically 
derived through social interaction and collective forms of selfhood.
This association between emotion and moral judgements is currently rep-
resented in the philosophical literature by Jesse Prinz. For Prinz, there is no 
reasonable way to separate natural or evolutionary emotions from socially 
constructed or reflexive emotions; rather, ‘Every emotion that we have a 
name for is the product of both nature and nurture’ (2004b, p. 1). In addition, 
Prinz (2007) considers morality to be a culturally constructed phenomenon, 
and this has important consequences for his theory of emotion and moral-
ity. From the very outset of his approach, Prinz appears to sit outside of 
traditional philosophical, sociological and psychological theories of emotion. 
Furthermore, Prinz argues that emotions are necessary for moral judgements 
to occur. This is not identical to the claim made by Smith that links certain 
emotions to truth claims about morality; rather, Prinz argues that emotion 
serves as motivation for moral judgements and that the latter cannot occur 
without the former (Prinz 2006). According to this view, moral questions are 
distinct from non-moral questions in that they specifically involve emotion 
in the act of offering an answer (Prinz 2007). Yet Prinz (2006, p. 30) extends 
this line of argument beyond the claim that emotions and moral judgements 
‘co-occur’; he insists that emotions play an influential role in determining the 
type and severity of the moral judgements that individuals make. Emotions 
are therefore ‘necessary and sufficient’ for moral judgements to occur (ibid.).
This sociological or anthropological approach claims that moral judge-
ments must be rooted in emotional experiences rather than based on reason 
as the former tends to gravitate towards a unifying answer, while moral sen-
timents remain radically different around the world. According to Prinz, if 
moral judgements were drawn from reason rather than emotion, we could 
expect to find greater consistency in moral practices across cultures. Prinz 
(2007, p. 173) makes this point in a number of ways, though it is perhaps the 
discussion of cannibalism that best explains how moral judgements can dif-
fer between cultures and across time periods. The key here is not that some 
cultures are more or less moral than others as a result of varied applications of 
sentiment, but that morality is determined in cultural or intersubjective prac-
tice. This understanding of reason and consensus alludes to similar (although 
better-elaborated) concepts in Habermas’ Theory of communicative action (1984), 
whereby illogical and contradictory ideas are inevitably pulled apart and super-
seded through balanced and open discourse. Prinz suggests here that emotions 
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are culturally specific, but reason is not. While critical theorists like Habermas 
(1984), Honneth (1995) and Horkheimer (1947) would argue that reason is 
a human capability with some consistency between various communities and 
cultures, each of these thinkers alludes to the potential for cultural conditions 
to distort or even manipulate concepts of reason and even common sense. 
While Prinz’s conception of reason is useful, there is cause for some scepti-
cism regarding the purity – and therefore trustworthiness – of reason. What 
passes for reason in the process of developing consensus is open to manipula-
tion, much like emotion.
However, there remain unresolved questions concerning the interplay 
between culture, emotion and morality. Consider the following example: how 
do we adopt Smith’s or Prinz’s approach in order to understand people who 
are disgusted by homosexuality or interracial marriage? Can legitimate and ille-
gitimate forms of disgust be distinguished from one another? It would appear 
that disgust can be the result of culturally constructed narratives and exposure to 
behaviour that may be seen as shocking or unusual. The Habermasian approach 
would suggest that homophobic and racist claims do not meet the standards of 
rational discourse, and are often based on falsified and contradictory informa-
tion. Sociological approaches might tell us that the feeling of disgust is the result 
of habitus or ideology and has no basis in logic, rationality or truth. There are 
clearly problems associated with over- or understating the extent to which 
emotional experiences are constructed, mediated and understood through social 
interaction. Prinz is not claiming that the feeling of disgust can provide access 
to moral truth, only that disgust in this instance would serve as motivation for 
an individual to condemn these acts as immoral. The greater point here is that 
since emotion is part of the reasoning process (i.e., in making assessments), 
both reason and emotion are susceptible to ideology and cultural norms, and 
therefore collaboration between sociological and philosophical perspectives are 
necessary. Returning to the distinction between what ethics are and what they 
do, the social bonds that are reaffirmed by shared ethical positions are not based 
on the truth of what ethics are; this can be entirely irrelevant. We can determine 
that emotion is a motivation for moral judgements, but it is not reducible to this 
role. Emotions also guide moral judgements in one direction or another. There 
is useful information about morality to be found in our emotional experiences 
and our gut reactions (Prinz 2004a), but this does not equate to the claim that 
there is moral truth in emotion that somehow trumps reason. The intense feel-
ings that arise in response to witnessing a violent crime or a slaughterhouse 
killing floor ought to be recognised by processes of moral judgements, but it 
does not follow that all emotions are evidence of moral truth.
A useful counterpoint can be found in Patricia Greenspan’s work on guilt and 
morality. Examples such as violent crime or animal abuse are relatively straight-
forward and more or less unproblematic, but Greenspan considers circumstances 
where emotion and reason appear to contradict one another in irreducible ways. 
She writes, ‘Guilt may be thought to be irrational in a case where, through no 
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fault of his own, the agent cannot avoid doing wrong, on the assumption that 
the reaction can be justified only if one is guilty’ (1995, p. 14). More specifically, 
Greenspan asks how we can understand the moral significance of guilt, when 
it remains for individuals who have chosen to do the right thing. Greenspan 
explains, ‘The dispute concerns not what to do in such cases but whether the 
action one must do, morally speaking, can still be wrong’ (1995, p. 9). Central 
to this approach is the view that moral dilemmas are the key to understanding 
the relationship between ethics and emotion. This is still an ethical framework 
where emotions ‘motivate’ moral judgement, but Greenspan is interested in 
cases that are more complex than just gut reactions. The value given to social 
emotions like guilt and blame in this approach allows for moral emotions to 
be construed in social or intersubjective connections. For Greenspan, a moral 
position is accepted as dominant when it is ‘held in force by shared emotions 
of moral assessment’ (1995, p. 187). Emotions like guilt and blame are motiva-
tors for individuals to conform to a set of moral values, but this is based on a 
desire to belong within a set of shared values, rather than an individual moral 
litmus test based on gut feeling. This more reflexive sociological approach to 
the philosophy of emotion takes social constructions seriously and ties them 
to emotional experiences that lead to action. This recognition of moral and 
emotional antinomies signifies a remarkable break from rationalist ethical frame-
works, while managing to bypass strictly realist approaches to morality. It also 
creates a space where sociological analyses of emotion and morality can provide 
useful contributions that unpack cultural and intersubjective phenomena. The 
question that remains is whether researchers in the sociology of emotion have 
successfully occupied this significant and important intellectual space.
On emotion and morality: sociology
The sociological study of morality undoubtedly begins with the work of Émile 
Durkheim. In Durkheim’s collectivist theory of social bonds, morality plays a 
pivotal role in connecting members of a given community in meaningful and 
long-lasting ways. In contrast, the dangers of anomie can be understood as the 
loss of these bonds, as a group of individuals who are unable agree to, and live 
within, a shared set of moral values will inevitably experience deteriorating 
social networks (Turner 1993). However, Durkheim’s keen interest in Kantian 
philosophy (Durkheim 2004) resulted in a series of reflections about morality 
that traverse sociological and philosophical boundaries (understandably, as these 
boundaries were not formalised during his lifetime). In an essay on The dualism 
of human nature, Durkheim separates sensory experience from moral activity 
as distinct and opposed forms of intellectual activity (1973, p. 151). Durkheim 
is contrasting one’s individuality – which is understood to be embedded in 
the social – with the body, and concludes that the contradictions and ten-
sions between the two are irresolvable. In a moment that resembles Freudian 
notions of repression, Durkheim claims that moral acts necessarily demand that 
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individuals deny their bodily instincts. From this, we can extract the notion 
that, for Durkheim, emotions and morality are in conflict with one another 
such that one inevitably limits or denies the other. While Durkheim is eager to 
establish the social function and generation of moral principles, moral acts must 
remain independent from bodily sensations and emotions.
More recently, Bauman has developed sociological perspectives on morality 
in order to capture the unique and constantly changing ways that individuals 
make sense of the world around them. More specifically, Bauman describes 
the impact of postmodernism (1991) and eventually liquefaction (2000) in 
order to demonstrate how fragmentation and rapid social change has led to 
murky moral relations between individuals. For Bauman, the lack of fixed 
moral structures once upheld by religious tradition places demands on cultural 
values to provide guidance in previously unexplored ways. As individuals are 
increasingly expected to make moral decisions that might have previously been 
considered fixed and unalterable, they are now forced to consider the nature 
of their relationships with others and this can lead to a newfound awareness 
of confusion, contradiction and ambivalence as an unavoidable normality (See 
Hookway et al. [Chapter 6], this volume).
Meanwhile, the sociological analysis of morality has arguably neglected emo-
tion as a means to understand culturally informed moral conduct. Hookway 
(2012) rightly highlights how sociologists offering a theory of modernity (or 
postmodernity) as a process of moral decline have consistently ignored or 
rejected emotion as a legitimate source for moral judgements. Conservative 
sociological arguments from thinkers like Bell, Reiff and Lasch consider the 
individualistic and narcissistic transformations away from traditional social 
structures to be fed by moral decisions within the self (Hookway 2012) – a 
process that essentially leads to forms of hedonism and, therefore, to a decline 
in values, decency and authenticity.
The prominence of moral systems has waned in sociological discourse, 
arguably leaving its analysis to the discipline of philosophy. This led Craig 
Calhoun to claim that the potential for sociology to understand identity and 
agency to its fullest potential has been limited by its unwillingness to engage 
meaningfully with debates about morality. Calhoun goes on to state that ‘[W]e 
(sociologists) have lost sight of the philosophical problems Durkheim thought 
sociology could solve’ (1991, p. 232). These criticisms demonstrate the poten-
tial for collaboration between sociological approaches and the position held by 
Adam Smith. In a statement that echoes the role of sympathy in Smith’s work, 
Calhoun writes that the self ‘is constituted in and through the taking of moral 
stances’ (1991, p. 233). The need for moral principles to affirm positive aspects 
of the self corresponds with sociological positions from Hochschild and Stets, 
to Denzin and Bauman. Smith’s approach (and, to some degree, Prinz could 
be included here) is clearly valuable to sociological discourse, although the 
diversity of approaches in philosophy means that much of the discipline’s work 
on emotion is difficult to translate into sociological debates.
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In contrast to the work of Adam Smith and Jesse Prinz, who suggest that 
emotions and sentiments are more relevant to moral judgements than they are 
to pure ethics, Turner and Stets (2006) describe morality as embedded within 
cultural values, ideology and various layers of normativity such that moral posi-
tions can be ranked from fixed rules to negotiable preferences. Sociological 
research on emotion has been reluctant to describe experience in dichotomies 
regarding health or rationality; instead, emotions are commonly presented as 
interactional, constructed and intersubjective. Any attempt by researchers to 
question the legitimacy of one’s emotions tends to be rejected as assertions 
of power. It should be no surprise then that while there are examples of the 
emotional impact of immoral or unjust circumstances (Ahmed 2010; Holmes 
2004), the links between moral judgements and emotional experiences are not 
well developed in sociology.
Turner and Stets set out a category of moral emotions that includes a broad 
spectrum of both positive and negative emotions that are ‘connected to morality, 
even if a person and others do not fully recognize this connection’ (2006, p. 544). 
Interestingly, their approach inverts the approach set out in the philosophical lit-
erature above. Turner and Stets aim to uncover how emotional experiences are 
‘fuelled’ by morality (2006, p. 544), which involves a reversal of the philosophical 
question above. This suggests that while emotions and morality are related, in 
contrast to the work of philosophers, the sociological approach is primarily inter-
ested in the former rather than the latter. This may provide some insight in to the 
lack of theoretical interrogation of moral judgements in the sociology of emotion. 
The challenge with the sociological approach is that it leaves the definition of 
morality – in sociological terms – only vaguely formulated and therefore focuses 
on emotions that are driven by moral positions (or, at the very least, experienced 
as such), such as shame and guilt. Turner and Stets go on to describe shame and 
guilt as second-order ‘moral emotions’ that at their primary basis are biologically 
‘hardwired’ (2006, p. 547). These second-order emotions are considered to be 
made up of a mix of primary emotions (in this case, sadness, anger and fear), 
as opposed to alternate uses of the term secondary emotion, where the object of 
an emotion is based in social interaction. This relational method might consider 
guilt to be a secondary emotion as it involves a failure to meet community stand-
ards for moral conduct. But Turner and Stets warn against resigning exclusively 
to constructivist perspectives and choose to highlight the traditional sociological 
reluctance to acknowledge the biological dimensions of human behaviour (2006, 
p. 547). While the need to consider physiology in the study of emotion is an 
important dimension of sociological analyses, these references to Turner’s earlier 
work fail to account for the breadth of cultural variance in moral norms.
Stets and Carter’s (2012) work on moral emotions shifts the focus to moral 
tensions that are linked to the legitimacy or authenticity of personal iden-
tity. This approach suggests that individuals experience positive and negative 
emotions about morality because actions (and perceptions of actions) either 
challenge or reaffirm a meaningful sense of self. In an example such as stealing, 
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the individual will experience the moral emotion (guilt) as the act of theft 
contradicts their belief that they are a decent person. In doing so, Stets and 
Carter potentially reduce moral emotions to a matter of identity authenticity. 
What each of these approaches lack is a sufficient sense that these are emotions 
that are experienced by a feeling subject. The focus on emotions as simply 
interactional or intentional overlooks the extent to which these emotions are 
felt by a subject who is affected by these feelings and experiences.
These perspectives are typical of the work on emotions and ethics in sociol-
ogy, and they could be read as a product of a specific paradigm in sociological 
thought. One explanation for how the sociology of emotion came to this posi-
tion is offered by Norman Denzin. In A phenomenology of emotion and deviance 
(1980), Denzin argues that the sociological literature on emotion has neglected 
existing philosophical and phenomenological perspectives in favour of largely 
symbolic interactionist perspectives. This is interesting for a number of reasons. 
For one, this chapter was published at a time when the sociology of emotion 
was barely formed as the distinct field that it is today, and so Denzin’s criticisms 
demonstrate remarkable foresight considering the contemporary direction of the 
area. But Denzin’s chapter also highlights a fork in the road in emotions research, 
where the gap between philosophy and sociology could have just as easily been 
avoided. Denzin draws heavily from the American philosophers Charles Cooley 
and William James, as well as the European phenomenologists Maurice Merleau-
Ponty and Edmund Husserl. He also identifies Sigmund Freud as a thinker that 
sociologists have hastily discarded from emotions research. Denzin argues that 
emotion is essential to understanding interaction, and therefore must be included 
in sociological analysis. Yet sociological approaches that focus on interaction 
and intentionality risk separating emotion and feeling from an authentic self. 
The cause of the problem is traced back to the influence of George Herbert 
Mead’s differentiation between the I and the Me, whereby the performative self 
is separated from the feeling self, and, according to Denzin, too much emphasis 
is placed on the intentionality of emotion and not enough is given to the experi-
ence of it. In contrast to the popularity of Goffman’s work in emotions research 
(see Hochschild 1983; Shott 1979), Denzin argues that the emphasis on rules 
is unnecessarily structural and leaves ‘little place for selves and feelings’ (1980, 
p. 252). Instead, we should remember Freud’s approach to emotion and the 
subconscious, where selves are often irrational, inconsistent and unpredictable.
Denzin’s ambitious claims and firm criticisms appear to blend the strengths 
of sociological and philosophical perspectives, such that the study of what 
emotions are and what they do are interwoven rather than pulled apart. While 
the theoretical literature in the sociology of emotion draws from both micro/
interaction perspectives as well as macro/theoretical perspectives, the bulk 
of sociological material favours the former over the latter. Consequently, 
there appears to be a reluctance to engage with themes that are generally 
more common among our philosophical counterparts. Topics such as rea-
son, rationality, morality, knowledge and subjectivity receive more attention 
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among philosophers of emotion, and while there are a number of legiti-
mate discipline-specific barriers that prevent sociologists from adopting these 
approaches, both parties have much to gain from finding common ground. 
Revisiting Denzin’s fork in the road is just one way of doing this.
Conclusion
What is it that a sociologist might object to in the philosophy of emotion? The 
possibility of finding truth in emotions comes to mind, as does the evaluation of 
emotions as either rational or irrational. Through a sociological reading of moral 
sentiments, it seems likely that sociologists can work with the first possibility, but 
not the second. Furthermore, philosophical approaches to emotion often lack 
a sufficient focus on power dynamics involved in emotion, and this is arguably 
one of the key strengths of the sociological approach. If we consider Barbalet’s 
work on class resentment (1992), or Hochschild’s analysis of gender and feeling 
rules (1983), it is clear that sociological approaches are capable of uncovering 
unique perspectives on emotion, each with important contributions to the 
role of morality, justice and inequality. So, what might a philosopher deem 
problematic about the sociology of emotion? The empirical emphasis in both 
microsociological approaches and large-scale quantitative approaches comes to 
mind, but this is evidence of a more paradigmatic difference. While many socio-
logical thinkers have offered definitions of what constitutes emotions (see Stets 
and Turner 2006), the sociology of emotion does not depend on finding con-
crete answers to this question. This is not the case in the philosophy of emotion, 
whereby an understanding of what the phenomenon is must act as a precursor to 
the investigation into what emotions do. Similarly, sociologists have asked what 
do moral systems do? From Durkheim’s functionalism to Bauman’s Liquid moder-
nity, the answer has been to maintain the fabric of society through social bonds. 
From a sociological perspective, this is a challenge for late modernity, where the 
public dissemination of moral outrage is no longer bound to local communities 
or perspectives. The philosophical question, on the other hand, needs to unpack 
sources of truth for ethical claims in ways that are not relevant to a sociological 
analysis or morality. Yet the analysis of sentiments and gut reactions does share 
an important feature with sociological perspectives; sentiments inseparably place 
emotion with morality, praxis, reason and the swelf. Furthermore, emotion plays 
a role when we employ reason to make ethical judgements. Importantly, the 
perspectives set out in this chapter can present this as a strength, not a weakness.
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Chapter 5
Sociological approaches  
to the study of gender  
and emotion in late modernity
Culture, structure and identity
Kathryn J. Lively
Introduction
One of the prevailing understandings in the sociology of emotion is that emotions 
are shaped, in large part, by the cultural and structural conditions of our time. 
For instance, in the period some social historians have dubbed the modern age or 
modernity (Giddens 1991), which was marked by a considerably more traditional 
division of labour, men, who spent much of their days toiling in factories, were 
typically viewed as unemotional and rational. In contrast, women, who spent the 
bulk of their time tending to the emotional needs of their children and creating 
a safe haven for their husbands, were seen as nurturing and caring on their best 
days and overly emotional and irrational on their worst. During this period, and 
even the decades following, women were held to different emotional norms than 
men. For instance, given the fairly rigid gender roles, it was commonly held that 
women were naturally more emotional than men, a notion that still persists – albeit 
in a much more relaxed form – today.
Over the last 50 years, however, the economic means of production have 
pushed many workers in many parts of the world out of manufacturing jobs 
and out of the sanctuary of home into more public-facing service-oriented 
occupations. Service occupations, unlike manufacturing jobs, require workers 
to engage in more face-to-face or voice-to-voice client contact, both of which 
require a greater ability to attenuate and to manage emotions (Wharton 1993). 
Indeed, the mass migration of workers out of factories and homes and into 
shops and other forms of service work has fundamentally altered our under-
standing of emotion.
Given the deep interconnection between culture, structure and emotion, 
it is not surprising that this period of late modernity (Giddens 1991; see also 
Patulny & Olson [Chapter 1], this volume) is also marked by a fundamental 
shift in the way that emotions are thought about in everyday life. Notably, 
this shift is captured in the prevailing sociological approaches to the study of 
emotion. One could argue that the sociology of emotion arose when it did as a 
result of the transition from modernity to late modernity. Because even though 
emotions had long been of interest to sociologists (e.g., Marx, Simmel, Weber 
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and Durkheim), it wasn’t until the late 1970s that sociologists from a variety of 
theoretical and methodological traditions converged on the important role that 
emotion played in everyday life (Smith-Lovin 1995). Taken together, these 
more concentrated approaches seem to reflect the relatively new understand-
ings of emotion that also arose in late modernity – that is, 1) emotions are 
much more complex than they were once believed to be, 2) emotions and 
emotion management are ubiquitous components of everyday life and 3) our 
emotional responses and the strategies we use to manage those responses are 
inextricably linked to our fundamental sense of self-identity. These changes are 
particularly visible with regards to the ways that different traditions of emo-
tional scholarship have approached gender.
In this chapter, I introduce four theoretical and methodological traditions 
that capture these historically, culturally and structurally bound understandings 
of emotion in modern life. I focus, in particular, on how each of these traditions 
deals with gender differences in emotion – not only in terms of its experience – 
but also its expression, its management and its relationship to self-identity. Over 
the last four decades, the sociological understanding of the relationship between 
gender and emotion has become increasingly sophisticated. In some ways, these 
recent re-imaginings of both gender and emotion are simply indicative of the 
current historical moment in which we find ourselves.
Notably, these four perspectives do not represent the totality of sociological 
scholarship on gender and emotion. Instead, they represent a very US-centred 
perspective, which was born out of perspectives and theories originating from 
what US sociologist James House (1977) once referred to as the three faces of 
social psychology.
Regardless of their theoretical or substantive foci, sociologists, as a group, 
have tended to, and continue to, approach the study of gender and emotion 
in one of four ways. The first and probably most well-known approach stems 
primarily from Herbert Blumer’s early formulation of classic symbolic interac-
tion (1937) and Goffman’s (1959) theory of dramaturgy. This approach relies 
disproportionately on qualitative methods, including ethnography, in-depth 
interviews and participant observation. This group focuses on the emergent 
nature of interaction, with particular attention to gendered emotion norms 
(e.g., women are naturally more sympathetic than men or big boys don’t cry) 
that govern both the experience and expression of feeling and how norms are 
negotiated, sustained and resisted within particular contexts.
Although much of this work originated from the study of women in largely 
female-dominated service occupations (see Hochschild 1983), emotional 
reflexivity and emotion management now seem to be nearly ubiquitous in 
modern life. Over the last decade, there has been a spate of studies that focus on 
men’s (and women’s) emotional experiences in a wider range of occupations 
(e.g., Pierce 1995), voluntary activities (e.g., Lois 2003; Vacarro et al. 2011) 
and associations (e.g., Schrock, Holden & Reid 2004) – many of which have 
been historically associated with men (but see Cottingham 2015). Scholars 
Sociological approaches 71
have also begun to problematise their understandings of gender, by taking into 
consideration the ways in which gender interacts with other such characteris-
tics as race, ethnicity, sexuality, social class, education and so on.
A second approach, the group processes approach, is drawn primarily from the 
early insights of Theodore Kemper (1978) and Robert Bales (1950). This body 
of scholarship tends to rely on experimental methods and typically uses small 
convenience samples – often of college students. In a recent introduction to the 
group processes literature, Huey and Lucas (2007) suggest that unlike symbolic 
interactionists, group process theorists are much more interested in the process 
than they are the group – let alone the contexts in which those groups are 
embedded. Generally speaking, group process scholars are interested primarily 
in the roles that status and power play in small-task-oriented groups. Thus, their 
attention to gender is couched predominantly in terms of status characteristics 
(Ridgeway 2011). From this perspective, women, just like other racial, ethnic 
and sexual minorities, engage in more emotion management, including the 
suppression of negative emotions and the expression of positive emotion, as a 
result of their weaker status position vis-à-vis the dominant groups (e.g., men, 
non-Hispanic Whites and heterosexuals [also see Cahill & Eggleston 1994]).
The third perspective stems from the social structure and personality paradigm 
(House 1977). Unlike the previous two approaches, which tend to rely on 
small convenience samples, this approach tends to favour large-scale nation-
ally representative or community-representative survey data. The utilisation of 
large samples and increasingly sophisticated quantitative methods allows scholars 
working in these traditions to control for a variety of individual and contextual 
variables – including sex, which is often construed as gender – as well as interac-
tions between variables.
Although simple group difference analyses of the self-reported experiences 
of women and men fail to capture the complex ways in which gendered pro-
cesses and meanings of emotion unfold over time, they do lend themselves 
to tests of the generalisability of the claims made by their qualitative and/or 
experimentalist peers (e.g., Lively, Steelman & Powell 2008). These approaches 
also allow for the modelling of the effects of culture and structure simultane-
ously in order to provide a more complete picture of the social forces affecting 
the relationship between gender and emotion.
The final approach is affect control theory (Heise 1979). Sitting at the nexus of 
symbolic interaction and group processes (Heise 2007), affect control theory – 
like the other more survey-based approaches to the study of emotion – also has 
the ability to model culture and structure simultaneously. However, instead of 
using static, large-scale datasets, affect control theory relies on a dynamic com-
puter simulation programme, Interact, to model theoretical predictions, which 
have then been substantiated among scholars using a variety of methods, including 
ethnography, surveys, experiments and, most recently, content analysis.
Affect control theory is somewhat unique among theories of emotion, 
because it has the capacity to generate contextually specific, hierarchical 
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interactions across a variety of settings. The theory also provides a unique 
multi-prong strategy for understanding the relationship between sex, gender 
and emotion. Unlike other theories of emotion, which tend to think of emo-
tion predominantly as a signal function (Hochschild 1983) or a social construct 
(Lofland 1985), affect control theory leverages insight from decades of research 
on semantic differentials (Osgood 1964) to highlight systematically gendered 
meanings within culturally shared lexicons of identities, behaviours, attributes 
and settings, as well as systematic differences in men’s and women’s affective 
understandings of particular identities and attributes that are typically invoked 
in discussions of gender and gender inequality (e.g., male, female, woman, 
man, feminine, masculine [Lively & Heise 2014]). Affect control theory uses 
the content of these affective lexicons – also known as sentiment dictionaries 
(Heise 2007) – to make predictions not only about emotions, but also behav-
iours and attributions.
In this chapter, I offer basic overviews of these four different perspectives 
in order to present a more holistic understanding of the sociological study 
of emotion and gender. As evident in the above, questions of culture and 
structure exist throughout all of these perspectives. The true distinction lies in 
matter of degree. Qualitative scholars associated with classic theories of sym-
bolic interaction and dramaturgy tend to put a disproportionate weight on 
culture, whereas group processes scholars tend to put an even more dispro-
portionate focus on structure. Those who approach this topic from a social 
structure and personality perspective and affect control theory have been 
somewhat more successful at balancing the two; however, they currently do 
so at the expense of the specificity or fine-grained detail apparent in the more 
focused approaches.
Again, this chapter is not meant as an exhaustive review on the sociological 
literature of emotion and gender. Rather, its purpose is to illustrate these four 
fundamentally different, yet still complementary, sociological approaches to the 
question at hand. Despite their origins some four decades ago, these approaches 
still lend themselves to answering even the most modern and pressing questions 
facing emotions scholars today. They do so because of their breadth and depth, 
and also because of their reliance on core sociological concepts and social psycho-
logical principles that transcend any particular context or historical epoch. This 
chapter also seeks to illustrate how sociological studies of gender and emotion 
have become more complex, in part to address the changing nature of gender, 
emotional experience, emotional expression and emotion management and the 
role they play in a rapidly changing world where our ability to comport – and 
even to know – ourselves has become increasing challenging and consequent.
Symbolic interaction/dramaturgy
Cultural approaches to the sociological study of gendered emotions are related 
most closely with the theoretical traditions of symbolic interaction (Blumer 
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1937; Mead 1934) and dramaturgy (Goffman 1959). They are typically couched 
in terms in gender differences in terms of emotion culture (e.g., Cancian & 
Gordon 1988), emotion norms (e.g., Hochschild 1979), emotion management 
(ibid.), interpersonal emotion management (e.g., Lois 2003), emotional labour 
(e.g., Pierce 1995) and emotional deviance (e.g., Lois 2013).
One of the strengths of these particular variants of symbolic interaction 
is their focus on the emergent and somewhat unpredictable nature of social 
interaction. Both perspectives, relying on a common metaphor of life as theatre, 
assume that actors interact with one another symbolically in ways that allow 
them to construct shared meaning. Actors adopt roles (e.g., attorney-paralegal, 
husband-wife) that shape, but do not determine, their behaviours and emotions. 
Much of this work illustrates how emotion rules – that is, norms that govern 
the experience and expression of emotion – are created, reified and resisted. A 
growing number of studies reveal how individuals come to be socialised to these 
norms both by individuals and institutions (e.g., Jackson & Wingfield 2013).
Taking gender into account, interactionist and dramaturgical studies reveal 
that women continue to be held to a different set of norms than men when it 
comes to emotional experience, emotional expression and emotion manage-
ment, across a variety of settings. Although it was initially assumed that women 
were more emotional than men, more likely to be subject to display rules and, as 
a result, engage in more emotion management than men – both in their private 
lives and in the workplace – that view is beginning to change. In fact, by the 
mid-1990s, studies began to reveal that men, too, often experienced emotions 
subject to feeling and display rules and also engaged in emotional labour – albeit 
by different means and often towards different ends (Pierce 1995). This new 
understanding of men, as well as women, as emotion managers, is consistent 
with theoretical accounts of the late twentieth century, during which emotion 
management has become a ubiquitous, if not a necessary, aspect of everyday life.
That said, women are still likely to be expected to be more caring and nur-
turing than men across a range of settings (e.g., Lois 2013), and find themselves 
facing situations where they feel obliged to mask feelings of anger, frustration or 
irritation – the form of emotional labour that carries with it the heaviest psycho-
social costs (Erickson & Ritter 2001). In contrast, men are still more likely than 
women to be held to a higher standard of affective neutrality and professionalism 
(e.g., Pierce 1995; Cottingham 2015) and enjoy higher status shields (Hochschild 
1983; Lois 2003), which protect them from the misplaced anger of others.
While this perspective acknowledges that the rules governing social inter-
action – and, subsequently, emotional experience, expression and socialisa-
tion – differ by gender (e.g., Cancian & Gordon 1988), only recently have 
scholars examined how gender interacts with other social factors, such as race 
and social class. However, Durr and Wingfield’s (2011) work on African-
American professional women and Jackson and Wingfield’s (2013) study of 
Black men in predominantly White colleges highlight intersectionality as an 
important new area for emotions scholars to continue to explore.
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Additionally, sociologists who study emotion and gender are slowly turning 
their attention to the emotional lives of individuals living outside of the tradi-
tional gender binary. Schrock, Boyd and Leaf’s (2009) analysis of the emotion 
management strategies of male-to-female transsexuals, for one, documents the 
emotional pitfalls of passing as well as a temporal aspect of emotion manage-
ment that, for the most part, had been overlooked in other qualitative studies; 
Nordmarken (2011) used autoethnography in order to analyse very compre-
hensively the interpersonal aspects of transgender life. In a series of deeply 
personal vignettes, Nordmarken’s personal narrative details what it felt like and 
what it meant to navigate everyday interactions in a gender-ambiguous body in 
ways that resulted in moments of both social rejection and connection.
Group processes
Unlike the cultural perspective, which focuses on the role of culture and 
norms, the structural perspective focuses almost exclusively on the effects of 
structure. Much of this tradition can be traced back to Robert Bales’ (1950) 
early work on group processes, as well as Theodore Kemper’s (1978) social 
interactional theory of emotion. An early pioneer in the sociological study of 
emotion, Kemper posited that most emotions could be determined by two 
fundamental dimensions governing social interactions: power and status. Power 
refers to one’s ability to get someone to do something against their will (Weber 
2010), while status has more to do with issues of deference and demeanour 
(Goffman 1959).
Many of the theories that arose from Kemper’s early observations of power 
and status – known as group process theories – were developed in laboratory 
settings, relying on undergraduate students. This methodology allows research-
ers to hold culture constant and to focus on the more structural mechanisms 
underlying emotional experience (e.g., Kemper 1978) and expression (Huey & 
Lucas 2007). Just like many cultural theorists tend to under-theorise structure, 
more structural theorists tend to under-theorise when it comes to culture (but 
see Ridgeway & Johnson 1990). That said, in recent years, many of the basic 
tenets of group research have been replicated – if not problematised – in more 
naturalistic settings (see below).
Because group processes scholars tend to focus on status and power, their 
explanations of gender stem from the differences of power and status between 
women and men. As a result, these scholars are less likely to theorise about 
gender, per se. Indeed, most of the theories in this tradition, much like more 
psychological approaches, assume that when anyone – male or female – does 
not get their expectations met, fails to receive their fair share, perceives an unjust 
distribution of rewards and punishments or feels like they got the short (or long) 
end of an exchange, they respond in ways that are patterned and predictable (but 
see Cecilia Ridgeway’s [2006] theory of socio-emotional behaviour and status, 
which draws heavily from Hochschild’s [1979] notion of feelings rules).
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More recently, von Scheve and colleagues (2013) have begun developing 
a multidisciplinary theory on collective emotions, which has the potential to 
run the gamut from small groups, such as those described here, to larger-scale 
collective action and social movements. They define collective emotions as 
‘the synchronous convergence in affective responding across individuals towards a 
specific event or object’ (von Scheve & Ismer 2013, p. 406, emphasis origi-
nal). Given that this perspective takes into account face-to-face encounters, 
culture and shared knowledge and identification with a social collective, this 
approach provides a valuable lens through which to better understand the 
myriad of ways in which gender shapes emotional response in an increasingly 
complex and interconnected world (see Kivran-Swain & Naaman 2014 for 
one example).
Social structure and personality
Unlike the group processes literature, which relies mostly on experimental 
data collected from college students, those who approach gender differences 
in emotion from a social structure and personality framework tend to rely on 
large-scale, nationally representative data. Again, this approach allows scholars 
to control for numerous factors simultaneously, such as sex, race and various 
markers of socio-economic standing, as well as important social roles.
This approach also allows scholars to tease apart different types of emotional 
and individual outcomes (Erickson & Ritter 2001) that may be obscured when 
using other methods. Whereas most of the quantitative work in this tradition 
conflates gender with sex out of necessity (e.g., Simon & Lively 2010; Simon 
& Nath 2004), some scholars have successfully incorporated other markers of 
gender into their analyses, including self-reports of femininity, masculinity and 
feminist-orientation (e.g., Erickson 2005; also see Kroska 1997).
Using data from the 1996 General Social Survey (GSS) emotion module, 
Simon and Nath (2004) tested cultural and structural theories of emotion. 
Their multivariate analysis revealed that women and men were more similar 
than they were different when it came to emotional experience. Once a range 
of socio-demographic factors (e.g., race, age, education, family income) and 
significant social statuses (e.g., employment, marital and parental) were held 
constant, there were very few significant differences in women’s and men’s 
self-reported emotional experiences. The only significant differences in men’s 
and women’s emotions, once structural conditions were held constant, were 
women’s higher rates of self-reported distress and anger. Notably, anger is an 
emotion that cultural sociologists typically associate with males (Simon & Nath 
2004; see also Sorial [Chapter 9], this volume). They also found significant dif-
ferences in the ways that women and men chose to manage their anger. These 
findings, taken together, shifted the conversation on gender and emotion 
by drawing sociological attention to men’s previously undocumented emo-
tional experiences, and to their unique and, in some ways, gendered means 
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of emotion management (see also Simon & Lively’s [2010] investigation of 
the relationship between women’s more intense and enduring anger and self-
reported distress; using the same data, they found that women’s higher rates 
of distress disappeared once intensity and duration of anger were controlled).
Also leveraging the 1996 GSS, Lively and Powell (2006) examined the rela-
tive effects of setting, status and sex on emotional expression. They found that 
individuals are more likely to express anger directly to family members, rather 
than people from work; they are also more likely to express anger directly to 
those of lower status, regardless of the context in which their anger occurred. 
Notably, the effects of context and status on emotional expression were roughly 
the same. They also found that once the constraining effects of setting and sta-
tus were controlled, sex differences disappeared.
Turning their attention to the emotional costs of inequity in the home, Lively, 
Steelman and Powell (2010) examined the effects of perceived inequity in the 
household division of labour on a range of emotional states (e.g., tranquillity, pride, 
self-reproach, anger, fear and distress [Lively & Heise 2004]). In keeping with basic 
tenets of equity theory, which predicts that individuals are likely to experience 
rather undifferentiated negative emotions when they experience an inequity in 
either direction (Walster et al. 1978), they also found that emotional responses to 
perceived inequity were dependent upon the direction of the perceived inequity, 
and the emotion under consideration (Kemper 1978), as well as sex.
More specifically, under-benefiting is positively associated with distress, rage 
and anger, whereas over-benefiting is positively associated with distress, fear 
and self-reproach. Moreover, men were more likely to experience feelings of 
anger or rage when experiencing perceptions of under-benefiting, whereas 
women were more likely to experience feelings of fear and self-reproach when 
experiencing perceptions of over-benefiting. These findings speak to the com-
plexity of emotional experience – even those related to basic social psycho-
logical processes – in contexts where structural and cultural changes may be 
occurring at differential rates.
In a more recent analysis of population-based findings – this time those 
from Kahnenman and Krueger’s (2006) Princeton Time and Affect Control 
Survey – Patulny (2015) argues that the choice of emotions measured in sur-
veys matters in determining subjective wellbeing in proximal contexts such as 
those in which gender is known to play an important role. Patulny’s case study 
analysis reveals that tiredness and interest (emotions that are excluded from 
Kahneman and Kruger’s wellbeing construct and did not fit within Ortony, 
Collins and Clore’s (1988) classification of emotion, which served as gate-
keeper for which emotions were included the in the aforementioned GSS 
emotions module [1996]) explain a large part of US women’s, but not men’s, 
dissatisfaction within the domains of education, unpaid housework and child-
care. Patulny’s work suggests that scholars in this tradition perhaps should 
incorporate more audit studies of emotions, instead of simply relying on a 
priori – albeit theoretically based – classifications of emotion.
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Affect control theory
Perhaps more than any other sociological theory of emotion, affect control 
theory (ACT) spans the theoretical and empirical gap between the cultural and 
structural perspectives. It also has one of the most highly developed understand-
ings of the complexity of emotion and affect (Heise 2007; Heise & McKinnon 
2010). Generally speaking, ACT assumes that individuals are motivated to cre-
ate events that affirm their affective meanings about the key elements of social 
events – that is, actors, behaviours, settings, traits and emotion (Heise 2007). 
The theory posits that each individual involved in social interaction carries 
two affective meanings: a stable fundamental sentiment, based on the individu-
al’s identity in the situation (combined with the individual’s salient traits and 
mood), and a transient impression that varies with events. The theory assumes 
that fundamental sentiments are culturally shared, although studies reveal some 
subcultural variations among specific identities (e.g., Hunt 2010).
For instance, a mother interacting with a child is motivated to engage in 
behaviours or thoughts that confirm her fundamental sentiments about mothers 
as well as her fundamental sentiments about children. Individuals achieve this by 
acting or cognitively reframing events in ways that move transient sentiments 
closer to fundamental sentiments. The theory is based on a necessary assumption 
concerning semantic differentials (Heise 1979; Osgood 1964). The essence of 
roles, behaviours, settings and emotions can be captured in three-dimensional 
ratings of words, gathered into culturally specific dictionaries. Roles, behav-
iours, settings and emotions are all rated on three dimensions – evaluation, 
potency and activity (EPA) – using the scale −4 to +4, with neutral. For exam-
ple, a mother has an EPA (evaluation-potency-activity) profile of 3.12, 2.98, 
1.44, meaning that the identity is viewed as extremely good, quite potent and 
slightly inactive. In contrast, feeling enraged has an EPA profile of 1.89, 0.76, 
1.98, meaning that this emotion feels quite bad, slightly potent and quite active.
Although affect control theory was developed initially as a theory of iden-
tity, where discrete emotion was deemed an interactional by-product of 
identity confirmation processes, several theoretical innovations moved the 
consideration of emotion front-and-centre (Smith-Lovin & Heise 1988), 
including the recent specification of an emotion model (Lively & Heise 2014). 
Affect control theory’s emotion model allows for predictions of a wide range 
of specific, discrete emotions based on the evaluation, potency and activation 
of one’s identity, coupled with the valence of one’s transient sentiment in any 
given event (Lively & Heise 2014).
Affect control theory offers currently underutilised insight to important group 
differences in emotionality in several ways (Lively & Heise 2014). For example, 
although the majority of the identities, behaviours, attributes and emotions are 
culturally shared, there are significant sex differences in the EPA profiles of par-
ticular identities, behaviours, attributes, settings and emotions, including those 
that are most often gendered (e.g., waiter versus waitress), as well as those that 
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deal specifically with gender (e.g., men versus women). For instance, women 
are more likely to hold more positive and powerful affective sentiments towards 
the identity of ‘woman’ or ‘female’ compared to those held by men.
Another way that affect control theory allows us to explore gender differences 
in affect and emotion is through a consideration of gendered roles. For instance, 
many of the social role identities that are culturally associated with women, 
whether they are in the private or public sphere, are viewed as slightly more 
positive, less powerful and more active than their counterparts that are culturally 
associated with men (e.g., grandmother versus grandfather, mother versus father, 
daughter versus son, waitress versus waiter, hostess versus host etc.). Finally, even 
marking an identity that has historically been occupied by men as being held by a 
female increases the evaluation and reduces the potency of the role. For instance, 
the EPA profile for an attorney is 0.30, 2.45, 1.92, whereas the EPA profile for 
a female attorney is 2.94, 1.69, 1.67. This change in profile alters the types of 
emotion that the individual is expected to feel (Lively & Heise, 2004), and also 
the amount of emotional labour they are likely to engage in, in order to maintain 
the fundamental sentiments associated with their role.1
Perhaps the most explicitly gendered analysis of emotion that has arisen from 
this perspective is Lively’s discussion of gendered differences in emotional seg-
ueing (2008). Building off previous work with David Heise (2004), Lively pre-
sents a map of emotional segues (paths of emotion management) for women 
and men. She found that women’s shortest paths between the most negative 
(e.g., distress, fear and anger) and most positive emotions (e.g., tranquillity and 
joy) are longer and more complicated than those most common to men. That 
is, the majority of women’s shortest paths require transitioning through segue-
ing emotions – sometimes more than one – and typically rely on emotions that 
have been culturally associated with women or seen, historically, as feminine 
(see Lively 2008 for more detail). Lively’s analysis also revealed that emotional 
segues occurred along the three affective dimensions – evaluation, potency and 
activation – upon which affect control theory (Heise 2007) is based, provid-
ing an important empirical and theoretical link to Hochschild’s (1983) theory 
of emotion management (also see Boyle & McKinzie 2015). This work also 
reveals a more nuanced understanding of the underlying affective structure of 
men’s and women’s emotions and why it is that women’s emotion manage-
ment tends to be more externalised, long-lasting and difficult compared to that 
of their male counterparts.
Conclusion
Since its inception nearly 40 years ago, the sociology of emotion has been 
attuned to the fact that women and men occupy different emotional realities 
that are shaped, in large part, by the structural, cultural and historical moment 
in which they live. Whereas women’s and men’s emotional lives were once 
seen as rigidly demarcated due to their embeddedness in separate spheres of 
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daily life, more modern assessments reflect the understanding that men and 
women are now more similar than they used to be. They also reflect a growing 
appreciation for the ubiquitousness of emotion and its management in every-
day life, as well as its inextricable relationship with identity. This is especially 
true in light of changing norms about gender, as well as gender itself, and its 
intersections with other equally important socio-demographic characteristics 
(e.g., race and social class) and ways of being.
The sociological approach to this topic, which occurred contemporaneously 
with the shift from modernity to late modernity, was developed as an attempt 
to understand how historically specific cultural norms around gender and social 
structural arrangements shape emotional experience. As might be expected, 
some have focused disproportionately on the cultural end of the continuum, 
providing rich, detailed accounts of individuals’ lives within specific social set-
tings, while others have focused more on structural differences, by specify-
ing interactional processes that are generalisable across contexts. Others, still, 
have attempted to theorise and model the effects of both culture and structure 
simultaneously. This latter group, in particular, offer compelling support for 
Ridgeway’s (2011) claims that gender differences in interaction – of which 
emotional experience and expression is a small but integral part – are, in fact, 
cultural responses to ongoing structural conditions.
Over the last few decades, some scholars have argued that as our society 
changes at an increasing rate, be it through mobilisation, hyper-connectivity, 
demographic shifts or the changing nature of institutions – including the very 
notion of gender itself – current sociological theories of gender and emotions 
may no longer be equipped to capture the growing complexity of individuals’ 
emotional lives (see Heise & MacKinnon [2010] for a recent review). While 
it is true that the genesis of many of these sociological theories occurred in the 
1970s, before the shift from modernity to late modernity was truly underway, 
nothing could be further from the truth.
The theoretical underpinnings of sociological studies of gender and emotion 
are based in a deep understanding of culture, structure and basic social psycho-
logical processes that are simultaneously specific and generalisable. In other 
words, the social psychological process of the ways in which individuals take 
on the role of the other and attempt to manage their own and others’ emotions 
in ways that confirm both their fundamental sense of self is the same whether 
it happens in face-to-face interactions or in online communities. To be sure, 
the details of that process might look different if that individual is a Black cis-
gender woman or a Latinx transgender man, but those are empirical questions. 
And, when answered, they will undoubtedly advance current understandings 
of intersectionality and emotion in a way that shifts or expands our theoretical 
perspectives and deepens our appreciation of the basic processes associated with 
identity, equity, exchange and group behaviour.
And while it may be true that the foundational institutions that sociologists 
have studied for decades – including work, family and gender itself – are also 
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changing at a rate unprecedented in modern history, they will undoubtedly 
continue to have norms associated with them that will continue to guide emo-
tions and emotional expressions, just as they continue to have – and likely will 
always have – status hierarchies based on socially agreed upon status characteris-
tics, which allow some people greater freedom over their emotional expressions 
while simultaneously denying similar rights to others. And there will always be 
individuals who adhere to those norms perfectly in ways that reify whatever 
status structure exists at the time, and some who rail against and reshape them in 
both subtle and not-so-subtle acts of resistance.
Note
1 These values are based on the female data, collected at Indiana University in 
2002–2004.
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Chapter 6
Loneliness and love in  
late modernity
Sites of tension and resistance
Nicholas Hookway,  Barbara Barbosa N e v e s , 
Adrian Frankl in and Roger Patulny
Introduction
Loneliness is one of the most important emotions to be impacted by the rise 
of late modernity. As noted in Chapter 1 (Patulny & Olson), late modernity is 
transforming the way people relate to each other, not only in terms of separating 
them from each other, but in creating novel spaces to form new connections. 
Anthony Giddens (1991; 1992) describes the transformation of intimacy, and 
Zygmunt Bauman (2005) the liquefaction of traditional ties and social bonds. 
However, inasmuch as these changes might render us lonelier than ever, they 
also offer the opportunity for acts of resistance, and to form new social con-
nections that may reduce loneliness. To understand this, we must recognise the 
difference between social and emotional loneliness (Weiss 1982), which has 
been conceptualised as the difference between actual contact with others versus 
a perceived lack of sufficient contact with others. Loneliness is more likely to be 
ameliorated from the making and maintaining of good quality connections with 
others than from merely building more social connections (Franklin 2012).
It is in observing this qualitative difference between contact and connection, 
and between the social and emotional conceptions of loneliness, that the com-
plexity of late modern loneliness starts to become apparent. Patulny and Olson 
(Chapter 1) argue that late modernity is characterised by emotional complexity, 
whereby we have new understandings of older emotions, and we have the advent 
of new complex emotions and emotional dynamics. This complexity is revealed 
in the recognition that the experience and emotional management of loneli-
ness are shaped by social-structural conditions such as gender and age (Franklin 
& Tranter 2011; Patulny & Wong 2012; Flood 2005; Stanley et al. 2010), but 
are also improved by increasing reflexive analysis and new forms of agency. 
Emotional reflexivity is a key element of late modernity, both for individuals 
seeking to understand and manage their emotions (Holmes 2010; Burkitt 2012) 
and within the greater macro-reflexive discourse of society about emotions as a 
whole (Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1).
Loneliness, in both these senses, is beginning to lose its stigma. We now 
recognise it as a social condition in need of de-stigmatisation, and in need of 
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new and innovative treatment methods. In this chapter, we consider three key 
sites that highlight the complexity of loneliness in late modernity. More spe-
cifically, we address how loneliness is being reshaped by wider social changes 
in love and intimacy, within digital media and within human-animal relations. 
We show how these sites are spaces of tension, both enabling the conditions 
of loneliness, but also offering new means of connection and agency for deal-
ing with loneliness. Cutting through the discussion is a wider recognition of 
the complexity of late modern loneliness, as it is reshaped by wider processes 
of individualisation, consumerism, mediatisation and increasing reflexivity 
(Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1).
Love and loneliness in late modernity
Changes in love and intimacy provide a central site to explore the emotional 
complexity of loneliness in late modern life. Contemporary theorists such as 
Bauman (2003; 2007) and Illouz (2012) declare that loneliness is endemic 
as intimate relationships become the focus of self-fulfilment and take on an 
individualistic and consumeristic quality. Bauman argues that the consumer 
endeavour ‘for new and improved attractions’ means contemporary relation-
ships have a limited shelf life, being always vulnerable to the urge to ‘upgrade’ 
in the search for the next ‘peak’ or ‘big bang’ moment (Bauman 2007, p. 106). 
The result is that people become more vulnerable to loneliness as relationships 
are uprooted and love becomes a vehicle for sensation and pleasure rather than 
enduring commitment and living for the Other (Bauman 2003).
Illouz (2012) is equally pessimistic about finding and making meaningful 
love bonds in contemporary life, particularly for women. Illouz (2012, p. 247) 
argues that romantic love in late modernity is not just a cultural ideal, but has 
become ‘a social foundation for the self’. Love is a key site in which the self is 
validated and valued, especially for women who may not have had the same 
opportunities for identity and meaning through career and paid work. Illouz 
(2012, p. 163) claims that love has become ‘the object of endless investigation, 
self-knowledge and self-scrutiny’, mediated via a constant supply of media and 
expert advice. The problem for Illouz is that while love is set up as a path 
to self-fulfilment – to finding yourself – the intensive, reflexive introspection 
and self-analysis creates ambivalence and a distrust of one’s own feelings and 
desires. Ambivalence is thus a new and defining emotional characteristic of 
contemporary love relationships.
Following Bauman (2003) and Illouz (2007), we theorise two main ways 
that emotions of ambivalence in love are transforming the late modern expe-
rience of loneliness. First, the consumer framing and intensive self-scrutiny 
that now characterises intimacy can heighten feelings of restlessness, ambiva-
lence and loneliness within relationships. Contemporary subjects may rejoice 
in the freedom of relationships ‘loosely tied’ but face the anxiety not only 
of their own disposability but of overlooking relationship ‘use-by dates’ 
Loneliness and love in late modernity 85
(Bauman 2003, p. 5). Ambivalence may not necessarily trigger a relationship 
termination, but it may be enough to destabilise the perceived quality of the 
partnership and thus create feelings of disconnection and loneliness.
Second, while ambivalence may create desires to leave a partner, fears 
of loneliness may handbrake such decisions. Bauman’s theory of liquid love 
insists on a relentless culture of moving on, but this overlooks how people may 
choose not to leave relationships due to concerns about impending loneliness. 
It is well established that partners may choose to stay together for the sake 
of children – even to the point of creating parenting marriages (Larson 2015) – 
but what is less well known is how partners may choose not to end unions 
due to ambient fears of loneliness. Following Bauman (2003), we argue that 
late modern relationships are beset by an emotional tension between risk and 
reward, between consumer desire for new sensations and pleasures and social 
risks of loneliness and isolation.
Although Bauman (2003) and Illouz (2012) theorise love as a source of 
lonely ambivalence, recent transformations in intimacy also provide hope for 
pure relationships to be a source of greater social and emotional connection. 
Giddens is arguably the spokesperson for this more positive assessment of rela-
tionship change, suggesting less rather than more loneliness as an outcome of 
changing practices of intimacy. If we cast a critical eye back on the modern 
period, though, with its abundance of traditional social connections, we can 
wonder about the degree to which these networks fostered meaningful con-
nections. Giddens (1992) argues that the pure relationship offers emancipation 
from oppressive, alienating and often materially dependent institutions such as 
marriage, particularly for women and those of diverse sexualities. Increasing 
mutual self-disclosure and an enjoyment of each other’s unique talents, albeit 
in tension with the voluntary nation of the union, creates the possibility for 
closer, more connected and less lonely relationships. The in-built fragility of 
the relationship is read not as the cause for anxiety and ambivalence as in 
Bauman, but optimistically as part of the very promise of intimacy and open-
ness in changing social conditions. While Giddens has been critiqued on a 
number of levels, including overplaying the emancipation of women from tra-
ditionally gendered roles (Jameison 1999) and missing how ‘pure relations’ still 
benefit men more than women (Illouz 2012), he deserves attention in terms of 
thinking through how changes in relationships are reshaping expressions and 
experiences of loneliness.
Further, by coupling Giddens with theorists such as Charles Taylor (1992), 
we can more optimistically theorise how love may resist loneliness through the 
identity work of mutual care and intimacy. Rather than the shift to personal 
relationships as a site for self-exploration being read as selfish or disappoint-
ing, we can see this as a positive development, which enables the creation of 
more satisfying, democratic, equal and trusting connections. Taylor (1992), 
for example, suggests that love is a centrepoint for self-fulfilment in a cul-
ture of authenticity. Rather than an example of narcissism or disappointment, 
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Taylor underlines the social, relational and moral dimensions of love relation-
ships and its links to identity-formation (Hookway 2017). Unlike the callous 
presentation by Bauman – deleting, moving on, forgetting – the search for 
intimacy is crucial to people’s lives and even if a relationship ends, this is a 
painful and morally fraught process. Love helps us discover our self, but it is 
a discovery performed in evaluative relationships about how others are faring 
and whether they are suffering or flourishing (Taylor 1992; Sayer 2011). One 
might argue that the feeling of love provides an instinctive signal as to the 
important quality of a relationship, and the need to maintain it so as to avoid 
emotional (if not social) loneliness. It is this shift from Bauman’s consumer 
‘connection’ to deep and sacrificial ‘relationships’ that offers solutions to emo-
tional loneliness (Bauman 2013, p. 62).
There is also a wider literature that critiques reflexive modernist argu-
ments that love has become increasingly short-term and ‘until-further-notice’ 
(Holmes 2016, p. 74; Smart 2007) based on empirical and theoretical grounds. 
A significant portion of empirical research shows that people still do largely 
remain in long-term committed partnerships and seek enduring, caring and 
committed relationships (Hobbs, Owen & Gerber 2017; Holmes 2017; Smart 
2007). The more evident churn is concentrated in the early part of the life-
course, with younger people more likely to explore and experiment with 
intimate relationships and identity than older age groups (Halpern-Meekin, 
Manning, Giordano & Longmore 2013). Furthermore, theorists suggest the 
contemporary West is still enthralled by the idea of soul-mate love (Carroll 
2001). This refers to the idea that there is the one out there, our other half, who 
will complete us and make us whole. While the search for the elusive grand 
amour can feed a liquid culture of moving-on, it also resonates with recent 
critiques of the individualisation thesis (Holmes 2010; Smart 2007). Theorists 
such as Holmes (2016) and Smart (2007) argue that intimate relationships have 
changed, but remain central to people’s lives. As Holmes (2016) points out, 
change does not mean decline and a pessimistic assessment that relationships 
now are simply about self-satisfaction. As intimate, social beings, we rely on 
care and support from others to buffer us against loneliness, but this now occurs 
within diverse family and intimate arrangements, and manifests through new 
digitally mediated relational interfaces. We turn now to examine how the rise 
of Internet-based forms of communication – and more recently social media 
networks – are re-shaping the practices of intimacy, and the potential role they 
may play in exacerbating or ameliorating loneliness.
Social media and loneliness
The proliferation of digital devices and social media platforms play a key 
role in debates about increasing loneliness in late modernity. The rise of 
user-generated communication technologies dovetail with broader analyses 
of the changing contours of identity and community in late modern times. 
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For theorists like Bauman (2007) and Turkle (2013; 2015), social media is a 
worrying trend that is making us lonelier. Bauman argues that the consumer 
quality of new communications sees connections replace relationships as social 
bonds become short-term and brittle. In Bauman’s terms, the Internet is a 
‘disconnection-on-demand’ service that is part of a wider story about how 
processes of individualisation and consumption are weakening contemporary 
social bonds (p. 107). Similarly, Turkle (2011) argues we are alone together as 
technology makes it easier to remain apart and offers the illusion of compan-
ionship without the demands. In our ‘robotic moment’, machinery is replacing 
human labour, including ‘love’s labour’ (Turkle, p. 106), and weakening rela-
tionships: ‘[. . .] we are together but so lessen our expectations of other people 
that we can feel utterly alone’ (p. 154).
How social, then, is social media? Is it making us lonelier? We need to be 
wary, here, of technological determinism (Mauthner & Kazimierczak 2018; Wyatt 
2008), whereby technology is over-empowered to direct social change, with 
little room for human agency and it ‘absolves us from responsibility for the 
technology we make and use’ (Wyatt 2008, p. 169). Sociologists of technol-
ogy have been critical of dystopian and utopian approaches to technology on 
these grounds. While the Internet has been blamed for creating loneliness, 
isolation and weakening social bonds (Bauman 2007; Turkle 2011; Twenge 
2017), empirical research points to a more complex picture of the relationship 
between the Internet, social media and loneliness.
Arguments that the Internet causes loneliness have become almost academic 
folklore, despite mixed findings. Much of this can be traced to Kraut et al.’s (1998) 
longitudinal study of American households in 1995–1996, who advanced the 
so-called Internet paradox based on findings that online communication was asso-
ciated with declines in face-to-face communication with household members, 
reductions in social network size and an increase in depression and loneliness. 
Despite the limitations of the original study (derived from a sample of university 
students at a time of low Internet penetration) and the fact that following studies – 
including by the same authors in 1998–1999 (Kraut et al. 2002) – did not reveal 
the same negative effects, the association between loneliness and the Internet 
remained a concern for scholars, media pundits and politicians, leading to studies 
specifically on this relationship (Amichai-Hamburger & Hayat 2011).
Further research challenges this isolating thesis of digital life, and provides 
contrary evidence that the Internet can serve as a mechanism for producing new 
forms of agency for those who feel lonely, and for those who want to maintain/
supplement their social connectedness. For example, Amichai-Hamburger and 
Ben-Artzi (2003) reveal that lonely people use the Internet more regularly than 
non-lonely people, concluding that it is lonely people who are attracted to 
using the Internet, rather than Internet usage that causes loneliness. Morahan-
Martin and Schumacher (2003) have also shown that lonely individuals used the 
Internet more for emotional support than non-lonely individuals, as they are 
more likely to make friends online and use the Internet to cope with negative 
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experiences – though they were also more likely to report that the Internet 
disrupted their daily lives. These overall findings were further corroborated 
by nationally and internationally representative studies demonstrating that the 
Internet improves the social lives of users (Amichai-Hamburger & Hayat 2011; 
Rainie & Wellman 2012). The general theme of this research was that rather 
than seeing the online world as supplanting offline relationships, it can enhance 
them by adding another layer of social interactivity.
However, richer understandings of types of use and socio-technical contexts 
that can both facilitate and inhibit loneliness remain underexplored. It is impor-
tant, then, that we pay attention to specific Internet use, such as social media 
or social networking sites, which uncovers convergent and divergent patterns. 
On the one hand, similar to general Internet use, a recent meta-analysis sup-
ports a causal model whereby loneliness significantly increases Facebook use 
(Song et al. 2014). Lonely people, in several Western and East Asian countries, 
use Facebook for social compensation, coping and social needs (Lee, Noh & 
Koo 2013; Song et al. 2014). On the other hand, data on young people shows 
inconsistent findings and complexity based on levels of loneliness and types of 
social media use (Frison & Eggermont 2015). The research needs to be nuanced 
to how people are using platforms such as Facebook, rather than talking about 
the Internet in blanket terms, to best understand the relationship between social 
media use and loneliness.
For example, Frison and Eggermont (2015) found in a longitudinal study 
investigating passive and active Facebook use (i.e., viewing content without direct 
exchanges between users versus interactions between users) that loneliness among 
young people predicted both types of use but with different consequences over 
time. Active Facebook use resulted in positive outcomes for lonely people, whereas 
passive viewing led to harmful effects on wellbeing, originating poor-get-richer 
and poor-get-poorer effects (Frison & Eggermont 2015). Active use seems to 
address both emotional and social loneliness, while passive use helps with social 
loneliness (e.g., number of contacts/relationships) but not necessarily with secur-
ing quality relationships and, thus, with alleviating emotional loneliness. This 
explains why the authors find a decreased perceived level of friend support over 
time for those engaged in passive Facebook use (Frison & Eggermont 2015). 
Other studies also reveal that different levels of social inclusion and gratification 
are attained from social media depending on the initial loneliness of the user 
(López et al. 2017). Types of social media can also play a differential role among 
young people; image-based social media, such as Instagram, are associated with 
less-lonely users (Pittman & Reich 2016). There is also a significant decrease in 
loneliness for users of image-based social media, as these platforms seem to pro-
vide a sense of immediacy and intimacy through images/videos that facilitate social 
presence and communication; text-based platforms (Twitter) seem to provide 
immediacy, but not intimacy (Pittman & Reich 2016).
Although research on the topic has been mainly on young people, interest in 
older adults has increased because these age groups are more likely to experience 
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loneliness (Wright-Bevans 2018; Neves et al. 2017). Such studies are still incon-
clusive, but scholars agree that targeted and co-designed technology seems critical 
for adoption and success of communication technologies to address loneliness in 
old age (Khosravi, Rezvani & Wiewiora 2016; Neves, Waycott & Malta 2018).
In contrast to the sweeping and one-sided positions that scholars such as 
Bauman and Turkle provide, there is an emerging consensus on the impor-
tance of a comprehensive and contextualised understanding of technology and 
loneliness. We argue that there is strong evidence that social media and digital 
technologies can work as a site to counter loneliness, but we need to nuance 
our claims. People progressively use technology to be/stay more connected, 
but that connectedness depends on socio-technical affordances (positive or 
negative, contingent on context), types of use, frequency of use, gratifications 
derived from usage, circumstances of loneliness and quality of relationships. As 
such, we argue that it is essential to deconstruct the technological determinism 
surrounding the links between sociotechnical systems, loneliness and social con-
nectedness. Understanding how humans use technology invites us to consider 
the assemblage of human and non-human actions, how humans interface with 
the ‘distributed agency’ (Bennett 2010, p. 38) of things and objects to produce 
different configurations of sociability and loneliness. Considering the non-
human leads us to consider our final site, in which both loneliness is registered 
and potentially resisted in late modernity – changing human-animal relations, 
more specifically the growth of companion animals.
Companion animals and loneliness
Sociology has increasingly recognised animals as new and significant social and 
moral actors in the contemporary West. New emotional relationships with 
animals can be located as part of a widescale de-centring of human-animal rela-
tions in conditions of late modernity. While modern human-animal relations 
were based on relations of instrumentality and measures of industrial progress, 
late modernity created new opportunities for intimate and close relations based 
on a diverse set of ‘de-differentiated’ sentiment, affection and emotional care 
(Franklin 1999, p. 45; Macnaghten 2004). In late modernity, humans increas-
ingly entered into close and emotional relationships with animals (Franklin 
1999), shining a spotlight on changing human bonds and an entirely new way 
to address loneliness.
Franklin (1998) argued that companion animal ownership has been rising dra-
matically since the 1960s, and that a large number of people have spontaneously 
changed the nature of their relationship with animals as a result of the weakening 
of human social bonds. In retrospect, we can understand this as a means of resisting 
the onset or the persistence of rising levels of loneliness. From the humanisation 
of animal naming strategies to funerals, burial practices and loss counselling for 
companion species, these shifts appeared to track a progressive weakening and 
fragility of human social bonds, growing levels of loneliness (Flood 2005) and the 
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strengthening and normalisation of emotional and familial social bonds with com-
panion species (Beck & Katcher 1983; Soares 1985; Council for Science and 
Society 1988; Franklin 2006; Haraway 2003; 2008; Berkoff 2017).
Growing human-animal closeness can be interpreted as a symptom of 
weakening social relationships, but can it also be read as a way to counteract 
loneliness? Could the mere company of animals ameliorate human loneliness, 
an emotional condition so often defined by the loss of human social affirmation 
and belonging (Mellor et al. 2008)? We are social animals and so are compan-
ion animals, and together we are social symbiotes, but to what extent are we 
interchangeable socially, such that human loneliness might be alleviated or 
even cancelled by companionate relationships with other animals?
Part of the answer to these questions concerns whether bonds with compan-
ion animals provides a sense of belonging to a social entity. When asked what 
motivated people to obtain companion species and whether they regarded 
their (cat, dog, bird) ‘as a member of your family?’ (Franklin 2006, p. ??), most 
respondents indicated that they selected pets for companionship for themselves 
and children, and ascribed them family membership. To see whether this was 
more than anthropomorphic sentimentality – and was in fact a case of the 
formation of meaningful human-animal family households – respondents were 
also asked whether their companion animals were allowed into the more inti-
mate, familial spaces typically restricted to non-human family members. Many 
respondents claimed that companion animals were allowed in their bedroom 
(over 50%); in their children’s bedroom (35%), on their furniture (48%), in the 
family room or lounge (66%), in the room where they eat (62%) and into the 
kitchen (66%). There was also evidence that more socially vulnerable groups 
(under-20s; singles; divorced and separated; those aged 70+) were more liberal 
in their sharing of household space. This was a dramatic shift from times when, 
for example, dogs were ‘kennelled’ outside the home.
The symbolism of household space needs to be emphasised here. Bedrooms 
are largely highly private spaces, the inner sanctum of privatised societies. Partners, 
close friends and siblings and other close family members form the restricted 
group of intimates use bedrooms together. So, in this sense, when people in our 
survey stated that an animal was both a member of the family and allowed into 
their bedroom, it was a refined answer indicating that they are very intimate 
family members. Sitting rooms in modern homes are places of social gathering 
and communal activities. Chairs symbolise both belonging and status in Western 
cultures and to be seated together means to be equally ranked. The discovery that 
half of those interviewed allowed their animals on furniture represents a major 
shift in the emotional social space of human-animal relations, and it is hard not to 
see some kind of substitution being played out (Franklin 2006).
Because human social bonds and belonging are often expressed and affirmed 
through embodied sensual/emotional modalities, and that many of these engage-
ments have been compromised by weaker social bonds (Dahlberg 2007) and 
quantum over quality of connections, it is likely that more people have turned to 
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companion species to address their fear and experience of emotional loneliness. 
After all, companion animals are social animals that also affirm and strengthen 
bonds through close and embodied attention, constant eye contact, haptic com-
munication and extended periods of attentiveness (Haraway et al. 1998; Franklin 
2016). As Bauman (2000), Mellor et al. (2008) and Franklin et al. (2018) argue, 
loneliness has been caused largely by a reduction in the quality rather than the 
quantity of human social bonds, and it is these embodied forms of attention and 
the time given over to them that lonely people consistently lack, rather than social 
contact per se. More significantly, dogs and cats have co-evolved alongside humans, 
and have developed communicative and physiological connections with humans 
that provided adaptive possibilities for the changing conditions of human intimacy 
in late modernity (Nicastro 2004; Haraway 2008; Kikusui 2017). As social bonds 
became increasingly fugitive and ‘until-further-notice’ (Bauman 2000, p. 82), 
companion species became a putative source of unconditional love and embodied 
attention that people craved. But did their pets really love them? While anthropo-
morphism has a real enough basis in human imaginaries, it is no longer accepted 
that close bonds between humans, cats, dogs and birds are merely imaginary or 
fanciful (Salmon & Salmon 1983; Soares 1985; Haraway 2016; Berkoff 2017).
More-focused research on loneliness in recent years has targeted animals’ 
therapeutic use against the ravages of loneliness and its significantly harmful 
mental and physiological effects (Cacioppo et al. 2005; Franklin et al. 2007). 
Qualitative and quantitative evidence for companion animals being used as 
an intervention to obviate/alleviate loneliness is well established (Pikhartova 
et al. 2014; see also Garrity et al. 1988; 1998). Pikhartova et al.’s research was 
based on the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing database of 5210 men and 
women, in which loneliness among women but not men was found to be alle-
viated by companion animals between Wave 0 and Wave 1 of the study. They 
also discovered that women are statistically more likely than men to acquire a 
companion animal when they become lonely.
Innumerable qualitative studies report that companion animals do ameliorate 
human loneliness, among them Rew et al.’s (2000) findings in respect of com-
panion dogs and homeless youths. Gilbey and Tani’s (2015) systematic review of 
these findings is less sanguine, but their findings were influenced by their use of the 
UCLA Loneliness Scale, in which 15 of the 20 proxy questions related to the qual-
ity and quantity of respondents’ human relationships and was therefore of little use in 
testing whether animals alone could have an impact. The studies seem to be testing 
not whether companion animals are fitting social subjects, alternatives for humans 
maybe, but whether their presence among lonely people repairs problematic social 
relationships between humans (Franklin 2015).
Conclusion
Loneliness provides an exemplar of how emotions have been reshaped in a de-
traditionalised, reflexive and individualised global social order. The chapter 
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considered the complexity of loneliness as an emotion against the backdrop of 
social change in three spaces: transformations in intimacy and love; social and 
digital media; and with companion animals. The first two sites were treated 
as both sources and sites of agency in managing loneliness in late modernity, 
while growing human-animal closeness was treated as symptomatic of weak-
ening social bonds but also a space where loneliness can be offset.
Drawing upon Bauman and Illouz, the chapter argued that transforma-
tions in intimacy, driven by processes of individualisation, consumption and 
intensive self-reflexivity, are creating more ambivalent love bonds. People 
can become lonelier in relationships, distracted by ‘new and improved attrac-
tions’ at the same time as fears of loneliness may handbrake decisions to end 
relationships. On the other hand, the move to pure relationships highlights 
possibilities for less loneliness, as relationships become more open, trusting 
and based on mutual disclosure. New technologies such as online dating 
apps, promising technological solutions to finding a soul-mate, offer possi-
bilities for offsetting social loneliness balanced by concerns about increased 
emotional loneliness. While Bauman identifies more callous emotional tenden-
cies, Giddens (1992), Taylor (1992) and Carroll (2001) show how love can 
be theorised as a complex emotional space of resistance to loneliness, a space 
where identity is forged in loving and caring relationships with others. How 
gender, age and other social constellations shape leave-making decisions and 
how fears of loneliness figure in these decision making processes must be 
addressed by future work.
Second, the chapter considered the new communicational bonds powered 
by digital and social media as both a source and antidote to contemporary 
experiences of loneliness. Theoretically, there are strong arguments that our 
increasingly digitally mediated lives are making us lonelier (Bauman 2012; 
Turkle 2013). Westerners have a surfeit of connections, but a shortage of 
relationships, as the digital provides the illusion of companionship with the 
commitment and the sacrifice. There are concerns that late modern rela-
tionships, increasingly mediated and digitised, are removing humans from 
necessary embodied and face-to-face relations. We suggest that while these 
theorists may explain aspects of contemporary loneliness in the digital age, 
we need to also be wary of technological determinism and pay attention to 
the technological tensions, possibilities and its interplay to provide a contex-
tualised understanding of sociotechnical systems and loneliness. While there is 
strong empirical evidence that new technologies may help mediate and even 
mitigate loneliness, we need to nuance our claims to socio-technical con-
texts, platform affordances, frequency of use, type of loneliness and different 
types of gratification. Further research is needed, as we still lack knowledge 
on types of loneliness, differences between social isolation and loneliness (used 
interchangeably in some studies) and ways to overcome approaches based on 
digital dualism (offline versus online) in a world where the online and offline 
increasingly blur. Most literature departs from a psychological standpoint, 
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which means that sociology has a vital role in bridging micro, meso and macro 
perspectives in the study of loneliness and sociotechnical systems (Neves et al. 
2017; Franklin et al. 2018).
Finally, we considered growing human-animal closeness as a window in 
which to examine changing social bonds. In this instance, we asked how 
the rise of companionship with animals and their changing social status since 
the 1990s is symptomatic of weakening social bonds and human loneliness. 
Our growing closeness with animals reflects how we have turned to animals 
for social affirmation and the amelioration of emotional loneliness. In this 
instance, our relationships with animals both highlight the human problem 
of loneliness, but are also sites in which people can enact agency and manage 
loneliness, especially those shown to be vulnerable, such as the elderly, the 
homeless, the mentally ill and men. Considering evidence that men expe-
rience loneliness in different ways to women and are less equipped to do 
something about it, further research is needed to determine how the loneliness 
assuaging effects of companion animals can be strengthened. There are also 
wider considerations about introducing policies and practices, such as allow-
ing housing tenants and aged facilities to have access to companion animals, 
as part of global strategies to ameliorate the effects of loneliness, particularly in 
the context of ageing societies.
It is important to note that we have revealed some of the complexity of 
loneliness as an emotion in this chapter. However, as indicated in each of the 
spaces considered, there is a need for much more research on this topic. It is not 
enough to just separate the emotional from the social variant of loneliness, and 
analyse each as uncontested categories. There is an urgent need for in-depth 
qualitative investigation into the emotional experience of loneliness, and the 
many further means by which it is actively resisted and managed.
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Emotions and criminal law




At the beginning of the 1990s, the secular movement and modern project of 
the rationalisation and de-emotionalisation of criminal justice (see Pratt 2000; 2002) 
came to a surprising end. A re-emotionalisation of law (de Haan & Loader 2002; 
Laster & O’Malley 1996) had become visible in several signal events and pro-
cesses: the return of shame into criminal justice procedures, in particular through 
restorative justice (Braithwaite 1989; Rossner 2017); a stronger focus on victims 
and their emotional needs, as evidenced in victim impact statements in courts; 
and highly emotionalised public discourses on crime and justice (Karstedt 2002; 
2011). The return of emotions was linked to three movements that changed 
criminal justice over the past decades: the victims’ movement, restorative justice 
and the emergence of a punitive climate in public and political discourse.
The re-emotionalisation of law is embedded in and part of an emotional turn 
in post-modern societies (Barbalet 2002), which Cas Wouters (2004, p. 204) 
described as an ‘emancipation of emotions’. Emotions that had been increas-
ingly disciplined and controlled en route to modernity re-entered both individual 
consciousness and public discussion. Emotions became valuable assets in social 
exchange, and required recognition as expressions of individual identity. 
However, the emancipation of emotions gave rise to subtle and overt rules of 
feeling and the display of emotions (Hochschild 2003; Vandekerckhove et al. 
2008), and pressures to adopt procedures of managing and regulating emotions 
mounted (Gross & Thompson 2007).
The conventional story of modern penal law portrays a narrowly delineated 
list of, and proper roles for, emotions in the legal realm (Bandes 1999; Maroney 
2006). As Nussbaum (2004, p. 46) argues, emotions have entered into penal 
law under the disguise of ‘reasonable emotions’. They are acknowledged as far 
as they represent a reasonable evaluation and reaction, as in mitigating circum-
stances for crimes of passion (Wiener 2004). Judges and other legal professionals 
have to restrain their emotions in court in order not to impede unbiased and 
rational decision making (Bergmann Blix & Wettergren 2016; Maroney & 
Gross 2014; Roach Anleu & Mack 2005; 2013). Consequently, the intrusion 
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of emotions into the realm of criminal justice and its institutions was watched 
with considerable concern, as it seemingly turned the clock back towards those 
allegedly pre-modern forms of emotive punishment (Karstedt 2006; Pratt 2000).
Both narratives of re-emotionalisation and reason ignore the actual presence 
and role of emotions in crime, law and legal procedures (Douglas 1993). As 
Maroney (2006, p. 120) states, ‘the law always has taken account of emotion. 
[. . .] Criminal law [. . .] reflects fear, grief, and remorse’. Anthropologist Jared 
Diamond (2008, p. 18) writes that modern criminal justice ignores the ‘thirst 
for vengeance’ that is ‘among the strongest human emotions’. He points to a 
paradox in the return of emotions in late modern societies, as they ‘permit and 
encourage us to express our love, anger and grief, and fear, but not our thirst 
for vengeance’ (ibid.). Modern criminal justice alienates us from deep-rooted 
feelings and moral emotions, which in fact are the foundations of justice.
Diamond is in agreement with researchers from disciplines like evolutionary 
psychology and behavioural economics in stating that criminal justice emerged 
from evolved cognitive-emotional processes (Eisner et al. 2017). Emotions like 
vengeance and anger are driving moral intuitions on what behaviours should be 
punished and who should be punished. The institutions of criminal justice as they 
evolved in human history offer a space for the most intensely felt emotions – of 
individuals as well as collectives – while simultaneously providing mechanisms 
that are capable of cooling off emotions (Booth 2012; Karstedt 2002). The diver-
sity among institutions of criminal justice throughout human history and across 
human societies testifies to humanity’s efforts to contain the emotions that inevita-
bly flare up in spaces where victims, offenders and bystanders meet (Boehm 2012).
These foundations of law and justice in cognitive-emotional processes 
help to explain the enduring and strong presence of emotions in contem-
porary criminal justice (Maroney 2006). However, late modern criminal 
justice systems have to find new answers to the presence of emotions in police 
stations, courts and restorative justice circles. Criminal justice has to accom-
modate the demands of victims to tell their stories and express their emotions, 
and justice officials have to present themselves with empathy (Pemberton 
2016). Balancing shame, blame and forgiveness has been identified as a major 
challenge not only for restorative justice (Braithwaite 2016), but also for 
criminal justice procedures more generally (Lacey & Picard 2016) as well 
as for transitional justice mechanisms (Jeffery 2008). Feeling rules and display 
rules (Hochschild 2003) represent a broader culture of emotions and society’s 
expressive values in courts. Victims express their emotions in victims’ state-
ments, which are granted in cases involving violent crime, including capital 
punishment cases in the USA, in homicide cases in the UK and also increas-
ingly in international criminal justice (Lens et al. 2013; 2015; Rose, Nadler & 
Clark 2006; Sarat 2001).
While giving space to the expression of emotions, late modern institutions 
of criminal justice are attacked for restraining emotions and discouraging their 
expression. What role is there for emotions in criminal justice settings and 
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procedures? What can reasonably be expected from a re-emotionalisation of law 
and justice; what might be the potential outcomes for victims? In order to get 
a deeper understanding of emotion dynamics in legal settings more generally, 
I turn to processes of emotion sharing (Rimé 2007; 2009). The social sharing of 
emotion is part of encompassing processes of emotion regulation in human 
beings, and a natural condition of social life. The field of emotion sharing situated 
in social psychology provides a theoretically rich and empirically promising 
framework for understanding universal emotional dynamics as they play out in 
contemporary late modern criminal justice institutions (Conway & Stannard 
2016; Rimé 2007; 2009), and the framework of emotion sharing provides 
a tool for analysing the cognitive-emotional processes that unfold in various 
criminal justice settings. In the following sections I explore the ways in which 
the legal setting and procedures impact upon the processes of emotion sharing, 
and what this implies for individual victims, offenders and justice professionals.
I will draw on research from a variety of settings, including domestic courts 
and in particular victim statements, as well as transitional justice settings. Victim 
statements represent a specific process of sharing emotions in court settings. 
As they epitomise the tensions between the expression of emotions and the 
reason of justice, they have elicited considerable disquiet among criminal justice 
professionals (Erez & Laster 1999; Erez & Roeger 1995; Herlihy & Turner 
2016; Kool & Moerings 2004; Pemberton 2016; Schuster & Propen 2011). 
Given the nature of the crimes adjudicated, transitional justice settings represent 
extremes of emotions and emotion sharing (Karstedt 2016a; 2016b). According 
to the 2004 Report of the United Nations Secretary to the Security Council 
(p. 2), transitional justice includes the full range of processes and mechanisms 
to ‘ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation’ after large-
scale past abuses. These may comprise ‘prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, 
institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof’ (UN 
Security Council 2004, p. 4); here I mainly use material from the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and from gacaca courts dealing with 
the genocide in Rwanda; these community courts were more informal local 
procedures, which were remotely modelled on traditional justice mechanisms.
Emotion sharing: universal dynamics 
in criminal justice settings
Emotion sharing: the framework
The social sharing of emotion is part of the interdependent processes through 
which human beings experience and regulate emotions. As any emotion leaves 
long-lasting cognitive and social consequences, emotional experiences ‘open 
upon social interaction and emotion sharing’ (Rimé 2009, p. 60). The social 
sharing of emotion ‘occurs in discourse, when individuals communicate openly 
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with one or more persons about the circumstances of the emotion eliciting 
event and about their own feelings and emotional reactions’ (Rimé 2009, 
p. 65). Interpersonal contacts, social exchange and collective constructions about 
emotional experiences facilitate interdependent practices of emotion regulation; 
these include, for example, stimulating cognitive processing of emotional expe-
riences, coping with emotions or strengthening of interpersonal relationships 
and social integration. Above all, processes of sharing emotions in networks and 
social circles ‘nourish the production of meaning pursued collectively in every 
culture’ (Rimé 2009, p. 62). The social sharing of emotions constitutes the inter-
face between private, interactive and collective emotions, and the propagation of 
emotions ultimately contributes to the construction of emotional climates (for 
an overview, see Rimé 2007; von Scheve & Ismer 2013). In particular, this is 
the case when an emotional event strikes collectively, for example, the terror 
attack of 9/11 in New York, as sharing reactivates felt emotions among those 
affected (Rimé 2007).
Research on emotion sharing provides a rich empirical foundation for under-
standing universal processes of emotion sharing and offers potential applications 
in legal and criminal justice settings. People share emotions independent of 
age and gender, education, status and cultural practices, thus corroborating the 
universality of emotion sharing (Rimé 2009). Emotion sharing is initiated early 
after an experience; however, the need for sharing lasts as long as the memory 
of the emotion maintains its impact, when, for example, the memory is evoked 
as in a court room (Curci & Rimé 2012). Sharing affects the individual who 
experienced the emotion and those who are the recipients (targets) of the shared 
emotion. Individuals share all types of emotions, both positive and negative. 
Negative emotions are elicited by loss, threats and other negative experiences 
and include anger, fear, sadness, shame and guilt; remorse or anxiety are also in 
this category. Sadness, vengeance and anger are shared as much as happiness and 
joy; further, the experience of sharing even very negative emotions is not per-
ceived as uncomfortable or painful by a majority of subjects and, consequently, 
traumatic emotional experiences are frequently shared, and victims also express 
a need to do so (Rimé 2009).
The social sharing of emotions leads on to emotional reactions among 
the listeners, the targets of sharing. Two types of reactions from listeners are 
observed. Socio-affective reactions are often non-verbal, and offer emotional 
support like comfort, consolation, empathy and bonding; they convey a 
sense of recognition and validation of the suffering and emotional experi-
ence. Emotion sharing initially favours socio-affective responses, and listeners 
respond with more socio-affective reactions the more intense the related epi-
sode and emotions are, in particular with non-verbal responses. ‘Cognitive 
responses’, in contrast, include a (re)-framing and (re)-appraisal of the episode, 
which ultimately should lead the narrator to a process of coping with the 
emotion and regaining control over the emotions and the situation (Rimé 
2009, pp. 71–6).
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The initial socio-affective responses to shared emotions have an immedi-
ate impact as they generate stronger bonds, convey a sense of belonging and 
can enhance a person’s social integration into groups and wider social circles. 
People feel spontaneously relieved after sharing their emotions, and generally 
benefit from sharing, as feelings of insecurity, loneliness and helplessness are 
alleviated (Zech & Rimé 2005). Sharing potentially reduces distress through 
both socio-affective and cognitive responses; it addresses immediate needs for 
comfort and consolation, validates negative emotions and enhances the adapta-
tion to emotional experiences. Sharing protects individuals from the impact of 
emotions and can promote long-term recovery (Rimé 2009).
The application of universal characteristics of emotion sharing focuses on 
questions of critical importance for late modern criminal justice settings, be they 
courts or tribunals, restorative justice or mediating circles. First, in which ways 
do these settings restrain and limit the sharing of emotions, and thus thwart 
potentially positive outcomes of emotion sharing? Second, in which way does 
the process of emotion sharing evolve between victims, defendants and the 
wider community, audiences and the public? Presently, only a small knowl-
edge base of empirical research exists, mostly for transitional justice settings 
(Kanyangara et al. 2007; Rimé et al. 2011; Stockwell 2014), but also for domes-
tic courts (Lens et al. 2015). In addition, research on victim impact statements 
provides insights into processes of emotion sharing without explicitly using the 
framework.
The legal setting: restraining or enabling?
In principle, the framework of emotion sharing largely supports the role that 
is assigned to the presence of victims, their statements and their expressions 
of emotions. A systematic review of research on transitional justice settings 
(Karstedt 2016a) provides compelling insights into how victims or perpetra-
tors perceive procedures in courts, tribunals or truth commissions as a space 
to share emotions, and actively engage in the process. Victims are motivated 
by the search for emotional support like meaning, recognition and validation. 
Lens and her colleagues’ (2015) report for a Dutch court on domestic violence 
cases suggests that those victims who are still traumatised and feel a high level of 
anger are more willing to deliver written victim impact statements to the court 
than those who are less affected by such emotions; they feel a continuous need 
to share their emotions. This is exactly what the universal emotions sharing 
framework would predict (Curci & Rimé 2012).
The mostly negative emotions shared in criminal courts (of all types) none-
theless instigate social interaction by story-telling and conversation, as suggested 
by the emotion sharing framework (Rimé 2009). Highly emotional represen-
tations of victims of serious crimes (in this case domestic violence) enhance 
their credibility and the sympathy for them, while those with a non-emotional 
presentation encounter the opposite reactions. Accordingly, if victims violate 
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expectations as to their emotions or if these are not deemed congruent with the 
crime experienced, they receive fewer responses expressing empathy or sym-
pathy (Lens et al. 2014). In a similar vein, legal professionals react differently to 
emotions expressed by victims. Schuster and Propen (2011) found in a study of 
judicial reactions to victim impact statements that judges appreciate expressions 
of compassion and tolerate expressions of grief but are uncomfortable with 
expressions of anger, which they might interpret as an interference with the 
requirements of court procedures (also Lens et al. 2013).
The legal setting of a criminal trial is not by default inimical to the recognition 
and validation of victims’ suffering; to the contrary, it actually legitimises such 
suffering within an institutional and authoritative context. This might explain the 
general willingness of victims of crime to share their suffering in domestic courts 
(Lens et al. 2013), and the wish of victims to testify before international tribunals 
and truth commissions in transitional justice procedures (Karstedt 2016a). The 
initially high hopes and optimism of victims who look forward to sharing their 
stories in courts as well as in truth commissions reflect universal processes of 
emotion sharing, as do their reports of initial relief (Gobodo-Madikizela 2002, 
for the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission).
Legal settings also provide a more cognitive mode of response. Besides 
socio-affective responses, narrators expect cognitive responses that help them 
to re-frame and re-appraise the emotional event, in particular if it has been 
distressing. A comparison of socio-affective and cognitive modes of responses 
found that ‘sharing situations which prompt cognitive responses can produce 
the recovery effect’, while mere social sharing by the narrator and a predomi-
nantly socio-affective response by listeners fails to generate such an effect (Rimé 
2009, p. 80). Victims of human rights abuses who participate in transitional 
justice procedures express a demand for (cognitive) understanding of the violent 
events, often in highly emotional language (Karstedt 2016a). Expectations are 
directed towards the legal setting to provide such responses of explanation 
and framing, which could hardly be obtained without the cachet and author-
ity of legal and quasi-legal procedures. The legal setting and the language of 
justice create a unique environment that is capable of delivering the cognitive 
responses that victims strive for. Lens and her colleagues (2015) show that it is 
not the expression of emotions per se in victim statements, but the experience 
of procedural justice – that is, the extent to which victims have a voice and feel 
recognised – that facilitates the framing and validation of suffering, and reduces 
feelings of anger and anxiety.
However, the formal legal setting constrains socio-affective modes of 
responses. In all courts, including truth commissions, judges, chairs and 
other legal personnel are restricted with regard to the expression of emotions 
(Maroney & Gross 2014). Victims who testified in international courts and 
tribunals mostly felt that their initially high hopes had been thwarted, and 
sharing their emotions was not met with appropriate responses or fell on deaf 
ears (Human Rights Centre 2014; Stover 2004). Similarly, victims in cases of 
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domestic abuse felt that their expressions of emotions were often neglected 
or ‘normalised’ within legal discourse (Propen & Schuster 2011, p. 57). This 
might account for the overall disappointment that victims often express in 
transitional justice (see Karstedt 2016a). In some cases, reactions from judges, 
which might have been well-meant as a socio-affective response, failed to rec-
ognise the suffering (for the ICTY: Dembour & Haslam 2004).
Justice settings and mechanisms ostensibly differ with regard to the space 
and encouragement they give to emotion sharing. Restorative justice practices 
encourage emotion sharing, which might account for the higher emotional satis-
faction of victims in such settings (Sherman & Strang 2011). Similarly, the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission were exemplary in encourag-
ing the sharing of emotions. This might account for victims’ reports of initial 
relief, and feelings of being recognised (Gobodo-Madikizela 2002). Likewise, 
the presence and involvement of a large group of victims, as at the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, where perpetrators of the genocide stand 
trial, seem to provide an environment where emotion sharing is facilitated and 
socio-affective responses can flourish, particularly within the group of victims 
present at the trial (Stover et al. 2011). In contrast, the audiences in the local and 
more informal gacaca courts in Rwanda represented divided communities, with 
non-sympathetic members of the perpetrator group. Sharing of emotions became 
a negative emotional experience for victims, who were distressed, angered and 
scared by negative and stigmatising reactions from the audience, and the denial 
of recognition of their plight (Brounéus 2008). Rimé and his colleagues (2011) 
found that emotional wellbeing of victims was significantly reduced, notwith-
standing gains in the overall collective emotional climate.
Disjunctions: emotion sharing between 
victims, perpetrators and audiences
The legal setting is a space where defendants and victims meet, though not 
always in person. Victims come with anger, sadness and memories of traumatic 
emotional experiences, while perpetrators feel anger, shame, guilt and remorse. 
All justice mechanisms give space to extremely negative emotions and distress-
ing emotional experiences that are shared between members of antagonistic 
groups, and with legal professionals (Ellsworth & Dougherty 2016). What are 
the specific qualifications and limitations for sharing such emotions in courts 
and other legal fora? Three conditions inhibiting emotion sharing have been 
identified that are of importance in legal settings: extreme trauma; emotions of 
guilt and shame; and an unreceptive environment.
Traumatic emotions are frequently shared, and people who are most affected 
by an event share their emotion as often as those who are less affected. Yet, 
individuals will refrain from mentioning the most sensitive issues, thus leav-
ing definite blanks in their narrative (Rimé 2009). Lens et al. (2013) find that 
victims generally participate in delivering victim impact statements if they still 
108 Susanne Karstedt
suffer from the consequences of the crime. However, those with the most 
intensive symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are more reluc-
tant about sharing all emotional aspects of their experience, and in particular do 
not want to share the most distressing ones; increased levels of PTSD-driven 
anxiety reduce the ability to confront the offender (Lens et al. 2013). Victims 
fear and experience negative consequences for their own wellbeing; this applies 
to domestic courts (Lens et al. 2013) as well as to transitional justice settings 
(Cilliers et al. 2016; Rimé et al. 2011).
When listeners are confronted with extreme trauma, atrocious events or 
severe illness, they tend to react with less empathy and even attempt to con-
strain the victim in the expression of emotions. Bystanders and non-victims 
severely underestimate the victim’s situation, react with anxiety and respond 
with simplistic interventions that cannot do justice to the complex conse-
quences of the negative emotional experience (Rimé 2009). The response of 
the judge at the ICTY to a victim whose father presumably had been killed – 
‘I hope your father will come back’ – illustrates this (Dembour & Haslam 2004, 
p. 160). Brounéus (2008) reports several cases of women who, after having 
given highly emotional testimony of their trauma in gacaca courts in Rwanda, 
were shunned by neighbours or other community members who had been 
present (see also Karstedt 2016a).
Perpetrators generally are restrained in sharing their emotions of shame, 
guilt or remorse. Both emotions are defined as ‘self-conscious emotions’ (Lewis 
2010, p. 305) or ‘retractive emotions’, that is, emotions experienced when an 
individual tries to retreat from or reject a certain action and to dissociate it from 
the self (Proeve & Tudor 2010). Individuals tend not to share events that elicit 
feelings of shame and guilt, and in particular they keep those experiences secret 
that involve a greater responsibility for the event. Perpetrators generally should 
be inhibited to actually share these emotions and be very reticent in expressing 
them (Finkenauer & Rimé 1998).
These limitations of sharing both traumatic and self-conscious emotions 
seemingly account for the general and widespread disappointment among vic-
tims after experiencing courts or transitional justice mechanisms (overview: 
Karstedt 2016a). Victims interpret the invisibility of signs of shame or remorse 
as a lack of such emotions, even if perpetrators experience them. This might 
feed into the reported perceptions of leniency and impunity for the offender, 
which for victims corroborate the lack of validation and recognition of their 
traumatic experiences in domestic courts (Lens et  al. 2015) and transitional 
justice (for the ICTY: Bașoğlu et al. (2005)).
Victims demand that expressions of guilt, remorse and shame are authentic 
and represent true emotions. Victims of gross human rights violations in South 
Africa, whether they had participated in the TRC proceedings or not, and 
whether they had given public or closed testimony to a TRC investigator, were 
not willing to forgive when only guilt was admitted, or an apology made by the 
perpetrator. They requested to see signs of true sorriness from the perpetrator 
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(Kaminer et al. 2001). The gap between offenders, who will hardly fully share 
their emotions of guilt and shame, and traumatised victims, who are unable to 
share the full amount of their emotional distress, constitutes a built-in dilemma 
for late modern criminal justice fora (see also Braithwaite 2016).
The discrepancy between emotions expressed by victims and hidden by 
offenders might also affect legal professionals who are part of the procedures. 
In particular, the genuine and authentic expression of remorse poses severe 
problems to judges and others present (Bandes 2016, p. 17). When judges and 
jurors react to sharing emotions from both victims and offenders, their emo-
tional responses will shape their ‘moral intuitions’ (Feigenson 2016, p. 29; Haidt 
2007) and thus their ultimate judgments of responsibility and blame. However, 
legal decision making is as much amenable to the influence of deliberation, 
different assessments and legal reasoning as to emotions and moral intuitions, 
and ultimate sentencing protected against emotional bias (see Roach Anleu & 
Mack 2005; 2013). In particular, victim impact statements are ‘neutralised’ by 
professionals and selectively framed as reasonable (Erez & Laster 1999) and little 
effect on sentencing has been found (Erez & Roeger 1995). Booth (2012) shows 
from the delivery of victim impact statements that cooling-out processes effec-
tively contained emotions in the courtroom, and assisted victims to adjust to the 
requirements of the legal setting.
Conclusion: enhancing the emotional 
capacity of criminal justice
Late modern criminal justice mechanisms have increased the space for emotions 
and expression of emotions. What comes to the fore (and fora) are the primordial 
emotions of anger and vengeance (see Sorial, this volume, Chapter 9), but also 
shame and remorse, and forgiveness, on which human justice and punishment 
is built. As late modern criminal justice relates back to the cognitive-emotional 
processes that have shaped institutions and procedures throughout human his-
tory, we need to enhance our understanding of emotion dynamics and develop 
new ways of regulating emotions that take into account universal processes of 
emotions in criminal justice.
Universal processes shape the ways in which emotions are shared and 
received, how different parties react and how emotions impact on outcomes, 
in social as well as in legal settings. In contrast to prevalent assumptions, it 
would be wrong to see the criminal justice model and its focus on reason and 
emotional restraint as inimical to the sharing of emotions in its diverse settings. 
Criminal justice has evolved from cognitive-emotional processes, and both are 
present when emotions are shared. The framework of emotion sharing lends 
support to the importance of the legal setting and its specific features, and 
more generally to what can be termed the emotional capacity of criminal justice 
institutions. Theory and research corroborate the presence and participation of 
victims and the encouragement of expressing emotions. The unique features 
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of the legal setting, such as testifying, giving evidence and examination of 
offenders, address victims’ cognitive needs for re-framing and re-appraisal of 
traumatic events. The rules of procedural justice and the authority of the law 
give recognition and validation to the victims’ suffering, as well as to the 
expression of emotions by the defendant, and simultaneously restrain moral 
intuitions of judges and jurors. The emotion sharing framework might help in 
identifying those criminal justice settings that have comparative advantages for 
sharing emotions, and developing moderating and mediating tools for crimi-
nal justice professionals that improve emotional experiences of victims and 
offenders. In this way we might move – as in the words of Lawrence Sherman 
(2003) – towards emotionally intelligent justice.
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Chapter 8
Undramatic emotions in learning
A sociological model
James P. Davis and Alberto Bellocchi
Introduction
In this chapter we describe a sociological model that illustrates the increasing 
complexity in our understandings of emotion, as it unfolds in late modernity (cf. 
Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1), which better illustrates the character 
of emotional experiences. The ontological foundation of our work connects with 
ideas that were present but often neglected throughout modernity. For example, 
our thinking resonates with Hume’s (1777/2007) notion of the mind as being 
composed of many particular perceptions (cf. Davis 2017). Our thinking also 
resonates with Durkheim’s (1915) neglected social epistemology (cf. Bellocchi 
2017), identified through the analysis of non-euro-centric cultures beyond the 
classical-modern lineage of thought. Rawls (2004) describes Durkheim’s (1915) 
epistemology as being neglected by sociology scholars over the past century, and 
we argue that his re-vitalised epistemology now contributes to more complex 
understandings of emotion in late modernity. With this foundation, our focus 
on the complexity about understandings of emotion emphasises the interde-
pendence of emotion and reasoning through micro-social experiences of our 
intertwined existence, as both biological and social beings (Davis 2016).
The experiences of emotion at the focus of our work may be described as forms 
of emotion that are often taken for granted. In the context of sociological studies of 
science education, such emotions were described previously as backgrounded emotions 
(Barbalet 2002) and background emotions (Damasio 1999), and are cited as examples 
of the complexity in understanding emotion as represented in late modernity. This 
complexity is evident in the way Barbalet (2002) and Damasio (1999) both use a 
similar term to describe different but inter-related phenomena. Barbalet’s (2002) 
notion of backgrounded emotions involves forms of self-regulation in a moral 
context, where the interplay between performed self-regulation and emotional 
experience of those performances are evident in social interaction. We interpret 
Barbalet’s (2011) notion of backgrounded emotion as being similar to what Collins 
(2004) describes as subdued and taken-for-granted undramatic emotional energy, 
which is the focus of this chapter. In contrast, Damasio (1999) describes background 
emotions as a fundamental neurophysiological sensation or feeling of being that is 
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always with us, but most often taken for granted. In psychology, such feelings are 
described as the physical basis of emotion by James (1894), and more recently as 
core affect (Russell & Barrett 1999; Yik, Russell & Steiger 2011). To avoid confu-
sion in our modelling of emotional experiences, we refer to Damasio’s background 
emotions as feelings that are a constituent element of the emotional experiences that 
we describe as emotional energy (Collins 2004).
Emotional energy (EE) is an individual-collective experience of emotion 
as an outcome of successful social interaction, evident in the self-coordinating 
quality of the interaction, rather than the valence of experiences (i.e., pos-
itive or negative; see Bellocchi & Turner, this volume, Chapter 3). These 
emotional experiences are described as an energy because they bind society 
together, meaning that EE exists in the biology of the individual and in the 
interactions of groups, beyond individual bodies. For this reason, successful 
social interaction is evident in the subsequent re-grouping of participants; in 
the maintenance of continuity and fluency in collective practices; in symbolic 
representations that are collectively produced or reproduced from an earlier 
interaction; or in emotional experiences focused around shared symbols and/
or the collective practices of others. Emotional energy becomes evident in an 
undramatic form, where there is a high degree of fluency within a social inter-
action (i.e., a successful interaction), but the participants tend not to be aware 
of the fluency of their experience; the experience just is. That is, members of 
the interaction take the experience for granted by treating it as part of their 
ordinary, everyday interaction without pausing to reflect on the nature of the 
interaction as it unfolds.
The terms dramatic and undramatic in relation to emotional energy refer to the 
character of bodily movements (internal and external) that form a constituent ele-
ment of the experience of emotional energy. Although Collins (2004) identified 
undramatic emotional energy as central to micro-sociological understandings of 
social interaction, much of his work identified more dramatic examples of EE. 
For example, Collins (2004, p. 134) suggested participants could self-report 
their experience ‘on a continuum from enthusiasm, confidence, and initiative at 
the high end, down to passivity and depression at the low end’. This presumes 
emotional self-awareness that tends to enable dramatic EE to be reported, as 
distinct from taken-for-granted undramatic EE. It follows that Collins (2004) 
over-emphasised dramatic experiences that could be more easily subject to 
self-report. A possible explanation for this focus is the ease with which more 
dramatic emotions (e.g., angry outbursts, euphoric displays of pride) can be 
identified empirically. Collins went on to suggest a methodology, particularly 
ethnomethodology, for the empirical study of undramatic emotion energy 
(UEE), but did not elaborate how this may be achieved in practice. The present 
study extends the notion of UEE in learning contexts by proposing a model to 
describe taken-for-granted experiences. This model was originally developed 
via the empirical study of micro-social practices (i.e., ethnomethods) through 
which emotional energy is experienced.
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The recognition of an ethnomethodological orientation is important in 
empirical studies of UEE because it enables us to explore taken-for-
granted, emotional experiences within and across moments of interaction. 
Ethnomethodology is the study of micro-social practices (i.e., bodily gestures 
and speech gestures) as a way of understanding how ideas and symbols are con-
structed to become a social reality in localised occasions of experience (Garfinkel 
1967). In this present, theoretical study, we highlight a key assumption within 
ethnomethodology because it makes possible an understanding of feelings as a 
constituent part of emotional experiences. Through Garfinkel’s (1967) work, 
our present study foregrounds Schütz’s (1972) sociological phenomenology, 
which becomes important when later interpreting experiences of feelings as a 
constituent of emotion. Essentially, our methodological orientation is impor-
tant for making internal feelings visible within our analysis of UEE in social 
interaction. We foreground the particularities of social interaction being expe-
rienced that we may understand by describing and analysing evidence of bodily 
movements (i.e., physiological and gestural), ideas and feelings (cf. Dewey 1894). 
The aim of this chapter is to explain the character of these three intertwined 
elements of emotional experience by synthesising the ideas of Collins (2004), 
Dewey (1894; 1895), Durkheim (1915), Garfinkel (1967) and Schütz (1972).
Next, we discuss the conceptualisation of EE, and the notions of dramatic 
and undramatic emotional energy developed by Collins. We identify the 
affordances and constraints of Collins’s approach to UEE. Then we present 
our novel conceptualisation, which clarifies terminology and explicates the 
dynamic dramatic-undramatic qualities of emotional experiences across a 
collective-idiosyncratic continuum. We then draw on examples from learn-
ing contexts to briefly illustrate the empirical approach we have used in the 
development of our model.
Conceptualisation of emotional energy
The present study arises from our experiences of researching social interac-
tion where we have come to appreciate the heterogeneous quality of EE as 
conceptualised by Collins (2004). The heterogeneity of EE is evident in the 
way Collins (2004, p. 105) defines EE in order to ‘widen our conception of 
emotion’. Through both formalised descriptions and examples, Collins (2004) 
defines EE as an experience that may be associated with dramatic emotion, 
about which participants may be aware and capable of making self-reports, 
using labels such as anger, fear or joy. In contrast, he also describes the pos-
sibility for experiencing ‘emotions that are undramatic’ (Collins 2004, p. 106) 
where participants may not conceive of their experience as being emotive 
(cf. Davis & Bellocchi 2018). Unravelling the distinction between dramatic 
and undramatic emotions within a conceptualisation of EE is the focus of our 
present chapter, because of its possible relevance to understanding emotions 
and reasoning in learning situations.
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Emotional energy, both dramatic and undramatic, may be described as a 
durable experience originating through smoothly flowing, successful social 
interaction. It involves a physiological, rhythmic entrainment where partici-
pants may experience a feeling of being ‘caught up in the swing of things’ 
(Collins 2004, p. 108). High, or intense, EE may be associated with ‘a feeling of 
confidence or enthusiasm for social interaction’ (Collins 2004, p. 108). Despite 
using language such as enthusiasm to illustrate EE, Collins (2004) explicitly 
describes the experience as being mostly neutral in terms of valence. On the use 
of valence and other descriptive labels in relation to EE, Collins (2004) makes 
a distinction between transient discrete emotions and experiences of EE by 
describing discrete emotions as the possible ingredients of social interaction. 
These may be evident contemporaneously with EE, but they are not viewed 
as essential to EE. On this basis, Collins conceptualises EE as having a neutral 
valence, as a durable tone that underlies the possible co-existence of other 
emotions that are positive, negative or attributable with a particular, discrete 
label. We adopt a more explicit approach than Collins by treating the valence 
attributed to emotion in a similar way to his treatment of discrete emotions. 
That is, we set them aside as possibly co-existing with EE, but not essential to 
EE (cf. Bellocchi & Turner, this volume, Chapter 3).
We acknowledge the possibility for emotional energy to co-exist with 
discrete emotions, which may contribute to the visibility of EE in what we 
describe as dramatic situations. But making a distinction between discrete 
emotion and EE is complicated by Collins’s terminological and descriptive 
methods. Unravelling Collins’s description of EE is challenging because he 
does not use ethnomethodological examples to illustrate UEE. The problem is 
further exacerbated with the use of dramatic examples such as a hockey match 
or a terrorist attack to illustrate the intensity of EE (Collins 2004). By using 
these types of examples, it is possible that readers of Collins’s work may associ-
ate intensity with dramatic situations only. As we clarify later with our model, 
bodily movements are only one indicator of emotional intensity.
Because of the over-emphasis on pronounced bodily actions, we focus now 
on explicating undramatic emotional energy, which is the less developed part of 
Collins’s (2004) conceptualisation. To explain the undramatic possibility of EE, 
Collins refers to Goffman (1967) and Garfinkel’s (1967) studies where emo-
tion tends to be evident as the smooth, disjuncture-free (i.e., flowing without 
disruption) experience of ethnomethods (i.e., social practices). Such forms of 
emotional experience are not captured by the idea of discrete emotion that is 
typically labelled in everyday situations. Instead, UEE is marked by a sense of the 
ordinary, unremarkable experience of successful social interaction. Collins (2004, 
p. 106) accounts for this by using Garfinkel’s (1967) description of such experi-
ences as a sense that ‘nothing out of the ordinary is happening here’. On the 
basis of this description, EE may be conceptualised as the embodied experience 
of ethnomethods that we identify as micro-social practices in the form of subtle 
physical gestures and speech gestures. This may explain why UEE may present 
118 James P. Davis and Alberto Bellocchi
as ‘uninteresting’ (Collins 2004, p. 106) to people who experience it. Like the 
embodied ethnomethods that carry the experience, UEE tends to be taken for 
granted. For this reason, the methods we use in any study of EE must enable the 
recognition of both dramatic and undramatic occasions of emotional experience.
Collins (2004) operationalised the enduring tone of emotional energy (dra-
matic and undramatic), recognising it as a mutual focus on objects or ideas. The 
experience of EE may be described as a sense of social cohesion or solidarity. This 
is explained as the rhythmic entrainment of embodied micro-social practices that 
extend contemporaneously from the collective experience, through and into the 
individual biological experience. This socio-biological experience of cohesion 
characterises the outcome of successful interaction. Collins (2004) explains that 
identifying EE involves observation of coordinated bodily movements such as 
facial actions or hand gestures as well as speech gestures in terms of what is said, 
and how things are said (i.e., prosodic features of speech). These forms of observ-
able actions are identified as evidence of EE as the self-organising directedness 
of social interaction over time. In this sense, EE may be observed as a collective 
attunement throughout social interaction that may also be evident after the initial 
interaction where it arises. During an interaction, EE is evident as the reflexive 
experience of being engrossed in performing the interaction, rather than pausing 
and overtly reflecting on it. Social practices unfold smoothly until a disruption 
to this flow occurs and the situation needs to be repaired. At such points the 
work of members to sustain interaction becomes evident to an observer. Collins 
(2004) suggested EE may also direct the attunement of individuals, as evident 
through their self-directedness, high levels of concentration and a smooth flow 
of thoughts during occasions of asynchronous interaction.
Throughout his description of EE, Collins (2004) uses the term high level or 
low level to differentiate the intensity of emotional experiences, which is distinct 
from the notion of valence. As an experience of social cohesion, Collins (2004, 
p. 106) specifically described EE as having a neutral quality in terms of emo-
tional valence, and he cited ‘Garfinkelian mundanity’ as a primary example. He 
described this neutrality as ‘a generic emotional quality at the middle of the 
plus-minus scale’ (ibid.) of emotional experience. This conceptualisation of EE 
with a neutral valence was then described as having high and low levels of 
intensity. Collins’s (2004) description of EE then becomes contradictory in the 
way he uses categories such as enthusiasm and depression (which are not neu-
tral) to describe different levels of intensity in EE. To illustrate the high-low 
continuum of intensity in solidarity (EE), Collins (2004) described the high in 
terms of confidence and enthusiasm (p. 109) towards social situations, and the 
low in terms of a depressed tone (p. 106) towards social situations. To contra-
dict the perception that high-low intensity is associated with positive-negative 
valence, Collins (2004, p. 108) explicitly used the example of a funeral, where 
participants may typically experience sadness as a dramatic transient emotion 
with a negative valence. However, the social cohesion typically experienced at a 
funeral, contemporaneous with sadness, may be indicative of highly intense EE. 
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Collins (2004) made an effort to describe a case of high-intensity EE with a 
neutral quality in terms of valence, even in a situation where the contemporane-
ously experienced discrete emotions may involve a negative valence. However, 
this example was often overlooked in subsequent research, leading to confusion 
and contradiction about intensity in EE that we aim to address in the definition 
of our model in this chapter. In essence, the way to think about the intensity of 
EE is in relation to the fluency and social cohesion of interaction. High levels 
of EE may be evident during moments of strong social cohesion, and low lev-
els of EE may be evident where social interaction involves disjuncture with an 
absence of interactional repair, indicative of disunity or dis-fluency. It is impor-
tant to note that during low-intensity EE, it is possible for high-intensity discrete 
emotions to co-exist, due to the biological-social interplay.
A graphical model of emotional energy
In this section we specify the dimensions and variables of EE in the form of 
a graphical model that is explored throughout this chapter in relation to dif-
ferent experiences of EE in learning contexts. The graphical model represents 
three dimensions of EE in the form of feelings, ideas and bodily movements 
(cf. Dewey 1894; 1895). Although we describe these as dimensions, they are 
inseparable as parts of the empirically observable phenomenon of social interac-
tion. These contemporaneous, interdependent dimensions are each represented 
along an axis that makes a visual representation of intensity in emotional energy. 
To define different levels of emotional intensity across these dimensions, we 
Figure 8.1 A graphical model of emotional energy
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identify variables that may be recognisable in situations of social interaction. 
These variables are described in relation to each dimension of the graphical 
representation as shown in Figure 8.1.
Feelings
Feelings may be described as the affective, internal sensation of the emotion 
that can only ever be directly validated as an individual’s reflective perspective 
of experiencing EE, in cases where they are made aware of the experience. 
Indirectly, feelings may be validated via the analysis of social interaction. Within 
our model of EE, feelings are typically unlabelled experiences that relate to a 
sense of social cohesion or confidence to perform actions within a localised 
situation. Through these situations, internal feelings become social as they form 
the basis for the ‘We-relationship’ described by Schütz (1972, p. 163). In the 
context of social interaction, the We-relationship is a taken-for-granted sense that 
other people within contemporaneous moments of the interaction experience 
events in a similar way to the self. This does not mean that one person under-
stands what is going on in the other person’s mind. It is that people tend to make 
a presumption that in sharing a situation, the sense of reality from the perspective 
of the self is similar to the sense of reality experienced by others. The basis of 
this internal experience is a physiological sensation (Damasio 1999) defined as 
feelings in our model of EE. It is through subsequent social interaction that such 
presumptions about each other’s feelings are either confirmed or disconfirmed.
Confirmation or disconfirmation of feelings becomes empirically evident 
from the observer’s perspective, through the fluency or dis-fluency of social 
interaction. As feelings are acted upon through the performance of gesture 
(physical and speech), the degree to which feelings are idiosyncratic or collec-
tive becomes evident through the fluency and continuity of the interaction. 
If the interaction is fluent and continues to maintain and build fluency, we 
may interpret the feelings of individuals within the interaction as being col-
lective because of their ongoing successful confirmation. In contrast, situations 
involving some disjuncture, ongoing disjuncture or a total breakdown in the 
interaction may be interpreted as idiosyncratic feelings being experienced by 
individuals. The intensity of feelings is therefore measured in Figure 8.1 on an 
idiosyncratic-collective continuum. This is an important feature of the model, 
because it is not necessary to specify feelings with labels in order to determine 
their collective status. It is sufficient to study the fluency of the social interaction 
as an indicator of the feelings about, and within, the We-relationship.
This method for identifying the collectivity of feelings is important because 
feelings are commonly unlabelled and taken for granted, even from an observer’s 
perspective. Garfinkel (1967) and his students made this taken-for-granted qual-
ity visible in everyday situations, using demonstrations to purposely breach the 
presumption of a shared reality (the We-relationship), thereby challenging fluency 
of internal feelings about a situation that were held by others. In highly dramatic 
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situations, the sense of the We-relationship may become obvious to participants 
to the extent that they could label their feelings and share these labels with each 
other or with an interested observer. Collins (2004, p. 58) illustrates these experi-
ences with a group of fans at a hockey match who provide their ‘own resonance 
for building up shared excitement’. Such ritualistic experiences of high-intensity 
dramatic EE involve participant awareness in the We-relationship, and it is this 
awareness that leads to an expectation for future experiences to draw spectators 
back to future hockey matches. This capacity to label some feelings transforms 
them from being simply internal feelings to being externalised (i.e., expressed) 
emotions with valence or discrete labels. For this reason, we acknowledge in 
our model in Figure 8.1 that feelings could remain neutral and taken for granted 
or they could be described with valence or other labels, but these descriptions 
are not essential to the intensity or collectivity of the We-relationship experience.
Ideas
Ideas form one of the dimensions of EE because emotions are always about 
something (Dewey 1894; 1895). Although that something may be a physical 
object, it is the idea or ideas we experience about the physical object that are 
integral to the emotional experience (Durkheim 1915). The contribution that 
ideas make to the intensity of EE is indicated by the degree to which ideas 
may be considered collective. We therefore identify ideas along the dimension 
as being of low intensity when they are idiosyncratic, and of high intensity 
when they are strongly upheld by a group. The idiosyncratic-collectivity con-
tinuum for determining the intensity of entrainment around ideas contributes 
to a degree of co-relatedness between ideas and feelings.
Along this dimension, ideas may also be vague or formal, which relates to 
the strength of the symbols and structures in place that are associated with ideas. 
In the context of science education, formal ideas may be recognised as scientific 
concepts collectively accepted by the scientific community.1 In particular situa-
tions where a scientific concept is agreed upon, it may be treated as a collective, 
formal idea. In a different situation where a scientific concept is proposed by 
a participant but rejected by others, we may recognise this as an idiosyncratic, 
formal idea. Vague ideas are also possible in science education contexts, espe-
cially in situations such as authentic science inquiry where participants may be 
exploring an unfamiliar phenomenon.
Bodily movements
Bodily movements comprise all of the motions and sounds of the body that become 
available for the self, and others, to interpret during social interaction. We include 
facial actions and bodily gestures, as well as less-visible physiological movements, 
in bodily movements. We also include speech gestures, which include both the 
content and prosodic features of speech. The intensity of EE attributed to bodily 
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movements is defined in Figure 8.1 along a continuum from idiosyncratic to 
collective bodily movements. Along this dimension, bodily movements may also 
be dramatic or undramatic. Dramatic bodily movements (whether collective or 
idiosyncratic) are typically associated with verbal utterances that may involve 
physical measures of sound energy such as high volume, pitch and power-in- 
the-air (Roth & Tobin 2010) or large physical gestures that draw group members 
together around a shared focus. Undramatic bodily movements typically involve 
slowness, stillness, silence, eye contact without verbal utterances, people being 
quietly spoken or coordinated acts of self-prohibition (Davis & Bellocchi 2018). 
What constitutes dramatic and undramatic bodily movements is an area requiring 
further research in the context of emotional energy, particularly in relation to 
facial expressions (Collins 2004). Furthermore, the relationship between bodily 
movements and intensity of EE is more complex and nuanced than the situations 
portrayed in previous studies (Ritchie et al. 2011; Tobin 2006). For this reason, 
our model recognises that both idiosyncratic (disfluent) and collective (fluent) 
bodily movements may vary in their dramatic or undramatic character. Given 
that the focus of our model is in the social cohesion that brings about a shared 
sense of reality, collective bodily movements are considered higher in intensity 
than idiosyncratic movements. This is because idiosyncratic movements set the 
individual’s actions apart from the coordinated activities of the group. This com-
plexity becomes evident as we discuss some empirical data later in this chapter.
Intensity of emotional energy
As discussed above, each of the three contemporaneous, intertwined and 
dependent dimensions of EE contribute to the level of intensity, both directly 
and via the indirect co-relatedness of these dimensions. This will become more 
evident as we describe permutations of the model, using descriptions of social 
interaction. In the graphical model shown in Figure 8.1, if we locate a point 
on each dimension it is then possible to join these points to form a triangu-
lated surface that defines the intensity of EE across a short series of moments in 
time. An example of this triangulated surface is shown in Figure 8.2 below, as 
part of our data analyses. We will call this triangulated surface an intensity sail 
because of its shape, and tendency to move, via enlargement and/or contrac-
tion over the duration of an interaction. We use the intensity sail to represent 
the intensity of emotional energy, because it captures the simultaneous inter-
play between the constituent elements of the emotional experience.
Separating notions of intensity, drama and valence
As discussed earlier, some interpretations of intensity and valence in Collins’s 
(2004) description of EE may lead to confusion between these two qualities of 
EE. Similarly, the emphasis by Collins (2004) on dramatic examples of EE may 
lead to a similar view that intensity arises from the dramatic bodily movements 
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Figure 8.2 The intensity sail
of EE alone, while excluding the possibility of intense experiences of undra-
matic emotion. The strength of our model is the inclusion of both dramatic and 
undramatic EE, represented through the constituent elements of the experience, 
which give rise to a measure of intensity in a three-dimensional representation. 
This representation of the experience captures the contemporaneous quality of 
all three constituent elements and their contribution to intensity. To illustrate 
the benefits of this model in understanding the different forms of EE, we focus 
below on two permutations of this model that address the tendency to conflate 
EE intensity with dramatic bodily movements and valence. The permutations 
we focus on are high-intensity UEE and low-intensity, dramatic EE. Due to 
the length limitations of this chapter, we use secondary, empirical data from 
science education contexts to briefly illustrate these examples.
High-intensity, undramatic emotional energy
In this section we provide evidence of a case where high-intensity feeling 
and ideas remain evident while bodily movements are interpreted as both 
high-intensity (collective) and undramatic. As shown in Figure 8.3, below, the 
intensity sail remains large, indicating highly intense emotional energy despite 
the undramatic quality of bodily movements.
This example of high-intensity undramatic emotional energy was originally 
described in a study of emotional climate, which is emotional energy interpreted at 
a class-wide level of analysis (Bellocchi et al. 2013). This case involves a pre-service 
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Figure 8.3 High-intensity, undramatic emotional energy
teacher, by the pseudonym of Charles, doing a class presentation. Bellocchi 
et  al. (2013, pp. 539–40) used electronic devices to record class self-ratings 
of EE, and these measures were compared with researcher observation of 
micro-social interaction. Immediately preceding Charles, another student had 
presented in a style that involved yelling and joking, with a power-in-the-air 
measure of 0.4 micro-watts per square metre (µW/m2). Power-in-the-air is a 
measure of the physical power of sound energy generated by the verbal utter-
ances of speakers in a particular situation. In contrast to the other student, 
Charles presented in a soft voice with a power-in-the-air measure of 0.2µW/m2. 
The researchers observed that despite this low power-intensity measure, the 
EE was intense because of ‘the melodic nature of his voice, his hand gestures, 
use of humour, and eye contact he made with the audience’ (Bellocchi et al. 
2013, p. 540). Supporting this view, the researchers also noted the self-report 
of EE experienced by the class was at one of the highest levels for the day when 
Charles was presenting.
In the study of Charles, the researchers were not looking for undramatic 
emotional energy, and for this reason they note, as an anomaly, the intense 
fluency of the interaction as contrasting with the low power intensity of 
Charles’s utterances. This contrast was notable because in previous studies 
power intensity in verbal utterances had been associated with the intensity of 
EE (Roth & Tobin 2010). We have returned to the study by Bellocchi et al. 
(2013) because we now recognise the experience by Charles as an example of 
high-intensity but undramatic EE because of the collective quality of his move-
ments in coordinating group attentiveness and shared focus.
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Our analysis of this situation as high-intensity undramatic EE is based on 
the low power intensity of Charles’s utterances, his use of eye contact and a 
melodic rhythm in his voice. These elements placed his bodily movements 
at the collective end of the bodily movement dimension with an undramatic 
quality. This was evident in the way that audience participation – through 
coordinated smiles and physical entrainment – contributed to the fluency of the 
interaction throughout his presentation, indicative of collective entrainment 
(e.g., intense focus, sustained attention). In addition to this corporeal undra-
matic intensity, collective feelings and collectivity around the ideas that Charles 
was presenting were inferred. With reference to Figure 8.3, we described the 
interaction involving Charles in terms of a large intensity sail drawn between 
undramatic bodily movements that maintain the intensity of EE, with the flu-
ency of bodily movements contributing to high collectivity in feelings and 
ideas, which increases intensity. Thus, it is possible to describe an experience as 
high-intensity, undramatic emotional energy.
Low-intensity, dramatic emotional energy
Experiences of EE that may be characterised as low intensity but dramatic may 
unfold where there is limited evidence of collective ideas, but much dramatic 
conversation and bodily movements. As shown in Figure 8.4, below, low-
intensity, dramatic EE may be represented as an idiosyncratic rating on bodily 
Figure 8.4 Low-intensity, dramatic emotional energy
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movements and low-intensity ratings on the ideas and feelings dimensions, pro-
viding an intensity sail that is very small. This is a complex permutation because 
dramatic bodily movements typically contribute to emotional intensity, but the 
dis-fluency of the movements co-relates with idiosyncratic feelings and ideas, 
thus reducing the overall intensity of EE. It may be possible that the idiosyn-
cratic dramatic bodily movements in this type of situation could be explained 
as being concurrent with some form of intense discrete emotion such as anger 
or anxiety. In such cases the discrete emotion may act as an ingredient to the 
situation, with the possibility that it counteracts against the intensity of EE at 
the social level because of its impact on cohesion and fluency, thus reducing the 
overall intensity of the EE.
Our example of low-intensity, dramatic EE draws from situations of class-
room conflict that are described by Roth and Tobin (2010). In these situations, 
the bodily movements of group members may shift to the extreme idiosyncratic 
end of the dimension, with a dramatic quality, because of speech gestures being 
louder, faster and at a higher pitch. Roth and Tobin (2010) observed these 
conditions by measuring voice pitch, amplitude and power-in-the-air during 
science classroom interactions. As indicators of dramatic bodily movements 
these actions would typically contribute to the intensity of EE. However, in 
situations of conflict, dramatic bodily movements typically lack fluency, which 
impacts on the collectivity of movements. The lack of fluency in dramatic bod-
ily movements co-relates with the feelings and ideas dimensions that both rely 
on fluency as evidence of the degree of collectivity across these dimensions. In 
situations of conflict, the lack of fluency in dramatic bodily movements may 
involve gestures that re-direct the interaction away from the other person’s 
ideological stance. This may be anticipated because in situations of conflict, 
ideas and feelings within the group tend to be the source of conflict and are 
therefore typically not shared (cf. Garfinkel 1967). For these reasons, through-
out moments of conflict, we may typically observe dramatic, dis-fluent bodily 
movements along with idiosyncratic ideas, where both of these dimensions 
(body and ideas) are co-related with idiosyncratic feelings.
Implications and future research
This study outlines the theoretical dimensions of emotional energy as part of a 
collection of empirical studies in science education contexts. This theoretical 
explication of our model illustrates our understanding about how experiences of 
EE are intertwined with reasoning, cognition and learning in late modernity. 
These connections have been indicated for centuries (cf. Durkheim 1915; Hume 
2007), but not explored in fine-grained detail until very recently. By studying 
the complexities of particular experiences, we are able to see how experiences 
of emotional energy are focused around ideas, enabling us to acknowledge these 
experiences as being essential to cognition and learning. This chapter contributes 
to understanding emotions in late modernity as we extend Collins’s (2004) ideas 
Undramatic emotions in learning 127
of undramatic and dramatic EE by operationalising these ideas in an empirically 
grounded micro-social model. This has been achieved by exploring the connec-
tion between the works of Collins (2004) and Garfinkel (1967), enabling us to 
operationalise the concept of internal feelings evident, and measurable in an ordi-
nal sense, as the fluency of social interaction. This we have explained in terms of 
the fluency of a We-relationship that is evident in the work of Schütz (1972) and 
applied in ethnomethodology by Garfinkel (1967). Importantly, this model also 
provides a visualisation of the constituent elements of EE and the contribution 
these elements make to understanding the intensity of EE experiences.
Throughout this study we have focused on the particularities of experience 
consistent with the empiricist ontology of Hume (2007) and social epistemol-
ogy of Durkheim (1915). The tension between the individual and the social are 
ever-present as we seek to unravel empirically observable phenomena (indi-
viduals and society) that are intertwined and inseparable. As we are positioned 
on the precipice of late modernity, our approach to understanding emotions 
promises to contribute to a comprehensive micro-sociological theorisation of 
emotion and cognition in educational contexts (cf. Bellocchi 2017).
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Note
1 Clearly within the scientific community there are multiple concepts signalling also a 
lack of central consensus. Here we refer to the long traditions of generally accepted 
theories and laws that are accepted widely until such a time as when they are replaced 
by more sophisticated alternatives.
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Chapter 9
Emotions and the criminal law
Anger and the defence of provocation
Sarah Sorial
Introduction
The defence of provocation is a partial defence to murder. If successful, it 
reduces a potential murder conviction to one of manslaughter. At the heart of 
the defence is the idea of loss of self-control. Defendants often describe the expe-
rience of losing self-control as one where they snap or crack in response to the 
provocation and explode into violence. They also claim that they came to their 
senses, to find themselves with a gun or a knife in their hand and the victim 
dead before them. The triggers for this loss of control are emotions like anger, 
but more recently the law has also recognised fear as a legitimate trigger for loss 
of self-control (UK Justice & Coroners Act 2009). These descriptions of the 
experience of anger and its effects on reason draw on and perpetuate classical 
understandings of the emotions as irrational and uncontrollable, and these ideas 
have had some surprising traction in the common law.
The provocation defence historically has been used by men who kill their 
wives or partners for reasons of separation or alleged infidelity, and to a lesser 
extent (and less successfully) by women who kill their abusive partners (Fitz-
Gibbon 2012). In 2010, the UK Government abolished the partial defence 
of provocation and replaced it with a new partial defence of loss of self-control. 
The new defence is designed to better cater for the circumstances that cause 
abused women to kill and to exclude defendants who kill for reasons of sexual 
infidelity (UK Justice and Coroners Act 2009). Yet the concept of loss of self-
control is retained and the law also still allows for anger as a trigger for losing 
it. Moreover, the first case to be tried under the new legislation – R v Clinton – 
appealed to and affirmed classical ideas of anger and self-control to explain why 
the defendant killed his wife.
Despite the evolving conceptions of the emotions in disciplines such as 
philosophy, psychology and sociology, the common law has strangely adhered 
to a very classical idea of the emotions, including the emotion of anger. Ideas 
about the emotions that emerge in the modern era demonstrate the ways 
in which emotions are socially constituted and expressed, and the ways in 
which individuals are responsible for managing and controlling their emotions 
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(Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1). In late modernity, there has 
been emerging evidence about the complexity of the emotions and their 
relationship and centrality to reasoning processes, challenging the idea that 
emotions are unstable and unruly forces that undermine reasoning (Damasio 
1994). However, these new understandings of the emotions have had a mixed 
response in common law. While legislators have attempted to incorporate 
these new insights into legislation, their uptake in the courts has been mixed, 
with many judges continuing to adopt and apply classical views of emotions 
like anger in how they interpret the new loss-of-self-control defence.
Drawing on recent research in philosophy, social psychology and the soci-
ology of emotions, this chapter argues that the common law continues to 
operate with an outdated and erroneous view of the emotions. Some key 
features to emerge from this research are: anger, like other emotions, is not an 
irrational response, but often emerges in response to some rational judgement; 
while we might not be able to control feeling emotions, we do have significant 
control in how we express our emotions, including whether we express them 
in violent ways; emotions are highly trainable; the ways they are trained are 
deeply gendered. Until these insights are incorporated in legal judgements, 
the laudable intentions motivating law reform in this area may not get the 
relevant uptake.
The law of provocation/loss of self-control
The defence of provocation is a common law creation. It emerged during 
the seventeenth century as a concession to human frailty at a time when the 
sentence for a murder conviction was capital punishment.1 The defence has 
three elements: the act of provocation, the subjective element and the objec-
tive element. King CJ described the elements as such:
To amount to provocation the acts or words must satisfy the following 
tests: (1) they must be done or said by the deceased to or in the presence of 
the killer; (2) they must have caused in the killer a sudden and temporary 
loss of self-control rendering the killer so subject to passion as to make him 
for the moment not the master of his mind; (3) they must be of such a 
character as might cause an ordinary person to lose his self-control to such 
an extent as to act as the killer has acted.
(R v The Queen 1981, pp. 321–2)
Historically, the common law has accepted the understanding of anger as an 
emotion that unseats reason, causing people (mostly men) to lose their self-
control and kill. In a series of pre-reform cases in the UK, male defendants 
appealed to classical descriptions of the experience of anger as undermining 
their reason and self-control. The cases of R v Suratan2, R v Humes, and R v 
Wilkinson all involved intimate partner killings, and were heard together on 
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appeal for lenient sentences. The Court of Appeal upheld the sentences and 
accepted the defendant’s descriptions of their experience of anger and the 
effects it had on their actions.3
Leslie Humes was an overworked solicitor, who was unable to accept his wife’s 
decision to leave him. He claimed his wife had big-style feelings for another 
man, and disclosed that she was planning to sleep with him. Humes attacked 
her with a bread knife in front of their three children. In police interviews, 
Humes said that in the days before the attack, he had convinced himself that his 
marriage had failed because he was a bad father and husband, only to discover 
that his wife had someone else. He could not explain exactly how he felt but ‘he 
had lost it totally. It’s like they say you can see a red mist. I was bellowing like 
a bull’ (at 57–8).
Mark Paul Wilkinson found it difficult to accept his partner Nicole’s 
decision to leave and to take their children with her. He claims that during a 
conversation she said: ‘I’ve got the kids. You have only got photographs of 
them’. He told the jury that he ‘just boiled over, red haze, gripped hold of her, 
adrenaline really going, heart pounding’. He killed Nicole by asphyxiation, 
while telling her to ‘shut up’ and ‘do me a favour and die’ (at 69). The trial 
judge believed that the offender had intended to kill his partner, but that it was 
not pre-planned; instead, it was a ‘violent, emotional reaction to the situation 
in which the offender eventually found himself’ (at 73).
In response to public outrage about lenient sentences for intimate partner 
killings (Wilkinson was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment, Humes to seven 
years, and Suratan to three-and-a-half years), the UK Government undertook 
significant reforms to the defence, abolishing the defence of provocation and 
replacing it with the new partial defence of loss of self-control. This new 
defence was designed to better cater for the circumstances that cause abused 
women to kill and to exclude defendants who kill for reasons of separation or 
sexual infidelity.
The new provisions differ significantly from the common law interpreta-
tion of the defence in three important ways: first, they remove the suddenness 
requirement; second, they expressly exclude disclosures of sexual infidelity as 
legitimate triggers; and third, they redefine the objective standard as based on 
tolerance and restraint rather than the reasonable person. These changes not only 
mark a significant departure from the previous law, but also attempt to incor-
porate late modern understandings of the emotions, in particular questioning 
the circumstances under which people experience anger, whether it causes 
them to lose self-control and in what ways.
For example, abolishing the suddenness requirement acknowledges the 
different and gendered ways in which men and women lose control and 
kill. Men have claimed that they killed in response to feelings of anger, 
which caused them to snap and act in the heat of the moment. Women, 
by contrast, kill their partners under different circumstances, typically in 
response to being subjected to years of violence and abuse, and kill out of 
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fear when their partner is sleeping or otherwise not threatening (Edwards 
2011). Abolishing the suddenness requirement and including fear as a quali-
fying trigger recognises that loss of self-control can occur in response to 
emotions like fear, and that self-control can be eroded over a long period of 
time, not just in the moment.
Replacing the reasonable person with tolerance and self-restraint will exclude 
those with an unusually short fuse or who are prone to anger (Taylor 2011, 
p. 54). This clause will also exclude those who are bigoted or prejudiced 
against others from minority or vulnerable groups in society, or those who 
are unacceptably intolerant in other ways, such as those who are excessively 
jealous or possessive, or who hold unacceptable attitudes, such as those that 
justify ‘honour killings’ (Taylor 2011, p. 54).
While these reforms will and have made it difficult for defendants who kill 
for reasons of separation or alleged infidelity to plead provocation, the reforms 
still retain the concept of loss of self-control, and the subjective and objective 
elements, albeit in modified forms. Moreover, the first case to be tried under 
the UK provisions – R v Clinton – did allow (on appeal) for evidence of sexual 
infidelity to explain what caused the defendant to kill his wife, demonstrating 
that classical understandings of what the emotions are and how they undermine 
self-control continue to have traction in the ways the new laws are interpreted.
In R v Clinton, the defendant, Clinton, obtained access to his wife’s Facebook 
page and saw photographs of his wife and her new lover posing together. 
There he also found messages containing sexual innuendos. He confronted her 
about these comments and images, and her responses were used as evidence of 
triggering events. Clinton claimed that his wife said a number of hurtful things 
and became very spiteful towards him, that she taunted him about his threat 
to commit suicide, and that she began to recount in graphic detail her sexual 
encounters with up to five other men. He described how he felt as follows:
With that the walls and ceiling just seemed to close in. She was talking but 
he could not hear what she was saying. He could see her mouth opening 
and closing. He could hear a noise, like the distant sea. He wanted every-
thing to stop. He wanted everything to slow down. He then reached out 
and grabbed the piece of wood. The attack on her followed.
(at 75)
At trial, Judge Smith did not find evidence that loss of self-control was the 
result of one of the qualifying triggers identified in the statute. Because she was 
to disregard specifically anything said or done that constituted sexual infidelity, 
she did not consider the comments made by the defendant’s wife as evidence.
On appeal, the court acknowledged that sexual infidelity on its own cannot 
qualify as a trigger, but raised the question of whether sexual infidelity is also 
excluded when it arises in the context of another or a number of other features 
of a case which can constitute qualifying triggers (at 21). The court held that 
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the ‘idea that [. . .] the context in which such words are used should be ignored 
represents an artificiality which the administration of criminal justice should do 
without’ (at 23).
It concluded:
The starting point is that it has been recognised for centuries that sexual 
infidelity may produce a loss of control in men, and, more recently in 
women as well as men who are confronted with sexual infidelity. The 
exclusion created by section 55(6) cannot and does not eradicate the fact 
that on occasions sexual infidelity and loss of control are linked, often with 
the one followed immediately by the other.
(at 36)
Clinton reproduces classical understandings of anger and its relation to loss 
of control, stymieing government attempts to change the law by legislative 
means. For these reasons, it is worth considering the place of anger in law 
in late modernity, whether it really does cause people to lose it in the ways 
described and whether it should function as an excuse in the ways that it does.
Emotions and late modernity: anger and self-control
The philosophical literature
The philosophical study of the emotions was largely neglected until Robert 
Solomon’s ground-breaking book The Passions was published in 1976. 
Solomon argued against William James’s famous definition of emotion as the 
feeling of physiological changes provoked by the perception of an exciting 
event (Solomon 1973, p. 1). One of the consequences of this view, Solomon 
argues, is that it becomes a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’; the more we think 
our emotions are things that happen to us, and which are entirely beyond 
our control, the more we come to think of ourselves as victims, lacking in 
responsibility for how we behave when we are experiencing an emotion 
(Solomon 1973, p. 126).
Instead, Solomon argues that not only are we responsible for our emo-
tions and our emotional choices, but that emotions are also cognitive in 
nature. By this, he means that they are more than feelings, sensations or 
physiological reactions; they are also judgements (Solomon 1973, p. 126). 
Emotions, for Solomon, are intentional states of mind which disclose the 
subject’s personal world and all that matters in it. They emerge because an 
agent judges the world and things in it to be characterised in a certain way 
and to have certain meanings.4
The main features to emerge from the philosophical discussion in the last 
20 years are that, first, emotions are intentional in the sense that they are about 
something. Second, emotions typically have a felt dimension, but this is not a 
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necessary condition to having an emotion. Third, that emotions are socialised 
in specific (and gendered/cultural) ways. While there is still some disagreement 
about the moral aspects of the emotions, there is broad consensus that we are, 
to varying degrees, responsible for our emotions. In the following sections, I 
elaborate on these three features of the emotions with specific reference to the 
emotion of anger, and then draw out some of the implications of this research 
for the defence of loss of self-control.
Anger typically arises in response to a judgement that a person or someone 
close to them has been wronged. These judgements are also bound up with an 
agent’s beliefs in complex ways (Nussbaum 2001, p. 28). In anger, the person 
must believe that some damage has been done to her or someone close to her, 
that the damage was significant, and that it was done intentionally (Ibid.). Of 
course, we can be mistaken about our belief, and the corresponding judgement, 
or we may be wrong about the source of our emotions. I may be angry because 
of a mistaken belief that I have been wronged, but subsequently discover that it 
was simply an accident on the part of the other person. In these cases, I would 
need to abandon my anger. I might also discover, on reflection, that the source 
of the anger was lack of sleep, and this impaired my judgement. Again, I would 
have to correct my emotion accordingly.
The fact that our emotions are amenable to a degree of correction and 
regulation on reflection and new evidence suggests that emotions are not sim-
ply forces that take us by surprise and over which we have no control. As 
Solomon argues: ‘if emotions are judgments and can be “defused” (and also 
instigated) by considerations of other judgments, it is clear how our emotions 
are in a sense our doing, and how we are responsible for them’ (Solomon 1973, 
p. 10). Normative judgements can be changed through influence, argument, 
persuasion and evidence, and so can our emotions. ‘I can be convinced that 
my anger is baseless and abandon it, but I can also make myself angry by 
focusing on how I have been wronged, or by dwelling on minor behaviour, 
building it up into a pattern of deceit and abuse’ (Solomon 1973, p. 10). 
Emotions can thus be abandoned, corrected or indulged.
Emotions often do involve feelings or have a physiological aspect. However, 
they need not. For example, one can feel angry in the sense that she feels her 
blood is boiling, or that she is shaking with anger. But a person can also have an 
emotion like anger without feeling angry. As Nussbaum notes, many women 
feel continuous anger at the domestic injustice that is part of their day-to-day 
existence, but the anger will only surface under certain conditions (Nussbaum 
2001, p. 70). This suggests that there is a difference between feeling an emo-
tion, having an emotion and expressing an emotion. A person may feel (in the 
physiological sense) angry, but she can also be angry without any discernible 
feelings. She may express that anger in different ways; she might calmly explain 
why she is angry to rectify the wrongdoing (for example, she may explain to 
her husband that she is angry because of inequitable childcare arrangements), or 
she might shout, kick the door or engage in other acts of violence.
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While it is the case that a person may have little control over feeling certain 
emotions, they do have significant control over how those emotions are expressed. 
In this respect, emotions can take us by surprise or seem to disrupt our lives. This 
is because emotions are, to quote Solomon, ‘urgent judgments’, or emergency 
responses to difficult situations, but they are nevertheless rational.
Emotions are rational responses to unusual situations. They differ from 
‘cool’ judgments and normal, rational, deliberate action in that they are 
promoted in urgency and in contexts in which one’s usual repertoire of 
actions and considered judgments will not suffice. An emotion is a neces-
sary hasty judgment in response to a difficult situation.
(Solomon 1973, p. 13)
Feelings of anger and their expression thus typically arise in response to some 
perceived wrongdoing or injustice committed against an agent, although they 
need not. For example, irascible agents may often feel angry at trivial things that 
have nothing or little to do with any genuine wrongdoing. Others may feel 
angry in response to an erroneous judgement that they have been wronged.5 
For these reasons, it is important to distinguish between moral anger and what 
I will call dispositional anger.
Moral anger arises in response to legitimate instances of injustice or wrong-
doing, while dispositional anger arises because the agent has not trained his or 
her emotional responses in the right kinds of ways. In the case of dispositional 
anger, the agent may be quick to anger over minor things, or because she has 
made an incorrect judgement about the demands of morality in any given situ-
ation. A person can also indulge her anger, working herself into a state by focusing 
on perceived slights or offence. Moral anger, on the other hand, is supported 
or underwritten by a normative moral framework, which determines whether 
the anger is justified in any given context, whereas dispositional anger is not.
To summarise the core features of anger to emerge from the philosophical 
discussion: anger is an emotion that arises in response to injustice or perceived 
injustice. In this respect, it is a judgement based on a belief. There is a differ-
ence between moral anger, which arises in response to legitimate injustice, and 
dispositional anger, which arises because an agent habitually misjudges situa-
tions, feeling anger even though it may not be rational to do so. There is also 
a difference between feeling anger and expressing that anger in various ways.
The empirical evidence
These features of anger have been affirmed by recent research in social psy-
chology. The empirical evidence supports the theory that anger is intimately 
connected to injustice. Anger has been found to be associated with a sense 
or perception that the self (or someone close to the self) has been wronged, 
offended or injured in some way. The feeling of anger is also associated with 
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a sense of certainty or confidence about what has happened and the belief that 
another person (not a random situation or the self) was responsible for the 
injury (Lerner & Tiedens 2006, p. 117). By contrast, negative events that are 
caused by forces outside an agent’s control tend to evoke feelings of sadness 
rather than anger, and negative events caused by the self tend to evoke feelings 
of guilt or shame. When people feel uncertain or lack confidence about the 
cause of negative events, they are more likely to feel fear and anxiety rather 
than anger (Lerner & Tiedens 2006, p. 117).
This research also affirms the view that emotions are not reflexive events; 
they are not things that simply happen to us.6 They arise for rational reasons, 
and we have control over how we express and train them. William Lyons, 
for example, argues that if an emotional state makes acting on that state more 
likely, and a person deliberately abandons herself to that state, she may also be 
abandoning what control she has over that state.
When angry, for example, one might feel like indulging in physical vio-
lence, which usually turns out to be morally reprehensible. Now if one 
fosters anger, savouring the outraged feelings and aggressive impulses, 
knowing that one normally acts on them quite implosively, one can be said 
to be deliberately loosening one’s aggressive impulses.
(Lyons 1980, p. 205)
Whatever the origins of extreme emotions, psychologists tend to agree that 
emotions always involve an element of choice. As Reilly writes:
Since there is always an element of choice, there may never be a loss of 
self-control. If a person’s reaction in an extreme emotional state is chosen, 
the element of excuse may disappear altogether. With no loss of self-
control, there is only a state of violence which is at all times connected in a 
complicated way to a series of choices: a choice not to get angry; a choice 
whether or not to translate the anger into aggression [. . .]
(Reilly 1997, p. 320)
Lundy Bancroft, a therapist specialising in counselling abusive men, affirms this 
view that an agent has a choice in how he expresses his emotions. Bancroft asks 
his clients who claim loss of control why they did not do something worse to 
their victim. The most frequent response he receives is ‘Jesus, I wouldn’t do 
that. I would never do something like that to her’ (Bancroft 2002, pp. 34–5, 
emphasis original). He claims that in his clinical experience, clients always give 
him a reason; they do not say ‘I do not know’ or ‘I can’t recall’. He concludes 
that an ‘abuser almost never does anything that he himself considers morally 
unacceptable’ (Bancroft 2002, pp. 34–5). Despite claiming to have lost control, 
abusers still exercise judgement, in some cases, believing it to be a (mistaken) 
moral judgement that they have been wronged.
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This view of emotions and choice was also evident in the 2004 Law 
Commission interviews with psychiatrists, many of whom claimed that those 
who strike out and lose control in anger can usually afford to do so, claiming 
that: ‘an angry strong man is much less likely to “lose self-control” and attack 
another person in circumstances in which he or she is likely to come off worse 
by doing so’ (Law Commission 2004, 3.28). This suggests that even when 
agents lose it, they are still able to make rational assessments of a situation, 
including assessments about their chances of success in committing acts of vio-
lence and whether there will be adverse consequences for them.
The fact that we also have some choice in how we express our emotions 
suggests that we also know what we are doing when in the grip of strong 
emotions. Emotions are thus amenable to a high degree of regulation. While 
individuals are largely responsible for how this regulation occurs, they do not 
regulate their emotions independently of cultural norms associated with the 
expression and management of emotions.
Socialisation of emotions
Cultures create norms to regulate emotions and motivate appropriate behav-
iour. Norms are guidelines for expected behaviours, thinking and feeling. 
They identify a range of permissible behaviour that enables groups to function 
effectively. As Hwang and Matsumoto explain:
Cultures encourage adherence to norms and create sanctions against infrac-
tions, which aids individuals and groups in negotiating the complexity of 
human social life. By regulating emotions via norms, cultures ensure that 
behaviours follow culturally proscribed scripts, increasing socially appropriate 
behaviour and thus facilitating social coordination and decreasing social chaos.
(Hwang & Matsumoto 2016, p. 149)
These cultural display rules are learnt early in life. They function to regulate 
expressive behaviour depending on the social context. For example, they assist 
us in determining and managing the appropriate emotional displays in social 
situations where there is a need to manage particular emotions. It is these rules 
that dictate the inappropriateness of crying through a meeting or a lecture, 
displaying elation or joy at a funeral or expressing anger by throwing objects at 
colleagues and so on.
These display rules are also deeply gendered.7 They regulate the emotional 
expression of men and women in very different ways. For example, while men 
and women experience anger with the same frequency, there are significant dif-
ferences in how that anger is expressed. These differences are attributable to how 
men and women learn and internalise cultural display rules. For example, women 
and girls are more likely to express their emotions verbally, while men and boys 
tend to use physical and aggressive means (Parmley & Cunningham 2014). 
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Boys are more likely to report expressing their anger by hitting, kicking and 
other forms of physical aggression, while girls reported ‘sulking and pouting’ 
(Parmley & Cunningham 2014, p. 324). Women and girls also report crying in 
response to anger more than boys and men (ibid.).
These results are also apparent in young children, confirming the suggestion 
that cultural display rules are learnt early in life. The evidence also suggests 
that as boys get older, they tend to mask their feelings of sadness, while girls 
conceal their expressions of anger (ibid.). Cultural display rules thus regulate the 
expression of anger in different ways for men and women; they tacitly allow 
men’s expression of anger in violent or aggressive ways, and require women 
to conceal or suppress their feelings of anger. These rules are enforced through 
rewards and punishments of various kinds.
This evidence suggests that anger is a complex emotion, one that it is deeply 
gendered, often in problematic ways, but nevertheless amenable to a high 
degree of regulation. It also suggests that the legal understanding of anger as 
both a trigger for aggressive behaviour and an out-of-control emotion is a very 
masculine understanding of anger and aggression. Anger does not undermine 
reason in the ways we think and it is expressed in many different ways, not 
exclusively through violence. The law’s recognition and privileging of this 
particular way of losing control (i.e., because of anger) is both limited and sim-
plistic. It is limited because alternative experiences (such as those of women) 
about loss of control remain ‘submerged and silenced’ (Edwards 2011, p. 88).
As Edwards argues:
[the battered woman’s] state of mind and manifestation of behaviour at the 
time of the killing are not a loss of self-control in the traditionally mascu-
linist sense at all. Nor is she in the period before the killing in a state of 
anger. She is in a state of fearful contemplation.
(Edwards 2011, p. 88)
Even though significant law reform has meant that this defence is now open 
to women, and that the law seems to recognise the different circumstances in 
which women kill, it still nevertheless expects women to conform to this way 
of losing control. According to Edwards:
Even within the new law the cumulative and chronic state of mind of the 
battered woman will still need to be established as a loss of control shaped 
in anger’s template [. . .] it is this inherent contradiction within the fear 
defence which threatens and undermines its very purpose and potential.
(Edwards 2011, p. 89)
The legal understanding of anger is also simplistic. There are many ways in 
which anger is expressed, and how it is expressed will often depend on who the 
agent is, the circumstances in which they find themselves and the cultural display 
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rules the agent has internalised. Men and boys have a greater tendency to express 
their anger in violent ways, while women tend to either suppress their anger or 
express it by either crying, pouting or being unhappy, despite the fact that both 
men and women experience the feeling of anger with the same frequency. While 
new legislative provisions do recognise the significance of cultural display rules, 
and the ways in which men and women are socialised into different emotional 
regimes, the common law understanding of anger still perceives of anger as an 
out-of-control emotion. It may well be that some men experience anger in this 
way; however, this could be attributable to the cultural (and legal) concessions 
made to male expressions of anger. If men are out of control when angry, per-
haps this is because they know they may get away with behaving as they do.
Conclusion
The simple, classical and dualistic understanding of emotions like anger in legal 
contexts has several troubling legal consequences: first, it has prevented the law 
from appreciating the complexity of emotions considering new evidence from 
philosophy, social psychology and sociology, and the ways the expression of emo-
tion is gendered. Second, the common law understanding of anger has blocked 
government attempts to reform the law of provocation by legislative means. 
Courtroom practices have continued to use classical understandings of anger to 
interpret new law. Third, adopting this gendered view of anger as linked to vio-
lence may prevent women who kill from fear from utilising the new defence, as 
they may need to demonstrate they lost it in ways men traditionally have.
In this chapter, I have defended a late modern view of the emotions (Patulny 
& Olson, this volume, Chapter 1). I argue that they are complex, they do not 
undermine reason, that they are amenable to a high degree of control and that 
agents have a responsibility – both legal and moral – to control their emotions 
in non-violent ways. This chapter has not advocated for the abolition of the 
defence of provocation, or for the new defence of loss of self-control; however, 
this late modernity view of the emotions does put pressure on law reformers 
to either abolish or reform such defences. Given what we know about the 
emotions, it is perhaps a mischaracterisation to suggest that a defendant ‘lost 
self-control’ in acting as he or she did, and perhaps more accurate to focus on 
their reasons for acting in the face of emotions, and whether such actions could 
be justifiable or explainable given the circumstances.
Notes
1 While this remains the case in some US jurisdictions, it is no longer the case in the 
UK, Australia and New Zealand, strengthening the case for the abolition or substan-
tial reform in these jurisdictions.
2 While Humes and Wilkinson succeeded with a defence of provocation, Suratan was 
convicted of involuntary manslaughter on the basis that there was insufficient evi-
dence of the mens rea for murder.
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3 While I only refer to two cases in this chapter as representative, the ways in which 
defendants describe their experience of anger and subsequent loss of self-control is 
consistent across common law jurisdictions. See also cases including R v Ramage [2004] 
VSC 508; R v Singh [2012] NSWSC 637, 7 June 2012; R v Butay [2001] VSC 417.
4 See also Hochschild’s work in sociology on ‘emotion work’ and ‘feeling rules’ to 
explain these ways in which we manage and control our emotions in ways consistent 
with cultural norms and expectations.
5 See also Pettigrove, G 2012, ‘Meekness and “moral” anger’, Ethics, vol. 122, no. 2, 
pp. 341–70; Pettigrove, G & Tanaka, K 2014, ‘Anger and moral judgment’, Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 92, no. 2, pp. 269–86; Nussbaum, M 2015, ‘Transitional anger’, 
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 41–56; Prinz, J 2007, 
The emotional construction of morals, Oxford University Press, Oxford; Nussbaum, M 
1994, The therapy of desire: theory and practice in Hellenistic ethics, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, NJ and Oxford.
6 See also Arenson, K, Bagaric, M & Gillies, P 2011, Australian criminal law in the com-
mon law jurisdictions: cases and materials, Oxford University Press, Australia and New 
Zealand, p. 183.
7 See Hochschild, A 1979, ‘Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure’, in 
American Journal of Sociology, vol. 85, no. 3, pp. 551–75 and Ekman, P & Friesen, W 
V 1987, ‘Universals and cultural differences in the judgments of facial expressions of 
emotions’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 712–17.
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Chapter 10
Achievement emotions
A control-value theory perspective
Reinhard Pekrun
Introduction
Achievement emotions are ubiquitous in educational settings. Students 
frequently experience emotions such as enjoyment, hope for success, pride 
about accomplishments, anger, frustration, anxiety, shame, or boredom at 
school. These emotions can be very intense, and today we know that they 
can exert profound effects on learning, performance, and well-being (Pekrun 
et al. 2002; Quinlan 2016). Nevertheless, they have received little attention 
from researchers until recently.
Throughout modern time, schooling and students’ learning have primar-
ily been seen as rational pursuits. Policy-makers, teachers, and researchers 
alike defined the goals of academic learning in terms of acquiring declarative 
knowledge about the contents of curricula and procedural knowledge of how 
to read, write, and calculate. The process of reaching these goals was also 
conceptualised in cognitive terms. Theories of learning focused on concep-
tualising the cognitive foundations of formal learning and human memory. 
Even behaviourist theories, despite their neglect of psychological processes, 
conceived the learning student as a rationally acting individual, although 
rationality was framed in terms of behaviour following the laws of condition-
ing (see Altman & Linton 1971).
As such, cognitive research dominated inquiry on academic learning through-
out the twentieth century. The situation changed slowly when researchers and 
practitioners began recognising that achievement-related anxiety before and 
during tests and exams had become a major problem at school and univer-
sity. There were a few early attempts to conceptualise exam anxiety, based on 
traditions in psychoanalysis and personality theory (see Brown 1938; Stengel 
1936), but the notion of test anxiety gained popularity when it was couched 
in neo-behaviourist and cognitive terms that matched the Zeitgeist during 
the 1950s and 1960s (see Mandler & Sarason 1952). With these concepts and 
the newly developed questionnaire measures of test anxiety (see Test Anxiety 
Questionnaire, TAQ; Mandler & Sarason 1952), the anxiety construct gained 
popularity in the decades to follow.
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For quite a long time, anxiety remained the only emotion construct that 
received educational researchers’ attention (for an exception, see B. Weiner’s 
[1985] attributional approach to various achievement emotions). During the 
past 20 years, however, there has been growing recognition that emotions are 
more complex and manifold (Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1), and 
that both negative and positive emotions are central to human achievement 
strivings. Emotions are no longer regarded as epiphenomena that may occur 
in achievement settings but lack any instrumental relevance. Instead, in this 
nascent research, it is recognised that various emotions are critically important 
for performance and the productivity of individuals, organisations, and cultures 
(Ashkanasy & Humphrey 2011; Pekrun & Linnenbrink-Garcia 2014).
In this chapter, I consider such emotions, with a specific focus on emotions 
in education. To begin, I define emotion and achievement emotions. I then 
review research on the origins and functions of achievement emotions, using 
Pekrun’s (2006; Pekrun & Perry 2014) control-value theory (CVT) of achieve-
ment emotions as a conceptual framework. In conclusion, I address regulation 
and modification of achievement emotions and their relative universality across 
genders, achievement settings, and social-cultural and historical contexts.
Emotion and achievement emotions
Emotions are multifaceted phenomena involving affective, cognitive, physiologi-
cal, motivational, and expressive components (Scherer 2009). For example, a 
students’ anxiety before an exam can be comprised of nervous, uneasy feelings 
(affective); worries about failing the exam (cognitive); increased cardiovascu-
lar activation (physiological); impulses to escape the situation (motivation); and 
anxious facial expression (expressive). Achievement emotions are emotions that are 
tied to achievement activities (e.g., studying) or achievement outcomes (suc-
cess and failure; Table 10.1). Most emotions arising from studying, working, 
or participating in sports are seen as achievement emotions, since they relate to 
activities and outcomes that are typically judged according to competence-based 
standards of quality. However, not all of the emotions experienced in achieve-
ment settings are designated the label achievement emotions. For example, social 
emotions are frequently experienced in these same settings. Achievement and 
social emotions can overlap, as in emotions directed towards the achievement of 
others (e.g., admiration, empathy, contempt, or envy).
Past research focused on emotions induced by achievement outcomes, 
such as hope and pride related to success, or anxiety and shame related to 
failure (Weiner 1985; Zeidner 2014). Although outcome emotions are of 
critical importance for achievement strivings, emotions directly pertaining 
to the activities performed in achievement settings are of equal relevance. 
The excitement arising from the commencement of a new project, boredom 
experienced when performing monotonous routine tasks, or anger felt when 
task demands seem unreasonable are examples of activity-related emotions. 
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Table 10.1 A three-dimensional taxonomy of achievement emotions
Object focus
Positive a Negative b
Activating Deactivating Activating Deactivating
Activity Enjoyment Relaxation Anger Boredom
Frustration
Outcome / Hope Relief c Anxiety Hopelessness
prospective Joy c
Outcome / Joy Contentment Shame Sadness
retrospective Pride Relief Anger Disappointment
Gratitude
a Positive = pleasant emotion; b negative = unpleasant emotion; c anticipatory joy / relief.
Recent studies have broadened the scope of research to include this important 
class of emotions (see, e.g., Tze, Daniels & Klassen 2016).
In the three-dimensional taxonomy of achievement emotions that is part of 
the CVT (Table 10.1), the differentiation of outcome versus activity emotions 
pertains to the object focus of these emotions. In addition, as with emotions more 
generally, achievement emotions can be grouped according to their valence and 
to the degree of activation implied. In terms of valence, positive (i.e., pleasant) 
emotions can be distinguished from negative (i.e., unpleasant) emotions, such 
as enjoyment versus anxiety. In terms of activation, physiologically activating 
emotions can be distinguished from deactivating emotions, such as excitement 
versus relaxation.
Exploratory research has documented that the emotions organised in this 
taxonomy are experienced frequently in achievement settings. For example, in 
a series of interview studies with high school and university students, we found 
that anxiety was the emotion reported most often across various academic 
situations (e.g., attending class, studying, and taking tests and exams; Pekrun 
et al. 2002). Despite the prevalence of anxiety, however, the vast majority of 
emotions pertained to emotion categories other than anxiety, with episodes of 
enjoyment, satisfaction, hope, pride, relief, anger, boredom, and shame also 
reported frequently.
Origins of achievement emotions
Emotions can be caused and modulated by numerous individual factors, 
including situational perceptions, cognitive appraisals, neuro-hormonal 
processes, and sensory feedback from expressive behaviour. Among these 
variables, cognitive appraisals of situational demands, personal competences, 
the probability of success and failure, and the value of these outcomes likely 
play a major role in the arousal of achievement emotions. In contrast to 
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emotions induced in phylogenetically older and more constrained situations 
(e.g., enjoyment of physiological need fulfilment; fear of falling; Campos, 
Bertenthal & Kermoian 1992), achievement emotions pertain to culturally 
defined demands in settings that are a recent product of civilisation. In these 
settings, people have to learn how to adapt to situational demands while 
preserving individual autonomy – inevitably a process guided by appraisals. 
Thus, researchers have focused on appraisals as the proximal determinants of 
achievement emotions.
Appraisals as proximal individual antecedents
Appraisals concerning a lack of control over performance and the threat of 
failure have been addressed as causing achievement-related anxiety. The find-
ings from various studies confirm that students’ control beliefs, self-concept 
of ability, and self-efficacy expectations negatively correlate with their test 
anxiety (Pekrun et al. 2011; Zeidner 1998; 2014). In addition, the subjective 
importance of failure predicts achievement anxiety (Pekrun & Perry 2014). In 
attributional theories explaining emotions following success and failure, perceived 
control plays a central role as well. In Weiner’s (1985) approach, attributions of 
success and failure to various causes are held to be primary determinants of these 
emotions. For example, attributions of success to internal causes (i.e., causes 
located within the person, such as ability and effort) are thought to arouse 
pride. Shame is seen to be instigated by failure attributed to internal causes that 
are uncontrollable (like lack of ability), and gratitude and anger by attributions 
of success and failure, respectively, to external causes controlled by others.
While test anxiety theories and attributional theories have addressed out-
come emotions, they have neglected activity-related achievement emotions. 
The CVT has revised and expanded core propositions of test anxiety and attri-
butional theories to explain a wider variety of achievement emotions (Pekrun 
2006; Pekrun & Perry 2014). The theory posits that achievement emotions 
are induced when the individual feels in control of, or out of control of, 
activities and outcomes that are subjectively important. Thus, appraisals of 
control and value are thought to generate these emotions. Control appraisals 
pertain to the perceived controllability of achievement-related actions and 
outcomes, as implied by causal expectations (self-efficacy expectations and 
outcome expectancies), causal attributions of achievement, and competence 
appraisals (e.g., self-concepts of ability). Value appraisals relate to the subjec-
tive importance of these activities and outcomes. These appraisals can pertain 
to characteristics of achievement activities themselves (intrinsic values) or to 
their instrument value for obtaining outcomes (extrinsic values).
Different control and value appraisals are thought to prompt different achieve-
ment emotions (Table 10.1). Prospective joy and hopelessness are expected to 
be triggered when there is high perceived control (joy) or a complete lack of 
perceived control (hopelessness). For example, a student who believes she has 
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prepared well for an exam (high control) may feel joyous about the prospect of 
receiving a good grade. Conversely, a student who believes he is incapable of 
mastering the exam (lack of control) may experience hopelessness. Prospective 
hope and anxiety are triggered when there is uncertainty about control, the atten-
tional focus being on anticipated success in the case of hope, and on anticipated 
failure in the case of anxiety. A student who is unsure about being able to master 
an important exam may hope for success, fear failure, or both (Pekrun 1992).
Retrospective joy and sadness are considered control-independent emotions 
that immediately follow perceived success and failure, further cognitive elabora-
tion being unnecessary (also see Weiner 1985). In contrast, disappointment and 
relief depend on the perceived match between expectations and the actual out-
come. Disappointment is aroused when anticipated success does not occur, and 
relief when anticipated failure does not occur. Finally, causal attributions of suc-
cess and failure to oneself or others induce pride, shame, gratitude, and anger, 
respectively. For example, a sports student who wins an important race will feel 
pride, provided that he attributes the victory to his own ability or effort.
Furthermore, the theory proposes that these outcome emotions also depend 
on the subjective importance of achievement outcomes, implying that they are 
a joint function of perceived control and value. For instance, a student should 
feel worried if she judges herself incapable of mastering the learning material 
(low controllability) in an important course (high value). In contrast, if she feels 
that she is able to learn the material (high controllability), or is indifferent about 
the course (low value), her anxiety should be low.
Regarding activity emotions (Table 10.1), enjoyment of achievement activi-
ties is proposed to depend on a combination of positive competence appraisals 
and positive appraisals of the intrinsic value of the action (e.g., studying) and its 
reference object (e.g., learning material). For example, a student is expected to 
enjoy learning if he feels competent to meet the demands of the task and values 
the learning material. When the intrinsic value of the action is negative (e.g., 
when working on a difficult project is perceived as taking too much effort), 
anger and frustration are expected to be aroused. Boredom is predicted when the 
activity lacks any intrinsic incentive value.
Empirical studies confirm that perceived control over achievement relates 
positively to students’ enjoyment, hope, and pride, and negatively to their anger, 
anxiety, shame, hopelessness, and boredom (Pekrun & Perry 2014). Furthermore, 
research has shown that the perceived value of achievement relates positively to 
both positive and negative achievement emotions except boredom, indicating 
that the importance of success and failure amplifies these emotions. For bore-
dom, negative links with value have been found, corroborating that boredom 
is reduced when individuals value achievement (Pekrun et  al. 2010). Recent 
studies have also confirmed that control and value interact in the arousal of 
achievement emotions. Positive emotions are especially pronounced when both 
control and value are high, and negative emotions are pronounced when value is 
high but control is lacking (Goetz et al. 2010; Lauerman, Eccles & Pekrun 2017).
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Figure 10.1 Control-value theory: basic propositions
Distal individual antecedents: the role of achievement goals
The CVT implies that more distal individual antecedents, such as gender 
or achievement-related beliefs, should affect emotions by first influencing 
appraisals (Figure 10.1; Pekrun 2006). A case in point is the influence of 
achievement goals, which are of prime importance for human achievement 
strivings. These goals may be focused on personal mastery, in which one 
judges one’s performance against one’s own prior performance or some 
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absolute standard (mastery goals). Alternatively, one might compare one’s 
performance to others (performance goals). Within those goals, one may 
focus either on approaching success or on avoiding failure, yielding four 
types of goals (mastery-approach, mastery-avoidance, performance-approach, 
performance-avoidance; Elliot & McGregor 2001; also see Elliot, Murayama 
& Pekrun 2011).
In a theoretical model linking goals to emotions, Pekrun et al. (2006, 2009) 
explained that mastery-approach goals focus attention on the ongoing mastery 
and positive value of the activity. By implication, they should foster positive 
activity emotions such as enjoyment of learning and reduce negative activ-
ity emotions such as boredom. In contrast, performance-approach goals focus 
attention on the perceived controllability and positive value of success out-
comes, implying that they facilitate positive outcome emotions such as hope 
and pride. Performance-avoidance goals focus attention on the perceived 
uncontrollability and negative value of failure, suggesting they evoke nega-
tive outcome emotions such as anxiety, shame, and hopelessness. In empirical 
studies, the relation between performance-avoidance goals and test anxiety has 
been best documented, but there also are clear relations for mastery-approach 
goals and activity emotions (positive for enjoyment, negative for boredom), 
and for performance goals and pride, shame, and hopelessness (Huang 2011; 
Pekrun et al. 2006; 2009).
The influence of tasks and social environments
The impact of task design and social contexts has been explored in research 
on test anxiety (Zeidner 1998, 2014). Lack of structure and clarity in class-
room instruction and exams, as well as excessively high task demands, 
increase students’ test anxiety. These effects are likely mediated by students’ 
expectancies of failure and perceptions of low control (Pekrun 1992). The 
format of tasks also matters. Open-ended formats (e.g., essay questions) 
seem to induce more anxiety than multiple-choice formats. In contrast, 
giving individuals the choice between tasks, relaxing time constraints, and 
giving second chances in terms of retaking tests reduces anxiety, presum-
ably because perceived control is enhanced under these conditions (Zeidner 
1998; 2014).
Regarding social environments, high achievement expectancies from 
important others, negative feedback after performance, and negative conse-
quences of poor performance (e.g., public humiliation) correlate positively 
with students’ test anxiety (Pekrun 1992; Zeidner 1998). Also, individual 
competition in classrooms is positively related to students’ anxiety, presum-
ably because competition reduces expectancies for success and increases the 
importance of avoiding failure (Zeidner 1998). From the perspective of 
the CVT, the following factors may be generally relevant to the development 
of achievement emotions (Figure 10.1).
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(1) Cognitive quality. The cognitive quality of tasks as defined by their struc-
ture, clarity, and potential for cognitive stimulation likely has a positive influ-
ence on perceived control and the perceived value of tasks, thus positively 
influencing achievement emotions. In addition, the relative difficulty of tasks 
can also influence perceived control, and the match between task demands 
and competences can influence perceived task value. If demands are too high 
or too low, the incentive value of tasks may be reduced to the extent that 
boredom is experienced (Csikszentmihalyi 1975; Pekrun et al. 2010).
(2) Motivational quality. Teachers, parents, and peers deliver messages con-
veying achievement values in two important ways. First, if tasks are shaped 
such that they meet individual needs, positive activity emotions should be 
fostered. For example, classroom environments that support cooperation 
should help students fulfil their needs for social relatedness, thus making 
classes more enjoyable. Second, teachers’ own enthusiasm in dealing with 
tasks can facilitate students’ adoption of achievement values and related 
emotions (Frenzel et al. 2009; 2017).
(3) Autonomy support. Tasks and environments supporting autonomy can 
increase perceived control and, by meeting needs for autonomy, the value 
of related achievement activities (Tsai et al. 2008). These beneficial effects 
likely also depend on the match between individual competences and need 
for academic autonomy, on the one hand, and the affordances of the envi-
ronment, on the other. If there is a mismatch, loss of control and negative 
emotions could result.
(4) Goal structures and social expectations. Different standards for defining 
achievement can imply individualistic (mastery), competitive (normative 
performance), or cooperative goal structures (Johnson & Johnson 1974). 
These goal structures influence individual achievement goals and the 
emotions mediated by these goals. Furthermore, they determine relative 
opportunities for experiencing success and perceiving control. More spe-
cifically, competitive structures imply that there are winners and losers, so 
that some people necessarily have to experience failure and the associated 
emotions such as anxiety and hopelessness. Similarly, the demands implied 
by an important other’s unrealistic expectancies for achievement can lead 
to negative emotions resulting from reduced subjective control.
(5) Composition of student groups. Chances for performing well compared to 
one’s classmates are reduced in a high-achieving class, thus students’ per-
ceived competence and control also tends to be reduced. Because percep-
tions of control prompt achievement emotions, being in a high-achieving 
class can reduce students’ positive emotions (e.g., enjoyment) and exacer-
bate their negative emotions (Pekrun et al. in press). Counter to a popu-
lar belief, the negative compositional effect of class-average achievement 
on emotional well-being is not reliably compensated by beneficial effects 
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on learning. When controlling for measurement error, the effects of class-
average achievement on individual achievement can be negative as well 
(Dicke et al. 2018).
(6) Feedback and consequences of achievement. Success can strengthen per-
ceived control, and cumulative failure undermines control. In environ-
ments involving frequent assessments, performance feedback is central to 
the arousal of achievement emotions. In addition, the consequences of 
success and failure are important, since they affect the instrumental value 
of achievement. Positive outcome emotions (e.g., hope for success) can 
be increased if success produces beneficial outcomes (e.g., future career 
opportunities), given sufficient contingency between one’s own efforts, 
success, and these outcomes. Negative consequences of failure (e.g., 
unemployment), on the other hand, may increase achievement-related 
anxiety and hopelessness (Pekrun 1992).
Functions of emotions for learning and achievement
Experimental research has shown that emotions affect a wide range of cog-
nitive processes that are relevant for learning, including attention, memory 
storage, and cognitive problem solving (Clore & Huntsinger 2009). It has been 
shown that both positive and negative emotions consume cognitive resources 
by focusing attention on the object of emotion (Ellis & Ashbrook 1988). 
Consumption of cognitive resources for task-irrelevant purposes implies that 
fewer resources are available for task completion (Meinhardt & Pekrun 2003). 
Furthermore, mood can enhance mood-congruent memory recall, with positive 
mood facilitating retrieval of positive self-related information, and negative 
mood facilitating the retrieval of negative information (e.g., Olafson & Ferraro 
2001). Finally, mood and emotions influence cognitive problem solving, with 
positive mood promoting flexible and creative ways of solving problems, and 
negative mood more focused, detail-oriented, and analytical thinking (Clore 
& Huntsinger 2009).
This experimental research has largely been conducted in laboratory settings. 
It is open to question whether laboratory findings are generalisable to the more 
intense emotions experienced in regular classrooms. In contrast, field research 
has directly analysed links between emotions and real-life performance. Most 
of this research has focused on test anxiety, but a few studies have analysed 
other emotions. The valence and activation dimensions of emotions may be 
most important for explaining the findings, implying that it is useful to distin-
guish between positive activating, positive deactivating, negative activating, 
and negative deactivating emotions (Table 10.1). In the CVT, emotions from 
these categories are posited to influence the following mechanisms of learning: 
(a) the availability of cognitive resources enabling individuals to focus attention 
on achievement tasks; (b) interest and motivation to perform these tasks; and 
(c) use of learning strategies and self-regulation of learning.
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Positive emotions: enjoyment, hope, pride, and relief
In experimental research, it was traditionally assumed that positive emotions 
are often maladaptive as a result of inducing unrealistic appraisals, fostering 
superficial information processing, and reducing motivation to pursue chal-
lenging goals (Aspinwall 1998). However, positive emotion has typically been 
regarded as a unitary construct in experimental research, instead of distin-
guishing between activating versus deactivating emotions. According to the 
CVT, deactivating positive emotions, like relief or relaxation, may well have 
negative motivational effects, whereas activating positive emotions, such as task 
enjoyment or pride, may have positive effects. Such a nuanced view is aligned 
with increasing recognition that emotions are more complex than previously 
thought (Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1).
More specifically, task enjoyment is posited to focus attention on the task, pro-
mote interest and intrinsic motivation, and facilitate the use of flexible learning 
strategies and self-regulation, thus exerting positive effects on overall perfor-
mance. In contrast, deactivating positive emotions, such as relief and relaxation, 
are thought to reduce task attention, can have ambiguous motivational effects by 
undermining current motivation while at the same time reinforcing motivation 
to reengage with the task, and can lead to superficial information processing, thus 
likely making effects on overall performance more variable.
Empirical evidence confirms that activating positive emotions such as 
enjoyment of learning are positively correlated with learning and performance, 
including positive relations with students’ interest, effort invested in study-
ing, elaboration of learning material, self-regulation of learning, grades, and 
test scores (Linnenbrink 2007; Pekrun et al. 2002; 2011). However, caution 
should be exercised in interpreting the reported correlations. Emotions prob-
ably affect performance, but performance attainment can reciprocally influence 
the arousal of emotion, making causation reciprocal rather than unidirectional 
(Pekrun et al. 2017). Considering reciprocal rather than unidirectional causa-
tion is another example of how we can acknowledge that emotions are more 
complex than researchers have assumed in the past (Patulny & Olson, this 
volume, Chapter 1).
Negative activating emotions: anxiety, shame, anger,  
and confusion
Negative activating emotions are expected to produce task-irrelevant thinking 
(e.g., worrying about test failure), thus reducing cognitive resources available 
for task purposes, and to undermine interest and intrinsic motivation. On the 
other hand, these emotions can induce motivation to avoid failure and facilitate 
the use of rigid learning strategies such as simple rehearsal of learning mate-
rial. As such, the effects on resulting performance depend on task conditions 
and may be variable, similar to the effects of positive deactivating emotions. 
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The available evidence supports this position. More specifically, test anxiety 
impairs performance on complex or difficult tasks that demand cognitive 
resources, whereas performance on easy and less complex tasks may not suffer 
or is even enhanced (Zeidner 1998). In line with these findings, test anxiety 
correlates moderately negatively with students’ academic achievement (ibid.). 
Again, in explaining the evidence, reciprocal causation needs to be considered. 
The relations between anxiety and achievement may be caused by effects of 
success and failure on the development of test anxiety, in addition to effects 
of anxiety on performance. A few longitudinal studies confirm that test anxi-
ety and students’ achievement are linked by reciprocal linkages across time 
(Meece, Wigfield & Eccles 1990; Pekrun 1992; Pekrun et al. 2017).
Similar to anxiety, shame related to failure shows negative overall correla-
tions with students’ effort and achievement (Pekrun et al. 2011). However, 
like anxiety, shame probably exerts variable motivational effects. Turner and 
Schallert (2001) have shown that students who experienced shame following 
negative exam feedback increased their motivation when they continued to 
be committed to future academic goals. Similarly, while achievement-related 
anger correlated positively with task-irrelevant thinking and negatively with 
academic self-efficacy, interest, self-regulation of learning, and perfor-
mance in a few studies (Boekaerts 1993; Pekrun et al. 2011), the underlying 
mechanisms may be complex. For example, depressed mood interacted with 
anger experienced before an academic exam, such that anger was related to 
improved performance in students who reported no depressive mood symp-
toms – presumably because they were able to maintain motivation and invest 
effort (Lane et al. 2005). Confusion can also be beneficial for learning if stu-
dents are able to resolve the problem causing the confusion (D’Mello et al. 
2014). In sum, the findings confirm that the performance effects of negative 
activating emotions are complex, in line with our increasing understanding 
of the complexity of human emotion. However, the relations with overall 
achievement are often negative, suggesting that educators should invest effort 
in minimising these emotions in students.
Negative deactivating emotions: boredom and hopelessness
Negative deactivating emotions (e.g., boredom and hopelessness) are posited to 
uniformly impair performance by reducing cognitive resources, undermining 
both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and promoting superficial informa-
tion processing (Pekrun 2006). Despite the frequency of boredom experienced 
by many students in school, this emotion has received scant attention, as has 
the less frequent, but devastating emotion of achievement-related hopeless-
ness. The available evidence confirms that boredom and hopelessness relate 
uniformly negatively to measures of students’ motivation, study behaviour, and 
achievement (Pekrun et al. 2002; 2011; Tze et al. 2016).
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Reciprocal causation, emotion regulation, 
and therapy
Emotions influence motivation and achievement, but achievement outcomes 
can reciprocally influence appraisals, emotions, and the environment (Pekrun 
2006; see Figure 10.1). By implication, emotions, their antecedents, and their 
effects can be linked by reciprocal causation over time. Reciprocal causation 
can take different forms and can extend over fractions of seconds (e.g., in link-
ages between appraisals and emotions), days, weeks, months, or years. Positive 
feedback loops likely are commonplace (e.g., teachers’ and students’ anger 
reinforcing each other), but negative feedback loops also matter (e.g., when a 
failed exam induces anxiety in a student, and anxiety motivates the student to 
successfully avoid failing again in the next exam).
Since emotions, their antecedents, and their effects can be reciprocally 
linked over time, addressing any of the elements involved in these cyclic feed-
back processes can regulate emotions. Regulation and treatment can target 
(a) the emotion itself (emotion-oriented regulation and treatment, such as using 
drugs and relaxation techniques to cope with anxiety); (b) the control and 
value appraisals underlying emotions (appraisal-oriented regulation and treat-
ment; e.g., attributional retraining; Perry et  al. 2014); (c) the competences 
determining individual agency (competence-oriented regulation and treatment; 
e.g., training of learning skills); and (d) tasks and achievement-relevant social 
environments (situation-oriented regulation). Related studies are scarce, except 
for research on therapy treating test anxiety (Zeidner 1998).
Relative universality of achievement emotions
The CVT posits that the general functional mechanisms of achievement emo-
tions are bound to universal, species-specific characteristics of the human mind. 
In contrast, the contents of these emotions, their frequency, and their process 
parameters (e.g., emotional intensity) may be specific to different individuals, 
genders, achievement settings, cultures, and historical times. The basic struc-
tures and causal mechanisms of achievement emotions are expected to follow 
nomothetic principles, whereas objects, frequency, intensity, and duration of 
emotions can differ, implying that their description may require the use of 
idiographic principles (Pekrun 2009). For example, in a cross-cultural com-
parison of students’ math emotions, we found that mean levels of emotions 
differed between cultures, with Chinese students reporting more enjoyment, 
pride, anxiety, and shame, and less anger than German students. Nevertheless, 
the functional linkages with perceived control and academic achievement were 
equivalent across cultures (Frenzel et al. 2007).
Following this logic, it can be assumed that the basic mechanisms of 
achievement emotions were also the same across historical epochs, including 
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modern times. At the same time, the specific objects of different emotions, 
their frequency and situational embeddedness likely changed dramatically, 
especially since the introduction of obligatory schooling during the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries globally. Achievement emotions likely play a 
more important role in children’s and adolescents’ lives in the late modern age 
(Giddens, 1991) as compared with earlier historical periods. However, data 
that could support this speculative assertion are not available.
Concluding comments
Achievement emotions are among the most frequently occurring and function-
ally most important kinds of emotions in education and modern society more 
generally, including society in the late modern age. Nevertheless, research on 
achievement emotions is clearly still in a nascent stage. Psychologists, sociolo-
gists, and researchers in applied fields such as education, work and sports are 
just beginning to acknowledge the importance of achievement emotions. The 
fragmented research efforts in these different disciplines need more integra-
tion, and researchers need to attend to the functions of emotions not only for 
achievement, but also for well-being and health.
Educational practitioners and policy-makers often did not take much care 
of students’ emotions either (with the possible exception of their test anxi-
ety). Fortunately, this situation is changing, as evidenced, for example, in the 
consideration of social-emotional learning (SEL) programmes across schools 
in many countries around the world (Brackett & Rivers 2014). However, 
these programmes, although applied in schools, typically do not consider the 
design of achievement settings and tasks in the classroom. The few attempts 
to redesign academic environments to foster positive emotions have met with 
partial success at best (Schukajlow et al. 2012). Little is known to date about 
regulation, treatment, and design of achievement settings targeting emotions 
other than test anxiety. The success story of test anxiety interventions suggests, 
however, that future research can be successful in developing ways to shape 
achievement settings and educational institutions such that adaptive achieve-
ment emotions are promoted and maladaptive emotions prevented.
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Mediating English historical 
evolution in Charles Kingsley’s 
Hereward the Wake (1866)
Andrew Lynch
Englishness and ‘the spirit of freedom’
Charles Kingsley’s novel Hereward the Wake (1866), set around the period of the 
Norman Conquest 800 years earlier, is subtitled ‘the Last of the English’, yet its 
outlook is prospective, tracing a line from a failed East Anglian resistance – seen 
as ‘the germs of our British liberty’ (Kingsley 1902, I. p. 4) – to the later growth 
of ‘a great nation’ and empire under ‘the spirit of Freedom’ (Kingsley 1902, II. 
p. 258). Kingsley, a polemical Low Church minister, novelist, professor of his-
tory at Cambridge and supporter of Charles Darwin, bases his fictional account 
of England’s historical evolution on fundamental factors of race, ‘blood’, religion 
and environment. All of these factors are also mediated through discourses of 
gender, specifically of masculinity. In turn, Hereward the Wake’s gender politics 
are closely related to a long historiographical tradition which made the Middle 
Ages a cultural and religious battlefield, and a testing-ground for models of 
English masculinity and for the gendering of history writing itself. Within this 
tradition, Kingsley represents emotions as laws of nature that help to drive his-
torical evolution in accordance with a providential pattern.
This chapter establishes the broader ideological and intellectual context in 
which Hereward the Wake’s view of English medieval history takes its place, 
and examines in detail how in a fictional form it participates in contemporary 
discussions of race, religion, gender and emotion. Kingsley’s novel is of great 
interest as an example of the output of a popular mid-Victorian public intel-
lectual operating, like his modern equivalents, across multiple media – articles, 
reviews and literary criticism in newspapers and magazines, university lectures, 
public addresses, sermons, polemical essays and disputes, novels, short stories, 
poetry, a play and a vast private correspondence (Chitty 1974). In subject, con-
tent and form, Hereward the Wake resounds most amply within that wider cul-
tural project. Confronting the mid-century break-up of long-standing cultural 
authorities and collective allegiances, and an increasing diversity of emotional 
attachments that was signalled to him by revisionist histories and the grow-
ing prominence of religious views other than his own, Kingsley strategically 
promotes his hero’s resistance to authority and his stubborn individualism as 
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actually essential common features of Englishness, around which past national, 
racial and religious traditions should rally and re-unite. As I note in a brief 
conclusion to this chapter, pride in English exceptionalism, hostility to immi-
grants and fear of external European control have also made themselves evident 
in the present day. Such traces of continuity offer some challenge to the idea 
put forward in this collection (Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1) that 
late modernity represents a significant emotional departure from modernity and 
earlier periods. The ideological grounds of political emotions such as fear, anger 
and anxiety have necessarily changed, and their main means of cultural propa-
gation are different, but the emotional mobilisation of ideas of true Englishness 
remains similar in effect and as powerful as it was before.
Degenerate monks and manly Protestants
The Middle Ages were a hot topic in the mid-nineteenth-century intellectual 
world. In the story of the development of England into a modern nation and a 
world empire, they often featured as a time of superstition and violence, before 
religious Reformation, scientific discovery and constitutional government had 
made ‘Great’ Britain (Lynch 2016; 2017). Negativity towards the Middle Ages 
often centred on the role of religion – Roman Catholicism – in medieval soci-
ety. This negativity was exacerbated in the nineteenth century by anxiety over 
Catholic Emancipation in 1829, the progress in the 1830s and 1840s of the 
Tractarian Movement, which stressed long-term continuities in English religious 
life, and the re-establishment of the English Catholic hierarchy in 1850. An 1855 
selection from Foxe’s Acts and monuments (1563) begins: ‘Popery is increasing in 
Protestant England’, and continues ‘Popery, liberty, and a British constitution, 
could not co-exist in a state of equality in this or any other country’. Yet readers 
are reassured that ‘the awakened zeal and aroused fears of Protestant Englishmen 
betoken the dawning of the old Protestant spirit’, ‘the spirit of our Protestant 
forefathers’ (Foxe 1855, pp. 3–4). Such rhetoric is typical of many works of the 
period. It does much more than re-assert the English religious settlement and 
constitutional arrangements of 1688. It teaches that Protestantism is inherently 
English, is male and is ‘old’, in the sense of ‘ancestral’, handed down from the 
past, but young (‘dawn’-ing) and virile in its zealous intolerance of ‘Popery’ 
as the enemy of liberty. Catholicism is shown as having always been alien and 
unnatural to the English ‘spirit’, even when it was the religion of the entire land. 
Disquiet at the celibacy of Catholic clergy also contributed to this impression of 
the unnatural. Protestantism laid claim to the true, ‘old’ and manly English past. 
The medieval era of England’s pre-Reformation history becomes therefore a 
kind of strange aberration, in which Englishness has not yet properly found itself, 
except in the victims of Church tyranny, and through perceived glimmerings of 
Protestantism in the aspirations of chivalry (Norman 1987, p. 52).
In that overall context, a question arose for Protestant historiography whether 
pre-Conquest England should be regarded retrospectively in a different light 
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from the later medieval period. Around the time of John Foxe’s Acts and monu-
ments, first published in 1563, there was some idealisation of England before 
1066, in contrast to ‘the last 500 years’ in which ‘Sathan broke loose’ (Foxe 
1563, I. p. 17). But there was still considerable hostility towards medieval 
monastic culture, in the aftermath of the dissolution of the monasteries around 
1540. Michael Rodman Jones points out that Reformation intellectuals like 
Matthew Parker treated pre-Conquest Viking raids on monasteries as divine 
punishment for ‘monkery’: ‘the religion or rather superstition & hipocrisie of 
monkes [. . .] by the justice judgment of God, utterly abolished, the Danes 
spoyling them, and cruelly burning them vp in there houses’ (Parker 1566, 
p. 7; Jones 2018, p. 196). In this Reformation ‘selective reading’ of the later 
tenth-century scholar Ælfric, ‘monasticism is roundly condemned whilst the 
intellectual product of it is held to be authoritative and idealised to the point 
of fetishisation’ (Jones 2018, p. 196). Overall, opinions on the Anglo-Saxons 
remained divided. The influence of Tacitus’s Germania from the Renaissance 
onwards ‘provided a rationale for a totalising vision of the Germanic world, 
a national character both generous and belligerent, and especially the dream 
of a free and elected political structure’ (Toswell 2010, p. 36). There was also 
a long tradition of respect for the ‘liberty’ and ‘principles of independence’ 
that David Hume (1778) perceived in Anglo-Saxon secular laws and institu-
tions (Hume 1983, vol. 1, appendix 1). These had been cited in resistance 
to royal absolutism from the time of Magna Carta onwards (Vincent 2015, 
pp. 26–7). ‘Scientific’ racial studies would employ the Germania to misrep-
resent the Teutonic peoples as both autochthonous and racially pure (Krebs 
2011), as Kingsley himself would assert about them.
But there was another tradition which stressed the decline of the Anglo-
Saxons, especially in their later period of rule, and scorned them on interrelated 
racial, gender, cultural and religious lines. Oliver Goldsmith in 1764 was scath-
ing: ‘The bravest blood of the English had been already exhausted in civil war, 
under the dissensions of the Saxon heptarchy; and, when those wars were ter-
minated, pilgrimages, penances, cloisters, and superstitions, served to enfeeble 
the remainder.’ ‘[U]nequal to make opposition against the Danes’, the Saxons 
‘therefore bought off their invaders with money, a remarkable instance how 
much they had degenerated from their warlike ancestors’ (Goldsmith 1764, 
vol. 1, letter 7). Specifically, these evils also arose because ‘the Monks acquired 
such power, as served to retard the vigour of every future operation against the 
Danes’ (Goldsmith 1764, vol. 1, letter 8). To Joseph Ritson, writing in 1802, 
King Alfred was ‘a wretched bigot’ and Anglo-Saxon poetry ‘a kind of bom-
baste or insane prose’. Furthermore, ‘while they [the Anglo-Saxons] continued 
pagans, they were unquestionably a brave and warlike nation; but, upon their 
conversion to Christianity, their kings became monks, their people cowards 
and slaves, unable to defend themselves, and a prey to every invader’ (Ritson 
1891, p. 33). Ritson transfers a version of Gibbon’s thesis on the fall of Rome 
after Constantine to the Romanised, hence feminised, Anglo-Saxons.
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Out of the friction between these separate traditions came a hybrid view: 
the love of liberty and independence were natural and inherent qualities in the 
English from the earliest times, whether or not Englishness was considered to 
have been later improved by Norman influence, but the ‘Romish’ church, and 
especially its monastic orders, viewed as an alien power, had always sought to 
suppress these qualities for its own power and profit. In this view, Catholics of 
any period were not seen as being in adult control of either their consciences 
or their emotions because these were managed and manipulated by the clergy, 
who fed their flocks on superstition and demanded blind obedience. In a com-
mon usage, the Catholic laity was considered ‘childish or childlike’ (Ward 
1879, p. 42). In Kingsley’s times, popular histories employed aggressive rheto-
ric against the Anglo-Saxon Church, especially monasticism, as a force that 
had infantilised and unmanned England. Charles Dickens in the early 1850s 
scorns ‘EDWARD, afterwards called by the monks THE CONFESSOR’, 
who neglected ‘his unoffending wife, whom all who saw her (her husband and 
his monks excepted) loved’, and who ‘had no children’. ‘The King was [. . .] 
as blind and stubborn as kings usually have been whensoever they have been in 
the hands of monks’. ‘As he had put himself entirely in the hands of the monks 
when he was alive, they praised him lustily when he was dead.’ (Dickens 1870, 
pp. 28–32). Dickens seeks to expose celibate monkish ‘sanctity’ as trickery, and 
intimately connects monastic influence with unnatural masculinity, physical 
and political incapability and historiographical deceit.
Dickens was following, at a popular level, in an anti-monastic tradition of 
historians featuring David Hume, Edward Gibbon (1776), Thomas Fosbroke 
(1802) and others. In this tradition, monks tell false history because they are 
monks, and therefore not real men: ‘the monks, who were the only annalists 
during those ages [. . .] were strongly infected with credulity, with the love 
of wonder, and with a propensity to imposture; vices almost inseparable from 
their profession and manner of life’ (Hume 1983, vol. 1, p. 27). ‘[W]e must 
supply the silence of antiquity by those legends which avarice or superstition 
long afterwards dictated to the monks in the lazy gloom of their convents’ 
(Gibbon 1820, p. 202); ‘Whenever the spirit of Fanaticism, at once credulous 
and crafty, has insinuated itself, even into a noble mind, it inevitably corrodes 
the vital principles of Virtue and Veracity’ (Fosbroke 1843, p. 3). For these 
writers it is not just true history, but the industrious, rational and virtuous 
manliness of the historian himself that is at stake in attacking the monk. In this 
respect, the atheist Hume, Gibbon the religious sceptic and the Anglican priest 
Fosbroke are of one mind.
Much as Kingsley differed in temperament, belief and outlook from Hume 
and Gibbon, he shared their views of medieval historiography, and blended 
them with his own combative form of anti-Catholicism. His earlier novels, 
Hypatia (1853) and Westward Ho! (1855), feature corrupt and treacherous 
priests, monks and Inquisitors. He also initiated a famous controversy by a 
review in Macmillan’s Magazine (1864) of two volumes of J A Froude’s History 
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of England (1850–1870) where he asserted that ‘Father [John Henry] Newman 
informs us that truth for its own sake need not be, and on the whole ought not 
to be, a virtue of the Roman clergy’ (Kingsley 1864, pp. 216–17). Kingsley’s 
long-term view of English religious history was simple: ‘the whole course of 
the British mind since the Reformation, and [. . .] its whole course before the 
Reformation [. . .] was one of steady struggle against the Papacy and its anti-
national pretensions’ (Kingsley 1890, p. 221). Histories more favourable to the 
pre-Reformation Church, or less impressed by its replacement, he regards as 
‘the outcome of an utterly un-English tone of thought’ that is wilfully blind 
to medieval ‘priestly abominations’ and ‘the rottenness of the whole system’ 
(Kingsley, 1890, p. 222).
To ignore wilfully facts like these, which were patent all along to the 
British nation, facts on which the British laity acted, till they finally con-
quered at the Reformation, and on which they are acting still, and will, 
probably, act for ever, is not to have any real reverence for the opinions or 
virtues of our forefathers.
(Kingsley 1890, p. 222)
Kingsley’s focus here is more on the dangerous national effects of slack histori-
ographical mediation of the past to the present than on the history itself, which 
he wants to take for granted as a self-evident ‘course’ of ‘facts’. He is deter-
mined to win the battle to control the popular mediation of emotions through 
English historiography. The very nature and essence of Englishness are at stake 
in maintaining the right kind of historical memory and its associated emotions 
in the lay public. Yet there is a peculiar anxiety in the writing, audible in its 
one note of qualification – ‘probably’ – amongst so much apparent certainty. 
Protestantism and contempt for Catholicism are totally natural to the English, 
yet they always need to be kept reminded of that.
Hereward: avatar of English racial evolution
In this long and complex context, Kingsley’s choice of Hereward the Wake, 
a legendary eleventh-century outlaw, as his avatar of English racial qualities 
solves a problem for him. This ‘rough-mannered Teuton’ of a hero belongs, 
to some extent, to a wider English movement claiming ‘an indigenous, non-
classicist cultural base’ in ‘a rejection [of] elitism of caste and temperament’ 
and of ‘the privileging of Rome and the classical tradition introduced by the 
Normans’ (Simmons 1990, p. 168). Hereward is presented initially as an art-
less, uncouth, archaic figure, a layman without intellectual pretensions – a 
perfect contrast to Edward the Confessor. He is an unsophisticated man, of 
straightforward masculine instincts and strong passions. Above all, he is by 
birth not an Anglo-Saxon, but a Dane, an East Anglian descendant of Viking 
invaders, and intensely virile. Kingsley asserts that unlike the ‘priest-ridden’ 
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men of Wessex, ‘the tools of [. . .] prelates’ (Kingsley 1902, I. p. 5), the East 
Anglians ‘never really bent their necks to the Norman yoke; they kept alive 
in their hearts that proud spirit of personal independence’ (Kingsley 1902, I. 
p. 4). As an East Anglian (of the area’s more northern regions), and a stronger 
strain of the ‘Teuton’, Hereward maintains the supposed English traditions 
of independence and freedom that Hume and many others had noted, but 
avoids the contempt aimed at the degenerate Anglo-Saxons, who ‘quailed 
before the free Norsemen, among whom was not a single serf’ (Kingsley 
1902, I. p. 5). These men of Viking descent are the ‘true Englishmen’ 
(Kingsley 1902, I. p. 4).
In Kingsley’s view, England, by retaining ‘the old Teuton laws’, had 
‘escaped, more than any other land, the effete Roman civilisation’ and ‘she 
therefore first of the lands, in the twelfth century, rebelled against, and, and 
first of them, in the sixteenth century, threw off the Ultramontane yoke’ 
(Kingsley 1877, p. 165). He was writing at a time when ‘racial attitudes in 
Britain, Germany and elsewhere in Northern Europe began to reify previ-
ous ethnic and linguistic differences and subsume them under the category 
of race’, ‘as Teutonic qualities became valorized as closest to Aryan origin’ 
(Ganim 2005, p. 30). Race, gender and religion are intimately fused in his 
ambitious long-range connection of the English Reformation with Henry 
II’s twelfth-century attempts to assert the Crown’s authority against the 
pope’s, focussed on his confrontation with Thomas Becket (Simmons 1990, 
pp. 113–39), and before that with the world of early Scandinavian Christianity, 
‘when the old fierceness of the worshippers of Thor and Odin was tempered, 
without being effeminated, by the Faith of the “White Christ”’ (Kingsley 
1875, p. 66). The accession of Henry II in 1154 is the last historical event 
in Kingsley’s novel, well after Hereward’s death, c. 1072. Henry is hailed by 
Hereward’s Norman successor, another descendant of northern sea-rovers, 
as ‘an English king [to] head the English people’, one who will ‘understand 
these Englishmen, and know what stout and trusty prudhommes they are all, 
down to the meanest serf, when once one can humor their sturdy independ-
ent tempers’ (Kingsley 1902, II. p. 262). In Kingsley’s master narrative of 
European history, outlined in many essays, the Teuton honesty and courage 
of the English mitigate the dangerous effects of their necessary exposure to 
‘Roman’ learning and artfulness, as part of a providential plan for the nation 
and the world.
Kingsley’s view of the role of God in world history is stronger than for 
most commentators of the period, but the racialised discourse through which 
it is mediated, as set out in his essay ‘The strategy of providence’, published as 
Lecture XII in The Roman and the Teuton, was quite commonplace (Kingsley 
1877; Oergel 1998, pp. 158–71). In his account, God, working through ‘the 
laws of Nature’, but involved in the slightest accidents of history, ‘enabled 
our race [the Teutons] to conquer in the most vast and important campaign 
the world has ever seen’ (Kingsley 1877, p. 292). Teutons were permitted 
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to conquer the Western Roman Empire, but the effort left them exhausted 
and disunited for centuries, until the time of Charlemagne. In this dangerous 
period the rise of Islam and the ‘Saracenic invasion’ prevented the Eastern 
Roman Empire from asserting its power over them, and so ‘saved Europe and 
our race’ – a vital matter, because ‘the welfare of the Teutonic race is the wel-
fare of the world’ (Kingsley 1875, p. 305).
It is in this overall racial context, which is simultaneously a religious con-
text, that Kingsley’s personal adaptation of Darwinian evolutionary theory 
in Hereward has greatest cultural and political resonance. In effect, Kingsley’s 
application of the theory reduced the complications Darwin caused to tradi-
tional forms and understandings of human emotional development, because 
in it ‘the laws of nature’ still operate in direct obedience to an omnipotent 
Creator. As Kingsley wrote to Darwin in 1859:
I have gradually learnt to see that it is just as noble a conception of Deity, 
to believe that he created primal forms capable of self-development into 
all forms needful pro tempore & pro loco, as to believe that He required a 
fresh act of inter-vention to supply the lacunas wh he himself had made. I 
question whether the former be not the loftier thought.
(DCP, LETT 2534)
Applying this belief to human history, Hereward the Wake treats long-term his-
torical developments as part of an inevitable and natural process in which all 
behaviour is symptomatic of the confluence of racial and environmental forces. 
A further ‘struggle’, it is implied, is to balance the benefits of civilisation, which 
are both civil and moral, with its inherent degenerative dangers for the race:
In the savage struggle for life, none but the strongest, healthiest, cun-
ningest, have a chance of living, prospering, and propagating their race. In 
the civilized state, on the contrary, the weakliest and the silliest, protected 
by law, religion, and humanity, have chance likewise, and transmit to their 
offspring their own weakliness or silliness.
(Kingsley 1902, I. pp. 1–2)
Kingsley’s acceptance of evolutionary theory as an enhancement of traditional 
creationist beliefs provides a modern discourse for his existing views on race, 
land and gender, but in articulating that he resists the biological and physi-
ological universalism of emotional origins and expression, in both humans 
and animals, that had been suggested in Darwin’s earlier work. (The expres-
sion of the emotions in man and animals would not appear till 1872, six years 
after Hereward). Kingsley’s initial description of Hereward emphasises instead 
his specialness – the ‘race’ and strength that give him right to rule – and also 
introduces a specifically cultural factor, Hereward’s lack of a certain grace, 
both human and divine:
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His face was of extraordinary beauty, save that the lower jaw was too long 
and heavy, and that his eyes wore a strange and almost sinister expression. . . 
He was short, but of immense breadth of chest and strength of limb; while 
his delicate hands and feet and long locks of golden hair marked him of 
most noble, and even, as he really was, of ancient royal race.
(Kingsley 1902, I. pp. 25–6)
Kingsley’s emphasis on ‘royal race’ reflects the former Christian Socialist’s 
greater class conservatism by the time of the novel’s writing (Norman 1987, 
pp. 53–7). Yet Hereward faces challenges. As a lowlander, of the more settled 
Britain, he ‘knows of no natural force greater than himself’, so his greatest 
danger is the lack of broadening experiences (which the plot soon offers him) 
because ‘he has little or nothing around him to refine or lift up his soul, and 
unless he meet with a religion and with a civilisation which can deliver him, 
he may sink into [. . .] dull brutality’ (Kingsley 1902, I. p. 3).
Hereward moves naively at first, more cannily later on, but always naturally, 
through a political landscape in which violence is constant, impossible to tame 
or to avoid, and where the strong man must make his own rules. Contact 
with continental civilisation, learned the hard way through mercenary wars 
and the Norman invasion, benefits the young man as it eventually does the 
whole nation: ‘Perhaps by no other method could England, and, with England, 
Scotland, and in due time Ireland, have become partakers of that classic civilisa-
tion and learning, the fount whereof, for good and for evil, was Rome and the 
Pope of Rome’ (Kingsley 1902, I. p. 9). Kingsley despises celibate monastic 
culture on religious and gender grounds, and Ireland on racial and religious 
grounds, and so blanks here the existence of the pre-Conquest insular Latinate 
culture that had seen Celts convert his Teutons to Christianity. So although 
he considers William’s taking of England, backed by the pope, an evil in itself, 
military invasion, whether of England by the Normans, or of Scotland and 
Ireland by post-Conquest England, is seen as the necessary method to transmit 
new and beneficial cultural influences. Nevertheless, there is a constant need 
to assert English exceptionalism – ‘sturdy independent tempers’ – within the 
sphere of wider continental influence. Unlike the earlier twelfth-century Gesta 
Herewardi, Kingsley’s main source, his novel allows little sense of ‘Hereward’s 
final integration into the political, legal and social, multi-ethnic community’ 
(Bremner 2007, p. 42) because it defines and privileges a narrower ‘real’ English 
community on specific racial, and incipiently religious, grounds. Certainly, 
Englishness has obtained a broader political, cultural and emotional repertoire 
than before, but has kept the essential old and innate characteristics that will 
keep its true nature mono-ethnic and mono-confessional.
Hereward the Wake can be seen as an attempt to reconcile two contrary 
demands in Kingsley’s mind – the evolutionary need for raw strength and 
vitality, and the civilisational and moral need for order and social utility – 
by mapping a vision of large-scale historical change onto the youth, maturity 
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and old age of the hero, as he progresses from Viking brat into life as a more 
cultured and sensitive married man, and finally into obsolescence, unfit for 
the changed requirements of the times and the new environment. Hereward 
registers evolutionary change on a personal level. His non-reflexive, instinctual 
emotional life is slowly modified into a set of more self-consciously managed 
and discriminating behaviours. As a young man he is ‘a true pattern of the half-
savage hero of those rough times, capable of all vices except cowardice, and 
capable, too, of all virtues save humility’ (Kingsley 1902, I. p. 61). Then, as his 
life experience keeps on course with the development of the English race, he 
learns French refinement through love, and finds
a purpose more noble in life than ranging land and sea, a ruffian among 
ruffians, seeking for glory amid blood and flame. The idea of chivalry, of 
succoring the weak and the opprest [. . .] the dim dawn of purity, gentle-
ness, and the conquest of his own fierce passions.
(Kingsley 1902, I. p. 89)
As the active helper of the weak, and as one who can be conquered only by 
himself, Hereward, in learning love and gentleness, avoids the possible stigma 
of effeminacy. Kingsley may ‘question [. . .] the foundations upon which the 
military code is built’ (Peck 1998, p. 127), but he embraces its violence pro-
cessually – both as the training ground of manly strength, and as the indirect 
means by which the nation’s avatar can broaden his horizons and receive an 
emotional education, finally tending towards ‘a conquest of his own fierce pas-
sions’ that is a feature of many a Victorian Bildungsroman. The process recreates 
him as a proto-modern man.
By the end of the novel, Hereward is a superannuated figure, his stage 
in the civilising process played out. A change has come in the requirements 
of the race: ‘war and disorder, ruin and death, cannot last forever [. . .] And 
then the true laws of God’s universe, peace and order, usefulness and life, will 
reassert themselves’ (Kingsley 1902, II. p. 259). Kingsley may also have in 
mind here the post-Conquest growth of professionalised central administrative 
and judicial systems that eventually directed English emotional loyalties to the 
state rather than the individual lord (Strayer 1970, p. 36–46). But although 
Hereward makes his peace with William, he is not fitted to be a courtier or 
state agent, as if anticipating Norbert Elias’s civilising trajectory (Elias 1978). 
In the end he ‘serves his people better in death’ (Wawn 2000, p. 319), but his 
‘spirit’ remains in legend to guide following ages:
above them, and around them, and in them, destined [. . .] to mould them 
into a great nation, and the parents of still greater nations in lands as yet 
unknown, brooded the immortal spirit of Hereward, now purged from all 
earthly dross, even the spirit of Freedom, which can never die.
(Kingsley 1902, II. p. 258)
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Seen in this light, the violence of the Middle Ages, often condemned by 
Enlightenment and nineteenth-century historians as barbaric, is saluted as 
part of the vital youth of the nation, made acceptable when it has later been 
‘purged’. Hereward’s violent career shows the English ‘going through a stage’, 
crude in itself, needing development, but manly and necessary if a free country 
and an empire are going to be the end results.
A comforting implication of that evolutionary view of history is that later 
British ages must have actually solved and superseded, along with the effete 
monks, the opposite problem of unruly violence that Hereward has exempli-
fied in his own times. A further outcome is a denial of Walter Scott’s influential 
idea, as promoted in Ivanhoe (1819), and with contemporary Scottish-English 
relations in mind, that post-Conquest England eventually achieved a successful 
racial mixture, like the English language itself, ‘in which the speech of the vic-
tors and the vanquished have been so happily blended together’ (Scott 2000, p. 17, 
emphasis added). For Kingsley, instead, the ‘race’ and language of the ‘Teuton’ 
English have conquered others and left them behind. There is even ‘a posi-
tioning of virility in the language itself’, especially through Nordic influences 
(Stitt 1999, p. 34). Even though the invasion has brought educational benefits, 
‘Latin does not belong’ in English, and ‘Norman French, too, appears to be 
superimposed, unnatural’ (Stitt 1999, p. 32). In emotional terms, the prompt 
to readers is to be proud of their racial achievement but justly to fear foreign 
influence from regions and spheres of influence classed as ‘Roman’ (Catholic, 
learned and crafty) rather than ‘Teuton’ (proto-Protestant, instinctual, true-
hearted and manly).
Kingsley’s triple appeal to race, religion and gender in interpreting history 
extends to his attitude to historical sources, which he values, more or less, 
according to how they mediate the ‘facts’ that ‘all along were patent to the 
British nation’. While he makes some allowance for the credulity and supersti-
tion of earlier ages, and admits a necessary recourse to imagination where the 
record does not survive, his complete confidence in the existence of continuing 
racial and religious types makes the process of filling in the gaps easy. Because 
the passage of time makes so little difference to the basic picture, Kingsley him-
self, as true English mediator of history, can be a fully competent judge of the 
medieval world, as of the modern world. There are frequent moves from the 
Middle Ages to the nineteenth century to note modern instances of continu-
ing racial characteristics, including the age-old superiority of the Teuton to the 
Celt. On Hereward’s travels amongst the Cornish, whom Kingsley imagines 
as descended from ‘ancient Phoenecian colonists’, his ‘hot old Punic’ host, 
named Hannibal, has ‘thin Punic lips’ and ‘the old Punic treachery in his heart’ 
(Kingsley 1902, I. p. 109). Kingsley also argues that the defeat of the Danes by 
Brian Boru at Clontarf in 1014 – a key event in Irish nationalist consciousness – 
was simply a matter of one Norse family overcoming another, and that Ireland 
had greatly benefited from its Viking visitors (Kingsley 1902, I. pp. 91–3). 
To discredit the favoured Irish (‘Milesian’) version of Clontarf, he invents in 
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Hereward a bard, Teague Macmurrough – ‘teague’ being a term of abuse for 
an Irish Catholic – with a scornful comparison to the work of Thomas Moore 
(1779–1852), ‘another Irish bard whose song was even more sweet, and his 
notions of Irish history even more grotesque’ (Kingsley 1902, I. p. 94). The 
argument over historiography has a wider political scope: that the Irish can 
never be trusted to tell their own history accurately supports the continuing 
necessity for them to be ruled by a superior people.
The partisan nature of Kingsley’s application of evolutionary theory in 
Hereward becomes apparent in this context. Only Teutons, ‘our race’, have 
the power to evolve, and to possess their ‘old’ qualities in a good sense while 
suitably adapting to their present circumstances. Everyone else just remains 
the same. Their failure to change explains their subjection, or even extinction. 
Writing in the devastating aftermath of the mid-century Irish famine, Kingsley 
coolly describes the ‘inveterate fashion of lawless feuds which makes the his-
tory of Celtic Ireland from the earliest times one dull and aimless catalogue of 
murder and devastation, followed by famine and disease’ (Kingsley 1902, I. 
p. 98). Venturing into English and insular history, with its massive ideologi-
cal freight, brought out these tendencies in Kingsley much more than when 
he wrote as a naturalist, where his imagination is much freer from racial and 
religious anxiety. Gillian Beer, writing of The water babies (1863), speaks mov-
ingly of Kingsley’s ‘particular delight in the processes of transformation’, and 
in ‘the value of change, mutation, the new beginning—and this is part both of 
his Darwinian and of his socialist thinking’ (Beer 2000, p. 124). ‘Kingsley, like 
Darwin, enjoys the enlargement of kinship – the great family which must, in 
human terms, include the chimneyboy and the scientist’ (Beer 2000, p. 121). 
Hereward, under the pressure of religious and racialised demands to keep its 
story ‘on-message’, breathes a very different spirit. Its version of evolution as 
applied to Kingsley’s version of long-range history actively suppresses the role 
of specific political, social and economic factors in historical causality – his 
take on the Irish famine is an example – and restricts a sense of kinship and 
the power of transformation to one chosen people. He actively resists diversity 
and complication of emotional attachment in these matters: non-Teutons sim-
ply cannot have a ‘new beginning’. In effect, there is little interest in specific 
scientific observation in Hereward. Since everything in history is held to be 
symptomatic of continuing laws of nature, evolution features mainly as an anal-
ogy for long-term racial success and failure in terms already drawn from other 
existing areas of ideology. Non-White races also had their evolutionary place, 
and some also exhibited a failure to change which doomed them to extinction: 
‘The Black People of Australia cannot take in the Gospel [. . .] All attempts to 
bring them to a knowledge of the true God have as yet failed utterly [. . .] Poor 
brutes in human shape [. . .] they must perish off the face of the earth like brute 
beasts’ (Kingsley 1880, pp. 414–17).
In making Hereward, Kingsley drew on a version of the Anglo-Saxon 
Chronicle, as well as the Domesday Book, and other histories, chronicles 
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and romances in English, Latin and French. The early twelfth-century Gesta 
Herewardi by Leofric the priest, more a romance than a history, was the chief 
source (Roffe 2004; Gesta 2000, pp. 634–5). But Kingsley changed the empha-
ses of the text to a large extent, especially in relation to monasticism. Most con-
trary to his gender and religious politics, the Gesta details reports made to King 
William of free-spirited monks in the Isle of Ely who have ‘risked endangering 
themselves rather than be reduced to servitude’ and ‘although monks, [. . .] 
had frequently undertaken deeds of valour with Hereward’ (Swanton 2000, 
pp. 651–3). Kingsley blanks this material. He does take from the Gesta the story 
that Hereward seeks knighthood from a monk, Brand, Abbot of Peterborough, 
because ‘he wished almost all those serving him and under his rule to be knighted 
by monks’ (Swanton 2000, p. 643); but quite independently of the source he 
introduces earlier episodes that colour this episode very differently. In his ver-
sion, Abbot Brand is Hereward’s uncle, a fiery former Norse warrior, whom he 
treats as totally different from all other monks. The boy Hereward vows future 
vengeance on Peterborough Abbey because the monks try to discipline him:
they would have flogged us,—me, the Earl’s son,—me, the Viking’s 
son,—me, the champion, as I will be yet, and make all lands ring with the 
fame of my deeds, as they rung with the fame of my forefathers, before 
they became the slaves of monks [. . .] Do you think I would not have 
burned Peterborough minster over your head before now, had it not been 
for Uncle Brand’s sake?
(Kingsley 1902, I. p. 28)
All this backstory is set up by Kingsley as a transformative context for one 
of the few widely agreed historical facts of Hereward’s life: that he forced 
Peterborough Abbey by burning, and looted it with Danish allies, who took 
much of the property back to Denmark. The Gesta merely says: ‘And laying 
waste the whole town with fire, they plundered all the treasures of the church 
and chased the abbot, although he and his men managed to escape by hiding 
themselves’ (Swanton 2000, p. 661). In Kingsley, the episode is heavily medi-
ated through the related discourses of religion and masculinity. Hereward’s 
long-promised vengeance strikes the monastery, but Hereward himself acts as 
the protector of the cowardly monks, now ruled by an arrogant and treacher-
ous Norman abbot, whom he still saves from murder by the wild Danes: ‘In 
the midst of the great court were all the monks, huddled together like a flock 
of sheep, some kneeling, most weeping bitterly, after the fashion of monks’ 
(Kingsley 1902, II. p. 62). As a whole this course of incidents allows Hereward 
to model proper contempt for the Church of Rome and monkish unmanliness, 
but distinguishes him from both old Northern violence and Norman tyranny. 
He thus provides a model of the free and independent English proto-Protestant 
man that has grown from the wild East Anglian boy, keeping his good natural 
instincts but learning to moderate his passions.
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In Kingsley’s ‘selective reading’ of a medieval document, just as in Matthew 
Parker’s view 300 years before (Parker 1566), the monks deserve all they get, as 
a judgement of God. A difference is that for Parker the deep motivation is reli-
gious, while for Kingsley ethnic concerns about ‘true’ Englishness are at least as 
important. As a Protestant English historian, Kingsley stages himself as a better 
mediator of the medieval past than Leofric the priest was able to be, improving 
on the Gesta by emphasising the enduring features of birth, race, religion and 
gender which must have been operative, according to his views, and which 
in his mind made the subsequent evolution of Protestant England’s history an 
inevitable affair. In the face of the massive social, technological and ideological 
changes facing mid-Victorian England, including the impact of evolutionary 
science on traditional religion, Hereward the Wake is part of Kingsley’s own 
struggle, both authoritative and anxious, against an invasion of ideas, to assert 
the continuance of an essential Englishness.
Emotion and the resilience of English separatism
One could easily think of Kingsley as a Victorian dinosaur, whose like has been 
left behind by radical changes in the cultural environment. Of his books only 
The water babies is still read; his assumption that a particular form of religion is 
the basis of all civil society no longer holds in his own country; the English lan-
guage is acknowledged and celebrated for its continuing enrichment from other 
tongues. Yet I would argue that Kingsley is also surprisingly contemporary, as a 
multi-media publicist who promoted a popular image of English exceptional-
ism and cultural separatism from continental Europe that survives to the pre-
sent day, and found full-throated voice in the victorious Brexit campaign of 
2017. In the face of changing political reality, fierce Victorian and Edwardian 
emotional commitment to empire eventually declined into a mild nostalgia, 
but English hostility towards immigrants and suspicion of control from external 
entities have kept their intensity. ‘Brussels’ has replaced Kingsley’s ‘Rome’ as 
the feared hidden hand on England’s destiny, and ‘Euorocrats’ have replaced 
monks and priests but the emotional processes of fear and anger that surround 
ideas of Englishness have remained much the same.
Some of these feelings find expression in Paul Kingsnorth’s novel The Wake 
(2013), which can be understood in part as a new version of Kingsley’s story. 
The Wake voices its protagonist Buckmaster’s hatred of the Norman ‘ingengas’ – 
incomers/invaders – in a synthetic Old English that also rejects the heritage of 
contact with French, and asserts a Kingsleyan investment in the essential iden-
tity of earth, place and name – ‘erce [earth] was this ground itself was angland’ 
(Kingsnorth 2015, p. 53). Buckmaster, like Hereward, spends his life in search 
of the feeling of English ‘freedom’; ‘no man was ofer me no man will be ofer 
me’ (Kingsnorth 2015, p. 11). But his nostalgia for a pre-Christian natural reli-
gion and a pre-political version of English identity comes to look increasingly 
like a desperate underclass fantasy of superior belonging, based on an absolute 
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(and very Kingsleyan) association of ‘erce’ (earth) with ‘folc’ (people); ‘folcs has 
their place what was set when the world was macd and when they gan from 
that place to others then erce is ired [angered] (Kingsnorth 2015, p. 208).
Nevertheless, even in Buckmaster’s extreme xenophobia, there are exceptions 
made, especially for the Danes:
an ingenga a denisc [Danish] man. and his men they set many fyrs and 
hams and tuns was beorned lic now and yet cnut [Cnut, reigned 1016–
1035] when he cum he cum as an anglisc cyng and locd ofer us as one and 
he done well by us [. . .] but frenc [French] men they is not the same mor 
lic hunds they is than men.
(Kingsnorth 2015, p. 126)
At least in Buckmaster’s unreliable mind, a hierarchy of races and a pattern of 
racial likenesses exist which strongly recall Kingsley’s own views. One sees too 
an antagonism towards the ‘fuccan preostes’ that matches Kingsley’s disdain 
for the Catholic clergy. Ultimately, what distinguishes the two books, cre-
ated 150 years apart, is that Kingsley’s racial and environmental essentialism 
is made a prolegomena to the rise of English institutions and empire, whereas 
Kingsnorth, abandoning traditional politics and alienated from the contem-
porary English mainstream, looks to the earth itself for meaning, identity, and 
consolation. Kingsley sees the pre-Conquest era as a raw but vital beginning, 
Kingsnorth as the site of a violated integrity. Yet in terms of the emotions – the 
particular attachments of love, hate, hope and fear that colour their mediation 
of the English past – the resemblances between their books are as striking as the 
differences. At least in these respects, it may be that late modernity has not made 
a great difference to popular nationalism, and that earlier emotional apprehen-
sions of Englishness can readily re-emerge when circumstances permit.
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Chapter 12
Affect and automation
A critical genealogy of the emotions
Elizabeth Stephens
Introduction
The mediation of emotions in late modernity by technological devices, 
automated systems and algorithmic logics has been well recognised (Gershon 
2010; Gregg 2011; Malin 2014; Pettman 2006; Smith, Atwood & McNair 
2018). While it may appear we are currently witnessing a radical increase or 
reconfiguration of the emotions under the conditions of late modernity, in fact 
the technological mediation of the emotions is not a recent occurrence but rather 
part of a longer history in which affect and automation have become entwined. 
In considering this longer history, this chapter thus contextualises the study of 
emotions within, or in relation to, that of affect.
Some scholars have been careful to differentiate between emotions, defined as 
social, feelings, defined as ‘personal,’ and affect defined as ‘prepersonal’ (Shouse 
2005). This chapter follows recent work in feminist philosophy and affect stud-
ies in arguing that these categories are most usefully understood as interrelated 
rather than distinct. In so doing, this chapter will not approach the relationship 
between affect and automation from the perspective of a history of the emo-
tions, but from that of a genealogy of affect. For Foucault, a genealogy differed 
from traditional methods of historical inquiry in two key ways. The first was 
that it was comprised of a series of ‘accidents’ and ‘deviations’ (Foucault 1977, 
p. 81), rather than a linear or unbroken narrative. It ‘disturbs what was previ-
ously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows 
the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself’ (Foucault 1977, 
p. 82). The second was that it approached history not simply through the study 
of texts or documents but as something inscribed ‘in the nervous system, in tem-
perament, in the digestive apparatus; it appears in faulty respiration, in improper 
diets, in the debilitated and prostrate bodies of those whose ancestors committed 
errors’ (Foucault 1977, p. 82). A genealogy hence provides the means to recover 
not simply a history of the body, but a bodily history: ‘Its task is to expose a body 
totally imprinted by history’ (Foucault 1977, p. 83).
Drawing on and extending Foucault’s understanding of genealogy, this 
chapter examines how experiences of emotions and affect, feelings and 
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sensation are mediated by their cultural, historical, subjective and physical 
specificity. It will move between consideration of affect and emotions, focus-
ing on the social and somatic dimensions of both, first by returning to a key 
moment of first encounter between human bodies and machines that took 
place at the very start of the Industrial Revolution, second by contextualising 
that individual case study within the wider history of automata and automa-
tion that unfurled over this period, and third by demonstrating what light this 
history has to cast on how emotions are understood in the present.
The strange sad tale of James Tilly Matthews 
and the Air Loom
This history begins in the final years of the eighteenth century, when the 
English spy James Tilly Matthews was committed to the Bedlam lunatic asy-
lum in London, claiming that a secret band of saboteurs and spies were using 
a machine he called the Air Loom to direct the course of political events in 
England, by controlling the bodies and minds of men (including his own). 
The Air Loom was operated by ‘pneumatic chemistry’, Matthews claimed. It 
emitted magnetic rays that could be used to control the thoughts and will of 
the government. Matthews had served as a double agent for the English and 
French during the French Revolution, and it has been claimed that he was 
a political prisoner as much as a psychiatric inmate (Jay 2003). The apoth-
ecary of Bedlam, John Haslan, published a study of Matthew’s case in 1810, 
under the title Illustrations of madness: exhibiting a singular case of insanity, which 
included an illustration of the Air Loom drawn by Matthews himself, depict-
ing his body under the influence of its magnetic rays. The text also included 
a lengthy account of the operation and effects of the Air Loom in Matthew’s 
own words, providing what may be the only first-person account written by an 
eighteenth-century inmate of Bedlam.
Matthews’ experience of the Air Loom was one of great suffering and sub-
jugation; it produced a ‘list of calamities hitherto unheard of, and for which 
no remedy has yet been discovered’, reported Haslan (1810, pp. 29–30). 
These included: ‘locking fluid in the tongue’, which impeded Matthews’ 
ability to speak; ‘cutting soul from sense’, in which a magnetic warp was used 
to fragment perception; ‘brain-sayings’, in which information was conveyed 
directly into the auditory nerves; ‘thigh talking’, in which the sense of hearing 
and perception was relocated to the thigh; and ‘bomb bursting’, experienced 
as a sudden convulsion of pain (Haslan 1810, pp. 28–37). For Matthews, 
the effect of the Air Loom was as a sort of affective explosion or sensorial 
shattering as his sensorium was rearranged. The Air Loom did not simply 
control Matthews’ body or brain, it also extended and reordered his senses 
by creating new affective and sensorial circuits between body and machine, 
so that Matthews was able to hear through his thigh or perceive through 
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vibrations in the air. In this way, unique as it may seem, Matthews’ case was 
also representative of the transformation of the human sensorium, or what 
Rancière (2000) has called the ‘redistribution of the sensible’, at the start of 
the Industrial Age.
Matthews is, to the best of my knowledge, the first known instance of a 
man who believed that his body and brain were being remotely controlled or 
influenced by a machine. To believe this is quite distinct from believing the 
body is a machine, as Descartes (1647) and La Mettrie (1748) had contended. 
Yet the effects of the Air Loom on Matthews also elided this difference. Under 
the influence of the Air Loom, Matthews ‘was reduced to a puppet, an automa-
ton, a thing of pumps and levers. This is the greater significance of the Air 
Loom: the machine has mechanized the man’, argues the cultural critic Mike 
Jay (2003, p. 193).
In this respect, Matthews’ case is representative of an increasing fear about 
the loss of human autonomy caused by the rise of machines, which would 
come to characterise cultural responses to the Industrial Revolution. As early 
as 1829, the Scottish philosopher Thomas Carlyle announced the emergence 
of a new ‘Mechanical Age’. This was an age in which human intelligence, 
along with traditional handcrafted artisanship, was rapidly being displaced by 
the relentless efficacy of machines: ‘Nothing is now done directly, or by hand; 
all is by rule and calculated contrivance’ (Carlyle 1838, p. 144). As a result, he 
argued, a profound transformation had taken place, in which ‘Men are grown 
mechanical in head and in heart, as well as in hand’ (Carlyle 1838, p. 150). 
Practices such as teaching, which had previously been highly individuated, 
had been standardised along with manual labour – effectively automat-
ing mental as well as physical work. This mechanisation only intensified in 
the following decades, as the industrial factory came to replace the manual 
workshop. Marx and Engels, writing 20 years after Carlyle in The communist 
manifesto, decried the way the nineteenth-century factory had transformed 
the workman into a mere ‘appendage of the machine’, so that it was ‘only 
the most simple, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack, that is 
required of him’ (Marx & Engels 2012, p. 43). Not only physical labour but 
also cognitive processes were being transformed and mediated by machines, 
setting the foundations for the increasingly complex technological mediation 
of emotions in late modernity.
By the start of the twentieth century, human reason and psychology 
were also recognised to have fallen under the influence of machine. For 
the psychoanalyst Victor Tausk (1988), writing in his 1919 chapter ‘On 
the origin of the “influencing machine”’, the belief that one’s brain was 
being controlled remotely by a machine was a key symptom of paranoid 
schizophrenia:
The schizophrenic influencing machine is a machine of mystical nature. 
The patients are able to give only vague hints of its construction. It consists 
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of boxes, cranks, levers, wheels, buttons, wires, batteries, and the like. 
Patients endeavor to discover the construction of the apparatus by means 
of their technical knowledge [. . .] All the discoveries of mankind, how-
ever, are regarded as inadequate to explain the marvelous powers of this 
machine, by which the patients feel themselves persecuted.
(Tausk 1988, p. 50)
Matthews’ description of the Air Loom strikingly anticipates this description of 
the influencing machine. And, indeed, the medical historian Roy Porter has 
identified Matthews as the first case of paranoid schizophrenia (1991, p. 64). 
This retrospective diagnosis, like that which sees Matthews’ as a puppet of the 
machine, frames Matthews as a passive victim of the Air Loom, and the rela-
tionship between man and machine as one of domination.
However, such a reading forecloses the more intimate and reciprocal rela-
tionship between automation and affect suggested by Matthews’ own account 
of his experience of the Air Loom. Matthews’ experience and account of the 
Air Loom were less a passive response to an Industrial Age already underway 
than they were the imagining into existence of a technology that did not 
yet exist. Matthews’ account of the Air Loom predates the period in which 
the automated loom – that great driver of early industrialisation – came into 
widespread use. The Jacquard loom, one of the first automated looms to be 
used in the industrial factories that would flourish from the 1820s onwards, 
was not developed until 1804, for instance. Similarly, the Air Loom’s mode 
of operation – magnetic rays and pneumatic chemistry – preceded the com-
mercial use of, or capacity to store, electro-magnetic power, as the first 
device to produce a large electric current was constructed by Alessandro 
Volta in 1800.
It is also striking that Matthews’ descriptions of the Air Loom were char-
acterised by expressions of desire and libidinality, in which the machine was 
understood to run on bodily extractions, including ‘seminal fluid’ and an 
‘extraction of gas from the anus’ (Haslan 1810, p. 66), while its operators 
spent their free time cross-dressing or participating in orgies. In this respect, 
the operation of the Air Loom anticipates the French post-structuralist theo-
rist Jean-François Lyotard’s description of capitalism as a ‘libidinal economy’, 
one propelled by drives and intensities – affective states – rather than the 
circulation of currency or goods (Lyotard 1974). Affect, following Lyotard’s 
account, is the driver of capitalist systems, including automation, not pas-
sively controlled by it. Capitalism, and with it late modernity, is characterised 
by the entwining of automation and affect, in which the somatic and social, 
the personal and prepersonal, exist in reciprocal and mutually constitutive 
relation. The relation between affect and automation is in this way both 
a surprisingly intimate history of the relation between human bodies and 
machines, and a history of intimacy itself, and its highly mediated conditions 
of possibility in late modernity.
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Automata as wonder machines: entanglements 
of intimacy and industrialisation
We can see this by expanding consideration of automation from that of indus-
trial automation to the less-known history of automata, and their cultural 
role as objects of public display and wonder. During the eighteenth century, 
automata played a key role in the development of mechanical technologies, 
and thus help us identify the cultural mechanisms by which automation and 
affect became entwined, so that automation would come to shape the condi-
tions of possibility of affect and affect to drive automation.
Lifelike automata, combining a lifelike appearance with mechanical move-
ments of great precision and which could be programmed to perform different 
tasks, were widely produced and celebrated as technological marvels through-
out the eighteenth century. Two of the earliest and most famous of these were 
produced in 1737, by the French inventor Jacques de Vaucanson. The first of 
these, ‘The Flute Player’, was an android that could be programmed to play 
any one of six airs, producing music by actually exhaling through the flute and 
moving its articulated fingers along its length. Ingenuous as ‘The Flute Player’ 
was, the second automaton Vaucanson produced in 1737 became even more 
famous. ‘The Defecating Duck’ was an automaton duck which was ‘fed’ in 
public, mechanically digested its food and then defecated onto a silver tray 
which was passed about to be admired by its aristocratic audience (Riskin 
2003). ‘The Defecating Duck’ was considered Vaucanson’s masterpiece, the 
fulfilment of the promise of the Enlightenment, representing the rational mas-
tery of the natural world through the manufacture of a wholly artificial biology. 
With over 400 moving parts in each wing alone, it could also flap its wings 
and digest water. Where nineteenth-century commentators feared man had 
become subjected to the automated industrial machine, eighteenth-century 
philosophers celebrated the invention of these automata as proof of man’s mas-
tery over nature and apparently limitless technological capabilities. However, 
Vaucanson’s Duck was actually an ingenious joke. Not only did it mobilise this 
technological mastery, this triumph of Enlightenment reason, in the service of 
the manufacture of the basest of products, faeces, it was fraudulent faeces to 
boot; there was a secret compartment of ‘digested food’ from which the duck 
mechanically defecated. Although it was indisputably a technological marvel, 
simulating actual biological processes mechanically proved beyond the autom-
ata makers of the eighteenth century.
Just as artificial biology was an object of both fascination and fraud in the 
eighteenth century, so was artificial intelligence. Wolfgang von Kempelen’s 
‘Mechanical Turk’, or ‘Automaton Chess Player’, was made in 1770 and exhib-
ited until its destruction by fire in 1854. Like ‘The Defecating Duck’, this was 
a genuine, and very impressive, automaton, which could mechanically move 
chess pieces around the board. However, Kempelen claimed the figure itself 
decided the moves of the chess pieces. This claim was a hoax; there was a person 
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hiding in the compartment beneath the figure, watching the game and deciding 
the moves via mirrors (Wood 2007). Automata occupied a place at the limits 
of technological capability and human ingenuity in the mid-century, and the 
hoaxes at the century of this history call attention to that limit even as they try 
to efface it. What drove and enabled the development of these automata was 
the intensely lucrative public fascination with their display, which we can see by 
turning to consider the best-preserved examples of automata from this period.
Where Vaucanson’s and Kempelen’s automata have been lost to time, three 
automata made by the master clock maker Pierre Jaquet-Droz still exist in perfect 
working order. The ‘Draftsman’ produces finely detailed sketches of a variety of 
different objects, including a portrait of Marie-Antoinette. The ‘Writer’ can be 
programmed to write a variety of sentences in an elegant script – including, teas-
ingly, ‘I think therefore I am’. The ‘Musical Lady’ can be programmed to play 
any one of half-a-dozen original airs on a keyboard. In the final decades of the 
eighteenth century, Jaquet-Droz toured Europe continuously with his autom-
ata, with tens of thousands of people queuing to see them. Like Vaucanson’s 
and Kemplen’s automata, Jaquet-Droz’s were designed as marvels; they were 
machines intended to provoke wonder and amazement in the spectator. In sim-
ulating artificial biology and intelligence, in seeming to be alive, they established 
an affective bond with the viewer. The public fascination they elicited was 
not simply a product of their technological ingenuity: rather, they were also 
designed to provoke an affective response in the spectator by simulating affec-
tive arousal. For instance, as the ‘Musical Lady’ plays, her chest rises and falls, so 
that she appears not only alive, but also affected by the music she plays; that is, 
she was designed not only to move mechanically, but to appear moved by the 
music she plays. In this way, she established an affective rapport with the viewer, 
linking them in a reciprocal and reciprocated expression of emotion. After 
Jaquet-Droz’s retirement, his automata were featured at the Paris Exposition 
of 1825, before being acquired by a nineteenth-century travelling show, the 
Museum of Illusions. In 1906, they were purchased by the Swiss Government 
and given to the Musée d’art et d’histoire at Neuchâtel in Switzerland, where 
they remain on display. Although they are occasionally cleaned, and the original 
clothes disintegrated, their mechanisms have never required repair.
For eighteenth-century viewers, Jaquet-Droz’s automata, like Vaucanson’s, 
represented the very embodiment of the promise of the Enlightenment: 
the capacity of human reason to decipher and master the laws of nature. As 
such, they were not simply popular – and lucrative – objects of public dis-
play. As Simon Schaffer (1994, p. 16) has argued, they were ‘arguments as 
well as amusements’. The cultural critic Gaby Wood (2007) has shown that 
for eighteenth-century audiences, automata were potent cultural symbols 
of the controversial materialist and mechanistic philosophies that had begun 
to emerge in the previous century, most famously in the work of Descartes. 
Automata suggested that animation was the product of mechanical processes, 
rather than the result of vital spirits or divine forces. The historian of science 
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Jessica Riskin (2003) argues that they were more complex than this, and did 
not simply represent the triumph of mechanistic philosophy. Rather, they 
were troubling objects, evidence of ontological uncertainty about the relation-
ship between the mechanical and the human.
The ontological question of whether natural and physiological processes 
were essentially mechanistic, and the accompanying epistemological ques-
tion of whether philosophical mechanism was the right approach to take 
to understand the nature of life, preoccupied philosophers, academicians, 
monarchs, ministers, and consumers of the emerging popular science 
industry during the middle decades of the eighteenth century. Neither 
mechanist nor anti-mechanist conviction, then, but rather a deep-seated 
ambivalence about mechanism and mechanist explanation produced the 
context for the emergence of artificial life. [Eighteenth-century automata] 
commanded such attention, at such a moment, because they dramatized 
two contradictory claims at once: that living creatures were essentially 
machines and that living creatures were the antithesis of machines.
(Riskin 2003, pp. 611–12)
It is precisely this ambiguity to which the hoaxes that accompanied the display 
of Vaucanson’s and von Kempelen’s automata call attention; this instability 
at the heart of their function and display reflects the instability of their cul-
tural significance. However, it is also important to recognise that if automata 
so often became the focal point for philosophical debates in the eighteenth 
century, it is precisely because, as charming and whimsical objects of public 
display, they were able to pose questions and embody new knowledge in ways 
that were much more difficult, even dangerous, to pursue in other contexts.
We have only to contrast the fate of Jaquet-Droz – celebrated and admired 
throughout his life for his technical achievement – with that of the philosopher 
Julien Offray de La Mettrie, to understand this. La Mettrie was forced to flee the 
liberal Netherlands after the publication of his L’Homme machine [Man a machine] 
(1748), in which he argued that the operation of human biology was the result 
of mechanical processes. Jaquet-Droz, who undertook actual experiments in 
human physiology and demonstrated a capacity to simulate biological processes 
mechanically, not only escaped such censure but also was widely acclaimed for 
his work. The difference between these is that Jaquet-Droz’s automata were 
wondrous machines able to elicit an affective sympathy in the public.
The important role affection played in the cultural reception of automata can 
be more clearly seen if we compare this to that of industrial automation at the 
same time. In the 1830s, the increasing use of automated looms in the weaving 
industry depressed wages for silk workers and threatened to make a generation 
of weavers redundant, thereby provoking what are often identified as the first 
workers’ uprisings of the Industrial Revolution in France (Woods 2007). Even 
as new technologies began to automate labour practices, with devastating effects 
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for workers, automata continued to be popular objects of public exhibition. Yet 
the actual technologies driving industrial automation were the same as those 
used to manufacture automata; Jacques Vaucanson, for instance, used the same 
mechanism he devised for his automata ‘The Flute Player’ and ‘The Defecating 
Duck’ to invent the automated loom. As the effects of industrialisation took hold, 
nineteenth-century fun fairs, penny arcades and other sites of popular enter-
tainment became populated by new mechanical figures like the coin-operated 
‘Laugh with Jolly Jack’. ‘Jolly Jack’ was a mechanical figure dressed as a sailor, 
who can still be seen in older funfairs. When a coin was placed in the slot in 
his booth, he would begin to laugh, his body moving around and shaking with 
amusement. The name ‘Laugh with Jolly Jack’ is as much an imperative as an 
invitation. It was designed to establish an affective economy, in the most literal 
sense, between the mechanical figure and the human viewer.
Automata and automation aroused very different feelings and emotions in 
the respective publics that came in contact with them, despite their use of 
the same technology. Automata were associated with an emerging market of 
commercial exhibitions and leisure industries. They were celebrated as marvels 
and wonders; they were fun. Automation, on the other hand, was associated 
with the transformation of labour practices, with dreariness and the increasing 
mechanisation of the human body. It inspired suspicion and fear. This affective 
complexity reflects the increasing prominence of automation in the cultural 
imaginary and social life of the nineteenth century, which would only intensify 
in the late modern period.
For the German philosophers Adorno and Horkheimer, writing in the 
Dialectic of enlightenment in 1944, the purpose of the leisure industries, or what 
they referred to as the Culture Industry, was industrial automation by stealth. 
The Culture Industry used amusement to covertly train human bodies to lead 
increasingly automated lives.
Amusement under late capitalism is the prolongation of work. It is sought 
after as an escape from the mechanized work process, and to recruit strength 
in order to be able to cope with it again. But at the same time mechanisa-
tion has such power over a man’s leisure and happiness, and so profoundly 
determines the manufacture of amusement goods, that his experiences are 
inevitably afterimages of the work process itself.
(1997, p. 137)
What had previously been understood in the popular imaginary as two distinct 
traditions – one of marvels and amusements, on the one hand, and machine 
and work, on the other – is here seen to be driven by a single imperative. 
What the history of affect and automation reveals, however, is not a narra-
tive of the mechanical control of the human body and brain, but something 
more complex: the history of our intimate lives with machines, our embod-
ied entanglements with and transformations by the increasingly technologised 
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world in which we find ourselves. This has important consequences for how 
we understand the cultural, historical and subjective specificity of affect and the 
emotions as they are experienced in late modernity.
Affect: autonomic vs automated
Affect and automation in late modernity are closely entwined as part of a dense 
network of somatic and social relations established over the course of the long 
history described above. To say emotions are mediated by technological devices 
and automated systems in late modernity does not mean they are simply manip-
ulated or controlled; rather, the relationship between affect and automation 
that subtends this needs to be understood as reciprocal, and mutually trans-
formative. To argue this is to go against the grain of how affect is understood 
in much contemporary philosophy and critical theory. As Greg Seigworth and 
Melissa Gregg explain in their introduction to The affect theory reader, affect is 
often taken to refer to a ‘passage of forces and intensities” which “emerges 
out of an unmediated relatedness’ (2011, p. 4). Understood as a spontaneous 
and unmediated bodily sensation, affect is taken to operate outside of, or prior 
to, perception and cognition. It is situated: ‘beneath, alongside, or generally 
other than conscious knowing’ (Seigworth & Gregg 2011, p. 1). This view 
is articulated in Brian Massumi’s assertion that affect is ‘irreducibly bodily and 
autonomic’, a product of ‘non-cognitive corporeal processes or states’ (2002, 
p. 437). Affect here is understood as a bodily sensation that enables forms of 
knowledge of a fundamentally different order to those of language, representa-
tion and conscious cognition. For this reason, it is often understood to operate 
outside of existing power structures: ‘circulating not primarily as a mode of 
discursive regulation but rather as the potential to “become otherwise”’, as 
Pedwell and Whitehead (2012, p. 116) put it. It is prepersonal or immanent, 
neither personal like feelings, nor social like emotions.
The assumption underpinning this understanding of affect – that there 
is an ontological distinction between affect and meaning, experience and 
representation, sense and significance – is one that has been examined and 
problematised at considerable length in feminist philosophy and critical the-
ory. For many feminist scholars, these registers cannot be held apart, but 
rather operate in interrelated and mutually constitutive ways. The feminist 
focus on what Lauren Berlant (2004, 2008) and Ann Cvetkovich (2003, 2012) 
have termed ‘public feelings’ problematises the conceptualisation of feelings 
as personal and emotions as social. Feelings, they argue, are simultaneously 
the individual internalisation and public or social manifestation of specific 
cultural formations or conditions. Their focus is thus on the political and lived 
entanglement of feelings, emotions and affects, rather than the philosophi-
cal distinction between these terms. Moreover, as Greg Seigworth (2011) 
explains, the Spinozist concept of affect is itself comprised of three related 
aspects: affectio, ‘an affection of one body by or upon another’; affectus, ‘a line 
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of continuous variation in the passage of intensities’; and affect, a condition of 
‘pure immanence or virtuality’ (Seigworth 2011, pp. 166–7). That is, the defi-
nition of affect itself already incorporates elements that map onto how feelings 
and emotions are often understood in the present, and on which basis they are 
often differentiated from affect.
This can be seen in Sara Ahmed’s The promise of happiness (2010). Happiness 
is not simply the personal or physical sensation or the unmediated experience of 
good feelings, Ahmed insists; it is also a (social) emotion produced by underly-
ing conditions of possibility, in which affective positivity itself is the product 
of specific historical and cultural contexts. Sensation and signification here are 
thus closely interlinked rather than distinct. Happiness is a ‘disciplinary tech-
nology’ (Ahmed 2010, p. 8), in the Foucauldian sense of the term; it is one of 
the mechanisms by which disciplinary societies construct subjects by orienting 
them around cultural norms. Happiness is ‘used as a technology or instrument, 
which allows the reorientation of individual desire towards a common good’ 
(2010, p. 59). It is not by happenstance that emotions and feelings are entangled 
here, or that both are understood as disciplinary technologies, caught up in cul-
tural systems of automation. The happy family, for instance, ‘is both a myth of 
happiness, of where and how happiness takes place, and a powerful legislative 
device, a way of distributing time, energy and resources’ (Ahmed 2010, p. 22). 
There is no ‘pure’ affect here, no unmediated sensations, no neat distinctions 
between the somatic and social, the autonomic and automatic. It is the messy 
and mutual relations between these terms and states that is the focus of analysis.
A similar argument and approach underpins Lauren Berlant’s Cruel optimism 
(2011), which examines how an arousal of a surge of joy and hope can also 
be toxic or serve to grind us down. Here again there are no pure categories; 
the putative distinction between the autonomic and automatic is problema-
tised rather than reinforced: a ‘visceral response is a trained thing’, as Berlant 
insists in The female complaint, ‘not just autonomic activity’ (2008, p. 52). This 
problematisation of affect as autonomic is a common thread in much feminist 
critical theory, which focuses on the way affect circulates and is driven by 
wider cultural systems in ways that automate its effects. Teresa Brennan (2004) 
has examined the way affect is ‘transmitted’ or spreads between and across pop-
ulations, while Anna Gibbs (2011) has argued affect is ‘contagious’. As Eugenie 
Brinkema (2014) recognises in The forms of the affects (2014), the focus on affect 
as a generalised state of pure force obscures the particularity of its expression in 
ways that unhelpfully mute what it has to reveal about cultural conditions or 
individual experience.
In the end, ethics, politics, aesthetics—indeed, lives—must be enacted in 
the definite particular. There is no reason to assume that affects are identical 
aesthetically, politically, ethically, experientially, and formally. The one way 
out for affect is via a way into its specificities.
(Brinkema 2014, p. xv)
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Defining affect as an undifferentiated pure or prepersonal intensity has hampered 
recognition of particularities and the ambivalence or equivocality with which 
this is negotiated by those whose embodied experiences might be quite different.
Sianne Ngai (2005) makes a similar point in her book Ugly feelings, in which 
the terms ‘feelings’ and ‘affects’ are often used interchangeably. Ngai exam-
ines the aesthetics of negative affects as represented in literature and film, and 
experienced in the ‘fully administered’ world of late modernity, which are 
characterised by what Ngai (2005, p. 11) refers to as ‘ambivalent states and sus-
pended agency’. Ngai takes as her exemplary figure Herman Melville’s character 
Bartleby the scrivener. Bartleby, having started out his employment (as a copy-
ist in a law office) churning out work of the highest quality with impressive 
speed and energy, gradually succumbs to a strange lassitude and negativity. To all 
requests, he responds: ‘I prefer not to’. This passive but obstinate refusal, and the 
obstruction of capitalist productivity this represents, is for Ngai exemplary of the 
affective and political ambivalence with which her book is centrally concerned. 
In this way, Ngai’s book contributes to the recent negative turn in affect stud-
ies (Stephens 2016) by focusing on minor affects rather than grand passions; not 
anger, grief or despair, but anxiety, paranoia, irritation, boredom and stupefaction 
are the subject of her book: ‘If Ugly Feelings is a bestiary of affects, it is one filled 
with rats and possums rather than lions, its categories of feeling generally being, 
well, weaker and nastier’ (Ngai 2005, p. 7). Minor affects are important to Ngai 
because they are ambivalent, equivocal, and in this way they have the potential 
to obstruct, to create a blockage in the catharsis-machine of literature or film: 
‘the feelings I examine here are explicitly amoral and noncathartic, offering no 
satisfactions of virtue, however oblique, nor any therapeutic or purifying release’ 
(Ngai 2005, p. 6). The ‘ugly feelings’ Ngai examines, like the ‘public feelings’ 
examined by Berlant (2004; 2008) and Cvetkovich (2003; 2012), and happiness 
as understood by Ahmed (2010), are ways of thinking about the entanglement 
between the subjective, somatic and social. Rather than distinguishing between 
sensation and signification, the autonomic and automatic, their studies focus on 
the points of interface or overlap between these registers. Affect here is not pure 
but contaminated by both social and somatic elements.
Conclusion
The relationship between affect and automation has a long history that allows 
us to better understand their mutual mediation in late modernity by contextu-
alising the forms of digital mediation so central to it within the longer history 
of mechanical mediation from which this relationship arises. As the case of 
James Tilly Matthews demonstrates, the reconfiguration of the human sen-
sorium at the start of the industrial age, and the sorts of institutional contexts 
in which this was mediated, reinforces the recent feminist critique of affect 
as an unmediated or pure force that exists outside of cultural, subjective or 
physical specificity. What we see so vividly above in Matthews’ account of the 
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Air Loom is the reconstruction of the viscera as a site of cultural training and 
affective mediation recognised by Berlant (2008), and which would come to 
define the field of possibility in which affect and sensation were experienced in 
late modernity. Donna Haraway (1985) has influentially described the human 
in the late modern period as a cyborg, but the longer history examined in this 
chapter reveals the role of human agency and affect in this long process of 
becoming-cyborg, which has been driven by a strong but ambivalent combina-
tion of fascination and fear. The reconfiguration of the human sensorium that 
dates back to the start of the Industrial Age is suggestive of an alternate history 
of automation to that in which human bodies are the passive objects of mecha-
nisation, revealing one in which they have willingly entered into intimate, and 
sometimes perverse, relationships with machines.
This history draws our attention to two key points. First, the affective 
responses and sensations produced by automated technologies are not unme-
diated, but are rather sites of sensory training (Stephens 2012). Second, that 
mediation has been driven, at least in part, by our affective responses to new 
technologies, whether positive or negative. To say that affect is mediated by 
automated technologies in the modern period, as I have attempted to show in 
this chapter, is to recognise the importance of the historical and cultural con-
texts in which it is experienced and understood. This does not foreclose on 
the complexities of the possible relations between affect and automation, but 
rather allows us to see this relationship in new ways. Whether we are consider-
ing the mechanical automation of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries or 
the digital automation of the twenty-first, the simulated artificial intelligence 
of von Kempelen’s ‘Mechanical Turk’ or the apparently imminent emergence 
of computational artificial intelligence in the present, the relationship between 
automation and affect is complex, but the mediation between the two is a con-
sistent feature over time. We can thus better understand the complexity and 
mediation of the emotions in late modernity if we focus on the relationality 
or entwining of affect and automation, on the various ways they influence and 
constitute one another as part of an affective genealogy, rather than the distinc-
tions between them.
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Chapter 13
The digital mediation of  
emotions in late modernity
Kathy A. Mills, Len Unsworth and Georgina Barton
Introduction
Late modernity has seen profound changes in the communication of emotion. 
Emotions are mediated through an array of communication technologies, 
through the mass media, multimedia and the Internet. Using social media, 
emotions can be socially constructed more rapidly, often interactively and in 
ways that are typically less bounded by traditional time-space constraints (on 
time-space, see Giddens 1991). Emotive symbols can become remixed, reused 
and made explicit through emoticons, memes, vlogs, blogs, clips, short music 
video, lip-syncing and graphic interchange formats (gifs) to potentially large 
audiences in online communities, or through back channels to individuals 
or groups. The texts of late modernity are, for the most part, multimodal – 
combining two or more modes of meaning.
The transformed mediation of emotions through technology is increas-
ingly ubiquitous – for example, through mobile devices attached to the body 
like an appendage – in public and private spaces, and the hybrid spaces in 
between (Mills 2016a). There is a paradoxical acceleration of both globalised, 
hyper-sensitised emotive media that bombards the senses and the mind, and 
a proliferation of personal dispositions shared in micro-interactions online 
through likes, retweets and thumbs up (on micro-interactions, see Patulny & 
Olson, this volume, Chapter 1; and Harding, this volume, Chapter 14). These, 
and many other technological transformations, have given rise to a renewed 
interest in emotions in sociology and in applied fields of research, such as edu-
cation, adolescent literacies, applied linguistics and communication studies.
This chapter outlines a multimodal semiotic framework to analyse the 
communication of emotions in filmic media. This work is a response to the 
emerging needs of children and youth to interpret and communicate emo-
tions in ways that extend well beyond verbal and linguistic forms to encompass 
everyday digital media production. For example, adolescents today use instant 
messaging and related online practices as a form of emotional relief, practices that 
are often multimodal (Best, Manktelow & Taylor 2014). These issues are central 
within the emergence of cultural and subcultural contexts that support the ease 
of production, consumption and rapid distribution of media.
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The multiplicity and reach of digital texts in a globally networked 
communication environment affords more accessible multimodal configura-
tions of emotional expression in late modernity, but also demands a new 
kind of reflexivity (Mills 2016a; Giddens 1991). This is a reflexivity that 
is less about tradition, and more about continuously revising and monitor-
ing the self (Archer 2012), both online and offline. Students need different 
competencies than previous generations to reflexively manage multimodal 
representations of self and identity owing to the rise in technology-mediated 
communication (on reflexivity, see Patulny & Olson this volume, Chapter 1). 
Part of this reflexivity involves understanding how identities and emotions 
are constructed for different audiences, markets and social purposes in digital 
space, and to what effect.
In this Web 2.0 world in which video and music sharing sites such as 
YouTube, Facebook and Blip.fm dominate the Internet viewing habits of youth, 
school curricula that purport to develop twenty-first-century communication 
skills need to begin to invest in building knowledge repertoires for the com-
munication of emotions in multimodal ways (Mills & Dreamson 2015). There 
is an urgent need for students to acquire metalanguages to describe, design and 
critique the kineikonic texts – moving image texts – that pervade their everyday 
textual environment (Mills 2011). They need to know the secrets behind the 
creative and persuasive orchestration of words, images, sounds, bodily commu-
nication and other modes that manipulate emotions across varied media in late 
modernity – an era that is also marked by greater freedom for the expression 
of emotions (see Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1). Educators need 
to teach a broader range of meaning-making resources to strengthen students’ 
emotional language across multiple modes and media, because this language is 
now necessary for full participation in higher education, workplaces and other 
civic forms of engagement.
Depicting and evoking emotions in images
In the analysis, we address focalisation in images, that is, whether the viewer is 
positioned as an outside observer of the depicted scene, or as having the point 
of view of a participant within the scene, or a view along with a represented 
participant within the scene (Painter, Martin & Unsworth 2013). Within focal-
isation, we principally address the use of contact images, where the represented 
participant gazes directly at the viewer. This contrasts with observe images, where 
the gaze of the represented participant is not directed at the viewer, and each 
has an affective component.
Affect – which denotes the visceral and aesthetic experiences of the 
body (see Pribram, this volume, Chapter 15 for further discussion) – can be 
invoked through ambience, ‘regarded as a visual meaning system for creating 
an emotional mood or atmosphere, principally through the use of colour’ 
(Painter, Martin & Unsworth 2013, pp. 35–6). Ambience invokes a gen-
eral emotional tone. The main meaning-making systems within ambience 
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Table 13.1  The relationship between musical structure and emotion (adapted from Ellis 
and Simons 2005, p. 18)
Structural features Emotion
Major key, consonant harmonies Positive valence
Minor key, dissonant harmonies Negative valence
Slow tempo, regular rhythm or meter Low arousal
Fast tempo, irregular rhythm High arousal
are: (a) vibrancy – depth of saturation of colours, (b) warmth – with posi-
tive effects created by warmer colours, such as red and yellow, and cooler 
colours, such as blues and greys used for neutral and negative effects, and 
(c) familiarity, which is realised by the amount of colour differentiation in 
the image – the more colours, the greater the sense of familiarity. The use 
of colour can serve ideational meanings, such as green for grass or blue for 
sky. Colour can be used compositionally, such as to highlight or foreground 
objects to make them more salient. However, in this analysis we give prior-
ity to the interpersonal role of colour, particularly its significance in terms 
of its emotional effect on the viewer (Painter, Martin & Unsworth 2013). 
Interpreting the depiction of subtle emotional moods, such as those cre-
ated through naturalistic or scenic images, often requires other contextual 
information provided by written language, music or other images in the 
sequence, with particular physiological and social/cultural features.
Music, emotions and multimodality
It has long been acknowledged that music impacts profoundly on the emo-
tions (Balkwill & Thompson 1999). Filmic and musical stimuli can elicit 
physiological changes in the listener or viewer that accompany emotions. An 
additive relationship exists between simultaneously presented film and music 
stimuli on some self-report measures of emotion. Music supports the visual 
narrative of a film to modulate the emotional response of the audience (Ellis 
& Simons 2005).
Specific musical elements, such as tonal and rhythmic features and tempo, align 
with distinct emotional effects. For example, faster tempo, irregular rhythms, 
increased volume and higher pitches can intensify emotions – unhappiness, dissat-
isfaction, uncertainty and stress – and elicit physiological responses, such as changes 
to facial muscles, heart rate and electro-dermal activity (Parke, Chew & Kyriakakis 
2007). Table 13.1 outlines other relations between music and emotion. Music 
may not trigger the same emotional responses in listeners from different social and 
cultural backgrounds, though research has shown some common patterns that 
hold even across cultural contexts (Balkwill & Thompson 1999).
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Other musical elements can be manipulated to influence different emotions 
of varying intensity. These include timbral features (such as the tonal quality of 
the instruments), expressive qualities (such as dynamics or volume levels) and 
articulation (e.g., smooth or rough rhythmic features) and melodic and har-
monic compositional devices (such as arrow pitch range, dissonance, harmony 
and repetition) (Barton & Unsworth 2014).
This original synthesis of principles from linguistics, multimodal semiotics 
and musicology highlights the powerful communicative potentials for youth 
to evoke emotions through filmic media in contemporary times. Filmic media 
are not new in late modernity, but the consumption and production of user-
generated podcasts or vlogs (video logs) has rapidly become one of the most 
visible everyday textual practices for youth today (Garcia 2015), both in and 
out of formal teaching contexts, and the impact on the mediated experience 
and expression of emotions and affect amongst late modern youth is likely to 
have been substantial.
Research description
The findings are part of a project that aimed to develop the multimodal expres-
sion of emotions of primary school children across three school sites located in a 
low socio-economic region of Queensland, Australia. The book trailer selected 
for analysis from a class set of films was produced by two female, middle-primary 
students (ages 9–10 years). The book trailer promoted the popular novel, Rowan 
of Rin, by Emily Rodda (2005). The movie can be viewed by typing this link 
into a browser: http://tiny.cc/gtrk0y.1 To prepare students for the learning task, 
a professional media artist taught a series of seven, two-hour lessons over the 
duration of one school term, or quarter. The unit of work was preceded by 
reading and discussing the novel Rowan of Rin, led by the classroom teacher 
over a number of weeks, and by developing the students’ knowledge of narra-
tive technique in novels and their understanding of the genre of the book trailer.
The lessons by the media artist over the course of one school quarter 
introduced the students to specialist knowledge of how to interpret animated 
films and other media, and how to represent emotion through vocabulary, 
intermodal relations, visual images, facial expressions, body language, col-
our and music. Students were taught technical and composition skills for 
film trailer design, such as using video cameras, shooting films and editing 
movies. To overcome the issue of downloading large files from the school 
server, students could combine their filmed footage with a wide selection of 
pre-prepared music, stock video animations, background images and scene 
imagery to suit their book trailer. The students selected the segments of 
music and edited them in the iMovie software to fit the mood of the image 
sequence and transitions.
Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with the students dur-
ing the film editing to clarify the students’ intended affect meanings in the 
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images and sound. Sample questions included: When you created this scene, 
what facial expressions did you choose to show different feelings and why? 
What backgrounds did you choose and why? When you added the audio 
track, what sort of music did you choose for this part and why? The point of 
this analysis is to reveal the emotional/affective associates between particular 
choices – or repertoire – of images chosen by students.
Analysis: extending the appraisal framework  
to the moving image
Our multimodal analysis extends the appraisal framework formulated by Martin 
and White (2005) to investigate the multimodal communication of affect in 
students’ book trailer movies. It extends beyond the original theorisation of 
appraisal as an account of the evaluative resources of written and spoken lan-
guage. We chose the appraisal framework because it remains one of the foremost 
systematic approaches to mapping feelings or attitude in applied linguistics (Mills 
2016b). Of particular relevance is the application of the appraisal framework to 
the study of affect in visual images, such as Economou’s (2012) analysis of large 
verbal-visual displays. Unsworth (2013) has conducted an analysis of evaluative 
images in children’s picture books and animated movies. More recently, Mills 
(2016b) and Mills, Bellocchi, Patulny and Dooley (2017) have examined how 
children represent affect, judgement and appreciation in photography at school.
Appraisal here refers to the language resources used to negotiate emotions, 
judgements and appreciation or valuation of phenomena, and to amplify and 
engage with these evaluations (Martin & White 2005). The work reported 
here focuses on one area of the appraisal framework that deals with emotions. 
In brief, affect is about positive or negative feelings. Martin and White (2005) 
use the following broad categories of affect – un/happiness, dis/satisfaction, in/
security – and suggest a range of interpersonal meanings and dispositions within 
these categories. For example, unhappiness can include feelings of misery (e.g., 
down, sad, miserable) or antipathy (e.g., dislike, hate, abhor), and happiness can 
include cheer (e.g., cheerful, buoyant, jubilant) or affection (e.g., fond of, love, 
adore). There is a fourth category called dis/inclination, which is irrealis affect 
implicating a trigger, which describes fear (e.g., wary, fearful, terrorised) or 
desire (e.g., miss, long for, yearn for).
Each of the aforementioned categories of affect may be descriptions of 
emotional states (e.g., I was petrified) or behaviours that indicate emotional 
states (e.g., his hands trembled with fear). The framework addresses the funds 
of language through which authors overtly encode what they present as atti-
tudes, but also how they indirectly or directly communicate feelings (Mills 
et al. 2014). Different intensities of the same emotion can also be expressed 
grammatically using different lexical terms. For example, graduations of scared 
from low to high could be expressed as disquieted (low), anxious (median) or 
distraught (high).
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An additional theoretical dimension of use here is the notion of the reflexive 
‘image repertoire’ developed by sociologist Ian Burkitt (2002). He argues that 
emotions involve positive and negative dimensions of empowerment (euphoria) 
and disempowerment (dysphoria), and (from Spinoza) that they can be tied to 
images and imaginings beyond the immediate encounter. From Barthes, he 
describes this as an image repertoire, or visual fragments of others that are used 
to construct and feel internal conceptions of, and metaphors for, emotions. 
Given the links made to Burkitt’s work by Patulny and Olson (see this volume, 
Chapter 1), these ideas combined with the present analysis might open up new 
ways of looking at Burkitt’s conceptions of reflexivity.
Findings: a multimodal analysis of film
In this section, we conduct a multimodal analysis of Emily and Isabella’s book 
trailer for Rowan of Rin to elaborate the embodied representation of positive and 
negative emotions. While at times we focus predominantly on one mode at a 
time, such as visual elements or music for the purpose of analysis, we acknowl-
edge the role of the interrelationships between the modes to communicate 
emotion (Unsworth 2006).
The opening scene of the trailer presents a picture of a mystical village, 
providing a setting for the action to follow. The ambient light in the centre 
contrasts with the darkness of the rocky cliffs, and the warmth of the brightly 
lit village contrasts with the cooler, foreboding darkness of the overhanging 
rocks on the left. The scene invokes the sense that the village is a safe place 
surrounded by a hostile and barren external environment. It locates the set-
ting and establishes the scene for the narrative, while implicitly foreshadowing 
adversity and hardship.
In this segment of the digital narrative, the music accompanying the open-
ing scene creates an ominous feeling due to the low-pitched note that is rapidly 
repeated. This technique in composition, both the intense rhythmic pattern that 
drives the action forward as well as the low pitch, creates a feeling of insecurity 
and indicates that something is about to happen. A slight ‘sshhhing’ sound (white 
noise) appears as the transition occurs, moving to the next section, which begins 
with a cymbal crash and accent. The overall effect generates a feeling of suspense. 
The second scene continues the traditional story beginning, locating the story in 
time using general terms (i.e., once) and place (Figure 13.1).
This provides essential contextual information for the viewer. Bright light 
sweeps across the image and the dark, shadowy frame functions to name 
the village with the word ‘RIN’. The dull or gloomy colour choice con-
trasts with the bright light of the previous village scene, suggestive of the 
impending gloom. The light merging into the dark in this transition and 
then merging back into the light creates an ambience that contrasts positive 
and negative emotional mood, or a sense of emotional ambivalence (Burkitt 
2002) in connection with the images as a prelude to further actions.
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Figure 13.1 Opening screen text: setting
Figure 13.2 Musical notation: syncopation
The visuals are accompanied by dark music in a minor key, which begins 
at a crucial point in the narrative, and which intensifies the ambience. The 
same low tone is maintained with the addition of strings an octave higher. 
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Both the low-pitched rhythm and the strings change from a constant semi-
quaver repeated beat to a syncopated effect – where the accent is off the beat 
(see Figure 13.2).
An irregular rhythm, such as used here, indicates insecurity and dissatisfaction. 
In addition, the soundtrack now includes a narrow pitch range, rather than the 
same note. The strings play a repeated motif on G that ascends one tone to A, 
followed by a descending semitone to F#, similarly functioning to indicate inse-
curity. This melody creates the emotion of insecurity building, due to the fast 
tempo and rhythm as well as the narrow pitch range. There is certainly a feeling 
that this section will transition to a new section in the narrative because of a sense 
of urgency. The use of tone – and not just image – extends Burkitt’s ideas of the 
‘image repertoire’ to show a more extensive multi-model repertoire of effects.
The next scene invokes insecurity through the divergent meanings com-
municated through the image and the language. The bold news inscribed 
in the screen text, ‘ONE DAY THE STREAM DRIED UP’ in capital 
letters, is divergently coupled with images of flowing and powerful white 
water, suggesting its former abundance and power. Stark emotional impact 
can be created when image and written language diverge (Painter, Martin 
& Unsworth 2013). This counterpointing or juxtaposing of text and image 
reinforces the tension in the narrative, suggesting catastrophic change for the 
village and potentially provoking a sense of insecurity in the viewer (Martin & 
White 2005). The music remains largely the same as the previous section with 
this transition, maintaining the sense of insecurity and discontent.
The next transition depicts in the foreground a wooly beast in a lush rural 
scene, marked by the bright light of the village. The experiential peacefulness 
of this image and the warm ambience of the colour of the beast, given further 
emphasis by the bright light, invites a positive emotional mood that suggests 
normality and contentment and the normalcy of the village; but this quickly 
takes a dramatic turn with a bleak overlay. With the contrasting light and 
dark noted above, this again reinforces as a sense of emotional ambivalence 
(Burkitt 2002).
The greying of the background and the eerie shadowing of the text over 
the silhouette of the wooly beasts is similar to earlier techniques used, with the 
text inscribing the fateful news that, ‘THERE WAS NOTHING LEFT FOR 
THE GREAT HUMPED WOOLY BEASTS’. This intensifies the first com-
plication of the narrative by showing the negative outcome of the dried-up 
stream. It invokes what Martin and White (2005) refer to as negative apprecia-
tion as a reaction to an event, with potential harm. The cool ambience of the 
dull, dark-grey hue evokes complementary negative affect (Painter, Martin & 
Unsworth 2013).
The change in the soundtrack evokes a similarly uncertain and intensifying 
mood as in the previous transition scene. The accompanying percussion and elec-
tric guitar sections add to the suspense. The students reported in the interviews 
that they selected ‘dramatic’ music segments. This is created by the percussion 
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Figure 13.3 Demand gaze
accenting every beat and particularly beat one of every measured bar of four. The 
electric guitar plays distorted chords of an interval of a fifth (i.e., with the tonic, 
G, and dominant, D), so it seems as though the music is played in G minor even 
though the Bb (median) is not present. A minor key typically evokes feelings of 
unhappiness and discomfort (Ellis & Simons 2005).
After the foregoing introduction, the narrative introduces the characters for 
the first time, as seen in Figure 13.3. This shifts the viewer perspective on the 
narrative from impersonal observation of an impending disaster to a perspec-
tive mediated by the viewer’s personal connection with a village character. 
Figure 13.3 introduces the main character, Rowan of Rin, played by a female, 
who establishes interpersonal contact with the viewers through her direct gaze 
toward them (Painter, Martin & Unsworth 2013).
The girl’s expression is one of concentration and a mixture of satisfaction, inter-
est and attentiveness. The contact image engages the audience directly, combined 
with a medium-close-up view, which makes the depicted emotional experience 
of the central character more readily accessible to readers (Unsworth 2013).
The actor shifts her gaze to look downward at the object in her hand, indicat-
ing her conscious attention or reaction to it. Stars appear in the transition slide, 
inviting a positive mood, perhaps pointing metaphorically to the main character 
or star of the narrative and hence visually invoking a positive judgement of the 
capacity of the character. The camera has a sustained focus on the character as 
the actor moves through her important journey. The music is intensified and 
the music soundtrack changes with only rhythmic, not tonal, features present. 
It is purely percussive.
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Figure 13.4 Camera view over shoulder
In Figure 13.4 there is an interesting use of the camera view taken over the 
shoulders of the main character and towards the antagonist. This type of medi-
ated focalisation from behind the character is used in film to show solidarity with 
the main character, as if viewing alongside the character’s point of view (Painter, 
Martin & Unsworth 2013). The lighting is very bright on the characters and 
the expression on the second character’s face indicates happiness, leading the 
viewer to infer that the interaction could potentially be positive, but this is still 
uncertain. The harmonic features of the accompanying music are decreased in 
this section, and only percussive sounds and a drone effect are used. Timbral 
features include rim shots on a snare drum, opening and closing cymbal sounds 
and irregular, off-beat rhythms. This creates even more suspense as the regular 
features of the music have been ruptured. More than images, sound and irregu-
lar rhythm form a repertoire of affective experiences that move the viewer.
The characters interact verbally, as indicated by the girl’s moving lips, and 
she casts her gaze downward for a few moments as Rowan awaits the reaction, 
creating suspense. The girl’s hand suddenly strikes, provoking insecurity, her 
arm creating a vector that indicates the striking movement. The rapid shifts 
in affect between the frames – from security and happiness in the previous 
scene, to insecurity and dissatisfaction – create a sense of drama. The contin-
ued percussive track invites surprise and alarm as the negative outcome of the 
negotiation is now certain. The rhythms are in alignment with the action of 
the girl’s throwing of the parchment.
The girl’s tossing head, striking arm and seeming evil swagger in the next 
scene can invoke interpretations of power and satisfaction, and, potentially, the 
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Figure 13.5 Frontal view face: surprise
viewer’s negative judgements of social sanction – the character seems mean and 
arrogant (Martin & White 2005). The students explained, ‘When they [Sheba 
the witch] throw the stick and it hits Rowan [. . .] I want them to feel [. . .] what 
type of people they are’. The camera angle creates a disjuncture between the 
apparent display of power in the posturing, because it is taken from a high angle 
which evokes the viewer position as more powerful, instead of what would have 
been a more appropriate low-angle view to reflect the powerful display of head 
tossing and laughter (Kress & van Leeuwen 2006). As the students explained in 
the interview, they included this important scene, ‘Because it gives them a clue 
how [. . .] Rowan ended up going on the quest’. The scene cuts to Rowan 
lying slumped, face concealed from view in a posture of defeat. To create sus-
pense, Rowan’s hands are shown slowly unravelling a mysterious scroll.
In this scene, depicted in Figure 13.5, the camera angle captures the face of 
the actor who shows a facial expression of surprise or fear (one of several pos-
sible ‘basic’ emotions; Ekman 2007), her gaze directed at the unfurled scroll. 
The camera angle could have been lowered in this shot to gain a closer view of 
the eyes and mouth, to be able to discern intensity of affect. We cannot discern 
whether this is positive or negative surprise from the facial expression alone. 
However, as the students explained in the interview, they wanted to show that 
Rowan was, ‘scared . . . terrified . . . like, with his mouth open and his eyes 
wide’. In the music, a distorted guitar part is introduced here moving from a 
low pitch to an octave higher and back to the low pitch. It ends with a wave 
(white noise) sound that increases in intensity with the strings section once 
again. This creates an overall ternary or three-part musical form, with the first 
and third phrases of the melody being the same.
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Figure 13.6 Transition: turning the page
In the trailer, Rowan stands up to indicate a move to action, with a glimpse 
of a smile, perhaps hinting at hope. A transition, shown in Figure 13.6, then 
shows a page turning, becoming one with the scroll, symbolically introducing 
the next ‘chapter’ of the narrative. The next scene contrasts the brightness and 
positive ambience of the daylight, as the images shift to a bleak, darkened forest 
scene. This provokes a sense of insecurity, challenge, fear and danger.
Fear is intensified, as the screen text, ‘ROWAN WAS WEAK AND NOT 
BRAVE’, makes a judgement of Rowan’s negative capacity (weak) and tenacity 
(brave). At the same time, the students explained in the interview that, despite 
this, ‘He didn’t give up’ – a positive judgement of social esteem (perseverance; 
Martin & White 2005). The selection of upper-case font adds textual salience, 
making the message appear to be stronger and more powerful, consistent with 
many of the other scenes in the trailer. This emphasis, along with the negative 
ambience of the background image, intensifies the sense of foreboding.
The music in this section utilises a range of features, including harmonic, 
rhythmic, timbral and expressive qualities to intensify the overall mood of 
uncertainty and dissatisfaction. A similar rhythmic pattern to the previous sec-
tion is used, featuring a new melody played by stringed instruments. Accents in 
the melody are placed off the beat, creating a feeling of tension and suspense. 
Further, the strings are no longer playing in unison, but harmonising within 
close distance of each other. The first interval is a minor third which then 
descends to a major second. This creates a clashing of sounds or dissonance 
which contributes to the uncertainly, dissatisfaction and even fear. The per-
cussive accompaniment also contributes to the tense feelings as the rhythm is 
syncopated with accents also occurring on the off-beat.
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Figure 13.7 Uncertainty and rising fear: screen text
The repeated motif of the bright light, which appeared earlier in the 
visual narrative in the introductory segment of the trailer, returns, perhaps 
signifying the restoration of the original state of the village and the wooly 
beasts, which are depicted in the background (see Figure 13.7). This use 
of light as visual rhyme links different parts of the narrative like a cohe-
sive device, and is a compositional or textual resource (Painter, Martin & 
Unsworth 2013). The use of the screen text, ‘WILL ROWAN SAVE HIS 
THIRSTY HUMPED WOOLY BEASTS?’, is significant, directly address-
ing the audience and coupled with the camera zooming in. The uncertain 
fate of the wooly beasts is invoked by the greying or blurring of the animals 
in the background.
In the early parts of the trailer, there is dark ambience to hint at impending 
doom, but in Figure 13.8, the fire moving across the black background intensi-
fies this more dynamically and dramatically. The screen text, ‘LOOK INTO 
THE FIERY JAWS OF FEAR’, quoted from the book, is accompanied by the 
image of the moving fireball. This creates a co-patterning of the image and text 
to flag fear, terror and intensified danger. The text hints at the survival of only 
one character, who must demonstrate determination, bravery and tenacity, to 
persist against impending doom. As the students indicated in the interviews, ‘I 
want them to feel that they need to find out how it ends’.
The fire continues to move slowly across the screen behind the text as the 
viewer is afforded sufficient time to read the rhyming verse. The music reaches 
a climax with the fiery image as the rhythmic features increase in intensity with 
faster repeated motifs. The dynamics increase in volume with more accented 
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Figure 13.8 Longer screen text: poetry of challenge
notes appearing. A new melodic theme appears that indicates a glimpse of hope 
as it modulates briefly to Eb major – the relative key to G minor (Figure 13.9).
The scene transitions to a barren and dark cave, with lonely figures seem-
ingly overwhelmed by the treacherous landscape. This is confirmed by the 
students, who explained in interviews that, ‘he’s scared when he goes up the 
[mountain], there’s something that he is scared of, and no one will save Rin’. 
The last embers of the fire from the previous scene burn away slowly on the 
left side of the cave, like a visual cohesive device between the current and pre-
vious scenes, before the image gradually fades.
The cool colour of the cave complements the other visual features, invok-
ing a sense of the difficult journey ahead, while a turn in the cave and 
misty tunnel leads to the unknown, creating a sense of uncertainty; however, 
bright light is suggestive of a more positive pathway. This is aligned to the 
music, as the soundtrack intensifies by repeating the melody an octave higher 
Figure 13.9 Musical notation: accented notes
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Figure 13.10 Unanswered questions: screen text
on the stringed instruments. The same background music continues for the 
next few scenes, again providing cohesion across the junctures of the visual 
image sequence.
The repeating bright-light motif or visual rhyme in the centre of the next 
transition flashes again, used as a cohesive device, perhaps signifying the ongo-
ing quest or hope. Using capital letters and the zooming screen text, the words, 
‘WHO WILL BE THE SEVEN VILLAGERS TO GO ON THE SPECIAL 
QUEST?’, function to personalise the difficult decision that the village must 
make and arouse curiosity (Figure 13.10).
The next scene transition, like a page turning from bottom-right to 
top-left, and a bleak, grey snowy scene creates a continuing ambience of 
uncertainty and chilling insecurity. The question, ‘WILL THEY SURVIVE 
THE JOURNEY?’ appears in capital letters, growing larger until they are 
illegible and disappearing to leave the bleak, grey background. The students 
explained in the interviews that they used techniques such as these, ‘because I 
don’t want to give away the ending of it, like what’s at the end and if they’ll 
save them or not’. This is an important feature of film, where lines of interpre-
tation are deliberately not closed off. The Ken Burns effect – slowly zooming 
in – intensifies the viewer’s sense of being drawn into the story (Mills 2011).
The next scene transitions with a heart-shaped break in the grey back-
ground. This is perhaps an intertextual reference to the seven hearts 
mentioned earlier. A red-eyed dragon is depicted in a moving fire, which is 
also an intertextual reference to the fire in the earlier scene and the words 
in the poem, ‘FIERY JAWS OF FEAR’. The dragon gazes directly at the 
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viewer – a contact image – establishing direct interpersonal engagement 
(Painter, Martin & Unsworth 2013). The text appears as, ‘ROWAN OF 
RIN’, which is both the title of the book and the name of the main char-
acter. This is done with dramatic pauses between each word, as each word 
appears on screen. These features intensify the enormity of the journey, the 
sense of challenge and the evoked sense of fear.
The movie ends with a black cross that intersects the title to indicate complete 
darkness. The final timing of the music is aligned with the large font that reads 
‘ROWAN OF RIN’. An unsteady ending with a distorted electric guitar chord 
is unresolved. This is because it does not finish on the tonic of the key, but rather 
the dominant or fifth D. In this way, both images and music evoke a sense of an 
unfinished narrative, inviting the viewer to read the book to resolve the tension. 
Burkitt (2002) notes that the use of language and the labelling of affective and 
emotional experiences are important for recognising the presence of emotions, 
which are coupled with the use of music to evoke an emotional response.
Conclusion and recommendations for research  
and educational practice
Late modernity is an era in which YouTube channels produced by youth now 
rival television channels as key sites for entertainment and learning. The abil-
ity to communicate emotions powerfully through film and vlogging warrants 
more serious attention in educational research. This research has highlighted 
the ability of young students to utilise the multimodal affordances of film 
for communicating emotions in synchronised and orchestrated ways through 
film. The multimodal semiotic analysis of interpersonal meanings in film 
has demonstrated the pattern of semiotic resources used by young students 
to communicate affect in nuanced and sophisticated ways. Affective mean-
ings can be interpreted from the visual design of children’s filmic narratives, 
including the students’ use of ambience through the selection of image colour, 
visual rhyme (e.g., repeated light), focalisation and social distance.
Written language can be used to inscribe or evoke emotional responses and 
judgement with varied typographic effects (capitalisation, shadows), use of the 
interrogative mood (questions), intertextual use of poetry and the Ken Burns 
effect (zooming in). The divergent coupling of words and image can heighten 
meaning, using powerful intermodal connections between images and words. 
Intermodal meanings are created through the music-image interface, with 
intensification of the music to indicate climactic points in filmic narratives.
Embodied meanings can portray affect and judgement experienced by char-
acters, utilising facial expression, gaze, gesture and other bodily movement 
to develop interpersonal meanings. This diverse repertoire of multimodal 
resources within the interpersonal semantic systems is quite encompass-
ing, and requires significant capabilities with a complex ensemble of modes. 
Such a complex of production and interpretation reinforces the importance 
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of non-verbal image repertoires (Burkitt 2002) that go beyond language in 
conveying emotional meaning.
A recommendation arising from the research is that the teaching of the 
multimodal language of emotions, through film and other popular media, 
deserves systematic attention in the curriculum, beginning in the early years 
and extending through high school. In the current global context of late 
modernity – where images proliferate across an array of networked com-
munication platforms – film design and its multimodal ensembles are rarely 
considered core components of the English curriculum in primary school, 
nor addressed with specificity or attention to sequential development (e.g., 
Council of Chief State School Officers & National Governors Association 
2013; ACARA 2017).
There is a need to build these understandings more cumulatively in the 
curriculum, creating a pathway for the sequential trajectory for negotiating 
interpersonal, ideational and compositional meanings and their development 
over time. Likewise, this recommendation for multimodal knowledge and 
skills can be extended to other related audio-visual media – such as other gen-
res of film, podcasts, vodcasts and animations – so that students can compare 
and contrast the affordances of each medium.
To conclude, viewing and sharing videos is an everyday literacy practice 
for youth and adolescents in late modernity. The communication of emotions 
is technology-mediated and multimodal. Young people today need appren-
ticeship into the multimodal communication of emotions through video and 
media design. The reflexive task of emotional communication in late moder-
nity is thus demonstrated to undergo ever-more-complex forms of mediation 
and to develop more complex audio-visual repertoires of meaning. Teachers 
have a key role to teach sophisticated interpersonal meaning systems that are 
necessary to enact reflexive social relationships in digitally dominated worlds. 
Students also need guidance to exercise self-reflexivity, monitoring their digi-
tal consumption of emotions and the flux and multiplicity of digitally edited 
selves – because with increased opportunities are the increased risks and con-
sequences of the ‘darker side of modernity’ (Giddens 1990, p. 7).
Note
1 Music track sourced from Lisi, A 2015, Helipad siege [royalty-free, original mp3 file], 
viewed 6 April 2017, www.youtube.com/watch?v=9LCkSXPorLU.
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The entanglement of emotion and 
technology in the 2011 riots
Jennifer Harding
Introduction
In August 2011, the UK experienced arguably the worst display of civil unrest 
in a generation (Lewis et al. 2011). Some politicians were keen to locate clear 
causes of the disturbance: in criminality, moral collapse amidst disadvantaged 
communities and poor parenting.1 Numerous commentators claimed that the 
2011 riots were distinguished from previous instances of disorder by: gang cul-
ture, the extent of looting and the widespread use of social media (Newburn 
2015). Some academics have sought to contextualise the 2011 riots in relation 
to structural changes in post-industrial British race, class, and consumer culture 
(Bauman 2011; Cooper 2012; Moxon 2011; Treadwell et al. 2013). Yet, various 
explanatory discourses fail to capture the complexity of the riots and their devel-
opment. Relatively little attention has been paid to how emotion and media 
figured in the unfolding of disturbance and its interpretation (see Khorana, this 
volume, Chapter 16; and von Scheve & Ural, this volume, Chapter 20 for more 
on the interaction between media, emotion and public perceptions).
This chapter is mainly concerned with the problem of how to concep-
tualise the entanglement of emotion and media in the process of rioting. 
It begins by discussing attempts to contextualise the riots. It then considers 
how emotions and media technologies have figured in attempts to explain 
the motivation and momentum of the riots: in mainstream media, accounts 
provided by rioters and some academic analyses. It reflects on the advantages 
of deploying affect and assemblage in analysis of relations between feeling, tech-
nology and acting in the riots.
The 2011 riots were defined by various attempts to represent them. It was 
widely reported in mainstream media that a peaceful protest at the police shoot-
ing of Mark Duggan2 developed into a riot on 6 August 2011 in North London. 
Family and friends of Duggan gathered outside Tottenham police station at 
5pm, waiting to speak with a senior police officer, who never arrived.3 Many of 
the original protestors left when the crowd swelled and began attacking police 
property. Images of burning police cars circulated via the Internet and, shortly 
after, people from neighbouring boroughs began arriving to join the disturbance. 
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The next day, a headline in The Observer newspaper proclaimed ‘Tottenham in 
flames as riot follows protest’.
Over the course of the next four days, disorder spread to other London 
boroughs and UK cities. Up to 15,000 people (as participants or observers) 
took to the streets,4 with almost 4,000 arrested by early September,5 marking a 
serious episode of civil unrest. Police struggled and failed to contain lawlessness. 
Rioters attacked police buildings and vehicles but looting was the most com-
mon unlawful activity (Lewis et al. 2011). It was estimated that approximately 
2,500 shops and businesses were looted during the riots (Lewis et  al. 2011, 
p. 27). Fashion retailers and stores containing high-value electrical goods were 
the most popular targets for looters, although some broke into cheap supermar-
kets to steal everyday basics such as washing powder, nappies and baby food 
(Guardian et al. 2011, pp. 43, 50).
Context of disturbance
Newburn (2015) suggests that the riots of 2011 shared with those of the 
1980s6 a similar structural, political and cultural context: ‘an economic 
downturn, relatively high levels of unemployment, a right of centre govern-
ment embarking on fairly radical reform, and rising levels of general social 
inequality’ (p. 50). In both instances, rioting occurred in ‘relatively impov-
erished, inner-city communities with sizeable minority ethnic communities’ 
(Newburn 2015, p. 59).
However, Newburn (2015) argues, the events of August 2011 were distin-
guished from earlier riots by: their fluidity and the pace with which they spread 
from location to location, possibly aided by communications technologies; the 
extent of looting; the failure of politicians to offer wholesale support to the 
police; and the nature and scale of the response of the penal system.7
Although race was played down in accounts of the 2011 riots – partly 
because they were not ‘race riots’ – race has been an overriding theme in post-
war riots in Britain (Newburn 2015, p. 50). Since the 1980s, disturbances have 
tended to ‘coalesce around conflict with the police’, with race ‘at the heart of 
the grievances’ (Newburn 2015, pp. 50–1). The perception of police misuse 
of power has been (as in the case of Mark Duggan) a significant trigger for 
disturbance. But, Newburn (2015) argues, this is only one of several factors, as 
riots are multifaceted and fluid. Indeed, more attention might be focused on 
the complex intersections of race, class and age.
Cooper (2012) argues that explanatory discourses (in mainstream media 
and political discourse) have centred on the ‘problem’ of ‘culturally-deficient 
communities’ (related to age, ‘race’ and the ‘underclass’) and ‘failing public 
services’ (police and education) (pp. 8–9). More liberal commentators have 
focused on conflict between a racist police system and ‘(largely black) margin-
alised communities’ (ibid., p. 9). However, neither explanation acknowledges 
the broader socio-cultural context of the 2011 riots and how this has impacted 
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young people marginalised by ‘race’ and class growing up in England (ibid., 
p. 11). Cooper argues that three decades of neoliberal restructuring in Britain 
have ‘hollowed out the social protections, educational opportunities, job 
prospects, and spaces for political engagement that previous generations could 
access’ (p. 13).
Others have argued that the 2011 riots were distinguished primarily by loot-
ing and that consumer culture, and feverish conformity to consumerist values 
together with rising inequalities, go a long way towards explaining this dis-
turbance (Treadwell et al. 2013; Moxon 2011). Bauman (2011) described the 
riots as ‘a mutiny of defective and disqualified consumers’. However, Newburn 
et al. (2015) point out that looting is common in major contemporary urban 
violence and the elevation of consumer culture as a primary differentiating fac-
tor ignores the expressive, violent and political character of looting. They argue 
that looting ‘is not an undifferentiated set of activities but rather a set of social 
acts capable of harbouring multiple meanings, motivations and understandings’ 
(p. 992). Indeed, while some rioters were engaged in appropriating goods to 
engage in high-end individual consumerism, others were taking basic goods to 
make ends meet; some looting was organised, much was opportunistic. Looting 
can be viewed as a form of violence and one means of expressing discontent 
(Newburn et al. 2015).
The looting in 2011 was perhaps distinguished by its extent. And, whilst 
it is always a public action, looting was made more visible by the circula-
tion of mobile photograph and video footage, rolling news and CCTV 
everywhere (Newburn et al. 2015). The affective dimensions of looting (anxi-
ety, excitement, the thrill of seizing an opportunity) were also intensified in 
a highly mediatised environment. However, these elements, emotions and 
media technologies, and their part in the unfolding of the 2011 riots, includ-
ing the politically pertinent expression of anger and resentment, have been 
underexplored. Next, I consider how media and emotions have figured in 
interpretations of the riots.
Mainstream media response to the riots
As Britons ask themselves what changed in their country that might have 
caused these riots, one obvious answer stands out: technology.
(The Economist 2011)
Commentators (police, politicians, journalists) generally identified communi-
cations technologies as a cause of unrest. Mainstream media reporting focused 
on the scale, speed and intensity of the crowd as it amassed through online 
social networking (Baker 2011). Prime Minister David Cameron asked in the 
House of Commons whether people should be prevented from communicat-
ing via social media ‘when we know they are plotting violence, disorder and 
criminality’ (Cellan-Jones 2011). Facebook and BlackBerry Messenger (BBM) 
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services were the key means of communication, enabling rioters to connect 
and organise. At that time, BBM provided the cheapest social networking facil-
ity and was especially popular among those from economically deprived com-
munities across England, with a 37% share of the youth market (Guardian et al. 
2011). It was an extraordinarily efficient tool for sharing information on where 
the riots were, safe routes home and what police were doing (Guardian et al. 
2011). However – despite the attention paid to social media by government 
and the press – television and the dramatic nature of its coverage played a large 
part in mobilising rioters (Lewis et al. 2011).
A notable feature of mainstream media coverage of the riots was reference 
to emotion. That is, emotions were part of a process of reflecting on and shap-
ing a major series of events. Journalists used specific emotion words (disgust, 
anger, fear, shock, sadness) to describe the response of police, politicians and 
the public to the riots and other emotion words (anger, frustration, lack of 
hope, grievance) to describe the motivations of rioters. Tom Lawrence (2011) 
wrote in The Independent, ‘Anger and frustration at police drove summer riots’, 
whilst Andy Dangerfield (BBC News 2011) stated, ‘London riots: Teenagers 
“lack hope”’. Here, emotions signal some acknowledgement of social inequali-
ties in Britain and possible grounds for grievance. However, the emotions most 
discussed were those attributed to the public, politicians and the police. These 
were invariably strong emotions (anger, fear, disgust) and worked to define 
a clear boundary between the law-abiding and the lawless, the rational and 
the irrational, reasonable and unreasonable anger, thereby aligning a pro-social 
majority against an anti-social minority and invalidating the concerns of the 
latter. On Tuesday, 9 August, a number of newspaper headlines expressed 
alarm at the unpredictability and escalating force of gathering crowds, or, more 
specifically, ‘the mob: The rule of the mob’ (The Daily Telegraph); ‘Mob rule: 
police and politicians powerless as London burns for a third night and riots 
spread’ (The Independent); ‘The anarchy spreads’ (Daily Mail); ‘Out of control: 
riots reach crisis point’ (i). Here, ‘the mob’ is characterised by strong emotion 
(specifically, anger), which is seen as uncontrolled, destructive and contagious. 
Indeed, palpable concern about the crowd – its force, intensity and effects – 
suffused public debate about the riots.
Negative thinking about crowds has roots in the work of nineteenth-century 
psychologist Gustave Le Bon, who argued that individuals gathering in large 
groups begin to lose individuality and free will, becoming part of a single collec-
tive mind, guided not by reason, but by instinct (Le Bon [1895] 2007). According 
to Le Bon, the ‘psychological crowd’ is always intellectually inferior to the isolated 
individual, suggestible and impulsive (pp. 15–19); ideas and emotions can spread 
like disease in crowds with ‘a contagious power as intense as that of microbes’ 
(p. 80). Some social groups are seen as more susceptible to transmitted affects, 
and the irrationality of the crowd, than others: namely, those already regarded as 
socially inferior and weak, such as lower social classes, women, children, minority 
ethnic groups (Blackman & Walkerdine 2001).
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Despite its tenuous foundations, the idea of affective or emotional con-
tagion has endured over time in popular discourse on people in groups and 
collective action. And, in the 2011 riots, the ‘mob’ was widely assumed to 
be largely young, Black and male, despite Ministry of Justice statistics, which 
indicate that a more diverse population appeared in court on riot-related crimi-
nal charges.8 An understanding of the crowd, or mob, as driven by emotion 
and necessarily irrational worked to subordinate already marginalised subjects 
and de-legitimise grievance. Digital media were considered responsible for the 
speed, intensity and violence of the crowd. And so, overall, mainstream media 
coverage tended to attribute the causes of rioting to a mix of emotion, digital 
technologies and (pre-existing) social identity.
A politics of resentment
Journalists from the Guardian newspaper and researchers from the London School 
of Economics (LSE) conducted 270 in-depth qualitative interviews in order to 
explore the riots from participants’ perspectives (Lewis et al. 2011).9 Their sam-
ple was mixed in terms of ‘self-identified ethnicity’ and included women and 
girls and those aged 13–57, although it was predominantly male and young.10
Interviewees cited poverty and policing as the two most important causes of 
the riots, with 86% and 85% of respondents respectively saying the causes were 
important or very important.11 They spoke in detail about their everyday lived 
experience of marginalisation and sense of resentment. Interview participants 
articulated resentment towards the police, but also towards large corporations 
and the government. They resented the way police treated them: more spe-
cifically, through the everyday practices of ‘stop and search’, mainly targeted 
at Black young men, and frequent insults giving rise to feelings of harassment, 
disrespect and humiliation. Participants resented big business and advertising 
corporations and media generally, for fuelling a consumerist culture from which 
the jobless felt excluded. Some, particularly young looters, spoke of the pres-
sure and ‘hunger’ for the ‘right’ goods and brands names and said that the riots 
enabled them to exercise a kind of ‘freedom’ by acquiring such things for them-
selves (Guardian et al. 2011, pp. 46–7). Participants resented the government 
and its austerity policies, which had led to benefits cuts and unemployment. 
Of respondents who were of working age and not in education at the time of 
the riots, a little over half were unemployed. For many, the central issue was 
not having a job or any prospect of a job (Guardian et al. 2011). They resented 
the disparity between the jobless and bankers receiving huge bonuses. Younger 
interviewees specifically mentioned the removal of the Education Maintenance 
Allowance (EMA), increased university fees and the lack of job opportunities.
Researchers write that the rioters felt ‘dislocated from the opportunities 
they saw were available to others’ and felt that they had little stake in the 
social order. Asked if they felt ‘part of British society’, only 51% of those inter-
viewed said that they did, compared with 92% of the population12 as a whole 
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(Guardian et al. 2011, p. 75). Interviewees talked about being invisible, their 
voices not being heard and no one caring ‘because you are poor’ (Guardian 
et al. 2011, pp. 76–7). Some felt despised for their poverty.
People look at us and once they take one look at us we can’t afford clothes 
to look good for [a job] interview and once they take a look at how we’re 
dressed and that they just automatically look down on us and it’s annoying. 
People hate it. That’s where a lot of the hate comes from.
(Guardian et al. 2011, pp. 77–8)
The authors of Reading the riots suggest that an outpouring of anti-police and 
anti-authority attitudes was for some a five-day catharsis. Many spoke of feeling 
empowered, liberated and euphoric. Repeatedly, they said confrontations with 
the police made them feel ‘powerful’ (Guardian et al. 2011, p. 91). Such statements 
further underlined rioters’ everyday feelings of powerlessness and hopelessness, 
which rioting, and specifically looting, temporarily reversed. Seventeen-year-old 
Denise said, ‘People were just passing fags from the counters’ and ‘You know 
what? For once it felt like you had so much power’ (Guardian et al. 2011, p. 21). 
Others described a sense of disbelief at the inability of police to stop them. A 
16-year-old said: ‘People were smiling. It was just everyone was smiling. It was 
literally a festival with no food, no dancing, no music but a free shopping trip for 
everyone’ (Guardian et al. 2011, pp. 51–2). Others described a happy atmosphere 
or vibe, with laughing and giggling (Guardian et al. 2011, p. 52).
Such accounts convey clearly joy, excitement and exhilaration at what riot-
ers could do – transgress and feel unstoppable – and show how the disturbance 
gathered and sustained momentum through emotion. Systematic and oppor-
tunistic looting are presented as a way of acting back (materially, symbolically) 
against lack of (economic, social, educational) opportunity, as looters seized 
what other people had (high-end goods, everyday basics) and with them a sense 
of self-worth and power. Participants describe feeling empowered through the 
process of violent consumerism.
Digital media played a vital part in sharing information on how to get to 
specific locations, safe routes home and police activity. They were used to dis-
play goods taken, and intensified the symbolic importance of collective action; 
the circulation of images of police cars ablaze and police unable to contain 
rioting were affectively potent and emblematic of standing up to authority and 
large corporations. The display of goods seized invoked (previously unarticu-
lated) feelings of resentment at systemic unfairness and signalled (temporary) 
affective empowerment through taking decisive action.
However, this is not to imply that all participants in the riots felt the same 
way or that their feelings were unambiguous and static. Indeed, some rioters 
wanted to march to Downing Street to protest at austerity measures and sought 
to distance themselves from looting; others resented materialism but stole high-
end goods. Some of those interviewed reflected on their actions with pride, 
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others with regret and shame. Nevertheless, their articulation of feeling can 
be seen as politically potent and a critical comment on lived experience at 
the margins of late modern society, characterised by increased individualisa-
tion, responsibility for self, insecurity (focused around lack of opportunity for 
education and employment and social protection) and reflexivity mediated by 
consumption and technology.
Digital society and mediated emotion
Late modernity is digital society; digitally networked communication tools and 
platforms have become thoroughly entangled in everyday activities, interac-
tions and relationships. Digital media have transformed social and emotional 
life, partly by expanding and intensifying the processes of reflexivity.
Following media theorists (such as McLuhan, Poster, Castells), any medium 
can be understood as a symbolic structure or social environment that shapes 
human interaction and the production of culture (Lindgren 2017). The Internet 
and social media, characterised by increased connectivity and interactivity, 
afford more extensive and frequent opportunities for social interaction, includ-
ing sharing, performing and displaying emotion (Lindgren 2017). Yet, digital 
technologies are distinguished not by enabling something completely new but 
rather by the proliferation, speed and intensity they afford communication. 
And, as with other media, the possibilities afforded by the Internet are shaped 
by the relational and contextual aspects of social interaction and the cultural 
political context in which its tools and platforms are used (Lindgren 2017).
Manuel Castells (2012) discusses the role of digital communications and 
emotion in the emergence of new social movements. He argues that, whilst 
their roots lie in various manifestations of injustice and their structural causes, 
contemporary social movements (from the Arab Spring to Occupy Wall 
Street) start with the emotions of individuals angered or outraged by specific 
(unbearable) events: financial crisis, food crisis, poverty, rampant inequali-
ties, undemocratic polity and so on. Emotions are transformed into collective 
action as individuals reflect, connect and share feelings with others via an effec-
tive channel of communication. Digital communication provides distinctive 
opportunities for forging a sense of togetherness and mobilising collective 
action. Indeed, ‘[t]he faster and more interactive the process of communica-
tion is, the more likely the formation of a process of collective action becomes’ 
(Castells 2012, p. 15).13 So, Castells argues, the origins of social movements are 
found in the emotions of individuals and in their networking on the basis of 
cognitive empathy. They develop in a hybrid social space consisting of social 
media, mainstream media, people’s pre-existing social networks and the occu-
pation of urban space (Castells 2012, pp. 10, 59). Yet, Castells insists that social 
media – or any technology – do not determine social movements but are more 
than mere tools (Castells 2012, p. 229). Rather, communications technologies 
are part of the materialisation of cultural practices (including emotions).
216 Jennifer Harding
Stephanie Baker (2011) examines the role of digital media and emotion 
in the 2011 riots. She argues that despite parallels with the social conditions 
(government cuts, poverty, discrimination) in which riots took place in the 
past,14 the 2011 riots are distinguished by the emergence of the ‘mediated 
crowd’. The mediated crowd is formed through affective reflexive commu-
nication in the virtual public sphere in a context where, Baker argues, digital 
media technologies have helped to intensify the reflexive processes pervading 
modern social life (as theorised by Beck, Giddens, Lash and others).
Baker states that the police shooting of Mark Duggan provided a focus 
for collective reflexive consciousness and action in Tottenham, and further 
unrest across the country. Individuals felt empowered to act together when 
they recognised that they shared feelings in common with others (Baker 2011). 
Affective reflexivity communicated via social media became a major factor in 
mobilising the mediated crowd and creating new forms of collectivity (Baker 
2011). Baker makes the point that, whilst crowds may appear homogene-
ous and monolithic entities acting in unison, individuals decide to engage in 
collective action and this decision making reflects the agent’s judgement and 
‘disposition to act’.
In attempting to specify the role of emotion in the riots, Baker draws on 
social psychologist Joseph de Rivera’s concepts emotional atmosphere (a transi-
tory mood) and emotional climate (a longer-term environment).15 She suggests 
that the initial unrest in Tottenham in 2011 reflects an emotional atmosphere 
of anger and resentment towards the police following the shooting of Mark 
Duggan. The subsequent riots, and their escalation, indicate an emotional 
climate consisting of ‘deeper structural conditions of political and social inequal-
ity’, together with related feelings of anger and resentment, which facilitated 
disturbance (Baker 2011, p. 3). Emotional climate, Baker points out, refers to 
a common structural environment that influences how individual and collec-
tives experience the social world but does not predetermine action or infer that 
participants experience the same emotions or operate as a homogeneous group 
(Baker 2011). This analysis is helpful in showing how emotions might be con-
sidered collective phenomena. However, it treats environments and subjects 
as external to one another and fails to specify their relationship. Anger and 
resentment feature as both atmosphere and climate, and are undifferentiated in 
terms of their qualities, intensities and effects. Perhaps, as I argue below, anger 
and resentment are better viewed as qualitatively and quantitatively different, 
and subjects and environments as not only interactive but also co-constitutive. 
Also, resentment might be seen as a complex emotion, differently experienced 
in relation to the police and government (clear-cut) and consumer culture and 
large corporations (ambivalent).
Both Baker and Castells view emotion as an individual response to par-
ticular (socio-economic-political) stimuli, which may then lead the subject to 
think and act differently. From this perspective, emotions are viewed as largely 
cognitively controlled and located in individual bodies and biographies, even 
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though they are recognised and develop in social interaction. Both authors 
emphasise individual reflexivity, judgement and choice, and imply a linear 
connection between emotion and (collective) action, facilitated by communi-
cations technologies. This approach successfully rejects a notion of emotional 
contagion (implying involuntary, irrational processes), in accounting for col-
lective emotion and action. However, it tends to present an understanding 
of the individual as overly rational and atomised, embodying an accentuated, 
albeit networked, individualism.16 And, a focus on subject positions and ori-
gins fails to capture theoretically the complex dynamics of movement and 
the process of affective empowerment. Additionally, more work is needed to 
understand how feelings, technologies, subjects and (social, emotional) envi-
ronments combined in the 2011 riots. Here, I suggest, it is worth considering 
the analytical power of affect and assemblage.
Affect and assemblage
Affect theory presents a way of thinking beyond overly rational and goal-
oriented understandings of human action and viewing experiences as 
connected with process rather than position, movement rather than stasis, 
as collective and external, rather than individual and internal (Seigworth & 
Gregg 2010, p. 7).
Cultural theorists have used the term affect to refer to sensible experi-
ence beyond signification (Grossberg 1992; Massumi 2002). Affect is seen as 
‘unstructured and unformed’ (Massumi 2002, p. 260). It does not require a 
subject and, indeed, precedes the individual. Emotion, on the other hand, is 
viewed as inevitably personal: experience recognised, organised and expressed. 
That is, emotion functions in the realms of meaning and ideology through ‘the 
sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point 
onward defined as personal’ (Massumi 2002, p. 28).17
Deleuze, drawing on Spinoza, understands affect as a body’s capacity to 
affect and be affected (Deleuze 1988).18 For Deleuze, affect is ‘transitive’; it 
refers to the change or variation that results when bodies (human, non-human, 
organic, inorganic, conceptual, social) come into contact and is ‘experienced 
in a lived duration that involves the difference between two states’ (Deleuze 
1988, p. 49). That is, affect is the force or intensity of an encounter, involving 
process, change and possibility.
Understanding the riots through the above-mentioned elements of affect 
theory foregrounds intensities in encounters between bodies (human and non-
human) on urban streets. It directs attention to inarticulate sensible experience, a 
developing atmosphere, temporary affective alignments, possibility, transforma-
tion and movement. It enables us to see how inarticulate feelings of resentment 
(quantity) may become recognised and expressed (qualified) as anger, and so have 
impact. By focusing on in-between-ness as people and messages encounter one 
another, affect offers a way of thinking how the riots took place. This avoids the 
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issue of identifying a single causal agent (particular individuals or technologies) 
and problematising the susceptibility of certain social groups. It presumes rela-
tionality, and sidesteps a bifurcation of the individual and the social.
However, Grossberg cautions that affect – used to refer to all non-semantic 
effects – may cover ‘too much ground’ (Grossberg 2010, p. 314). Work on 
affect often assumes its immediate effectivity whereas affect, in order to pro-
duce specific effects, needs to ‘go through’ regimes and discourses that organise 
the body and everyday life (Grossberg 2010, p. 316), recreating the unequal 
(economic, social, educational, political) relations of a particular historical 
conjuncture.
The place of digital media in the relationality of the particular historical 
conjuncture in which rioting occurred can be examined using the concept 
‘assemblage’. Assemblage captures the interaction of human and non-human 
elements, seeking to avoid determinisms (technological or social) and viewing 
technologies and humans as external to one another (Deleuze & Guattari 1987; 
Macgregor Wise 2005, p. 81). Deleuze and Guattari use assemblage to refer to 
a ‘constellation of singularities and traits’ (1987, p. 406). These can be diverse 
entities such as people, technologies, things, social institutions, concepts, ideas, 
words, images, emotions and so on. Assemblage includes specific entities and 
also qualities, affects and effects, directing attention to not only what an assem-
blage is but also what it does (Macgregor Wise 2005), and so to movement and 
change. Assemblages create territories and stake a claim; they are not fixed but 
are constantly being made and unmade (Macgregor Wise 2005). Assemblage 
provides a way of thinking about how feelings, technologies and ideas were 
entangled in particular ways to make a protesting assemblage that became a 
series of looting assemblages through the encounters of numerous bodies.
An initial protesting assemblage comprised: a gathering of people on a street 
(protesters, commentators, spectators), symbols of authority (police personnel, 
buildings and cars), the practice of protesting, ideas of (in)justice, emotions 
(expressions of grief by family and friends and solidarity by supporters), affects 
(a sense of grievance) and various communications (between those physically 
co-present and virtually present others). This assemblage claimed a new terri-
tory: the right to protest at perceived injustice and seek answers to questions 
about what happened and why.
The protesting assemblage was gradually dismantled as family and close 
friends left and remade as others arrived. A new assemblage formed consist-
ing of some of the original protestors, incomers, affects (a sense of unfairness, 
resentment, excitement, togetherness), emotions (anger, solidarity, pride), 
buildings and the circulation of images of acts of lawlessness (in particular the 
destruction of property and looting) via social media and broadcast televi-
sion, and social institutions (criminal justice system, government, media). This 
assemblage claimed a new territory: the possibility of affective empowerment 
through taking revenge against authorities (police, government, large corpora-
tions) over social inequalities.
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These assemblages created affective alignments and made things happen 
because of the way in which different entities were ‘brought together in par-
ticular relations’ (Macgregor Wise 2005, p. 78). The influence of digital media 
technologies cannot be separated from their interactions with other elements 
in the assemblage.
Conclusion
The 2011 UK riots signalled a public articulation of feeling that deserves to be 
understood in part as political. Participants identified policing and poverty as the 
main causes of the riots. They reported feeling insecure and excluded from the 
social order. Public discussion (led by police, politicians and journalists) focused 
mainly on the capacity of digital media technologies to accelerate, multiply and 
intensify the communication of negative emotions fuelling the violence of the 
crowd. This interpretation presented technology as determining social action, 
emotion as contagious and certain social groups as undiscerning and irrational, 
thereby de-legitimising a sense of grievance and obscuring its structural and polit-
ical roots. Subordinate groups were further subjugated and unvoiced through 
this discourse. Sociologists analysing the role of digital communication technolo-
gies and emotion in social movements (Castells) and the UK riots (Baker) have 
tended to understand individuals as overly rational, focusing on cognitively con-
trolled emotions, and technologies and subjects as external to each other.
In contrast, I have argued that certain analytical tools – affect and assemblage – 
are especially useful in exploring a sense of movement and the entanglement of 
emotion and technology in the riots and sidestepping the bifurcation of subjects 
and technologies, subject and environments. I have argued for an analytical 
focus on process and movement, rather than position, in order to grasp some 
of the complexity of the riots and the possibilities they offered for transitory 
affective empowerment.
Notes
 1 See, for example, Prime Minister David Cameron’s statement on violence in 
England on 10 August 2010; and Home Secretary Theresa May’s speech in the 
House of Commons on 11 August 2011, specifically focusing on criminality and 
gang culture.
 2 A 29-year-old British man shot and killed by police in Tottenham, North London, 
England, on 4 August 2011. At the time, the Metropolitan Police stated that officers 
were attempting to arrest him on suspicion of planning an attack, and that he was in 
possession of a handgun.
 3 There were fewer than 100 people at the original gathering (Lewis at al. 2011).
 4 See the final report of the Riots, Communities and Victims Panel (2012).
 5 Statistics produced by the UK Ministry of Justice (2012) show that: 5,175 offences 
were recorded by the police; 4,000 people were arrested by early September; and 
3,103 had appeared before courts by 10 August 2012.
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 6 For example, in Brixton (London), Handsworth (Birmingham), Moss Side 
(Manchester) and Toxteth (Liverpool).
 7 Specifically, the numbers arrested and prosecuted (aided by all-night court sittings), 
the scale of sentencing imposed, the use of CCTV and the extensive resources put 
into locating and arresting perpetrators (Newburn 2015, pp. 59–60).
 8 According to Ministry of Justice statistics, 37% of those appearing in court on 
riot-related charges were White, 40% were Black and 6% Asian. There was some 
geographical variation, with 37% White in London and 79% White in Merseyside 
(Lewis et al. 2011, p. 3).
 9 The 270 participants were from London, Birmingham, Manchester, Salford, 
Nottingham and Liverpool.
 10 79% of those interviewed were under 24 years old and 21% were women and girls 
(Lewis et  al. 2011). ‘In terms of self-identified ethnicity, 26% of the sample were 
white, 47% black, 5% Asian, and 17% “mixed/other”’ (Lewis et al. 2011, p. 3).
 11 Participants were asked to say which of a list of causes of the riots they regarded 
as most significant and these same factors were also put to 1,001 adults across the 
UK by ICM, the Guardian pollsters. Participants in the ICM survey cited poor 
parenting (86%) and criminality (86%) as leading causes of the riots (Lewis et al. 
2011, p. 11).
 12 According to an ICM survey of 1,001 adults across the UK (Lewis et al. 2011, p. 11).
 13 Castells’ consideration of the significance of emotion and digital communications 
in propelling new social movements draws on a theory of affective intelligence, his 
‘network theory of power’ (2011) and his conceptualisation of ‘mass-self commu-
nication’ (2009).
 14 During the 1980s and early 2000s (for example, in Brixton in 1981 and in Brixton 
and Birmingham in 1985; in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in 2001).
 15 de Rivera defines ‘emotional climate’ as an objective measurable environment, 
relating to underlying social structures, social relations and the exercise of political 
control (de Rivera 1992, pp. 2–3, 7).
 16 Rainie and Wellman (2012) outline the concept ‘networked individualism’ as feature 
of late modernity. Here, networks replace more traditional social groups and com-
munities and each individual resides at the centre of his/her own set of networks in 
a social world marked by increased individualism (Lindgren 2017, p. 101).
 17 According to Massumi (2002), affect can be qualified and potentially transformed 
into emotion.
 18 Deleuze distinguishes between Spinoza’s conceptualisation of affectio (‘the state of 
the affected body’, which ‘implies the presence of the affecting body’) and affectus 
(‘the passage from one state to another’) (Deleuze 1988, p. 49).
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In Chapter 1 of this collection, Patulny and Olson describe late modernity 
as, on the one hand, ‘increasingly individualised and reflexive’ (p. xx; italics 
in original). Such growing atomisation and self-managed introspection also 
alters emotions, which ‘are more individualistic in late modernity’ (p. ??; italics 
in original). On the other hand, late modern identities are increasingly filtered 
through media, which have ‘replaced the traditional institutions directing our 
emotions’, so that ‘emotions are now mediated through mass media’ (pp. ??, ??; italics 
in original). I suggest that an inherent tension exists between these two broad 
paths – individualisation and mediation – used to characterise late modernity.
Rather than individualistic, by definition mass media imply collective, shared 
cultural sites, experienced as important social spaces by late modern subjects. 
Many media scholars have described the spread of mass media as a defining 
feature of modernity, beginning first with newspapers and, subsequently, film. 
Miriam Hansen has argued that cinema epitomises ‘a specifically modern type of 
public sphere’, born of the mechanisms of modernity and emerging along with 
modernism (Hansen 2000, p. 342). Cinema’s qualities of mass production and 
consumption reflected modernity’s new technological and industrial processes fab-
ricating reproducible commodities – movies – in which numerous publics could 
partake, regardless of how dispersed or diverse such populaces were. Arguably, its 
own mass-based conditions of emergence rendered early cinema, and Hollywood 
in particular, well situated to express the preoccupations and experiences of modern 
times. Developing generic forms such as slapstick comedy and action-adventure, 
the movies quickly became adept at entertaining the sensibilities of twentieth-
century modernity, approximating both its democratic processes of ‘abundance’ as 
well as its crises and dislocations (Hansen 2000, p. 341).
Contentions about the centrality of mass media for modernity include the 
notion that, in the face of declining historical sources of community, media 
came to play an increasingly complex and significant role in the shaping of 
sociocultural existence. In the late modern era of intensifying global mass 
information and communications, film, television and computerised media 
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continue as pivotal sites for collective experience and public exchange. 
Certainly, changing mass media technologies demand careful analyses of their 
particular functions and outcomes, each new form altering individual and 
social life in divergent ways. However, ever-changing technologies should not 
cause us to overlook mass media’s broad public function as sites for negotiating 
shared cultural values or exploring contemporaneous social realities.
Although current audiences may be more fragmented than in previous decades, 
mass media continues to rely on substantial numbers of co-existing consumers, 
even as niche marketing and narrowcasting have emerged to address the diver-
sity of late modern subjects. Further, beyond shared consumption, all mass media 
require collective socio-cultural and aesthetic competencies in order for viewers, 
readers or listeners to understand and appreciate mediated programming.
This chapter considers narrative media as ‘a public space of social imaginings 
within a culturally conditioned aesthetic framework’ (Gledhill 2000, p. 232). 
Mediated stories serve as public sites through which we attempt to recognise, 
make sense of, reject or revise our contemporary social circumstances and identi-
ties. Narrative media express social relations aesthetically, by means of historically 
and culturally developed techniques that, to varying degrees of success, perform 
everything from the vast to the most intricate aspects of contemporaneous lived 
experience. One of the functions of fictional media, partly accounting for why we 
turn to it with such avidity, rests in its ability to bring into recognition aspects of 
lived existence that would otherwise remain unmarked or inexpressible. Prominent 
among the most resistant to articulation, emotions constitute a range of experience 
rendered expressible by narrative media, as ‘a public space of social imaginings’.
Indeed, nowhere is late modern theory’s contradiction between self-
reflexive individualisation and collective mediated experience more evident 
than in the arena of emotionality. The view of late modernity as domi-
nated by individually managed emotions attributes a curiously large degree 
of autonomy to the otherwise extensive commodification of late modern 
citizenry. The danger in tying emotions too narrowly with atomised self-
reflexivity is that we reinforce emotionality as private and personal, instead 
of exploring its manifestations as social and public practices. In contrast, how 
emotionality functions in mediated forms offers entry points for exploring 
emotions as broadly felt sociocultural events. Especially in popular cultural 
modes, narrative media comprise spaces where emotions are exercised in 
shared configurations via specific aesthetic processes.
Borrowing from contemporary affect theory, I outline emotions as felt 
experiences thoroughly entangled with the socio-cultural. However, I argue 
that a productive conceptualisation of emotionality within socio-cultural terms 
has been largely overlooked in contemporary affective and cognitive theories, 
which tend to pursue individually harboured versions of emotions, whether 
embodied or in mind. In subsequent sections, I trace ways emotions are acti-
vated aesthetically in films, in order to express collectively recognisable feelings 
towards depicted social circumstances.1 This is not to argue that audiences 
Storied feelings 225
respond emotionally to represented events in uniform ways; that would no 
more occur in mediated conditions than in ‘real’ life. But mediated emotional 
experiences afford opportunities to recognise the ways we might, ought or fail 
to feel towards aspects of social worlds we share in common.
Sociocultural emotionality
One of the motivations for the turn to affect theory has been to counter the con-
ceptualisations provided by linguistic, psychoanalytical and ideological theories 
in past decades. Affect theory serves to refocus attention on the material body – in 
particular on its visceral, autonomic, non-cognitive functions. Concentrating on 
embodied aspects of existence avoids post-structuralist conclusions that human 
activity can be reduced to language, discourse and signification.
For example, in Brian Massumi’s influential account, affect is equated with 
intensity and vitality in ways that are ‘irreducibly bodily and autonomic’ in 
nature, manifesting primarily in the skin, ‘at the surface of the body, at its 
interface with things’ (Massumi 2002, pp. 28, 25). Affect is a non-conscious 
state that registers the intensity of experience – its strength and duration – for 
a being that is not yet a subject.2 Similarly, Deborah Gould considers affect as 
a ‘noncognitive, nonconscious, nonlinguistic, and nonrational’ state that mani-
fests as ‘unnamed, but nevertheless registered, experiences of bodily energy and 
intensity’ (Gould 2010, pp. 25–6).
Massumi identifies emotions, in contrast, as the quality or content of an 
experience achieved by passing through semantic or semiotic processes, which 
include language, ideology, narrativity and other forms of signification (ibid., 
pp. 26–7). In this view, emotions occur in the realm of meaning production 
through the ‘sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an experience’ (ibid., p. 28). 
The problem with signification for Massumi is that it freezes pre-subjective fluid 
processes into fixed, socially determinate positions. For her part, Gould argues 
that emotions are constituted when affective bodily intensities become trans-
formed, through cultural mediation, into ‘conventionally known and fixed’ 
phenomena (ibid., p. 27). The result is that emotion ‘squeezes’ affect ‘into the 
realm of cultural meanings and normativity’ (ibid.). Thus, the new materiality 
remains ‘relatively autonomous from the sociocultural’ (ibid., p. 31).
Rather than a drawback, I argue much value exists in affect theory’s concep-
tualisation of emotionality as socio-culturally informed experience. The potential 
in affect theory’s rendering of emotionality can be located, precisely, in emotions’ 
presence in the ‘realm of cultural meanings’. Relationality with the socio-cultural 
evades historical limitations in which emotions are connected too exclusively 
with either the mind as cognition or the sensating body. Affect theory’s schema 
of emotionality, although intended as critique, works towards circumventing 
radically biological, psychological or individualistic accounts of emotionality.
As noted, Massumi identifies narrative as a dominant system of significa-
tion. And indeed, emotions are pivotal to most forms of popular storytelling 
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(Williams 2009; Pribram 2018). Compensating for the limitations of rational, 
articulable explanation remains a reason we occupy narrative worlds, with 
their emotionally resonant images, sounds, characters and stories. Although not 
taken up to the degree merited, film and television exist as productive sites for 
detailed analyses of emotions as socio-cultural phenomena. Popular culture’s 
complex narratives rely on intricate emotional appeals in order to create their 
impacts and meanings, enabling people to recognise aspects of what they feel 
and, therefore, who they are. Conversely, popular narratives may be used to 
constrain or refuse various ways of feeling. One purpose of popular narrative is 
to move us by providing, through felt recognition, access to the quality, content 
or force of an experience assessed as ‘emotional’.
In defence of narrativity
One of the examples Massumi turns to, in order to differentiate affect from 
emotion, is narrative film. He proposes that the affective surplus of images can 
be located by bracketing out all narrative elements, because affect ‘resonates 
to the exact degree to which it is in excess of any narration or functional line’ 
(p. 26). While the content that serves a film’s narrative purposes relies on emotion, 
pure intensity manifests in images that exist tangentially to storytelling demands. 
In contrast, emotion occurs among people, learned from social practices via cul-
tural content: ‘indexing to conventional meanings in an inter-subjective context’ 
(ibid., p. 24). Narrative operations rely on emotional effects because they activate 
‘conventional meanings’ received from social others (‘inter-subjective context’). 
Similarly, Patricia Pisters identifies affect in film as that which has ‘no narrative or 
logical function’ (Pisters 2003, p. 75). Once narrative functions are circumvented, 
we encounter what remains as ‘pure affect’ (ibid.).
However, affect theory underestimates the complexity of mediated narrative 
processes, first, because it is based on a reductive conceptualisation associated pri-
marily with plot and, second, because it assumes that aesthetic elements (image, 
sound) can be detached from narrative factors with near-surgical precision. To 
the degree affect is identified prior to the exhaustion of narrative functions, the 
mediated feeling experience constitutes emotion, not affect. At stake is much 
more than a semantic distinction. If we accept the proposition that emotions 
are feeling experiences activated in cultural realms, then narrativity moves us by 
accessing felt recognition to the qualities of our social experiences. Exploration of 
emotions in mediated narrativity reveals the profound traces of inter-subjective 
(social, historical) contexts. However, I dispute that mediated emotions are as 
invariably conventional, fixed or normative as affect theory proposes.
Mediated pleasure
In the category of narrative function, Massumi includes elements such as 
sequencing, continuity, linear causality and temporality, action and reaction 
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(pp. 26–8). While most narrative film and television encompass these ele-
ments, their deployment is neither fixed nor prescribed. For example, forms 
of temporality and sequencing are likely to be present; but they need not, and 
in many instances do not, take shape in linear fashion. Further, the elements 
Massumi singles out are, for the most part, linked to plot. Although emplot-
ment (actions, events) may be the first property that comes to many minds 
when thinking about mediated stories, narrativity encompasses considerably 
more attributes, including characters, structure (the mode in which the story is 
told), geography (setting and spatial mobility), themes, genres and tone.
Massumi turns to a 28-minute narrative film that aired on German television 
in the 1970s, which he summarises as follows (p. 23):
A man builds a snowman on his roof garden. It starts to melt in the after-
noon sun. He watches. After a time, he takes the snowman to the cool 
of the mountains where it stops melting. He bids it good-bye and leaves.
Massumi finds the film interesting because, at the time it aired, the snowman 
story frightened a number of young viewers, prompting a group of researchers 
to study children’s emotional responses to it (Sturm & Grewe-Partsch 1987). 
The researchers evaluated nine-year-olds’ physiological and verbal responses 
to the film, determining, amongst other results, that the young respondents 
found the saddest scenes to be the most pleasant (ibid., pp. 32–3). Massumi 
points to a disjuncture here; on the one hand, sadness as emotional response 
to the narrative; on the other hand, pleasure as autonomic, visceral reaction to 
the intensity of the experience. Because sadness can be regarded as paradoxical 
to pleasure, Massumi believes he has located an instance in which an affec-
tive surplus, in the form of pleasure, can be distinguished from the emotional 
effects of the narrative (sadness, fear).
Leys (2011) offers a detailed critique of Massumi’s interpretation of the 
scientific results of Sturm and Grewe-Partsch’s study. Here, I focus on the 
implications from a media studies perspective. At the outset, cinematic 
emotion and affect need to be differentiated from their social counterparts. 
Media do not identically replicate our lived felt experiences, nor is that their 
cultural usefulness. For audiences who seek out cinematic varieties of felt 
experience, a greater number of emotions register as being more pleasurable 
than in many socially experienced situations (fear and horror films, anxiety 
from suspense thrillers, sadness with the dramatic romance). One of the 
pleasures found at the movies is to be emotionally moved by experiences 
that would register as unenjoyable if encountered in our lived circum-
stances. Instead of a paradox, pleasant sadness can be understood as part 
and parcel of the snowman film’s narrative operations. Dramatic structure 
guides emotional shifts. If fright is instigated by the snowman’s threatened 
demise – melting – fear is alleviated through rescue by human benefac-
tor. Subsequently, sadness is evoked when its human protector must leave 
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the snowman behind because the two survive in different environments. 
Dramatic adversity is resolved, in that the snowman’s demise ceases, but at 
the narrative cost of separation from its human companion.
The evocation of sadness depends on cultural inflections that infuse the narra-
tive dilemma. Emotional impact relies upon viewers’ culturally constituted ability 
to endow the snowman with an anthropomorphised identity and then link ‘his’ 
melting to death. Viewers of all ages also engage with the inevitability of separa-
tion between snowman and human protector; the characters have no option but 
to remain in the environments in which the film has established each belongs. The 
narrative dilemma draws viewers into a negotiation, exchanging the snowman’s 
continued survival for estrangement. Pleasurable sadness, in storied terms, results 
when the pain of emotional loss at separation from a loved being co-mingles with 
the satisfaction that one’s sacrifice ensures the survival of that which is beloved.
The snowman narrative illustrates that mediated feelings may register as 
pleasurable even when arising out of what is emotionally painful or conflictual. 
Instead of pointing to ‘the primacy of the affective in image reception’ (Massumi 
2002, p. 24; italics in original), the snowman film challenges the notion that 
mediated pleasure can be extracted from its narrative contents or cultural con-
texts. Mediated emotions rely on communal comprehension of storytelling 
operations and felt commonalities created by social locatedness; in this instance, 
anthropomorphism, symbolism, weather phenomena and ecological knowl-
edge among nine-year-olds.
Sound
Certain affect theory presupposes the divisibility of aesthetic elements from 
storytelling activities. Aesthetic elements reference modes of expression, which 
for film and television include the work of the camera, sound, editing and mise-
en-scène. The supposition that modes of expression can be treated in isolation 
from substantive matter has a long history for various artistic practices, fre-
quently formulated as a polarised ‘form’ versus ‘content’ relationship. In media 
studies, such debates sometimes take shape as an aesthetics-contra-narrative 
opposition, in which particular historical moments have tended to prioritise 
one over the other. However, the introduction of ‘culture’ into the theoretical 
mix complicates matters.
For affect theory, narrativity (including its emotional effects) exists in the 
realm of signification and, thereby, is compromised by normativity and sta-
sis. In contrast, specific aesthetic elements are conjectured to have affective 
impact by functioning in a direct manner upon the embodied recipient. Thus, 
mediated affect, surfacing as bodily intensities, remains unfiltered by narrative 
operations. For its part, cultural theory argues the indivisibility of content 
and form because both are products of – and as such, suffused with – cultural 
implications. To ‘divorce meaning from form’ suggests that cultural processes 
do not shape aesthetics, which is to imagine them as somehow intrinsic and 
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timeless (Bhaskar 1999, p. 399). Citing Bakhtin, Ira Bhaskar argues that the 
‘powerful deep currents of culture’ are given palpable materiality through 
aesthetics (p. 401). Narrativity can only take shape by means of aesthetic treat-
ment, calling into question any notion that style functions independently, 
because aesthetics carries with it the cultural values of its times. Cultural the-
ory, then, insists on the indissolubility of aesthetics and narrativity, while affect 
theory searches for aesthetic escape routes from narrative conventionalities.
In his discussion of the snowman film, Massumi describes it as ‘[j]ust images, 
no words, very simple’ (p. 23). However, the researchers who conducted the 
original study indicate that it was ‘produced with sound but without words’, 
although they do not specify if the accompanying audio consisted of music, 
ambient sound or a combination (Sturm & Grewe-Partsch 1987, p. 30). 
Although the film involves no dialogue or voiceover, it cannot consequently 
be described as constituted solely by imagery. Linguistic elements such as dia-
logue do not mark the limits of audio-visual narrativity, which encompasses 
non-articulated meanings that take form through the auditory, as well as visual, 
aesthetics of media – for instance, in the widespread use of musical scores. 
As Laura Marks notes, it is within ‘the power of nonverbal sound to have 
meaning in ways that cannot be reduced to simple signification’ (Marks 2000, 
p. xv). That nonverbal audio possesses the capacity to create meaning beyond 
‘simple signification’ suggests emotions evoked by music or ambient sound 
bring into being feelings that are not necessarily conventionally known nor 
fixed. Simultaneously, when meanings are elicited we find ourselves located 
not solely in relation to affect, but experiencing emotion in the meaning-
generating realm of culture. We turn to aesthetic forms because they comprise 
modes of expression for that which, otherwise, would go unrecognised or 
remain inexpressible, including large swaths of emotional experience and rela-
tions. One of the purposes of stories is to locate other means of conveying that 
which exists outside articulation and, as such, eludes named familiarity but, 
nonetheless, bears meaning, value and import.
To illustrate how audio conveys the inexpressibly emotional, I focus on an 
example of ambient sound from Saving Private Ryan (1998). Its director, Steven 
Spielberg, emblematises, and is partly responsible for, the most conventional 
forms of contemporary Hollywood cinema. Even so, his films display moments 
that exceed conventionality, opening us up to felt recognition of that for which 
we lack a name. Further, the film’s early, graphic, 24-minute battle sequence is 
explicitly set in a very specific narrative and historical context: the Normandy 
invasion of Omaha Beach on 6 June 1944. At the same time, the prolonged land-
ing sequence is clearly intended to have visceral, sensate impact, with both audio 
and visual elements designed to overwhelm the recipient with feelings of horror.
Accompanied by some dialogue but no musical soundtrack till near its end, 
sound effects predominantly drive the landing sequence audio. The noise is cha-
otic, immersive, unrelenting; endless machine gun fire punctuated by the screams 
or moans of pain and death, as bullets repeatedly hit their targets. Ships arrive 
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under a barrage of shots; soldiers jump overboard hoping to make it ashore alive. 
In the midst of this, a 28-second underwater sequence takes place, in which the 
noises of war give way to the monotonous hum of submerged hearing, muffling 
to almost inaudible the sounds of carnage. Underwater, soldiers jettison their 
rifles and helmets, struggling to get free of equipment now weighting them from 
resurfacing. The 28-second underwater sequence is followed by quick camera 
moves in which, three times, we briefly resurface, only to go under again. Each 
time the camera rises above waterline, the assailment of noises abruptly recurs, 
then disappears as we sink once more. Camera movement and sound mimic the 
struggle for survival as some men resurface while two are shot underwater, turn-
ing the sea red, and we watch one soldier quietly drown.
The above-water assault of unrelenting noise sets audience nerves on edge, 
providing a haptic effect clearly intended to analogise the barrage of bullets, 
slaughter and fear soldiers encounter. Additionally, however, the movement 
between two audio spaces, above or below the waterline – one deafening, the 
other eerily hushed – creates emotional complexity that reverberates due to 
the established narrative and historical context. If, most fundamentally, the 
sequence depicts an imperative for survival, in which soldiers struggle to 
re-emerge from the ocean, it also emphasises the conditions for continued exist-
ence. Remaining in the quiet of the ocean guarantees certain death; returning 
to the cacophonous living means re-emergence into the brutality of the bat-
tlefield, itself a world of death. The 28-second underwater sequence fashions 
a release from the relentless sounds of cruelty, the stench of slaughter and fear. 
The jarring juxtaposition presented by camera and sound, as we oscillate above 
and beneath the waterline, probes whether that relief will be temporary or per-
manent. Hearing the remorseless audio as we re-emerge creates a plea for escape 
from the clamour of war, so that death may seem the more peaceful prospect. 
And so we watch the soldier who drowns give up his struggle quietly, in a 
moment of horrific peace. The dislocations created by two distinct audio spaces 
express the conflicting conditions of death as quietude and lived existence as 
death, in this specific historical and narrative context.
Popular media are replete with instances such as these, moments of emotional 
value conveyed through aesthetics. If much of emotional life remains submerged 
from the expressible, audio-visual narrativity seeks means by which emotion 
may be glimpsed, overheard or otherwise felt. Marks observes that cinema 
occurs ‘on the threshold of language’ (2000, p. xvi). Indeed, much of mediated 
experience takes shape well removed from that threshold. Making sense of emo-
tions exceeds tracking ideological positions or rational, cognitive activities with 
which, as in much affect theory, emotionality has been too exclusively aligned. 
Accepting such a limited conceptualisation means losing grasp of valuable social 
and mediated narratives of emotion when they do not appear in overt or easily 
accessible articulated form.
Although emotions are activated, negotiated and exchanged in socio-
cultural realms, they do not require articulation. We access emotions – feel 
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them and express them – through pathways other than the specifically spoken, 
written or thought. We experience emotions nonverbally as well as verbally, 
through images, audio, tone, texture, movement and gestures more than they 
are retrieved as conscious awareness or partner with rational, contemplative 
thought. Sue Campbell (1997, pp. 2–3, 6) contends that a handful of what 
she calls ‘classic’ emotions, such as love, fear, anger and pity, are taken as 
paradigmatic of all emotional experience, although, she strenuously argues, 
they are not. Instead, the bulk of our emotions exist in ‘nuanced, complex, 
or inchoate’ forms that remain unspecified, in the sense of lacking labels or 
being available to articulation (ibid., p. 3). Campbell offers up an alternative 
version to that of affect theory, one in which emotions signal intricate, elu-
sive and, as their etymology suggests,3 constantly moving events, as they take 
shape, shift, combine, separate, disperse and reform in boundless, fluctuating 
constellations.
Images
Strands of affect theory that rely on film to elaborate their arguments predi-
cate a good deal on the nature of ‘the image’. Here again, how one performs 
the subtraction of an image, or elements within an image, from the narrative 
environment in which it nests, in order to arrive at a moment of pure affect, 
proves challenging. Even a still image may encompass narrative aspects. For 
instance, Wendy Steiner (2004) outlines the ways medieval Italian paintings 
incorporated narrativity prior to the advent of the Renaissance. Repeating the 
appearance of a particular character staged along a singular, unifying landscape 
such as a winding path and, later, using rooms within a single building to indi-
cate ‘the co-presence of temporally distinct moments’, painters created ‘the 
multi-episodic narratives of pre-Renaissance art’ (Steiner 2004, pp. 160, 164). 
The invention of vanishing-point perspective disrupted such narrative picto-
rial practices, because the Renaissance model of perceptual realism demands a 
viewer who observes a scene ‘from a fixed vantage point at one moment in time’ 
(Steiner 2004, p. 158; italics in original). Thus, Steiner argues that historical 
conventions, not medium necessity, led to exchanging ‘the non-realist narrativ-
ity of the Middle Ages’ for the ‘non-narrative realism’ of much Western art, 
until the late nineteenth century (p. 162).
For film and television, it becomes even more difficult to imagine the 
absence of narrative inflection, except in the most experimental modes, given 
the embeddedness of an image in the context of all surrounding shots. Usually 
the basic unit of ‘image’ in film is regarded as the single camera shot. Yet even a 
still shot in the absence of camera movement exists as part of a series of images, 
instigating viewers to search for sequential, temporal, spatial, causal, symbolic 
or other relationality to the shots that precede and follow. Moving images, 
whether by movement of figures within the frame or via camera movement, 
are even more difficult to distinguish from storytelling aspects because, by 
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definition, they involve passage across space over a temporal duration. At its 
most fundamental, narrativity may be defined as a peregrination, a journey 
from one place to another over a period of time, however small the journey or 
brief the temporal moment.
Discussing the film, American Beauty (Sam Mendes 1999), Pisters finds it 
unoriginal in story terms but more intriguing in its use of video footage associ-
ated with the teenage character Ricky Fitts (Wes Bentley) (Pisters 2004, p. 1). 
She argues the video sequences serve as ‘a database of memories and impres-
sions with no (narrative) coherence or logical development’, thereby liberating 
the video images from the cause-and-effect dynamics of narrativity and, in turn, 
freeing Ricky from the weight of typical characterisation (pp. 1–2). Instead, he 
arrives at something akin to a pure gaze and a new, non-personal ‘mode of 
individuation’ (p. 2). I, too, found the film’s home video footage haunting and 
evocative, lingering with me long after I first encountered it, especially the 
sequence in which the wind blows about a white plastic bag. Here, I revisit 
that scene but, in contrast to Pisters, I do so to consider the ways the plastic bag 
sequence is narratively and culturally informed so that it expresses the other-
wise emotionally inexpressible, in a cinematic context that works to release the 
image and its emotional associations from stasis.
The floating plastic bag sequence surfaces twice in the film, both times posi-
tioned and supported by narrative aspects. On the first occasion, the scene plays 
on a video monitor in Ricky’s bedroom for a minute and 25 seconds. It is 
anchored narratively by the presence, in the frame, of Ricky and 16-year-old 
Jane Burnham (Thora Birch), as the two sit in front of the monitor, their backs 
to us. The video plays in the background space between them, their figures 
in the foreground serving to bookend the sequence, while Ricky explains the 
footage’s importance to him. On the second occasion, at the end of the film, the 
plastic bag sequence runs again for 21 seconds, situated narratively by a voiceover 
from Jane’s father, the now-dead Lester Burnham (Kevin Spacey). This time 
we view the scene directly, that is, without the intermediating presence of 
video monitor or characters, but with audio contextualisation provided by 
Lester’s voiceover. The reprisal of the floating plastic bag carries the key story 
function of coda, intended to encapsulate the entire film’s emotional impact.
On both occasions, the sequence comprises a cinematic single image, 
shown without edits (with the exception of an eight-second close-up of 
Ricky in the midst of the first shot). Yet the image also exhibits continuous 
figure movement – the nonstop floating of the plastic bag, leaves swirling on 
the sidewalk – along with unceasing camera movement, constantly reframing 
in order to follow the bag’s actions. Movement often renders a richer, more 
complex image than a still shot, in this case performing a peregrination that 
emphasises the spatial features of location and mobility, as the bag tries to take 
flight or attempts escape. In its first showing, the bag appears to rise upward 
against the red brick wall, only to quickly fall back down to the ground, as 
if trapped. On its second attempt, at the end of the film, the bag manages to 
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scale the red brick wall, rising to the top of the frame before the image fades 
out, this time breaking free of its environs.
However, if one considers the bag’s journey insufficient storyline to justify 
narrative status, the sequence has also been aligned, through visuals and audio, 
with at least three characters (Ricky, Jane, Lester). Additionally, cultural inflection 
permeates the scene in a manner fundamental to its evocative, haunting quality. 
Cultural suffusion occurs through one narrative property in particular: setting. 
Initially, the choice of location seems odd for something meant to be achingly 
beautiful. We view an apparently urban site, no horizon of sky visible, only a grey 
concrete sidewalk in front of a red brick wall. Dead, brown leaves twirl about on 
the concrete, although no trees are in sight. Against the familiar building materi-
als of urban public space, the white plastic bag dances, as Ricky characterises its 
movement. Of course, the plastic bag also belongs to this urbanised environment, 
a piece of litter carelessly discarded on the street, awaiting removal along with the 
dead leaves. The scene’s efficacy depends on cultural recognition of public objects 
and environments we routinely associate with waste and paucity.
That we are intended, paradoxically, to view the sequence as beautiful is 
made clear by Ricky’s introduction to the video, in which he asks Jane, ‘You 
want to see the most beautiful thing I’ve ever filmed?’ The scene’s intended 
appeal is further reinforced by Ricky’s description as it plays on the monitor, 
his words closely echoed in Lester’s later voiceover, in which they speak of feel-
ing so much beauty in the world it overwhelms their hearts. Elsewhere in the 
film, Ricky references finding beauty in the ugly, boring and ordinary rather 
than mistaking the ugly, boring and ordinary for beautiful. We can appreciate 
the dependency on cultural context in making such a distinction if we imagine 
replacing the blustery plastic bag with a video sequence that follows a butterfly 
as it travels amongst the red roses of the Burnham’s carefully tended garden. 
Related to the film’s title, and associated most closely with Jane’s mother, 
Carolyn Burnham (Annette Bening), the rose garden would not function in 
the same manner as Ricky’s video because the narrative has activated social 
associations of the flowers in their suburban setting with sentimentality, façade 
and denial. Instead, in the home video images we are presented with beauty 
located in life’s less-inviting, trivial and discarded matter, which includes a 
number of the film’s characters.
The process by which we see, and feel, the beauty in the wind-driven plastic 
bag commences from the normative, the clichéd, in order to reach a less-
familiar or ‘already known’ experiential quality. The red roses in the garden, set 
against an affluent suburban home with white picket fence, feel stultified, rigid, 
dead. An alternative version of American beauty is the correspondingly clichéd 
image of a naked, teenaged woman (Mena Suvari), served up on a bed of rose 
petals. This alternate American beauty turns out to be an equally empty fantasy, 
in this instance, linked to Lester’s disastrously erroneous perceptions. Only by 
journeying through these versions – a peregrination across conventional, false 
notions of beauty – are we able to grasp and appreciate Ricky’s vision.
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Pister’s contention that Ricky’s video footage is original, that he recognises 
things differently, is correct. However, his home images do not function as 
some sort of pure gaze, as she suggests; rather, they work in conjunction with 
other narrative and aesthetic elements. Ricky’s experience achieves expres-
sion by moving from static, rejected images of beauty to finally reaching a 
visualization – his dancing plastic bag against a red brick wall – that is less 
well known, less familiar and, thus, freshly felt. Yet, it’s not clear what that 
emotion should be called: beauty-in-waste; beauty-in-the-ugly. As Campbell 
suggests, we must turn to neologisms to point towards the expansive wealth 
of cognitively uncultivated terrain that our emotional experiences encom-
pass. Even ‘classic’ emotions, such as fear and sadness, which we possess the 
cognitive competency to name, do not exist as singularities. Instead, they are 
complex systems that can incorporate a near-infinite variety of felt experi-
ences, contradicting the idea that we point to something specific, bounded or 
static when we reference emotionality.
The effectiveness of the plastic bag video cannot rely on Ricky or Lester 
telling us, in linguistic terms, that the sequence evokes an aching beauty. Their 
words may point the way, but the success or failure of accomplishing that 
objective depends on whether audience members directly feel its beauty. The 
notion of ‘felt recognition’ is activated in the study of melodrama as narrative 
and aesthetic modality (Gledhill & Williams 2018). The felt of felt recognition 
references audiences undergoing an emotional experience, rather than register-
ing solely an intellectual understanding. Popular mediated narrativity involves 
processes of coming to care, of feeling the impact of something brought home. 
The recognition in felt recognition involves encountering aesthetic realisations, in 
the doubled sense of enacted and acknowledged. Mediated narratives ideally, 
and often enough in practice, offer up opportunities to engage with what feels 
fresh, unfamiliar, inarticulable. Amidst the ‘functional lines’ of accustomed plots 
and other conventions, we also seek out and consistently make new discoveries. 
Indeed, familiar narrative and aesthetic landscapes provide the groundwork for 
moments of unexpected felt recognition to emerge.
Conclusion
The examples explored from Saving Private Ryan and American Beauty repre-
sent brief excerpts from the totality of the films. Yet, they signal that moving 
pictures and sound hold the power to initiate an abundance of such moments. 
Audiences who co-exist in shared socio-cultural worlds carry the competencies 
to recognise the emotional conflicts being staged or the emotional stakes under 
strain, even as individually felt responses vary.
Audiences seek out occasions to encounter unanticipated felt recognitions, 
contributing to the pleasures of mediated experience. Cultural meanings dom-
inated by normative phenomena in stasis allows little room for the shocks, 
surprises, excitement and thrills that draw audiences to popular storytelling. 
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Yet, mediated felt experiences like excitement need to be accounted for: what 
do we care about, how do we come to care about it and which emotions are 
enabled or excluded in that process? Freshly discovered feelings provide audi-
ences with cinematic pleasures, even when the emotions engaged are deemed 
painful, as in the cases of fear and sadness.
Excerpts from all three films discussed – the snowman story, the extract from 
Saving Private Ryan and American Beauty’s floating plastic bag – share narrative 
conflict as emotional dilemma in common. Whether taking shape as pleasurable 
sadness, peaceful horror or discarded beauty, the three peregrinations encour-
age audiences to engage with emotions as complex forms of cultural existence. 
Mediated storytelling encompasses the pleasures of felt recognition – the moments 
that make us cry as well as laugh or smile – that we might not otherwise grasp 
about the worlds we occupy, the identities available for us to take up, and the 
social relations we enjoy or fail to attain. Narrative media create collective spaces 
which enable late modern subjects to entertain their socioemotional imaginings.
Notes
1 For the complexity of mediated emotions as socio-cultural events, see ‘How 9/11 
changed the movies: the Tony Scott barometer’ (Pribram 2016).
2 Usually affect is described as non-conscious, beyond acts of ‘mind’, whether con-
scious or unconscious.
3 ‘Emotion’ originates in the mid-sixteenth century as ‘a public disturbance; a commo-
tion’, taking on the additional meaning of social migration in the seventeenth century 
(Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 2007, p. 821).
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Chapter 16
Screening the refugee
Freedom Stories and the performance of 
empathy in an ‘emotional community’
Sukhmani Khorana
In this chapter, I use the public question-and-answer (Q&A) session after a 
screening of the Australian documentary, Freedom Stories, to unpack the per-
formance of empathy in the context of advocacy for asylum seekers. The 
affective as well as performative aspects of this empathy demonstrate how 
‘emotional communities’ are formed, the manner in which they function and 
their mediation in late modernity. Beginning with an overview of Australia’s 
bipartisan political support for mandatory detention of boat arrivals, I empha-
sise the importance of media narratives to shift public debate and the role of 
empathy in this process, as well as the need to transcend beyond empathy and 
into the realm of responsibility and action.
Asylum seeker policy in Australia
In Australia, public debate on the issue of asylum seekers has been vexed and 
polarising. However, what distinguishes Australian policy from other nations 
of the Global North is that despite being a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee 
Convention, ‘it is the only country where there is mandatory immigration 
detention for all unlawful non-citizens’ (Brown 2013). According to the 
Refugee Council of Australia, mandatory detention is used as more than a 
risk-management tool. This is because until recently, ‘asylum seekers arriving 
without authorisation were detained for the entire time it took to determine 
whether or not they were refugees – regardless of whether they posed any 
health or security risks to the community’ (2014). Such a policy has resulted 
from a consensus on both sides of politics that ‘asylum seekers pose a threat 
to the integrity of Australia’s borders or to its social fabric; that fear of asylum 
seekers is legitimate; and that a policy of deterrence is an appropriate response’ 
(Neumann 2012). Neumann (2012) notes that this policy of deterrence is occa-
sionally questioned when the courts insist that it must not violate Australian 
law, or when the public sporadically shows compassion for individual asylum 
seekers, especially children. In the most recent of such cases, the Victorian 
Supreme Court approved a $70m (AUS) compensation payout to current and 
former Manus Island asylum seekers over their illegal detention in dangerous 
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conditions (Doherty 2017). This has been reported to be the largest human 
rights class action settlement in Australia, though it has not impacted federal 
government policy.
In addition to the legal resistance, the power of narrative to invoke a 
response to the asylum seeker issue amongst the broader Australian public 
merits attention. Such a response is often articulated as a feeling of empathy 
or compassion for humanitarian reasons, and seldom crosses over into the 
realm of responsibility or action. It is due to such limitations of empathy that 
Carolyn Pedwell has observed that this particular emotion ‘has become a 
Euro-American political obsession [. . .] within the contemporary “western” 
socio-political sphere, empathy is framed as a “solution” to a very wide range 
of social ills and as a central component of building cross-cultural and transna-
tional social justice’ (2014, p. ix–x). In this way, it is similar to Sara Ahmed’s 
(2010) postulation on happiness being an end-point. To elucidate, Pedwell 
(2014, p. ix–x) suggests that in many contemporary narratives of global social 
justice, empathy can be a conceptual stoppage in terms of carrying on a 
conversation or analysis. It is no surprise, then, that many refugee-themed 
narratives (in Australia and elsewhere) grapple with the problem of invok-
ing the compassion of their audiences by calling on the discourse of a ‘shared 
humanity’, while also trying to ensure this affective response is not transient 
and/or depoliticised (see Khorana 2015).
Empathy as the ‘correct’ response
The mainstream news narratives of asylum seekers in Australia can be compre-
hended in terms of the political and editorial stance of the outlet in question. 
In the case of most conservative media outlets, research has demonstrated that 
there is a tendency to dehumanise refugees. This results from editorial tac-
tics such as visual framing, not portraying individual asylum seekers but only 
showing them as members of groups or collectives and associating them with 
threats to border security rather than humanitarian crises (Bleiker et al. 2013). 
In other words, the picture of the refugee invoked by such narratives is that of 
a distant and potentially threatening other, thereby diminishing any capacity 
for invoking an empathetic response.
When it comes to the nation’s less ideologically conservative media outlets, 
editorials and features attempt to humanise refugees in order to evoke empa-
thy in the reader/viewer. ‘Is Australia losing its empathy?’ (Krznaric 2014), 
‘Australians lack empathy for plight of asylum seekers’ (Ireland 2013), ‘What 
happened to our compassion, Australia?’ (Reilly 2014), ‘Compassion is the new 
radicalism’ (Naidoo 2014); these are a handful of headlines and statements that 
manifest the self-identified ethical response to asylum seeker issues in Australia. 
Moreover, feeling empathy or compassion is established as the morally correct 
reaction to witnessing asylum seeker testimony in the form of news stories or 
creative storytelling, such as film or visual art. In other words, the mainstream 
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media narratives that aim to effect social change often stop short of conflating 
humanisation with the evocation of empathy.
Despite the above, invoking empathy in refugee-themed narratives is some-
times accompanied by a depoliticisation of systemic issues. This takes place by 
shifting responsibility onto the feelings of the ethical citizen, rather than the 
imperative of international obligations or the power imbalance in regional rela-
tionships. Moreover, particular figures such as children may be more likely to 
inspire an empathetic response. This has been noted in the case of the Syrian 
toddler Aylan Kurdi, whose body was washed up at a Turkish beach. This led 
to a worldwide surge in public compassion for refugees, as seen in the popularity 
of the hashtag #CouldBeMyChild on social media. However, El-Enany (2016) 
observes that images of the bodies of Black African men who had died trying 
to cross the Mediterranean did not create a positive response from Europe, and 
instead invoked fear. In a similar vein, Kirkwood conducted a discourse analysis 
of UK parliamentary debates on the European refugee crisis, and found that while 
refugees were presented as being within ‘our’ moral community, ‘some forms of 
“humanisation” appear to reinforce paternalistic relations between those who 
need and those who provide asylum’ (2017, p. 122). In the Australian context, 
Peterie (2017) used discourse analysis of press statements from political leaders 
to establish that since 2001, governments have constructed varying objects of 
compassion in the asylum seeker debate, and depicted maritime arrivals as either 
unworthy or dependent. Also, evoking empathy and challenging entrenched 
attitudes has become the pre-occupation of several self- and institutionally funded 
documentaries on the subject, as will be detailed in the next section.
Refugee documentaries and mediated 
community screenings
When I first watched the documentary Mary Meets Mohammad in 2013, I 
became interested in writer-director Heather Kirkpatrick’s account of its 
screenings. As someone who was located outside of the film festival circuit in 
Australia, and primarily interested in the film as a contribution to public debate 
on the issue of asylum seekers, she circumvented the conventional viewing 
venues for documentaries of this kind. Rather, through the film’s website and 
all of its screenings in spaces such as university film clubs, advocacy groups like 
Red Cross and Amnesty and even detention centres, the notion of ‘community 
screenings’ was encouraged. This was usually facilitated through a small screen-
ing fee and a hosting information pack. In the wake of this, there has been a 
spate of refugee-themed documentaries produced and released in Australia. 
These include: Freedom Stories (Thomas 2015), Chasing Asylum (Orner 2016), 
Constance on the Edge (Mason 2016) and Cast from the Storm (Mason 2016).
All of the above films are classified as documentaries, and have links to 
‘community screenings’ (in varied forms) on their official websites. For 
instance, in the case of Chasing Asylum, there is a tab on the homepage called 
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‘Take Action’, and this takes visitors to yet another page with options such as 
‘Host a Screening’, ‘Sign a Petition’, ‘Sign the Pledge’, ‘Write to your MP’, 
‘Volunteer’ and ‘Donate’. In other words, the emphasis is explicitly on asylum 
seeker advocacy, and political actions related to the same. Similar to this, the 
website of Constance on the Edge has a navigation bar with links to sections 
like ‘Act Now’ and ‘Screenings’. While the former leads to information on 
the ‘impact strategy’ for the film, it also has tabs for hosting a screening and 
donating to the campaign (via the Documentary Australia Foundation web-
site). The latter tab lists past and upcoming screenings throughout the country, 
and contains details on how to obtain a screening licence (with cinema and 
community options). Finally, the homepage of Cast from the Storm also has 
links for ‘Screenings’ and ‘Host a Screening’. Moreover, the latter page has 
an embedded video which appears to be an edited version of a range of audi-
ence reactions to screenings of the film. It is not clear from the video, or 
the information accompanying it, whether this was recorded at one particular 
screening or at a number of them. However, what stands out are both the 
responses themselves, and the production team’s interest in documenting and 
(re)presenting them. While most respondents mention the word ‘moving’ in 
relation to the film, they also note that what made it so was the featuring of 
refugee children and their stories. Only one respondent featured in the video 
explicitly said that the film made her want to do something (presumably about 
the refugee situation in Australia). Yet another interviewee reported being so 
moved that she wanted to cry, and added that she couldn’t imagine what these 
kids had gone through.
Witnessing and the performance of empathy
In this section, I recount the Q&A session that took place at the end of a 
community screening of Freedom Stories. This screening was organised on 
the evening of 10 June 2016 in the Hope Theatre at the University of 
Wollongong (UOW) as part of a pilot study project (with Associate Professor 
Tanja Dreher and Professor Bronwyn Carlson) funded by the Faculty of Law, 
Humanities and the Arts. The project, titled ‘Community and Alternative 
Media in the Illawarra: A Participatory Approach to Fostering Inter-
Community Responsiveness’, aimed to analyse the potential for community 
and alternative media to contribute to solidarities between communities that 
experience racism in the mainstream media. The film itself documents the 
later-life experiences of former ‘boat people’ who arrived in Australia in 
2001. It had already been screened at a number of cinemas and community 
spaces around Australia. At the Illawarra-based public event, we used several 
methods to collect data on inter-group understandings of refugee issues. We 
observed the conversations people were having about the film via a relevant 
Twitter hashtag, and also audio-recorded the post-screening Q&A with 
director Steve Thomas and ex-refugee participant Amir Javan. In addition, 
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a qualitative questionnaire consisting of eight questions, largely centred on 
responses to the film, use of media for refugee advocacy and avenues for 
changing attitudes was distributed amongst viewers at the beginning of the 
screening. I have analysed these questionnaire responses as a means to under-
stand witnessing through ‘proper distance’ elsewhere (Khorana 2018). In the 
subsequent sections, my focus is on the Q&A itself, and how it works to per-
form empathy and thereby facilitate the formation of a mediated emotional 
community in late modernity.
Attendees of mainstream and niche film festivals will be aware of the Q&A 
format at the end of certain screenings. This is usually a chat between a facili-
tator and members of the filmmaking team, and includes questions from the 
audience. As such, a Q&A session is deemed to add extra-textual ‘value’ to the 
experience of the film. Also, what happens more broadly with regards to audi-
ence reception in film festival settings (especially when social justice-oriented 
films are screened) is transposed onto the context of the community screening. 
According to Chan in her book on cosmopolitan cinema, ‘Serendipity is very 
much a part of the affective cosmopolitanism of a festival’ (Chan 2017, p. 99). 
She adds that such an affective experience of encounters with other cultures is 
of three overlapping kinds.
Firstly, there is the encounter with the films. Secondly, there is the encounter 
with the spaces of the festival: such as the venues, buildings, outdoor screen-
ings, alternative site screenings and so on. And thirdly, there is the encounter 
with a particular form of ‘imagined community’ that runs concurrent to the 
kind of imagined community first introduced by Benedict Anderson [. . .] 
a community of participants drawn together by a kind of common cultural 
literacy and shared practice.
(Chan 2017, pp. 99–100)
The imagined community described above is akin to the affective community 
that gathers for a ‘community screening’, especially if the subject (such as advo-
cacy for asylum seekers) is made explicit in the publicity material. This was 
certainly the case for the screening of Freedom Stories at UOW, as audience 
members were drawn from staff and students, members of the Refugee Action 
Coalition (Illawarra branch) and Wollongong residents who had come across 
advertising by the local city council. While this community may be regarded 
as self-selecting and already interested in the issue to varying degrees, it is still 
worth examining their interaction and affect during the Q&A. This is because 
heightened moments of performative empathy may be telling in terms of the 
accelerated emotional shifts within late modernity, as well as the potential to 
harness empathy for wider social change.
The cosmopolitan encounters that take place in a film festival setting are often 
indicative of the beginnings of intercultural understanding, and the affective dis-
comfort or empathy that it invokes. According to Chan, ‘It is this feeling of taking 
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pleasure in partial comprehension that evokes a cosmopolitan affect, one which 
signals an equal desire to be at ease with difference while accepting the limits of 
restricted perspectives’ (2017, p. 102). While such acceptance of the limits of com-
prehending a different culture or experience is key to moving beyond a notion of 
empathy based primarily on similarities, it also signals the potential for action that 
is latent in affect. In his work on the mediated affect that takes place in relation to 
politicised Twitter hashtags, Papacharissi notes this potentiality of affect:
Its in-the-making, not-yet-fully-formed nature is what invites many to 
associate affect with potentiality [. . .] It is present in the rhythm and pace 
of storytelling, which is instant, emotive and phatic, frequently taking the 
form of a nod, a clap, a nudge, and other forms of affective expression.
(2016, pp. 316–17)
The above-mentioned potential was evident in the case of the community 
film screening in terms of its articulation by the ex-refugee participant, Amir 
Javan. When asked about the capacity of the documentary to change minds (on 
Australia’s asylum seeker policies), Amir responded that he became interested 
in the project in the first place because ‘if this thing can change one opinion in 
23-and-a-half million in Australia, it’s worth it to be made’.
While empathy is often understood in popular discourse as something that 
arises in the face of witnessing another’s distress, the disciplines of moral psy-
chology and philosophy add another dimension that is crucial to understanding 
how an ‘emotional community’ may be formed. For instance, in Moral senti-
mentalism, Slote argues that, on the one hand, parents use moral principles to 
‘induct’ empathetic concern for others into the young child (2010, p. 20). At 
the same time, the child can also learn empathy when it is demonstrated by 
the parent, thereby showing that moral attitudes can spread by contagion (ibid. 
2010, p. 20). The latter aspect of acquired empathy is crucial for understanding 
both why it is ‘performed’ at screenings of social justice-oriented films, and also 
how it may lead to a sort of empathic osmosis. Moreover, the existence of social 
media, as well as 24/7 news media, in later modernity amplifies the potential of 
this affect, and its repeated performance leading to further affect by contagion.
In addition to the potentiality of affect at screenings such as the one being 
examined here, the impact is also notably symbolic in the manner in which 
hegemonic ways of being and power relationships are questioned. This takes 
place both through the choice of the content that is screened, and in the modal-
ity of the Q&A sessions. According to Papacharissi (2016, pp. 316–17), such 
symbolic impact on media publics should not be underestimated because, ‘In 
order to make revolutions and change institutions, we must reimagine them 
first’. He adds that such a process of ‘reimagining society cannot occur without 
first negotiating and redefining what societal institutions represent and what their 
role should be’ (Papacharissi 2016, p. 320). In the affective responses observed 
during the Q&A at the end of the screening of Freedom Stories, such an interest 
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in re-imagining current policy and talking back to power was especially evident 
in individual queries addressed to the filmmaking team about what to do next. 
The following dialogue teases out this symbolic aspect in detail (emphasis mine):
Questioner:  My question is more about what do we do now? We’ve 
watched this film. It’s inspired me to do more. So, from 
your point of view, what can regular people of Australia do to 
share this message or to assist people who may have been in your 
situation? Sorry for crying!
Amir Javan:  No, no please . . . Thank you for your question. In fact, what we 
can do is, it is my personal opinion . . . what Steve did, and peo-
ple like Steve have already changed a huge number of opin-
ions, because in the last two days I realised that this movie was on in 
Wollongong and was screened three times . . . So I’m sure that, for 
example, you have got a hundred friends, I’ve got a hundred, each 
one of us, if we are a hundred, if we get the message to a hundred 
[each], it’s going to be 10,000 in the next 15 days, in the next 
week. And this is the way that the message is spread out.
The symbolic element of affect is therefore made explicit in Amir’s reiteration 
of the ability of the message of the film to ‘spread’ via online media, word of 
mouth and further community screenings. Such spreading, in turn, is reliant on 
the performance of the affect which was generated by the screening, and not 
merely a re-telling of its content.
As noted in the dialogue above, the audience member is not only express-
ing her concern and grief at the treatment of asylum seekers, but also finds it 
necessary to tell Amir that she is crying. It is the contention of this chapter 
that in addition to mobilising individual emotions, late modernity calls for a 
performance of them (sometimes individually, and often collectively). In their 
research on news coverage of bushfires in Victoria (a state in Australia), Duffy 
and Yell (2014, p. 112) similarly found that there has been a marked shift in the 
public demonstration of private grief:
While grief is a personal and private process in 1983, and is not portrayed 
at all in 1939, in 2009 it is not only acceptable but expected that private 
individuals will publicly display their grief. What is more, audiences are 
included in the grieving process [. . .] the witnessing of trauma through 
photography facilitates public responsiveness.
This expectation of display, and the media’s interest in facilitating a perfor-
mance of affect, is central to understanding the role that both can play in turning 
empathy to responsibility in the contemporary era. In the subsequent section, I 
will therefore relate the emotional rules of late modernity to the performativity 
of an empathetic public during the community screening.
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Mediated affect and publics in late modernity
In the first chapter of this volume, Patulny and Olson list the defining charac-
teristics of emotions in late modernity, remarking that they denote ‘increased 
change and complexity; a decline in traditional social structures; an increasing 
mediation of human activity through technology and digital mediums; and 
growing flexibility, freedom and autonomy – but also self-responsibility and 
reflexivity’ (2018, p. 12). In effect, these shifts mark a change in the very ‘emo-
tional rules’ that historians of emotions have been observing as multivalent 
in any given historical epoch. In her well-known article on ‘worrying about 
emotions in history’, Rosenwein notes that emotional rules tend to be a combi-
nation of individual and cultural attributes, and hence that we need to consider 
the approaches of both cognitivists and social constructionists (2002, p. 837). 
She adds that this combination points towards a history of the emotions that 
‘does not postulate “restraint” as its one variable, but looks rather at two com-
plementary issues: what people consider (both consciously and unconsciously) 
conducive to their weal or woe, and what possibilities cultures provide for the 
expression and representation of their feelings’ (Rosenwein 2002, p. 837).
Given the above understanding of emotional rules, it is my contention in 
this chapter that advocacy communities increasingly need to display their empa-
thy and related emotions to mobilise apathetic individuals and, sometimes, even 
institutions. During the Q&A at the end of the community screening of Freedom 
Stories, for instance, film director Steve Thomas emphasised that former refugees 
who participated in the documentary were also a self-selecting group who were 
happy to re-tell, and thereby perform their stories for Australian audiences. When 
asked about how he recruited interviewees for the film, Thomas responded:
And I guess I found three kinds of people: there were those who 
had had the experience, but wanted to put it behind them and 
not talk about it anymore and get on with their lives. And a lot of 
them just didn’t want to be associated with the ‘refugee’ tag anymore. At 
the other end of the spectrum, there were people who’d been through the 
experience and it was so bad for them that they can’t lead a normal life, 
and it would have been very difficult for them to participate in a film. And 
in between were people like Amir [Javan] who has suffered greatly 
through the process of detention and so on but has managed to 
transcend that and has an interest in telling his story.
Thomas’s testimony on the group of ex-refugees unequivocally interested in 
sharing their story on screen is also in line with Duffy and Yell’s research 
on the Victorian bushfires mentioned in the section above. They found that 
contemporary media has a particular role in amplifying (and sometimes com-
modifying) emotions, and this has accelerated a shift towards public sharing of 
private emotions (Duffy & Yell 2014). Moreover, they conclude that, ‘Public 
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emotional display – and the act of bearing witness to this – is becoming the 
new form of emotional regulation’ (Duffy & Yell 2014, p. 113).
If emotional regulation is now being replaced with public display, especially 
in the presence of traditional or social media, we then have to consider what 
kind of publics or communities it is interpellating, and perhaps even helping 
form. In her work on the history of the emotions, Rosenwein has defined 
‘emotional communities’ in the following terms:
People lived – and live – in what I propose to call ‘emotional communities’. 
These are precisely the same as social communities – families, neighbour-
hoods, parliaments, guilds, monasteries, parish church memberships – but 
the researcher looking at them seeks above all to uncover systems of feeling: 
what these communities (and the individuals within them) define and assess 
as valuable or harmful to them; the evaluations that they make about others’ 
emotions; the nature of the affective bonds between people that they rec-
ognise; and the modes of emotional expression that they expect, encourage, 
tolerate, and deplore.
(Rosenwein 2002, p. 842)
What does this say about the individuals involved in refugee advocacy com-
munities, especially as it pertains to their consumption of related media, and 
exposing (apathetic) others to such mediated communication? What forms of 
expression do they aim to elicit? What if this is met with resistance?
At least in terms of their communication with refugees (especially those in 
detention), such communities aim to exhibit and share messages of solidarity and 
goodwill. According to Steve Thomas during the Q&A, this may have political 
or apolitical motivations, but it is expressed clearly through affective gestures:
my experience with people like Amir, is that even though they were in 
detention, people know that it’s a political thing and they also know that 
many Australians disagree with it. And one of the reasons they know that 
is because people write to them, they send them cards, they send 
them credit for their phone cards, they send them mobile phones, 
they send them Christmas presents. Social media. Those are the things 
I think that help people get through the detention experience – knowing 
that ordinary Australians are not like the government. And I remember 
when we were with Reyhana [Akhyand] and her daughter, Mariam, and 
we’d finished filming but Reyhana said, ‘hang on a moment’. . . she went 
out the back and she came back with this big pile of cards and 
these were well-wisher cards that had been sent to them from 
when they were in Woomera, from kids in primary schools, people in 
churches, ordinary individuals and 13 years after coming out of detention, 
Reyhana still had those cards and that was an indication of how much 
those messages meant to her.
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Thomas’ recounting of Reyhana’s (one of the documentary participants) story 
indicates that ex-refugees who wanted to re-tell and perform their narrative of 
seeking refuge and being in detention were affectively assisted in this by advo-
cates, through meaningful and supportive expressions. In this way, the loose 
emotional community that is refugee advocates reinforced the experiences 
of the refugees, and it is this effacing that facilitated a degree of resilience, if 
not widespread social change. The term ‘resilience’ here does not imply an 
expectation for refuge communities to live up to (in the eyes of governments 
or individual advocates). Rather, its usage here is derived from Bourbeau’s 
work on migration, where he defines resilience as ‘the ability to recover from 
or adjust easily to misfortune, adversity, unease, conflict, failure and/or change 
[and is] the internal or external [. . .] qualities that help people to bounce back 
and to adapt positively in the face of profound adversity’ (2013, p. 6). In other 
words, the gestures and gifts from refugee advocates assist refugees (especially 
in detention) with the capacity to cope and carry on.
In terms of the role of the media in facilitating emotional communities, 
and not just displaying individual emotions, Papacharissi is of the view that 
there is a definitional function at play. Using politicised Twitter hashtags such 
as #ThisIsACoup as examples, he explains that they are open to definition, 
redefinition and re-appropriation, and therefore serve as ‘framing devices that 
allow crowds to be rendered into publics; networked publics that want to tell 
their story collaboratively and on their own terms’ (Papacharissi 2016, p. 308). 
He adds that the implications of such a framing role are that the media may 
not make or break revolutions, yet they lend a distinct ‘mediality’ to emerging 
publics, and the resulting affect keeps them going (Papacharissi 2016, p. 308). 
What is therefore produced is not a well-defined community, but rather ‘feel-
ings of community’:
Driven by an ambient, self-sustaining mode of reflexivity, generated and 
re-generated by accumulating and imbricated digital layers of expression, 
affective traces persist and bind networked publics long after the initial 
events that called them into being [. . .] while affective attachments to media 
cannot produce communities, they may produce ‘feelings of community’.
(Papacharissi 2016, p. 310)
While the traces of affect produced by movements on social media may be 
different to feelings generated by a community film screening and a Q&A, 
there is a marked similarity in terms of queries about what happens when one 
leaves the online realm or screening venue. The mediality generated might 
persist if the affect itself has intensity, and not just potentiality. For instance, 
one of the stories that stood out at the community screening under examina-
tion is Amir’s account of running into former Australian prime minister John 
Howard, and the subsequent strong response from the audience. It is listed 
verbatim below:
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I said Mr. Howard, maybe you don’t know me, but I’m Amir 
Javan. I was in the detention centre for four-and-a-half years. 
And immediately, his face is changed because he didn’t expect 
that, in the Liberal Party meeting, to be stonewalled –
[audience applause]
– by someone from the detention centre.
[audience laughter]
And then I told him immediately, because I knew that it was a short time 
that I could talk. I said, Mr Howard, you mentioned to Australians that I 
was a queue-jumper, that I was an illegal immigrant, I was a boat people 
[sic] and we all come to take Australian jobs. And you accuse me of that 
back in 2001 that might be terrorist come by boat to Australia. Just . . . 
here is my card –
[audience laughter and clapping]
– here is my business card, I work in Chatswood as a real estate agent.
The audience laughter and clapping during the narration of Amir’s encounter 
with Howard had the affective intensity of a highly charged political rally where 
a politician delivers an emotive speech. That these words came from an unlikely 
source – that is, a former refugee – perhaps made them more evocative for the 
responding audience.
Despite the above, it is crucial that I end on a note of caution on the effec-
tiveness of these affective communities, especially in terms of being catalysts 
for sustainable social movements. For instance, Papacharissi observes that such 
mediated affective attachments may either ‘self-propagate a movement to gen-
erate community, and/or entrap people in a loop of sustained spectatorship’ 
(2016, p. 311). She further argues that social media platforms may serve as 
conduits for momentary connection, but may not assist with the negotiation of 
collective identity (Papacharissis 2016, p. 314). In a similar vein, in her work 
on the ‘affective turn’, Brooks noted the differing schools of thought on the 
kinds of bonds formed in late modernity:
Turner conceptualizes a sense of belonging and solidarity as either ‘hot’ 
or ‘cool’ and predicts that the close sense of solidarity and commitment, 
which he describes as ‘hot’ solidarity, will be replaced with ‘cool’ soli-
darity [. . .] Craig Calhoun maintains that globalisation actually estab-
lishes new identities and solidarities. He argues that there is no reason 
to assume that the new sets of relations will be ‘thin’ as Turner and 




As such, it is unclear whether the solidarities and synergies that are emerging 
amongst publics – usually in a mediated form or facilitated by the media – will 
lead to lasting efforts for community building and/or social change. However, 
the reflexivity that is now a distinctive feature of late modernity (see Patulny 
& Olson, this volume, Chapter 1) will certainly aid in our understanding of 
how to be better individual advocates, and how to channel mediated affect 
more collaboratively.
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Impartiality and emotion in 
everyday judicial practice
Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack
Introduction
Impartiality1 is a foundational legal value. It expresses the judicial obligation to 
be unbiased in relation to any party or issue, and to be independent, especially of 
the government, in rendering a decision (American Bar Association 2011; Geyh 
2013; 2014; Judiciary of England & Wales 2013; Lee 2014; The Council of 
Chief Justices of Australia & New Zealand 2017). These obligations of judicial 
attitude, role and practice (Lucy 2005) are central to law as a modern institu-
tion. Despite the myriad changes prompting many to cast the present era as late 
modernity, the legal system remains ambivalent about emotion and continues to 
aspire to entrenched modern values of rationality, objectivity and impersonality 
(Weber 1978; also see this volume, Chapters 1 and 2).
The conventional judicial role casts impartiality as requiring judicial practices 
to be without emotion. Emotion is assumed to be political, unstable, personal 
and irrational, therefore jeopardising the impartial exercise of judicial authority 
(Bandes 2009; Bandes & Blumenthal 2012; Conway & Stannard 2016; Maroney 
2011; 2012). The exclusion of emotion is implicit in the judicial oath of office 
that provides for the administration of the law: ‘without fear or favour, affection 
or ill-will’ (Campbell 1999, p. 146). This parallels the dominance of imperson-
ality in Weber’s ideal-type bureaucracy, which expects officials to act ‘without 
hatred or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm’ (1978, p. 225). 
As emotion and feelings are associated with particular, personal and private 
relationships, they are thought to result in bias (positive and negative), and are 
thus inconsistent with disinterested, detached decision making and legal process 
(Conway & Stannard 2016; Dixon 2012; McKenzie 2016; Wettergren 2010).
Even so, impartiality must be realised in practice. Judicial officers2 must 
embody and perform impartial legal authority as part of their everyday judicial 
work, often in circumstances of considerable emotion. Research involving in-
depth interviews with judicial officers finds that, when defining impartiality, they 
stress their obligation to listen to both sides and their limited role, to wait until the 
evidence has been heard and then apply law to the facts. They describe putting 
aside excluded evidence or a personal attitude that might amount to bias or preju-
dice or an emotion in order to make a legal, rational and non-emotional decision. 
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While some judicial officers use the language of emotion and feelings, or identify 
particular emotions, many do not. Several individual judicial officers see emo-
tion work as a necessary, albeit circumscribed, component of their judicial work, 
which includes reflexively monitoring and self-regulating their own feelings 
(Holmes 2010). It also entails adopting an emotional state compatible with the 
conventional model of judicial authority. Emotionlessness – or non-emotion – 
can entail considerable emotion work (see Wettergren, this volume, Chapter 2).
This chapter examines how contemporary judicial officers articulate 
impartiality and investigates the ways they frame and perform it in light of the 
emotional demands that need management in their everyday judicial practice. 
The conventional judicial role that disavows emotion is the touchstone for 
judicial officers’ reflexive monitoring of the myriad of emotions they experi-
ence. Their emotion management strategies entail recognising, not denying, 
a place for emotion apart from the logical reason of law.
The performance of impartiality
Despite the disavowal of judicial emotion, recent scholarship and institutional 
changes point to the important role of emotions and emotion management 
(Bandes 2009; Bandes & Blumenthal 2012; Bergman Blix & Wettergren 2016; 
Maroney 2011; Maroney & Gross 2014; Roach Anleu & Mack 2005). In 
some circumstances, judicial officers must be more emotionally engaged and 
expressive than anticipated by the conventional model. However, these devel-
opments do not appear to displace impartiality conventionally understood as 
dispassionate, detached and impersonal. While emotion, in and of itself, may 
not be inconsistent with impartiality, the incursion of certain emotions into the 
judicial decision making process can be experienced as a marker or signal of 
bias against or partiality for a party or a claim.
After a description of the research design and interview research method, 
the ways judicial officers articulate, understand and perform impartiality are 
discussed in light of several overlapping themes which emerge from the inter-
views. These include: reliance on the terms of the oath itself; the concept of 
an open mind; and the need and capacity to put aside information, attitudes 
or emotional thought to be inconsistent with achieving impartiality. A few 
interviewees reflect on the practicality of maintaining impartiality, whether 
understood as putting aside feelings or attitudes, or keeping an open mind. 
While not all judicial officers interviewed explicitly mention emotions or 
emotion management, the consistent image of impartial judging they describe 
is one where emotion can and should be excluded from the judicial process.
Research design
Interviews were undertaken with 38 judicial officers throughout Australia, 
between August 2012 and December 2013, ranging in length from 
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Table 17.1 Number of interviewees by court level and gender
Court level Male Female Total interviewees
Supreme 5 4 9
District/County 7 5 12
Magistrates 7 10 17
Total N 19 19 38
Source: National interviews with judges and magistrates 2012–13.
25 minutes to 1 hour and 33 minutes. Most were conducted in the judicial 
officer’s chambers. Table 17.1 describes characteristics of the 38 interviewees.
Interview questions were open-ended, allowing interviewees to discuss a 
full range of issues from their own perspective and in their own words, based 
on their experiences and knowledge. Judicial officers were asked what they 
understand by the concept of impartiality and how they would describe this in 
lay person’s terms. As the aim was to conduct the interviews more as a conver-
sation than a question-and-answer process, there was ample scope for probing 
responses and seeking further information (Silverman 2011).
During the interview, consent was sought from the interviewee to record 
audio and to write notes. All but two interviewees consented to being 
recorded, and all interviewees agreed to note taking. After each interview, 
handwritten notes taken during or after the interview, including observations 
about the court building or location of the interview, were more fully written 
up. Interviews that were audio-recorded have been fully transcribed within 
the Project to maximise accuracy and confidentiality. The computer software 
package NVivo was used to organise, analyse and examine relationships in this 
rich text-based, non-numerical data.
Judicial officers’ understanding(s) of impartiality
Several strong, overlapping themes emerge from the ways judicial officers 
explain their understanding of impartiality. First, many rely primarily on the 
words of the judicial oath. Second, several refer to their duty to decide on 
the facts or the evidence, being open-minded and not pre-judging, in line 
with the adversarial model of legal decision making (Gillman 2001). Third, 
some mention experiencing specific emotions and feelings in response to 
features of the substance of a case or qualities displayed by the participants – 
defendants, litigants, counsel, victims – especially when experienced face to 
face in the courtroom. They emphasise their understanding of the need to 
put these attitudes, emotions or feelings aside, and their capacity to do so, 
drawing an image of judicial practice uninfluenced by emotion (Maroney 
& Gross 2014).
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The judicial oath
When asked to define impartiality in lay terms, several responded by referring 
to or quoting the judicial oath.
I’m sure I’ve thought about this from time to time or I’ve had to give myself 
a good talking to but I, look I think we all and I certainly do strive to do 
it, umm, you know it’s what our oath of office is all about, umm, so look 
I’m sure from time to time I’ve had to really, you know, think it through, 
umm, but you know I certainly think I’ve always managed to come to a 
matter genuinely impartially as much as I, you know, conceive that to be.
(I 33, female judge)3
This comment implies that impartiality is not necessarily a fixed state, but rather 
a goal, something that she ‘strive[s]’ to achieve, and may entail some degree of 
self-talk (Goffman 1981). This judicial officer concludes that she has ‘managed 
to come to a matter genuinely impartially’, in terms of how she ‘conceive[s] 
that to be’, acknowledging that other judicial officers might conceive of impar-
tiality somewhat differently.
Interviewees who associate their understanding of impartiality with the 
oath often do so as part of identifying other elements of or ways of achieving 
impartiality.
Oh I would explain impartiality as meaning that the judicial officer cannot 
take or even appear to take sides or I was going to say appear to favour one 
side over another but that’s probably not lay language, um, must decide the 
case without, again I’m erring on the side of the judicial oath, fear or favour 
affection or ill-will, which translates into giving both sides a fair go – that’s 
the very base [sic] lay language if I can put it like that.
(I 01, female judge)
This judge restates parts of the judicial oath by describing impartiality as ‘meaning 
that the judicial officer cannot take or even appear to take sides’, translating the 
requirement into very ordinary Australian language: ‘giving both sides a fair go’.
Keeping/maintaining an open mind
Some judicial officers concretely frame their understanding of impartiality in 
terms of legal method, and their central judicial role of applying law to facts, 
emphasising keeping an open mind while hearing all the evidence. Some inter-
viewees recognise that impartiality can be understood as a practice or process, 
rather than solely or exclusively as a static or achieved mental state. Interviewees 
also comment on the relative ease or difficulty of achieving impartiality. One 
magistrate points to legal process as central to accomplishing impartiality.
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I 26:  Umm, you’re nobody’s friend. You’re not there to serve the 
police or the plaintiff. You’re there to apply the law. That sounds 
simplistic. It’s hard to –
Interviewer: Is it difficult at times to do that?
I 26:  Yes, it is. Absolutely. It is very difficult because applying the law is 
determining what the facts are and then applying the law to the facts.
(I 26 male magistrate)
The emphasis on a limited judicial role aligns with the adversarial model of judi-
cial decision making. However, this magistrate, along with other interviewees, 
finds doing this ‘very difficult’. A judge describes being impartial as requiring 
waiting to hear both sides and all the evidence; she also finds this difficult:
I think it would be having an open mind. Not making a decision until 
you’ve heard all of the material to be placed before you, umm, and having 
an enquiring mind [. . .] I found it the most difficult part – to, umm, not 
want to rush ahead and get to the point and to be able to sit there and to let 
others develop the point [. . .] To be impartial and to listen and to consider 
what’s put rather than the assumptions you have.
(I 35, female judge)
Some judicial officers describe keeping an open mind as easy, straightforward 
and natural, even intuitive, or an automatic consequence of legal training and 
socialisation:
Well that at its core is, umm, the ability not to pre-judge issues. Keeping an 
open mind. Umm, and I think you know even if you do have some sort of 
view, I mean you often have the papers about a case before you actually go 
into court, umm, to have the ability to put that aside. Now there’s no doubt 
being I suppose both a lawyer and judicial officer for some time, you do 
develop, umm, the ability to do that. I mean as a magistrate you have cases 
where you rule on confessions and they go out the window and then you 
still have to judge the case, umm. Interestingly it’s easier to do than perhaps 
a lot of people think, you know, because in fact you don’t want your mind 
clouded by other issues. It’s hard enough just dealing with the technical/
legal matters that you need to deal with so you know it’s quite, you have to 
put something out of your mind and I really do think you do do it.
(I 33, female judge)
This judge describes impartial judicial decision making as keeping an open 
mind, not ‘clouded’, and identifies the obligation to ignore information that 
has been legally excluded, of which she is aware. Many interviewees identify 
the need to set aside or put aside material, including attitudes or emotions, so 
that the judgment is restricted to the law and the facts presented in court.
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Putting aside bias and emotion
Several judicial officers elaborate on their understanding of an open mind as 
setting aside biases and emotions. Interviewee I 01 (quoted above) elaborates 
her approach to impartiality by continuing:
You know you are to put out of your mind, when dealing with the case 
before you, any personal prejudices or beliefs or sympathies or hostilities 
you may have of a preconceived nature but just to decide the case on the 
factors and on the evidence as presented to you.
(I 01, female judge)
This judge operationalises the normative and practical requirements of the 
judicial oath: ‘to put out of your mind [. . .] any personal prejudices or beliefs, 
or sympathies or hostilities’. This list of elements includes emotions, which are 
characterised as internal, individual, personal and removable. She also elabo-
rates on the importance of deciding on the evidence, reflecting the formal 
judicial role of applying the law to the facts to reach a legally valid result. 
Another judge pinpoints practical steps in achieving impartiality in the face of 
pre-existing attitudes, which may be emotionally driven.
It’s the quality of being able to identify and overcome, umm, your biases and 
prejudices [. . .] We all as judges come to umm a decision making with biases 
and prejudices but umm so long as you come willing to change your bias 
to recognise what it is and to change it or to make a decision despite it then 
you have that quality of impartiality. So far from denying the biases it’s best 
to identify them to yourself and by identifying them and putting them aside 
as best you can. I’m not suggesting it’s easy or that we do it well always but 
that’s what impartiality is, impartiality is identifying it and putting it aside.
(I 23, male judge)
This judge elaborates on the considerable effort involved in seeking impartiality: 
first, recognise any bias or prejudice and, second, change it or make the deci-
sion ‘despite it’. Impartiality is the capacity to ‘overcome’ biases and prejudices 
which has to be done ‘as best you can’, implying that it may not be possible 
to achieve completely: ‘I’m not suggesting it’s easy or that we do it well’. The 
quest for impartiality, for this judge, requires considerable and difficult emotion 
management (see Wettergren, this volume, Chapter 2).
Impartiality and emotion management
Emotions emerge in the interactive context of the courtroom, for example, 
annoyance or anger at a lawyer or litigant, distress stemming from the nature 
or facts of a crime or a response to the grief or sadness of others (Baillot, 
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Cowan & Munro 2013; Booth 2016). Many judicial officers interviewed 
explicitly identify emotion as inconsistent with the demands of impartial deci-
sion making, which requires keeping an open mind. They deploy specific 
strategies to limit what they describe as the impact of emotion in their daily 
work. These strategies are examples of emotion work, emotion regulation or 
emotion management (Hochschild 1979; Lively 2008).
The next judge explicitly links being impartial and keeping an open mind as 
entailing management of her own emotions. This involves ‘being self-aware’, 
practising ‘self-reflection’ – a kind of auto-correction – as part of emotion 
work, both of the experience of emotion and the outward display.
Well, umm, you have to start with an open mind. So to start with an 
open mind you have to listen, umm, you have to you know, look at and 
listen to everything that can properly be put before you and if you’re not 
going to look at something you’ve got to explain why, umm, and umm, 
you have to be clear in your reasons for decision as to why you have gone 
one way or the other particularly, not so much on the law but particularly 
in factual findings where you’re having to rely upon, umm, well you’re 
drawing conclusions, umm, as to whether you should accept the evidence 
of one person rather than another, that’s very challenging to explain that, 
umm, carefully. Umm, something that I don’t think is immediately obvi-
ous to, umm, the reader of a decision or somebody watching you do 
your job is self-awareness [. . .] of how you’re responding to people in 
your process and to, if you’re finding that the way a particular person is 
behaving makes you feel a little hostile or prickly about them, you know, 
what is that, what’s that trigger, is it actually them or is it something else 
about you. So that self-reflection, umm, I think is helpful. [. . .] That’s the 
essential aspect of impartiality is that you’re focussed on your, your process 
of decision making and being self-aware in that of your, umm, umm, any 
inherent bias or emotional response or whatever it is.
(I 37, female judge)
This comment underscores listening as part of an open mind, especially as ‘fac-
tual findings’ are ‘very challenging to explain’. Perhaps she is implicitly aware 
that findings of fact can entail judgment which can be perceived by others as 
lacking objectivity or impartiality. She proposes that ‘you have to be clear in 
your reasons for decision’. Giving reasons can be an important opportunity for 
the performance of impartiality, including the suppression of some emotions 
on the part of the judicial officer. Thomas suggests that requiring a statement 
of reasons would avoid ‘[t]he danger of sentences based on an immediate emo-
tional reaction to some particular feature of the offence’ (1963, p. 247). This 
could be especially important in lower courts, where sentencing decisions are 
often given ex tempore, as part of interacting directly with the defendant. The 
judge above (I 37) also refers to ‘self-awareness’ and ‘self-reflection’, both of 
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which relate to emotion regulation and management of own emotions includ-
ing identification of emotion as a trigger: feeling ‘a little hostile or prickly’. 
Such an ‘emotional response’ might be an indicator that a judge is not being 
impartial; locating the source or trigger can facilitate regulating the emotion 
experience and expression.
One magistrate describes a more active method of emotion management to 
maintain the ability to hear both sides and decide impartially, in the face of an 
emotion such as anger.
I know sometimes you can feel sometimes the anger or something coming up 
and you just have to go okay this is the time to get off the bench and just walk 
around for five minutes because of what’s been said or the manner in which 
something’s been said and I think most colleagues are aware of those issues.
(I 12, female magistrate)
This is an example of situation modification (Maroney & Gross 2014) where 
the judge attempts to manage her own emotions by leaving the bench for a few 
minutes. Such a strategy is limited. The exigencies of a busy courtroom reduce 
the opportunities for a judicial officer to adjourn matters or to leave the bench 
for lengthy periods (Mack & Roach Anleu 2007).
A more commonly expressed approach is to put aside whatever emotion 
is thought to be inconsistent with the central legal method of deciding cases, 
and focus on this judicial obligation. As the following judicial officer explains:
I think in terms of impartiality, I think, it is picking up that case and look-
ing at, looking at the facts that come before you and deciding it on noth-
ing but the evidence that you have before you and not what the person 
looks like, is wearing, or whether their lawyer is good or bad, and I think 
often we would not be human if we didn’t pre-judge people and make an 
assumption [. . .] It’s about putting all of that to one side as well and no 
matter how dreadful or unpleasant their lawyer is or they are – it’s about 
looking at the facts that you have before you and making a decision on 
the facts and as they apply to the law. [. . .] maybe it’s different in the 
higher courts because you don’t, you do more law than, we’re not really 
doing a lot of law, we’re doing really more fact finding and maybe you’re 
doing more law and so you have the longer cases and maybe you don’t 
experience it as much, I would be surprised if any magistrate didn’t have 
to remind themselves because you get some so seriously unpleasant people 
and doing dreadful things that you’ve got to go stop.
(I 03, female magistrate)
This magistrate views decision making as founded on objective facts and 
legally determined evidence, and so she excludes emotion and feeling from 
the process. If case details evoke or trigger emotions, these must and can be 
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put aside. This magistrate also highlights feelings – negative and positive – that 
can emerge in interchanges with ‘accused persons [. . .] and their lawyers’. She 
distinguishes the magistrates courts from higher courts which ‘do more law 
[. . .] we’re [magistrates] doing really more fact finding’. This resonates with 
Abbott’s (1981) concept of professional purification: in Anglo-American legal 
systems, higher courts typically deal with problems or disputes translated into 
legal argument by legal professionals (barristers), where emotion and human 
complexity are removed, whereas lower courts do not deal with this level of 
purification but with cases where legal, social and human issues meld.
By characterising their practices as having an open mind, judicial officers 
associate their work with thinking, as a cognitive process, rather than as an 
emotional or affective experience. However, thinking and feeling are not com-
pletely separate processes or practices, but can interact.
Well I mean impartiality means that you are deciding the case, you know, 
without fear or favour to one party or another [. . .] and you know I mean 
I think this often comes to – well this should come to lawyers and judges 
almost instinctively. [. . .] I see people who I feel sorry for, I occasionally 
see people who I think you know are really not very deserving, you know 
you do feel some antagonism towards them either because of what they’ve 
done or sometimes how they conduct themselves but I think, you know, 
I know for myself that if ever I begin to sort of feel that way I consciously 
say look just, forget it, put it out of your mind because if, you know I’m 
mindful that it’s just folly, just gets you into so much trouble.
(I 06, male judge)
Beginning to feel certain emotions, such as anger or frustration, might signal 
that the quest for impartiality and adherence to the conventional mode of 
judicial authority could be at risk. The capacity for self-regulation, including 
managing one’s own emotions, comes from a judicial officer’s legal training, 
enabling self-talk as an emotional management strategy: ‘I consciously say look 
just, forget it, put it out of your mind’. This internal self-talk is a conversation 
between the judge as ordinary person and the judge qua judge.
The following female magistrate also describes the ways evidence can trig-
ger emotional responses and the importance of managing her own emotions.
I can remember when I did my first Care List, I had no concept that par-
ents did such atrocious things to their children in this day and age, and I 
can remember one of the first files I looked at, the house was just appall-
ing, the fridge, I thought I was going to be sick, umm, and my, looking 
at it in chambers before I went on the bench, my blood pressure, anger, 
everything was just running rife [. . .] and so I had to pull myself back and 
walk on the bench and think you’re not here to judge this person on your 
own standards, you’re here to deal with it on the evidence and only the 
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evidence, umm, and I find it easy when you do that. If you don’t look for 
what might be behind something else or speculate on why they’re doing 
this, you just go straight down the line, there’s the evidence. [. . .] If you 
start to find people guilty or not guilty based on your personal views of 
things well the justice system’s going to go to rack and ruin and you know, 
umm, so I haven’t found it that hard actually. Sometimes I find it hard, the 
decision I have to make, but actually just dealing with it on the evidence I 
haven’t found – as hard as I thought I might.
(I 19, female magistrate)
In this excerpt the magistrate describes her emotional reaction to the facts of a 
case and refers to the physical manifestation of emotion: ‘I thought I was going 
to be sick [. . .] my blood pressure, anger, everything was just running rife’. The 
evidence – the things she saw and heard during the case – triggered an emo-
tional response. She describes managing her own emotions: ‘I had to pull myself 
back’. This is a specific example of the ‘kinds of transitions involved in emotion 
work’ (Lively & Heise 2004, p. 1112). This reflection also suggests the idea of 
a performance; she had to ‘walk on the bench’ (the stage) and put her feelings 
into the personal realm (offstage) reminding herself of her judicial role (part) and 
responsibilities: ‘you’re not here to judge this person on your own standards’. 
She invokes the conventional model of judicial authority, through talking to 
herself: ‘you’re here to deal with it on the evidence and only the evidence’. 
Importantly, the issues are institutional not personal: ‘if you start to find people 
guilty or not guilty based on your personal views of things well the justice sys-
tem’s going to go to rack and ruin’. The judicial officer reframes the way she 
assesses information, shifting from a personal reaction to a professional, dispas-
sionate stance. ‘[C]ompetent judges learn to treat vivid stimuli as professionally 
relevant rather than personally provocative’ (Maroney & Gross 2014, p. 146).
Conclusion
Although Patulny and Olson (this volume, Chapter 1) argue that late modernity 
is ushering in a new emotional regime, the emotional legacy of modernity con-
tinues within the judiciary. The notion of emotion-free rational action underpins 
the conventional model of judging (Weber 1978). ‘[I]nsistence on emotionless 
judging –that is on judicial dispassion – is a cultural script of unusual longevity 
and potency’ (Maroney 2011, p. 630). The focus on putting emotions aside, 
before turning to reasoned (rational) decision making based on the facts and 
the law, requires internal human processes such as self-awareness, or self-talk or 
‘setting aside’. These are all forms of emotion management (Hochschild 1979). 
Some judicial officers find meeting these expectations relatively easy, learned as 
a part of legal training and practice as well as a formal judicial obligation. Others 
are more challenged by these demands. Considerable research establishes that 
cognitive and emotion processes are difficult, even impossible to disentangle 
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in practice (Barrett 2006a; 2006b; Reddy 2009). More significantly: ‘Emotion 
and reason are mutually dependent and informed by one another in ways that 
blur the distinction’ (Wettergren & Bergman Blix 2016, p. 22), so that the 
claimed absence of emotion, or the suppression of all emotions anticipated by 
the conventional understanding, is somewhat illusory. The question becomes: 
in everyday judicial practice in court, ‘which particular emotions are implicated 
in distinct types of social interaction or processes?’ (Barbalet 2011, p. 41).
Understanding impartiality and emotion in judicial work requires deeper 
understanding of emotions and emotional processes, including those that tend 
to have low expressivity. ‘[T]he majority of emotional experiences, and cer-
tainly some of the most important for social interactions and outcomes, are had 
without the emoting subjects being consciously aware of them’ (Barbalet 2011, 
p. 39); these are background emotions. While observable states associated with 
emotion that are seen as ‘spontaneous, unruly and disorganising’ (Barbalet 
2000, p. 336) might threaten rational action and judicial impartiality, back-
ground emotions might facilitate or advance the performance of impartiality.
In the context of the judiciary, collateral or background emotions might 
include a sense of loyalty to the judicial role, feeling ready to decide and deliver 
a sentence or feelings of satisfaction that they are implementing legal or social 
values, such as justice, fairness and impartiality. While some judicial offic-
ers identify some emotions they put aside (e.g. anger, frustration, sympathy) 
deemed as inappropriate for the judicial role, many do not explicitly recognise 
other emotions they may rely on when they invoke the rule of law or the oath 
of judicial office to describe their practices. In this sense, the judiciary can be 
understood as being part of an emotional community (Rosenwein 2006) or 
having an emotional style (Gammerl 2012), which entails distinct feeling rules 
acquired through training and experience.
The quest to accomplish impartiality – to be impartial – requires judicial 
officers to undertake considerable emotion work. In this sense, the script of 
judicial dispassion (Maroney 2011) ‘is emotionally sustained’ (Wettergren & 
Bergman Blix 2016, p. 31). Yet these norms of judicial practice and institu-
tional requirements are not completely determinative. Not all judicial officers 
approach or think about their work in the same ways; they do not understand 
impartiality identically, nor do they experience and display the same emotions. 
Emotion work undertaken by judicial officers entails reminding themselves of 
their judicial role – what they are there for – and its requirements: to decide 
cases on law and facts. In late modernity, judicial officers may have to be 
more emotionally engaged, departing from the conventional model of judicial 
authority, though this does not appear to shift the dominant conceptualisation 
of impartiality as dispassionate, detached and impersonal. The continuing quest 
for impartiality, whether understood as detached impersonality or entailing 
some emotion engagement, inevitably requires emotion work and reflexivity 
on the part of individual judicial officers, demonstrating the complex intersec-
tions between rationality and emotion in the legal system.
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Notes
1 Impartiality and objectivity are associated concepts; both are aspirational ideals, val-
ues and processes, as well as practical accomplishments. Specifying the relationship 
between the two is beyond the scope of this chapter (see Jacobsson 2008).
2 In this chapter, the term ‘judicial officer’ refers to any member of the judiciary, regard-
less of court level or type. Generally, in Australia, the term magistrate refers to judicial 
officers in lower courts and judge refers to those who preside in the higher (interme-
diate and supreme) state and territory courts or national courts.
3 The interviews are are labelled by the code ‘I ##’, in which I indicates this is inter-
view data and ## refers to an individual interviewee. Quotes are given verbatim, 
with any identifying details deleted. For more information, see Roach Anleu and 
Mack (2017).
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Chapter 18
Power, (com)passion and  
trust in interprofessional 
healthcare
Rebecca E. Olson and Ann Dadich
Introduction
Most formal healthcare systems are hierarchical, with some professions, 
notably medicine and physiotherapy, holding more influence than others. 
Hofling and colleagues’ (1966) oft-cited experiment illustrates power inequity 
between medicine and nursing; 22 hospital-based nurses were telephoned by 
a researcher, claiming to be ‘Dr Smith’, who instructed them to administer 20 
milligrams of a fake medication to a patient in their care. This dose was twice 
that permitted, as per the label. Although protocol should have prevented the 
nurses from heeding telephone directions from this unknown doctor, 21 nurses 
nonetheless had to be stopped from administering the fictional drug. This clas-
sic study suggests healthcare hierarchies can affect medical errors and adverse 
events, compromising patient safety.
Revised care models were introduced, partly to address the patient safety 
issues associated with healthcare system hierarchies. Since the late 1980s, first 
multidisciplinary and then interprofessional models of care have featured in 
healthcare reforms, receiving widespread support (Ackland et al. 2005; WHO 
1988). Rather than working separately within professional silos, interprofes-
sional practice aims to create ‘high-functioning teams that communicate and 
collaborate efficiently and effectively’ (Dow et al. 2017, p. 1). Interprofessional 
clinicians work together within and across disciplinary boundaries to inte-
grate and coordinate holistic care that awards primacy to patients and carers 
(McCallin 2001). Given its overarching aim and the ethos that it emanates, 
interprofessional practice might help to redress the negative effects of the 
power imbalances within healthcare hierarchies, fostering a more egalitarian 
professional landscape (Olson 2015a; Paradis & Whitehead 2015).
Seminal theoretical and empirical work within medical sociology elucidates 
the foundations of healthcare hierarchies and their effects. A growing body of 
scholarship examines interprofessional practice sociologically, but emotions are 
largely absent from these works. This is an important omission, as emotions 
imbue and ‘constitute the bases of social life’ (Barbalet 1996, p. 75), particularly 
within healthcare. Healthcare – where trained professionals monitor, diagnose, 
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resuscitate, care for and usher in and out human lives – represents a social 
space of heightened emotion. The emotional labour and care work performed 
in interactions between clinicians – especially nurses – and patients has been 
acknowledged in sociological research (James 1992). By comparison, the way 
emotions colour and structure interactions between different health professions 
is under-researched and under-theorised.
This chapter examines the affective bases of traditional, hierarchical models 
and interprofessional models of healthcare. Overall, we explicate the emotional 
elements of healthcare work, and how emotions sustain or undermine different 
models of care. Accordingly, we define emotions as physiological, structural 
and cultural, experienced individually and collectively, consciously and uncon-
sciously (thus, we use emotion and affect interchangeably) and capable of 
‘do[ing] things’ at a structural level (Ahmed 2004, p. 119; Barbalet 2006). We 
draw on theories from Collins (1990), Foucault (1972) and Holmes (2010) to 
conceptualise how hierarchies and emotions intersect. And we conceptualise 
interprofessional practice as illustrative of broader trends in late modernity.
As detailed earlier in this book (Patulny & Olson (Chapter 1)), late modernity 
is an era where change typically occurs too fast for habits or routines to solidify. 
Healthcare reform is now routine (Brunsson 2009; Dadich & Hosseinzadeh 2013; 
Dadich et al. 2013); multidisciplinary and then interprofessional care models have 
replaced traditional structures. Training to prepare students for these frequently 
revised care models speaks to this increasing pace of change. Socialisation into 
roles for work within older, silo-based care models is of less value. What was 
previously acceptable and/or feasible has limited fit with the present. To ascer-
tain how to act during late modernity, individuals and those they work with are 
likely to find value in reflexivity: an almost continuous process of reflecting on 
reflections and questioning the self and environment fit. It involves ‘monitoring 
[. . .] sensory input from the environment [. . .] and bodily dispositions’ (Giddens 
1991, p. 77), while using ‘information about the conditions of activity as a means 
of regularly ordering and redefining what that activity is’ (1994, p. 86).
To inform our examination of emotions in late-modern, interprofessional 
healthcare interactions, we draw on our Australian research, based on data 
collected between 2012 and 2015. Primary data were sourced from inter-
views and focus groups with health professional students (e.g., undergraduate 
physiotherapy, occupational therapy, exercise physiology, nursing and speech 
pathology students) in New South Wales and Queensland who completed 
clinical placements and interprofessional education. These data were themati-
cally analysed, supported by qualitative research software NVivo. Secondary 
data were sourced from the Twitter accounts of organisations dedicated to 
cancer care – one nursing, one medical and one interprofessional (Dadich & 
Olson 2017; Olson 2015b). For comparative value, a critical affective analysis 
was conducted on these data (Dadich & Olson 2014).
We posit that healthcare hierarchies are sustained by an emotional dis-
course that casts emotion as a threat to objectivity, and also work to elicit 
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negative emotional energy among subordinates. Interprofessional models 
of care might disrupt this negative emotional energy flow, as this form of 
practice depends on clinicians who reflexively foster trust. First, we describe 
professional hierarchies within Australian healthcare systems, which are 
based on gendered and epistemological differences; we then explicate the 
emotional discourses that inform, and the emotional experiences affected by 
these hierarchies. Second, we examine the emotional dimensions of inter-
professional models of care and health professional education to question 
how this way of organising health professionals disrupts or reinforces health-
care hierarchies. Third, we theorise interprofessional practice as illustrative 
of broader late modern trends, requiring health professionals to engage in 
ongoing reflection on their reflections and emotions, as they learn how to 
interact in a rapidly changing social and professional landscape. Finally, we 
outline the main emotional challenges of interprofessional practice and how 
these might be addressed.
Healthcare hierarchy
The uneven social terrain in healthcare systems is widely acknowledged. The 
medical profession’s prime positioning remains unchanged, despite recent 
trends: the surge of malpractice lawsuits, the rise of defensive medicine, insurers’ 
limitations and the increasing role of the pharmaceutical industry (Timmermans 
& Oh 2010). Medical professionals retain their authority, explicitly through 
resource control (Kenny & Duckett 2004), and implicitly as knowledge gate-
keepers (Crowe, Clarke & Brugha 2017). Understanding what underpins the 
hierarchy within health systems has been a primary focus of medical sociology. 
In this section, we outline scholarship on the hierarchical relationship across 
medicine and nursing, and then the allied health professions.
Sociological research on the unequal relationship between doctors and 
nurses has emphasised medicine’s alliance with scientific knowledge, medicine’s 
desired autonomy over its work and the reverberations of broader gendered 
and class divisions of labour within healthcare. Turner (1995) asserted that 
medicine’s alignment with scientific knowledge in the late nineteenth century 
shaped its professional status, as compared to its competitors: namely, barbers 
and surgeons. Similarly, Freidson (1988) argued that alignment with a distinct 
body of knowledge is central to what distinguishes professions, such as medi-
cine and law, from semi-professions, like nursing. Most important for Freidson, 
however, is a profession’s sovereignty over its own work, professional stand-
ards and the work of subordinate semi-professions. The importance of this 
state-sanctioned authority was echoed by Willis’ (1989) concept of medical 
dominance. However, Willis (1994, p. 24) argued that relationships between 
doctors, nurses and other clinicians (e.g., allied health professionals – defined 
later) also reflect ‘the social division of labour in the wider society – a society 
stratified along class, gender and other lines’.
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Patriarchal binaries that have remained relatively constant are evident in 
the division of labour between doctors and nurses. Traditionally, a female 
nurse was described as the ‘physician’s hand’, implying that nurses provided 
physical and care (not intellectual) work, that they are handmaidens and 
that they report to physicians. As Larson (1995, p. 180) explained, ‘virtues 
such as duty, discipline, self-control, and obedience were extolled’. In short, 
medicine is associated with higher-status intellectual work. Caring, linked 
with lower-status women’s work, is central to nursing (Kelleher, Gabe & 
Williams 1994).
Epistemological and gendered divisions also underpin the hierarchy 
across female-dominated allied health professions. Allied health encompasses 
a range of health professions, such as social work, occupational therapy, 
speech pathology, physiotherapy and psychology. These professions occupy 
the middle-ground of healthcare hierarchies, sandwiched between medicine 
above, and nursing and healthcare assistants below (Williams & Lawlis 2014). 
Within allied health, particular disciplines dominate, like physiotherapy and 
psychology, both of which align more with scientific knowledge than mater-
nalistic or emotional definitions of care (Murray 2017; Short 1986). Although 
occupational therapy historically, ‘achieved legitimacy [by] backing [. . .] 
women’s charity networks’ (Linker 2005, p. 106), physiotherapy emphasised 
its scientific-basis and the ‘brawn’ it requires, bestowing physiotherapists with 
‘authority over the disabled body’. The birth of psychology as a discipline 
and a practice was wedded to science and the use of scientific methods to 
demonstrate legitimacy (Kantor 1963). These efforts can be interpreted as a 
strategic distancing of both physiotherapy and psychology from the emotional 
dimensions of care.
Emotions in healthcare hierarchies
While ‘the social structure of health care’ has sustained the attention of medical 
sociologists since the subdiscipline’s inception (Willis 1994, p. 12), the emo-
tional dimensions of clinician care, and the emotional implications within this 
social structure, have only received regular attention since the 1990s. James 
(1992) highlighted this more-difficult-to-explain aspect of hospice nurses’ 
roles, relative to their physical and organisational work. As part of their formal 
role, nurses were understood to work to change their emotions, and those of 
patients and carers. James and Gabe (1996) speculated that delayed acknowl-
edgement of the emotional dimensions of health and healthcare might reflect 
wider omissions in sociological history that favoured the rational, masculine 
and objective over the emotional, feminine and subjective.
Although clinicians’ emotional labour is recognized – particularly during 
patient interactions – theorisation of, and research on, the significance of emotions 
to the social structure of healthcare is limited. Next, we outline Durkheimian 
and Foucauldian theories on the organising role of emotions in interprofessional 
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interactions in healthcare. We then apply these theories to our own data to con-
sider how emotions sustain healthcare hierarchies. We draw first from interview 
and focus group data collected from a study into allied health and nursing students’ 
experiences of interprofessional education (Olson 2015b), and second from a sys-
tematic and critical analysis of tweets from three cancer care organisations – one 
medical, one nursing and one interprofessional (Dadich & Olson 2017).
Interaction rituals
Williams (2000), drawing on Collins (1990), offers a Durkheimian reading of the 
importance of emotions in interaction rituals and in the social order of the medi-
cal system. In large organisations, like hospitals, higher-status ‘order-givers’, like 
senior doctors, draw positive ‘emotional energy’ from interactions, while lower-
status ‘order-takers’, like junior nurses, can experience diminished emotional 
engagement (Williams 2000, p. 301). Over time, these repeated interactions and 
emotional-energy patterns accrue and work to: (1) increase the probability that 
lower-status players experience negative emotions, while higher-status players 
experience positive emotions; and (2) reinforce organisational stratification.
Olson’s (2015b) findings support Williams’ (2000) conceptualisation. In her 
study, pre-licensure nursing and allied health professionals positioned doctors 
and senior nurses as ‘order-givers’, and junior or student nurses as frustrated 
‘order-takers’. Krystal, a nursing student in her twenties, described her frustra-
tion at receiving orders from a senior male doctor while on placement. She 
hinted at a hierarchy underpinned by patriarchal and epistemological distinc-
tions with affective reverberations:
They might know more in an area . . . That doesn’t mean we should be 
ducking our heads and putting our tails between our knees because the 
doctor’s walked in. That’s something that frustrates me a lot . . . They 
don’t let females catheterise males . . . I walked in to watch this doctor 
catheterise and he literally put his sterilised gloves straight on and went, 
‘Set it up’ . . . I was very, ‘Really mate?’
Speaking on behalf of her nursing colleagues, Krystal recalled instances of ‘duck-
ing our heads and putting our tails between our knees’ when interacting with 
doctors. This alludes to a collective and an embodied emotional response to the 
subordinate positioning of nurses, relative to physicians. Her critique and frustra-
tion to this response is demonstrated by her non-verbalised response to the male 
doctor – ‘Really mate?’ – following his directive. The ironic use of the Australian 
term ‘mate’ suggests limited comradery and the excerpt speaks to nurses’ negative 
emotions when positioned as subordinates in healthcare hierarchies.
Healthcare hierarchies are both inter- and intra-professional. Harriet, a 
nursing student in her forties with relevant experience, described the hierarchy 
within nursing, partly based on qualification:
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You go into the hospital and say, ‘I’m an AIN [Assistant in Nursing]’ and 
someone goes, ‘Oh, I’m a double EN [Enrolled Nurse]’ . . . ‘Well I’ve got 
a Diploma in Nursing’ and the next person will go, ‘Oh, I’ve got a Degree 
in Nursing’ and somebody goes, ‘Oh, I’ve got a Masters’ and someone else 
will say ‘I’ve got a Doctorate’ and people will put you down the whole 
time. When you are a student [. . .] you are nothing and it doesn’t matter 
how old you are, it doesn’t matter how much experience you’ve got.
Harriet depicted qualifications as a way nurses repeatedly ‘put you down’ and 
exercise authority over other nurses. This can elicit a sense of ‘you are noth-
ing’, which has the effect of reducing positive emotional energy.
Harriet and Krystal illustrated the negative emotional-energy pattern 
experienced by subordinates within healthcare (e.g., junior nurses). This sup-
ports Williams’ (2000) account of the emotional basis of the social order of 
healthcare. Other scholarship on the significance of emotions to healthcare 
hierarchies, which draws on the Foucauldian concept of discourse, explicates 
how emotions, power and knowledge converge to imbue and legitimate 
subjects and positions.
Emotional discourses
Discourse speaks to the knowledge and power nexus that is central to Foucauldian 
scholarship. It represents ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which 
they speak’ (Foucault 1972, p. 49); it refers to a particular way, based in a 
particular form of knowledge, of conceptualising something. Conceptualising 
a thing, person or role in a particular way informs its relative and relational 
position. In other words, discourse denotes how the competing ways that we 
understand the world and ourselves shape subjectivities – consider, for instance, 
how research practices, and the value awarded to particular knowledges, are 
based on (and help to promote) dominant philosophies and ideologies.
In the context of emotions, a Cartesian dualist discourse dominates.1 
Derived from Ancient Greek philosophies (e.g., Plato and Socrates), the 
Enlightenment era (e.g., Descartes) and (masculine) European philosophies 
of knowledge, this discourse depicts the mind and body, reason and emotion, 
as separate (see this volume, Chapter 1). Feminist scholars have critiqued 
such binary views for furthering patriarchal ways of seeing, knowing and 
being – where the experienced world differs from a world that is constructed 
using philosophies of knowledge that manifest via dominant, patriarchal and 
science-based discourses (Hekman 1990; Smith 1990). Such dualist concep-
tualisations of emotions have been debunked by empirical research depicting 
the similarities in men’s and women’s emotions (Patulny, Smith & Soh 2017), 
by research demonstrating how emotions and the body influence reasoning 
(Damasio 2003), as well as sociological scholarship asserting that emotions 
are not solely contained within individual bodies, but work across people 
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through relationships (Barbalet 2002). Yet, a dualist discourse still underpins 
two of our most powerful social structures – namely, law (Roach Anleu et al. 
2016) and, as this section shows, medicine.
Our own analysis of tweets from three cancer care organisations – one med-
ical, one nursing and one interprofessional – speaks to the different cultures 
and emotional discourses across medicine and nursing (Dadich & Olson 2017). 
Tweets from the nursing organisation were optimistic, and filled with both 
‘sadness and joy’ (p. 73):
Cancer clue gives hope for older mothers
The #Welcome to country of course made me cry. Heart Warming
The tweets from the interprofessional organisation were comparatively devoid 
of emotions, with few to no references to emotions or messages aiming to 
inspire affective responses. Tweets from the medical organisation used research 
findings to evoke emotional responses, like fear or hope:
Radiation fears prompt new guidelines – baby monitors should be placed 
1 metre away from cots
These findings suggest that there are distinct emotional discourses in nursing 
and medicine. In nursing, emotions are treated as commonplace, experienced 
by clinicians and patients and implicated in most social interactions. Perhaps 
this is not surprising, given the centrality of emotional labour in nursing care 
(James 1992). In contrast, medicine treats emotion as less relevant, and only 
helpful for health promotion in order to evoke behaviour change.
These findings extend McNaughton’s (2013) analysis of emotions in medical 
education. McNaughton outlined three central discourses of emotion – namely, 
‘Emotion as physiology’, where they are thought to be a universal phenomenon 
based in one’s biology, but also a potential symptom of pathology; ‘Emotion as 
skills’, where emotions are conceived as psychological, physiological, observable 
and open to change through skilled performances, reflecting understandings of 
emotional labour and emotional intelligence; and ‘Emotion as a socio-cultural 
mediator’, where emotions are thought to be socially, collaboratively, culturally 
and politically constructed and even treated as valid knowledge (McNaughton 
2013, p. 73). Despite the role of emotions in reasoning and relationships, and 
although emotions are shaped by sociocultural and political forces, most medi-
cal education depicts emotions as physiological and something clinicians should 
suppress, get over or get used to. This framework echoes the outdated yet still 
pervasive view of emotions as pathological, problematic and separate from reason 
and objectivity.
Law and medicine, as examples par excellence of professions, follow physi-
ological and dualistic understandings of emotion. This treatment of emotions 
underpins their legitimacy, as based in ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ knowledge 
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(Fineman 2010). In addition to patriarchal and knowledge divisions, the health 
system hierarchy, with the superior positioning of medicine, is underpinned by 
an emotional discourse. Those at the top – (specialist) doctors, (and to some 
extent) physiotherapists and psychologists – partly gain legitimacy by treating 
emotions as physiological and biochemical elements that can be partitioned 
and managed, if not restrained. Conversely, those at the bottom more often 
employ skills-based conceptualisations of emotions as part of their work with 
patients and their carers.
Interprofessional care models and emotion
Having identified the place of emotions in healthcare hierarchies through their 
gendered and epistemological connotations, we examine the emotions impli-
cated in different approaches to healthcare and healthcare education, which 
have gained significant momentum – interprofessional practice and interprofes-
sional education. Following interprofessional practice’s shared model of care, 
interprofessional education involves learning where, ‘students of two or more 
professions learn with, from and about each other to improve collaboration 
and the quality of care and services’ (CAIPE 2018, para. 1). Changes to uni-
versity-based, pre-licensure training and socialisation enacted in the name of 
interprofessional education, along with changes in the practical organisational of 
care, have catalysed interprofessional healthcare system changes (Olson 2015a).
Sociological theorisation of interprofessional education is under-developed 
(Kitto et al. 2011; Michalec & Hafferty 2015), and relationships between inter-
professional practice (and the associated education), emotions and healthcare 
hierarchies are rarely acknowledged. Here we explore how interprofessional 
practice and interprofessional education influence relationships across (and 
within) health professions, affecting the often-overlooked emotional dimen-
sions of collaborative healthcare. To inform our analysis, we again use Collins’ 
(1990) theory of stratification and emotional energy. We re-examine interview 
and focus group data collected for a study of healthcare students’ experiences 
of interprofessional education (Dadich & Olson 2017). Overall, we suggest that 
interprofessional practice relies on trust, and can improve how (pre-licensure) 
clinicians feel about the hierarchy, with limited effect on the hierarchy itself or 
other social forces that shape it.
Despite the paucity of attention on emotion in this area, our analysis points 
to the importance of emotion – notably, pride and trust – to interprofessional 
practice (Dadich & Olson 2017). Students indicated that interprofessional care 
can lead to the best patient outcomes, enabling them to take pride in their 
(future) work and profession.
Between the professions and in yourself . . . you feel like, yes, you’re 
giving the best care. You can provide the best care to the patient.
(male nursing student, p. 72)
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Pride is a foundational pro-social emotion (Scheff 2014) – yet, within interpro-
fessional practice, it can be mediated by trust. Trust is another primary social 
emotion (Barbalet 1996). Although characterised by a ‘low feeling state’, trust 
is necessary for cooperation (p. 81). To be proud of their interprofessional 
work, students, such as the nurse quoted earlier, highlighted the need to have 
faith in their clinical colleagues. But a lack of familiarity with the person and 
the profession often made trusting other professions/als difficult.
I’ve got one patient. He needs something to be addressed, which is something 
related to feet. So just refer to podiatrist. But we don’t know what podiatrists 
do . . . [It is important to] know what they are doing . . . for the sake of the 
patient, so you know that this is the outcome the patient is going to get.
(p. 72)
These (and other) findings affirm the role of emotions in interprofessional prac-
tice. Despite this role, the study demonstrated the seeming robustness of the 
health system hierarchy – and this was met with both resentment and relief 
(Dadich & Olson 2017). For instance, in acknowledging a persistent chain of 
command, based on knowledge differences and decision-making authority, the 
male nursing student noted:
some people . . . [are] kind of dominant – they say ‘Hey, I’m in medicine 
. . . so I should lead’ . . . that’s it . . . As a nurse, you’re supposed to not 
know everything. You’re supposed to not do the doctor’s job.
(p. 71)
Yet for the allied health students, discussion of medical dominance was tinged 
with appreciation and acceptance:
it’s accepted that the doctor is in that position and they do have that right 
to make certain decisions that we don’t. So I don’t think there was any 
clash . . . Everyone kind of knew where they sat.
(fourth-year podiatry student, p. 72)
If each team member was treated fairly, and listened to – that is, not given 
orders – these allied health participants accepted the hierarchy and did not dis-
play negative emotional energy or emotional disengagement.
This evidence suggests that while interprofessional models might assuage – 
if not reduce – the negative emotions and the depletion of emotional energy 
experienced by ‘order-takers’ (Collins 1990), they do little to challenge (let 
alone restructure) other forces underpinning the health system hierarchy.
Findings highlight two key points. First, emotions are implicated in the suc-
cess (or otherwise) of interprofessional practices – particularly pride and trust. 
Second, interprofessional models do not necessarily (and perhaps cannot) flatten 
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enduring healthcare hierarchies. Instead, interprofessional practice shapes how 
this hierarchy is perceived, experienced and felt, especially during interprofes-
sional interactions. Collins’ (1990) theory enables us to see how shared decision 
making can counter the negative emotional energy of the ‘order-taker’ and 
‘order-giver’ effect – yet the codified (Friedson 2001), epistemological, gen-
dered, discursive and emotionally imbued (or neutral) nature of other healthcare 
practices might remain unchanged, or only slightly altered.
Late modern, emotionally reflexive clinicians
Finally, we draw on Barbalet (1996) and Holmes (2010) to theorise that coop-
eration based on trust, on which interprofessional practice depends, requires 
health professionals to work more reflexively to cultivate trust within teams. We 
conclude by considering the challenges of fostering trust within interprofessional 
teams, given the late modern context.
Following Barbalet’s (1996, p. 77) exegesis on social emotions, we consider 
trust to be ‘the emotional basis of cooperation’. Organised action depends on 
trust, but this dependence can be direct or indirect. Under silo-based and more 
hierarchical care models, cooperation is indirectly dependent on trust. It is, we 
speculate, achieved via one’s ‘trust that coercion will be used against them if 
they fail to cooperate’ (p. 78). Interprofessional practice depends directly on 
trust. Cooperation under interprofessional models relies on each health pro-
fessional’s familiarity with and confidence in others’ specialisations and work. 
This way of working, we argue, requires reflexivity.
Interprofessional practice assumes that no one profession/al is sufficient to 
provide holistic care. This view of knowledges and practices is typical of late 
modernity, where uncertainty imbues rapid changes, specialisation and multi-
plicities. Faced with different options, interprofessional practitioners must be 
reflexive. Rather than rely on habit or one discipline’s best-practice guidelines, 
health professionals must question the best course of action for each patient in 
each situation, given available information, resources and health professionals. 
Emotional responses to these questions – the health professionals’ emotional 
reflexivity – guide collective decision making. As Burkitt (2012 p. 469, original 
italics) explains, ‘feelings and emotions are not just attendants to reflexivity; they 
are the basis and motive for reflexive thought’. Faced with ever-present compet-
ing knowledge claims, and limited ‘knowledge . . . to make a fully reasoned 
decision’ (Holmes 2010, p. 149), individuals must rely on emotion to proceed – 
which includes the emotions of other health professionals within and beyond 
the interprofessional team. Maximising professional resources requires the team 
to: be confident in and trust the knowledges and abilities of fellow health 
professionals. This entails a relational form of ‘emotional reflexivity’, whereby 
all health professionals, not just the ‘order-takers’, reflect on their interactions 
with colleagues – and their feelings about these reflections – in forging the 
trust, confidence and cooperation that interprofessional practice requires.
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The main challenge is that, right when familiarity becomes more important – 
for its role in fostering trust and cooperation – it becomes more difficult to 
sustain. Late modernity is marked by escalating change, expanding complexity 
and an increasing need for flexibility (Kuhn 2006). Just as a health profes-
sional becomes sufficiently familiar with a colleague and their practices, they 
are likely to change. Barbalet (1996) referred to this as a trust paradox. As social 
complexity increases, we must rely more on trust in decision making; yet, as 
social complexity increases, ‘the possibilities for familiarity on which individual 
trust rests’ also decrease (Barbalet 1996, p. 80).
In summation, more hierarchical ‘order-giver’ and ‘order-taker’ care models 
can elicit cooperation between health professionals via their trust in sanctions. 
Interprofessional care models require health professionals to rely more on their 
own emotional reflexivity to make collective decisions based on trust. Yet, just 
when trust becomes more directly implicated, the familiarity on which it depends 
becomes more difficult, as late modernity entails complexity and change.
Conclusion
This chapter describes longstanding healthcare hierarchies, based on gen-
dered and epistemological differences. It goes on to illuminate the dynamic 
relationship between hierarchies and emotion – namely, emotional prac-
tices and emotional discourses. It considers how interprofessional healthcare 
shapes emotion-based hierarchies: a change in how clinicians feel about 
the hierarchy and an increasing reliance on trust for cooperative decision 
making. Following this, and guided by Holmes’ (2010) conceptualisation 
of emotional reflexivity, we argue that interprofessional healthcare requires 
emotional reflexivity.
The exploration of emotions, their discursive conceptualisation, how 
they are treated within health professions and how they are acknowledged 
during interprofessional interactions speaks to the theme of this book. 
The focus of this chapter – namely, the need for emotional reflexivity in 
interprofessional healthcare – demonstrates: the rise of emotional complex-
ity; the tensions between collectivised and individualised emotions; and 
an increasing propensity to reflexively manage and reinterpret emotions as 
organisational and cultural expectations change (see Patulny & Olson, this 
volume, Chapter 1).
This focus has important implications for scholars of the sociology of emo-
tions, interprofessional practice and health sociology. Although it recognises 
that the ‘interpretation of others’ and one’s own emotions has become more 
central’ to reflexive practices in late modernity (Holmes 2010, p. 145), further 
empirical evidence – though difficult to acquire – is needed.
Our chapter also suggests a need for theoretical and methodological devel-
opment to capture and clarify the dynamic and structured relationships between 
interprofessional healthcare, emotional practices and emotional discourses. 
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The need for such research is amplified, given the relative dearth of research 
that advances interprofessional healthcare theory (Parker-Tomlin et al. 2017; 
Zwarenstein, Goldman, & Reeves 2009).
Note
1 Although Descartes’ philosophy has been widely interpreted as perpetuating binaries 
(mind versus body; men versus women; reason versus emotion), many (see Gobert 
2013) argue that this is a pervasive misinterpretation of Descartes’ work.
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Compassion and power




As a motivation for social justice-oriented action, compassion has been 
criticised for presupposing an unequal power relationship between a privileged 
giver of compassion and a disadvantaged subject (Berlant 2004). Reflecting 
broader debates within the academic literature regarding care work and 
humanitarianism, critics argue that ‘compassionate’ relationships all too often 
reinforce and reproduce inequalities; they also imply that care givers derive 
emotional gratification both from the privileged benefactor roles that these 
programmes afford them, and from the sense of moral virtue that they achieve 
as a result (Korf 2007; Hutchinson 2014; Gosden 2007). In making these argu-
ments, scholars in this tradition charge volunteers with a failure of reflexivity. 
They suggest that many volunteers are either insufficiently reflexive concern-
ing their position in these programmes, or reflexive in the wrong way. That is, 
they suggest that when these volunteers do engage in introspection, they focus 
not on the moral complexities of their positions, but on maintaining their 
preferred public images.
This chapter interrogates these ideas through an empirical study of volunteer 
reflexivity in asylum seeker friendship programs. It draws on in-depth inter-
views with 30 volunteers who support asylum seekers in Australia’s onshore 
immigration detention facilities, and foregrounds the role of reflexivity in this 
work. This chapter provides evidence (a) that reflexively managed moral emo-
tions concerning Australia’s ‘politics of fear’ (Wodak 2015) inspire volunteers 
to begin visiting detention facilities; (b) that reflexively managed guilt and 
identity dislodgement regarding the structural injustices that they encounter 
in detention inform their volunteer relationships; and (c) that mutual exercises 
in emotion work (Hochschild 1979) – where asylum seekers and volunteers 
work together to create small pockets of normality – are common in these 
affective institutional settings. In presenting these findings, this chapter contests 
the previously described understanding of care-based volunteer work. It also 
provides evidence to support Patulny and Olson’s (this volume, Chapter 1) 
argument regarding the central role that micro- and macro-reflexivity play in 
late modernity.
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The politics of fear
Australia’s detention system has been described as one of the strictest in the world 
(AHRC 2011) and has frequently been accused of breaching Australia’s inter-
national human rights obligations. Australia’s Migration Act 1958 (‘Migration 
Act’) requires the detention of all non-citizens who are in Australia without 
authorisation, regardless of their personal circumstances or whether they pose a 
security threat. Individuals who are detained under the Migration Act are not 
permitted to challenge their detention in court. They are imprisoned without 
charge or trial, and must remain in detention until they are granted a visa or 
removed from the country (AHRC 2017, p. 12).
This policy has often seen maritime asylum seekers physically excluded 
from the Australian community (McLoughlin & Warin 2008; Fleay & 
Hoffman 2014; McAdam & Chong 2014; Fleay & Briskman 2013). This 
has been particularly true since 2001, when offshore processing was intro-
duced in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the USA.1 
Australia’s detention policies have seen asylum seekers incarcerated ‘on the 
fringes of capital cities; lost within semi-arid and desert regions, and [with the 
introduction of offshore processing] on small Pacific islands’ (McLoughlin 
& Warin 2008, p. 255). Secrecy and inaccessibility have thus played a cen-
tral role in Australia’s detention system, with maritime asylum seekers kept 
‘out of sight, out of mind’. This situation has all but precluded the forma-
tion of organic friendships between detained asylum seekers and members 
of the Australian community. The physical boundaries that these policies 
have produced have also served at least two communicative functions. First, 
they have sent a message to the asylum seekers themselves, contributing to 
Australia’s ‘deterrence’ objectives by telling them that they are not welcome 
in the Australian community. Second, the imprisonment of asylum seekers in 
prison-like facilities has contributed to the (politically expedient) perception 
that asylum seekers are dangerous criminals.
Researchers working in this space have also drawn attention to the impor-
tance of discourse in contributing to this portrayal. In particular, scholars have 
used Cohen’s language of ‘folk devils’ and ‘moral panic’ (2011) – as well as Hall 
and colleagues’ related notion of the ‘signification spiral’ (1978) – to describe 
the discursive construction of asylum seekers as threatening Others (Said 2003). 
As Procter explains, folk devils are ‘scapegoats onto which internal social anxi-
eties are displaced in order that they can be dealt with’ (2004, p. 80); they are 
screens onto which concerns can be projected (Garland 2008, p. 15). Moral 
panics, on the other hand, are the public frenzies that develop around these 
folk devils and their apparent risk to public morality (Cohen 2011).
In their 1978 book Policing the crisis, Hall et al. coined the term ‘signification 
spiral’ to describe the conflation and intensification of discrete moral panics 
through discourse. Hall et al. were interested in the way that the statistically 
unremarkable phenomenon of ‘muggings’ had become the focus of a moral 
panic in 1970s Britain, and their book described the process by which this 
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panic had been amplified through a discursive process that linked the muggings 
with other distinct panics. According to Poynting et  al. (2004), several dis-
tinct moral panics have also been mapped together in contemporary Australia, 
forming a signification spiral and thus inflaming public concern. Poynting 
et al. argue that discrete moral panics surrounding issues such as ‘ethnic crime’, 
‘Islamic terrorism’ and ‘boat people’ have been brought together through the 
identification of a single (conflated and homogenised) folk devil at the cen-
tre of the panics – namely, ‘Muslims’, ‘Arabs’ and ‘Middle Easterners’ (2004, 
p. 6). Poynting et  al. note that disparate communities throughout Australia 
have been tarnished as this signification spiral has developed; not only has 
‘Middle Eastern [. . .] become conflated with Arab, [and] Arab with Muslim’ 
(2004, p. 59), but ‘Muslim with rapist, rapist with gang, gang with terrorist, 
terrorist with “boat people”, “boat people” with barbaric, and so on in inter-
minable permutations’ (2004, p. 49). As such, the mere appearance of belong-
ing to one of these groups has come to be seen as evidence of immorality and, 
indeed, criminality.
The portrayal of asylum seekers as criminals has been a significant dimen-
sion of the politics of fear (in which fear is fuelled and manufactured for 
political purposes (Wodak 2015, p. 1)) that has developed in Australia sur-
rounding maritime asylum seekers. This construction has been most clearly 
visible in the portrayal of asylum seekers as ‘illegal immigrants’, despite the 
reality (much cited in the literature) that seeking asylum is legal under inter-
national law (McAdam & Chong 2014). At times the portrayal of asylum 
seekers as people engaging in unlawful transactions – that is, paying people 
smugglers to take them to Australia – has further contributed to their charac-
terisation as criminals (McCleary 2011, p. 31). Accusations of criminality have 
also taken less-explicit forms, as is evident in the (often oblique) conflation 
of asylum seekers with terrorists through the aforementioned signification 
spiral. As Poynting et al. explain, ‘juxtapositions are more powerful than any 
claim, easily disproved, of real links between terrorists and refugees’ (2004, 
p. 37), and while Australian governments have at times explicitly connected 
asylum seekers with the threat of international terrorism (Klocker & Dunn 
2003, p. 71), this conflation has often occurred more subtly, as when hardline 
asylum seeker policies have been justified using the lexis of ‘national security’ 
(Peterie 2016). When combined with allegations of cultural incompatibility 
(Clyne 2005; Dunn et al. 2007; Every & Augoustinos 2007; Martin 2015) 
and alarmist language regarding the magnitude and disorder of the inflows of 
asylum seekers to Australia – metaphors such as ‘flood’ and ‘invasion’ have 
been common (Bleasdale 2008, p. 7) –the perceived threat posed by the (in 
reality quite small numbers of) asylum seekers has been amplified.
While lines of causation are complex and contemporary politicians argu-
ably respond to community fears as much as they fuel them (Papastergiadis 
2004; McMaster 2002), Australia’s asylum seeker policies and discourses have 
been implicated in the production and reproduction of public fear and hostility 
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regarding asylum seekers. Indeed, when asked to justify negative opinions regard-
ing asylum seekers, members of the Australian community typically cite political 
tropes such as those described above (Pedersen et al. 2006).
This politics of fear – which has seen Australia building and bolstering both 
physical and symbolic barriers to keep out the Other – speaks to a broader global 
trend. In late modernity, the conflicting (yet inherently connected) forces of 
globalisation and securitisation have seen walls erected between people, even 
as capital continues to flow, largely uninhibited, from the Global South to the 
Global North. As Dallmayr observes, a notable feature of the current global 
system has been ‘the return to fences, check-points, and dividing walls’.
We witness today the ominous resurgence of dividing barriers: the fence 
between the United States and Mexico, the gates between Europe and 
North Africa, and the wall between Israel and Palestine. By themselves, 
the barriers are only physical constructs; but their presence testifies to 
deep-seated motivations: the prevalence of fear and distrust; the desire to 
exclude the unfamiliar or alien; and the obsession with being free from 
intrusions.
(Dallmayr 2011, p. 4)
It is against the backdrop of these fears and fences that this chapter considers the 
micro- and macro-reflexive practices of volunteers who support asylum seekers 
in Australian immigration detention facilities.
Asylum seeker friendship programmes
In Chapter 1 of this collection, Patulny and Olson coin the term ‘macro-
reflexivity’ to argue that, in late modernity, people are reflexive not only at the 
micro level of their individual feelings, but also with respect to larger (often 
emotionally defined) social phenomena. Late modernity, they argue, sees 
people increasingly exposed to sensationalised media reporting and political 
discourses surrounding, for example, the threat of terrorism. The above discus-
sion of the moral panic (and associated signification spiral) that has developed 
around asylum seekers in Australia speaks to this phenomenon. As Patulny and 
Olson imply, however, late modern politics has also been implicated in the 
production of counter-emotions that see people both recoiling from and find-
ing ways to contest the global politics of fear.
This phenomenon of emotionally informed resistance is observable in 
Australia, where the strategies of exclusion and dehumanisation described 
above have inspired a range of voluntary programmes which see members 
of the community visiting asylum seekers in Australia’s onshore immigra-
tion detention facilities. Additional (often overlapping) networks of volun-
teers also exist to support asylum seekers in the Australian community, and to 
help these asylum seekers to build lives in Australia if and when their refugee 
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claims are substantiated. These ‘friendship programmes’ reflect the diversity of 
Australia’s asylum seeker support movement (Gosden 2012): they are formal 
and informal, large and small, rural and urban, religious and secular, explicitly 
activist and purportedly apolitical, flat-structured and hierarchical. What these 
programmes have in common is a commitment to supporting asylum seekers 
through personal relationships and associated acts of care.
Friendship programmes that involve volunteers visiting asylum seekers in 
Australia’s onshore immigration detention facilities take advantage of a pro-
vision that allows individual detainees to receive private visitors. While this 
provision qualifies the above argument regarding the physical separation of 
detained asylum seekers from the Australian community, gaining entrance to 
detention facilities is difficult. In a 2017 report titled ‘Unwelcome visitors’, 
the Refugee Council of Australia found that visitors to Australia’s onshore 
immigration detention centres are required to negotiate increasingly strict and 
capricious entrance procedures, including ‘paperwork, body searches and drug 
testing’ (2017, p. 14). Furthermore, the report drew attention to the ‘inconsist-
ent and rapidly changing rules and regulations’ that volunteers face inside the 
facilities. These rules, the report noted, ‘are often applied inconsistently, not 
only between different detention facilities but even within the same centre, 
depending on the staff implementing the rules’ (2017, p. 13). These constantly 
shifting controls, Neil and Peterie argue, function to assert ‘a radical asymmetry 
of power’ (2018); they also produce anguish in detention centre visitors, and 
discourage volunteers from continuing in their work (Peterie 2018a).
The dark side of compassion
Qualitative studies concerning the experiences of asylum seekers in immigra-
tion detention attest to the important role that volunteer visitors play within 
these facilities. Detention is isolating, and many detained asylum seekers feel 
abandoned and bored (Coffey et al. 2010; Fleay & Briskman 2013). The friend-
ships that develop between asylum seekers and volunteer visitors are important 
because they provide some relief from the mundanity of detention centre life. 
In a 2010 study of previously detained asylum seekers, Coffey et al. found that 
‘the majority of participants highlighted the paramount significance for their 
morale of contact with visitors as “relieving the gloom of life while detained”’ 
(2010, p. 2074). Volunteers puncture the isolation of detention and show the 
detained asylum seekers (as well as those who detain them (Fleay & Briskman 
2013)) that they are not forgotten.
Despite the value that friendship programme volunteers provide, work of 
this kind has not been immune from critique. One criticism – frequently 
evoked within the existing literature – concerns the power dynamics that 
structure these activities. This critique resembles and reproduces broader 
debates in the academic literature regarding care work and the politics of 
compassion. The concern here is that activities of this kind draw a hard line 
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between care providers (in this case volunteers) and care recipients (in this case 
asylum seekers), empowering the former group while disempowering the later 
(Darling 2011).
Humanitarianism and equivalent forms of care work have often been under-
stood as ‘arising from a sense of compassion, to act to alleviate human suffer-
ing’ (Gosden 2007, p. 150; emphasis added). For some scholars working in 
this area, this motivation is highly problematic. ‘Compassion’, Berlant argues, 
refers first and foremost to ‘a particular kind of social relation’ (2004, p. 9); it 
suggests an association in which ‘the sufferer is over there. You, the compassion-
ate one, have a resource that would alleviate someone else’s suffering’ (2004, 
p. 4; emphasis in the original). In this way, compassion-based relationships 
have been seen as necessarily unequal. Regardless of the conscious intentions 
of the caregiver, the underlying logic of compassion has been said to produce 
a mode of relating that all too often disempowers care recipients (Korf 2007). 
The racial, class and at times religious contours of Australia’s asylum seeker 
support movement (many volunteers and activists are White, middle-class and/
or nominally Christian) further problematises these dynamics. As Banki and 
Schonell observe with respect to ‘voluntourism’, many of the critiques sur-
rounding this kind of work ‘focus on power imbalances, colonial legacies and 
structural white privilege’ (2017, p. 3).
An associated critique concerns the sense of moral virtue that has been 
associated with ‘altruistic’ feelings like compassion. As Hutchinson observes, 
such emotions can be seen as a Western privilege in and of themselves (2014). 
Emotions, like most resources, are not distributed equally in society; rather, 
emotional inequalities exist and often follow the contours of other social ine-
qualities, particularly those concerning socio-economic status (Barbalet 1998; 
Stets & Turner 2008). In this way, care-based volunteering has been charged 
with allowing care givers to feel good about themselves even as they repro-
duce the social, political and emotional hierarchies that oppress those they seek 
to help. Scholars in this tradition follow Nietzsche (2006) in suggesting that 
‘ulterior motives and material interests’ (Snaider 1998, p. 118) underlie moral 
ideals such as compassion, even if these motives are not transparent to those 
who possess them. Compassion-based volunteering is thus redefined not as 
altruism, but as a ‘kind of feel-good consumption that leads to our satisfaction’ 
(Pavlasek 2016).
Comparable critiques have been made regarding the concentration of power 
with non-refugees in Australia’s asylum seeker support movement. Refugees, 
Survivors and Ex-detainees (RISE) – ‘the first refugee and asylum seeker 
organisation in Australia to be run and governed by refugees, asylum seek-
ers and ex-detainees’ (2017) – insists that only those who have been directly 
impacted by Australia’s detention policies should lead the movement opposing 
them. Alfayadh and Shah (2017) have similarly written about the need to not 
only hold governments to account, but to also scrutinise ‘the people who claim 
to be there for the most vulnerable’.
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Structural imbalances lie within the refugee advocacy space. There is a lack 
of representation of those with lived experiences, and the individuals at the 
helm of refugee organisations who act largely in self-interest. These are the 
issues that are in need of urgent reform.
(Alfayadh and Shah 2017)
Supporters from non-refugee backgrounds, these authors caution, should ‘always 
consider the space [they] are occupying and the privilege [they] bring’ (ibid. 
2017); put differently, supporters should be reflexive about their motivations, 
positions and actions.
These concerns about the politics of compassion have been central to con-
temporary debates about care and volunteer work in the social sciences and 
humanities. Significantly, however, they are also present in traditional philo-
sophical discussions of the emotion. Aristotle (2010) identified moral equality 
as a pre-condition for compassion. For those following in this Aristotelian tra-
dition, compassion is premised on ‘the belief that the pitier’s own possibilities 
are similar to those of the sufferer’ (Nussbaum 1996, p. 31); that is, on the 
understanding that the self may experience undeserved suffering of a similar 
nature in the future. This notion of shared possibilities affords compassion a 
political imperative. The compassionate person – recognising that ‘this could 
happen to me’ – must redress the structural causes of the other’s suffering if 
they are to secure their own future security. From this perspective, the mode 
of paternalistic and self-aggrandising relating to asylum seekers that is described 
in much of the contemporary scholarship is not ‘compassion’ but something 
else entirely (Peterie 2017). ‘True’ compassion does not reproduce privilege so 
much as denaturalise it.
Empirical investigations
Having discussed the socio-political context in which asylum seeker 
friendship programmes take place, and the existing scholarship regarding 
reflexivity and emotion within these programmes, this chapter will now 
turn to present findings from an empirical study of 30 volunteer visitors to 
Australian immigration detention facilities. The study involved in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews, which were conducted in person in 2015 and 
2016 as part of a larger study concerning the experiences of volunteers who 
support asylum seekers in Australian immigration detention centres and 
within the Australian community. These 30 volunteers were affiliated with 
a broad range of asylum seeker support groups, and visited detention facili-
ties in different parts of Australia. The findings presented here underline the 
importance that they placed on the reflexive management of their emotions, 
and highlight the Aristotelian qualities (Nussbaum 1996; Peterie 2017) of 
their expressions of compassion.
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The imperative to act
For the majority of the detention centre volunteers who participated in this 
study, visiting detention represented a direct and deliberate response to the 
political situation described above. Interviewees uniformly believed that the 
government’s policies were wrong and that popular (emotion-laden) rep-
resentations of asylum seekers were factually incorrect. In condemning these 
policies, interviewees described the empathy and compassion that they felt 
for those that Australia’s policies affected; they also emphasised the anger that 
they felt concerning the harms that their country had inflicted. This phenom-
enon of emotions animating moral judgements and moving people to action is 
well-documented in the sociology-of-emotions literature, as well as in interdis-
ciplinary work regarding social movements. As Jasper notes, ‘emotions make us 
care about the world around us’ (2006, p. 21); they give force and passion to our 
cognitive judgements.
In addition to these feelings of compassion and anger, volunteers also described 
the guilt that they felt as Australians. Interviewees commonly described their 
sense of responsibility – and in many cases moral complicity – regarding the 
fact that harms were being inflicted by their country, in their name. This idea 
of being morally implicated in a situation of injustice resonates with Jaspers’ 
(1947) work concerning ‘German guilt’ in the wake of the Holocaust. Rackley 
describes Jaspers’ concept of ‘metaphysical guilt’ as the moral responsibility that 
individuals feel when they fail to intervene in ‘wrong’ or immoral situations. 
To experience metaphysical guilt, Rackley summarises, is to feel
‘co-responsible for every wrong and every injustice in the world,’ because 
we have done nothing or not enough to alleviate the misfortune of others, 
or to avert their tragedy. Our passivity and inaction regarding the tragedy 
of others entails ‘moral bystanding,’ a kind of complicity [. . .] The logic 
of metaphysical guilt is charged with an ethical responsibility to act in the 
face of suffering, for passivity means complicity.
(2002, p. 57)
Many of the volunteers who participated in this study described a similar sense 
of ethical responsibility regarding Australia’s treatment of maritime asylum 
seekers. Indeed, their decisions to commence their volunteer work were born, 
in part, of a need to escape this position of complicit bystander by actively 
‘doing something’. While volunteers were thus motivated by their emotion-
informed judgements regarding the morality (or otherwise) of Australia’s asy-
lum policies, they were also aware of and reflexively concerned with their own 
moral identities within this space. As one volunteer reflected with respect to 
her own infant daughter, ‘at some point [she] is going to grow up and ask me 
what I did when our governments were locking up children [. . .] I can’t have 
her grow [up] and ask me and for me to respond with “nothing”’.
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Negotiating privilege
Participants in this study testified to the Kafkaesque nature of immigration 
detention. Detention, as they experienced it, was a scheme of constantly shifting 
permissions and prohibitions – a world in which unpredictable rules dictated 
the small details of asylum seekers’ lives (Peterie 2018a; 2018b; Neil & Peterie 
2018). These visitors also underlined the human costs associated with the 
scheme, offering vivid examples of the anguish that detention produced in the 
asylum seekers they visited. In addition to describing the impacts that detention 
had on their detained asylum seeker friends, however, interviewees also talked 
about the way that visiting detention affected them personally. The pain associ-
ated with witnessing suffering has been well documented, and it has been shown 
that this pain is even more pronounced when the suffering in question is that of 
a loved one (Figley 2012). It was not just the fact of their friends’ suffering that 
the participants in this study found so difficult, however. Rather, their anguish 
was in part a result of their own positions within the detention space.
In drawing comparisons between their own lives and those of the asylum 
seekers they visited, participants in this study highlighted the similarities that they 
had found between themselves and their detainee friends, and explained how 
these similarities connected them through bonds of empathy and mutual recogni-
tion. Several interviewees described the deep connection they felt when they met 
asylum seekers who were their own age, and came to understand what detention 
really meant by comparing their own experiences of, for example, youth, with 
those of their friends. One interviewee, for instance, recalled his shock when he 
learnt that Australia had been detaining his asylum seeker friend for six years.
When he told me that it had been that long, I didn’t even, I couldn’t even 
imagine what it would be like to go six years without ever being outside. 
Ever being able to start your life. ‘Cause he’s the same age as I am. So 
to know that he’s 26 and knowing how much I’ve grown from being 
20 to 26. He hasn’t had that chance to experience all the things that I’ve 
experienced in six years [. . .] Getting your licence, travelling around. All 
those kinds of little things. Even just making friends, being in relation-
ships [. . .] He’s missed out on a lot.
Another interviewee, a teacher and mother, alluded to her own experiences 
struggling with a newborn baby as she reflected on what detention meant for 
the parents she visited. ‘I know how hard it was to have a new born with lots 
of support’, she said. ‘We’re causing these mums to have postnatal depression. 
I find that really difficult to bear’.
The interviewees often expressed distress as they drew these comparisons. 
Their juxtapositions illuminated many small everyday injustices, but they also 
spoke to broader structural inequalities, and they made the visitors aware of 
their comparative advantage.
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I found it really hard that those mums couldn’t look after their kids properly. 
That they had children going to school in the mornings – they couldn’t see 
their school. They couldn’t talk to their teachers. They couldn’t go to P&C 
night. They couldn’t go to the athletics carnival. They couldn’t engage with 
their children and to watch mums not be able to parent their children – and 
dads – but as a mum myself to see that. I just found it incredibly distressing. 
Sorry [crying]. Yeah, it’s very upsetting to see that. To know that I could 
go home to my beautiful house with my beautiful family and live my very 
middle-class life, and to know that those children were not able to do that.
For this volunteer, as for many others, the striking disparities that she saw 
between her own life and those of the asylum seekers were important. They 
highlighted the many rights that her asylum seeker friends were denied, and 
made these injustices personal. These juxtapositions, however, also added to 
the volunteers’ feelings of ‘metaphysical guilt’ (Jaspers 1947; Rackley 2002); as 
one volunteer explained in tears, ‘I feel ashamed of being here and free’.
The discomfort that the interviewees experienced surrounding their own 
comparative privilege was particularly apparent in the way that they reflected 
on the question of whether their relationships were equal. While almost all 
interviewees characterised their relationships as genuine friendships, some 
nonetheless suggested that the institutional context in which these friendships 
took place precluded equal interactions. As one interviewee reflected, ‘me 
going through there for two hours and then walking off and getting in my 
car? What can be equal [about that] if the other person’s locked up and bored 
and frightened?’ In this context, interviewees expressed fear that their visits 
might be perceived as ‘pervy’ or patronising, and actively sought to avoid this 
dynamic by allowing the asylum seekers that they visited to ‘drive’ their inter-
actions. The volunteers thus noticed, were confronted by and at times endeav-
oured to disavow their own comparative privilege. In contrast to what the 
social scientific literature concerning compassion might predict, these volun-
teers derived not emotional gratification but emotional discomfort from their 
social advantage, as their reflexive processes made them acutely aware of the 
arbitrariness and injustice of their own good fortune.
Shared performances
Visiting detention had a significant impact on the participants in this study. The 
volunteers cared about their asylum seeker friends and – notwithstanding the 
distressing scenes that they encountered within detention – they enjoyed see-
ing them. During their visits, the volunteers drank tea and coffee, shared food, 
played cards or board games and talked with the asylum seekers. Those who 
visited detained families played with the children, and some visitors offered 
assistance to asylum seekers who were working on legal submissions or other 
292 Michelle Peterie
aspects of their protection claims. The relationships that developed between 
the volunteers and the people that they visited were (as previous studies have 
documented (Fleay 2016)) both intimate and intense.
While detention has been described as a traumatising environment (Peterie 
2018b; Newman & Steel 2008), the asylum seekers and volunteers nonetheless 
enjoyed some moments of happiness. The volunteers noted, however, that these 
moments were often somewhat choreographed. While visiting their detainee 
friends, the volunteers usually tried to be cheerful and optimistic. They chose 
not to show the asylum seekers their own despair as it felt insignificant and self-
indulgent beside the greater anguish that the asylum seekers were experiencing. 
The visitors thus managed, masked and at times deferred their negative emotions, 
repressing their own feelings of anguish until after their visits.
Equally, the volunteers observed that the asylum seekers engaged in similar 
acts of emotion work in order to protect their visitors from the full force of 
their despair. One volunteer, for instance, described a conversation that he 
had with an asylum seeker who had recently attempted suicide. The man had 
appeared to be his usual ‘happy’ self, but when the volunteer was alone with 
his friend, he asked him how he really was.
He said he couldn’t keep going on, he’s never going to get out. He said he 
doesn’t have anywhere to go. He can’t go home because they’re going to 
kill him. He can’t stay here because he doesn’t want to live here. Doesn’t 
want to live [. . .] And as soon as the boys came back he kind of snapped 
back to being happy again.
Another interviewee explained that there were times when she would go 
through the ritual of drinking tea and sharing cake with an asylum seeker, 
knowing that his mind was occupied with thoughts of his imminent depor-
tation. The asylum seekers and volunteers, these stories suggested, worked 
together to create small pockets of normality in which all parties could find 
temporary reprieve from the confronting realities of detention.
Reflexivity in late modernity
As noted earlier, the academic literature regarding care-based volunteer work in 
general, and asylum seeker friendship programmes in particular, has at times taken 
issue with the power dynamics that these programmes entail. Scholars have sug-
gested that work of this type all too often reduces to an exercise in privilege and 
emotional gratification. In doing so, they have charged volunteers with either 
failing to be reflexive concerning their motivations and actions, or with being 
reflexive in the wrong way – that is, with reflexively managing their own per-
formed identities, but failing to interrogate their intentions and subject positions.
The evidence presented here problematises this portrayal by painting a 
markedly different (empirically informed) picture of the reflexive processes of 
volunteers. While questions of identity – and, in particular, questions of moral 
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identity – were very present in volunteer accounts of their activities, inter-
viewees engaged with these ideas with more sophistication than the literature 
allows. In particular, volunteers were reflexive at both the micro and the macro 
level. They monitored, managed and were often guided by their emotions 
not only in their individual volunteer relationships, but also in their broader 
appraisals of the discourses and policies that comprise Australia’s politics of fear 
surrounding asylum seekers. For participants in this study, efforts at identity 
construction went far beyond the performance of virtue through emotion-
ally gratifying altruism; indeed, volunteers grappled with issues of institutional 
affect, undeserved privilege and national guilt, and struggled to understand 
their own position in relation to structural injustices and harms. The mode of 
relating that these volunteers described resonated not with the contemporary 
scholarship regarding the pitfalls of paternalistic compassion, but with the older 
philosophical tradition that recognises the structural and political critique that 
‘true’ compassion entails.
Taken together, these findings lend support to Patulny and Olson’s argu-
ment (this volume, Chapter 1) that efforts to ‘reflexively construct an iden-
tity and manage emotions’ are a key aspect of late modern emotional life. 
While it is beyond the scope of this study to consider whether such reflexiv-
ity was equally required in previous historical periods, it is clear that – for the 
participants in this study as well as for scholars in the politics of compassion – 
micro- and macro-reflexivity is now essential.
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Note
1 For a detailed discussion of this policy – which sees asylum seekers processed on small 
Pacific Islands, beyond the jurisdiction of Australia’s courts – see Gleeson 2016.
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Chapter 20
Affective dynamics of conflicts 
between religious practice and 
secular self-understanding
Insights from the male circumcision and 
‘Burkini’ debates
Christian von Scheve and Nur Yasemin Ural
Introduction
In 2012, many countries across the globe witnessed protests against the release 
of the film The Innocence of Muslims, an anti-Islamic film produced by Nakoula 
Basseley Nakoula. The film was widely perceived as being offensive to Muslims 
and has stirred both violent and non-violent outrage. Muslim protesters com-
plained that the film ridiculed their belief, was deeply injurious and perceived 
as dishonouring, and demanded the film be removed from the online platform 
YouTube. The controversy was further aroused when Western commentators 
claimed the film should be protected by the right to freedom of speech and 
expression. Contrary protesters claimed that the freedom of speech should not 
include the freedom to insult and offend. Similar patterns of outrage and debate 
over the limits of the freedom of speech vis-à-vis religious sensibilities can be 
found in the publication of Rushdie’s Satanic verses in 1988, which provoked 
riots in Pakistan in 1989, after which the Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa 
calling for the death of Rushdie; the publication of Muhammad caricatures in 
the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in 2005, which stirred massive worldwide 
protests in early 2006; or the publication of Charlie Hebdo’s Muhammad cartoons 
in 2015, which drew tens of thousands of Muslim protesters to the streets across 
the globe. How do these publications become related to emotions of irrita-
tion, dishonor, insult, injury, offense and outrage? Is there anything specifically 
‘religious’ or ‘Muslim’ about these emotions, as some of these examples might 
suggest, and indeed many in the public debates surrounding these controversies 
claim? And what are the consequences of these emotions for the dynamics of 
minority/majority and secular/religious relations in late modern societies?
We may find some of the answers when interpreting the abovementioned 
artworks and publications within the larger context of the status of feelings, 
affect and emotion in controversies arising between religious convictions and 
worldviews on the one hand and the principles and self-understandings of 
liberal-secular states on the other. They are but the most prominent examples 
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of the way in which ‘hurtfulness’, ‘emotionality’ and ‘injury’ have come to 
play central roles in the discourse on and the treatment of religious practices 
and claims for recognition in liberal secular democracies over the past decades. 
Although many disciplines have investigated these lines of conflict from nor-
mative, judicial and political perspectives (e.g., Asad 2003; Mahmood 2015; 
Nussbaum 2012), feelings and emotions have only recently attracted attention 
as an important dimension of systematic inquiry (e.g., Mahmood 2009). The 
language of emotionality, hurtfulness and injury forms both the limits of free 
speech and religious practice on the one hand, and their legibility, accept-
ability and legitimacy within a liberal secular state on the other. Claims and 
demands made in the name of religion are constantly interpreted and labelled 
as highly affective and emotional, whereas claims regarding secular principles, 
for example, that of free speech, are usually portrayed as reasoned, deliberate 
and even ‘affect-neutral’.
Looking at these debates, it is almost exclusively religious subjects who either 
self-categorise as or are portrayed by others to be hurt and injured. Much less do 
we find references to emotions in defence of secular subjects and positions. For 
instance, outbursts of disbelief, astonishment, contempt and anger in many Western 
media outlets over the violent protests of Muslims in response to The Innocence of 
Muslims are hardly ever framed in emotional terms, but rather as rational responses 
to irrational religious behavior. Religious minorities – in this case Muslims in the 
Western world – are equally held responsible for rendering their injury intelligible 
and credible to a secular public and/or religious majority (Agrama 2012), which 
essentially amounts to a request to de-emotionalise, at least in rhetoric.
How can we understand these emotional dynamics that go hand-in-hand 
with discursive conflicts between religion and the self-understanding of secu-
lar publics as one of the main dividing lines in many contemporary Western 
societies? And what do they imply for the social relations between different 
societal groups and the recognition and accommodation of cultural differ-
ence, which has proven to be a key challenge of many late modern societies? 
In this chapter, we suggest a perspective that is not primarily concerned with 
the careful elucidation of people’s actual phenomenal feelings vis-à-vis these 
debates, but rather with the discursive construction and political strategies at 
evoking emotions as well as with the potential social ramifications of these 
religious and secular emotions. Analysing these constructions and strategies, 
we argue, is essential for an understanding of emotions in late modernity more 
generally, given that attempts at the management of public emotion, at politi-
cal emotionalisation and at the incitement or suppression of specific emotions 
are key to this condition (e.g., George 2016; Pankaj 2017).
‘Religious’ emotions in historical perspective
It is interesting to note that although ‘religious feelings’ or ‘religious emo-
tions’ are frequently mentioned in public debate, the more established 
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meaning is different from its use in discourse. Traditionally, religious emo-
tions can be characterised according to their ‘cognitive objects’, a ‘depth 
condition’ and a ‘pragmatic condition’, as suggested by Järveläinen (2008). 
The cognitive object would refer to the objects of religious experience, 
which basically represent the intentionality of religious emotion. The depth 
condition takes up ideas from Schleiermacher and Otto, emphasising the 
relationality of religious emotion, therefore the idea that they rest upon a 
perception of relatedness between the emoting subject and another entity. 
The pragmatic condition highlights that religious emotions depend on reli-
gious practices and culture.
When religious emotions are mentioned in controversies over religious 
practices and the principles of the liberal-secular state, they tend to assume a dif-
ferent meaning. As shown in our introductory examples, the notion of religious 
emotions refers to experiences of injury, harm, ridicule and vilification that 
result from being in one or another way linked to a particular faith, religious 
practice or community. One of the central questions related to this under-
standing of religious emotions is whether there should be legally guaranteed 
protection from this kind of harm, which was a controversial issue throughout 
Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Frevert 2016). At times, 
the protection of religious sentiment was considered essential because it was 
considered part of one’s individual rights to wellbeing and freedom from harm. 
At other times, religious feelings were to be protected in order to secure the 
collective order and prevent public outrage (ibid., p. 34).
Outside the legal sphere, the regulation of the freedom of expression to 
accommodate religious sensibilities is frequently discussed by civil society organ-
isations who criticise ‘blasphemy laws’ – laws protecting a (majority) religion 
from irreverence and offence – as incompatible with the principles of the secu-
lar state and demand they be abolished. For example, a consortium of NGOs 
launched the campaign ‘End Blasphemy Laws’ in 2015 (International Humanist 
and Ethical Union 2015). Also, certain public intellectuals (Fourest 2015) and 
scholars (Bouldoires 2016) in France have demanded a ‘right to blasphemy’ in 
Europe, as part of the freedom of expression that should be protected within 
the democratic polity. Paralleling recent demands within the public sphere, 
some European countries have abandoned their blasphemy laws, for instance 
Denmark, in favour of anti-discrimination laws that also cover non-religious 
forms of offence. This move can be interpreted with reference to specific secu-
lar sensibilities which basically form a counterpart to religious emotions in late 
modern controversies between the religious and the secular.
These historical and legal constellations indicate that religious feelings and 
emotions are a peculiar and analytically misleading category, because they tend 
to suggest that emotions are exclusively on the side of the religious and it is 
exclusively religious subjects that are affected by these debates. Empirically, this 
is most likely an untenable position. To understand better these debates and 
controversies, we not only need to understand how, precisely, the attributions 
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of emotions towards religious subjects work, but also to comprehend the feel-
ings and emotions on the side of secular subjects.
Emotions and emotional regimes
To uncover the role of emotions in the religious-secular divide more effectively, 
a promising initial step is to look at how emotions are explicitly mentioned in 
discourse using emotions terms and labels. For example, the controversy over 
a genuinely ‘German’ culture (Leitkultur) vis-à-vis other, in particular Islamic, 
cultures in 1998 and 2015, the debate over the Mohammed caricatures in 
2006 or discussions about whether Islam is an integral part of German soci-
ety in 2010 all make reference to specific emotion words. The Mohammed 
caricatures in Jyllands-Posten and the Innocence of Muslims film and the recurrent 
controversies show the significance that speakers in a discourse ascribe to emo-
tions and to their potential injury. The debate concerning a German Leitkultur, 
that is, the search for dominant and genuinely German values, worldviews and 
practices that make up German collective identity, is rife with fear and anxiety 
over the corrosion of this Leitkultur in wake of globalisation and immigration 
(e.g., Saleh 2017; Thierse 2017).
Furthermore, the articulation of these emotions, in particular feeling offended 
and insulted, frequently becomes an essential part of collective mobilisation, as 
is evident in the manifold protests against these artworks and political state-
ments (‘Protests in Cairo and Benghazi’ 2012; ‘Protests over anti-Muslim film’ 
2012; Kovaleski & Barnes 2012). Importantly, discursively articulated and thus 
‘collectivised’ emotions tell us little about how individuals actually feel towards 
certain artworks. On the contrary, one might speculate that emotions in late 
modernity are characterised by the drifting apart of (medially) articulated and 
experienced emotions.
Emotions in these debates are often attributed to (collective) religious sub-
jects as being (unduly) affected and suffering from hurt ‘religious feelings’. 
Likewise, discussions regarding the adequacy and the legal status of certain 
religious practices, such as the wearing of headscarves, ritual slaughtering or 
circumcision, are often framed referring to notions of anger, indignation and 
resentment amongst those being confronted with and opposing these actions, 
as well as notions of anger and injury in the defendants of these practices. The 
social repercussions of this discursive construction of emotion are manifold, 
and in the following we aim to emphasise two of them.
First, recourse to ‘religious feelings’ to some extent constitutes a novel 
discourse beyond established political language and contributes to the con-
struction of (symbolic) boundaries, and cultural identities and the formation of 
affective communities based on religious and secular beliefs; the possible emer-
gence of communal bonds based on similar ways of feeling and being affected 
in view of specific events and situations. Discourse on conflicts between reli-
gious convictions and secular self-understandings hence strives towards the 
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establishment of particular – and antagonistic – ‘emotional regimes’ (Reddy 2001) 
through which the complexity of emotional life is replaced by an almost 
Cartesian dualism between religious and secular emotions.
Importantly, these regimes also provide insights into the mutual constitution 
of ‘the religious’ and ‘the secular’ within discourse. It becomes obvious how 
‘the religious’ is viewed and constructed only in conjunction with ‘the secular’ 
(Mahmood 2015; Asad 2003). Accepting the view that secularism is no cultur-
ally or religiously ‘neutral’ baseline from which a secular public appraises and 
evaluates religious practices and beliefs, but instead is in itself an outcome of 
specific historical constellations that have led to ideas of the separation of state 
and religion, mostly in the Christian world (Asad 2003), this discourse can be 
interpreted from at least two different angles.
On the one hand, when speakers in the discourse, representatives of Muslim 
communities or organisations as well as the secular critics of religion and 
Islam, ascribe religious pain and injury to ‘the Muslims’, they do so in view 
of some secular ‘Other’, either subjects or institutions, who are portrayed as 
calm, rational, deliberate and free of affect. In contrast, the Muslim subject is 
constructed as one with undue religious sensibilities from the perspective of 
representatives of the secular state. Affect and emotion are cast as characteristic 
of the religious subject, which, looking at the history of Western thought, 
would exclude reason and rationality.
On the other hand, it is remarkable to see that in cases where representatives 
of certain faiths demand changes in legal regulations, in particular concerning 
freedom of expression that put religious sensibilities under special protection, 
secular subjects as well speak and act in a highly emotional manner. Politicians as 
well as self-proclaimed representatives of the liberal state tend to voice outrage, 
indignation and anger in view of these demands. This likewise applies to cases 
in which certain religious practices shall be recognised, even though they might 
clash with legal rulings and existing religious privileges in some cases, such as the 
wearing of certain kinds of headscarves by public servants, ritual circumcision of 
underage males or the construction of mosques. The German Leitkultur debate 
is an example at hand. It is firmly rooted in fears and anxieties over the loss of 
this alleged culture, and these fears and anxieties are essential to the emotional 
regimes of right-wing populist parties and movements, many of them mobilis-
ing against the ‘Islamisation’ of the Occident. They create emotional repertoires 
of fear that in themselves become sources of community and demarcation.
The religious-secular divide as an 
affective arrangement
Discourse about emotions and the attribution of specific emotions to individuals 
and social groups through emotion words reveal the highly politicised emotional 
regimes and repertoires of the religious-secular divide that operate through 
symbols and language. We suggest that the religious contestations of the secular 
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and liberal order constitute a specific affective arrangement (Slaby, Mühlhoff & 
Wüschner 2017) consisting of affective relations amongst discourses, practices, 
actors and collectives, which we explain in more detail below. Capitalising 
on explicit references to feelings and emotions in discourse provides insights 
on what is said and written about contested religious-secular constellations in 
predominantly secular publics, and about the emotions and sensibilities that 
go along with these constellations. However, this says very little about what 
individuals actually feel and experience in view of these debates. Analysing dis-
course reveals what speakers say about how people are (or should be) affected by 
these debates. In fact, these statements and attributions can be interpreted first 
and foremost as political strategies to legitimate or de-legitimate certain claims. 
This might be an effective political strategy in two ways. First, an audience 
might take these attributions of emotions for granted and make decisions or 
take actions based on these appraisals and modes of making sense of the world. 
Second, an audience might take up the attributions of emotions and make them, 
performatively, their very own emotions. In the sociology of emotion, this ‘tak-
ing up’ of emotions has been discussed in theories of collective emotions (von 
Scheve & Ismer 2013) and collective emotional orientations (Bar-Tal 2001). 
This speaks directly to the relation between emotions that people actually expe-
rience and publicly negotiated, collectivised emotions, and their consequences 
for different forms of social action, for instance related to integration, belonging 
or participation in social movements.
An alternative reading would we be more substantially geared towards a 
Foucauldian understanding of discourse and subjectivation. In this understanding, 
one need not exclusively focus on explicit statements concerning emotions that 
individuals might or might not experience, but on the consequences discourse 
brings about for forms of self-understanding and self-relatedness. In this regard, it 
is imperative that forms of subjectivation also encompass a bodily dimension, for 
which it is not only conceptual thought that matters, but ways of being affected in 
a non-conceptual and non-symbolic sense (e.g., von Scheve 2017; Slaby 2016).
For this reading, the concept of affect can be instructive. Although this con-
cept has many meanings in different disciplines, works within cultural studies 
conceive of affect as a counterpart to language and discourse and emphasise 
the critical importance of bodies and their interrelations for the social world. 
Much of affect theory subscribes to the post-structuralist critique of the liberal, 
transcendental and autonomous individual, but departs not from language and 
discourse – as most post-structuralists would do. Rather, it starts from relations 
between bodies to suggest a theoretical and process-ontological alternative 
(Blackman et al. 2008).
The understanding of affect proposed here, however, is more compatible 
with social science theory and methodology. We understand affect as a ‘mode of 
being’ and a continuous bodily orientation towards the world that has meaning-
ful evaluative qualities (cf. von Scheve 2017). The orientation that affect provides 
is not achieved primarily through linguistic representation and deliberative 
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thought, but through basic cognitive capabilities of the body. Because affect is 
ubiquitous and continuous (like perception), it is best thought of not as some-
thing episodic, but rather in terms of steady fluctuations or in terms of changes 
in the modes of being and the sensibilities and capacities to act.
Affect works primarily through altering bodies’ capacities to act (whereas 
emotions would include conceptual knowledge, object directedness etc.). This 
can happen in various ways, through alterations to cognitive and perceptual pro-
cessing, to the endocrine and hormonal system or to autonomous and peripheral 
nervous system activity. Affect is often – though not necessarily – associated with 
emotions (and vice versa) and can be conceived of as object-directed ‘affective 
comportments’ that are categorised into culturally established and linguistically 
labelled prototypes, for instance fear, anger or happiness. The notion of affect 
proposed here is in some ways related to what others have called ‘background 
emotions’ (Barbalet 1998) or ‘existential feelings’ (Ratcliffe 2009).
An affective arrangement then is a:
material-discursive formation as part of which affect is patterned, channeled 
and modulated in recurrent and repeatable ways. Such arrangements usually 
bring multiple actors into a dynamic conjunction, so that these actors’ mutual 
affecting and being-affected becomes a vital part of the arrangement itself.
(Slaby, Mühlhoff & Wüschner 2017, p. 7)
These notions of affect and affective arrangements therefore seem fruit-
ful for an alternative understanding of the contested constellations of the 
religious-secular divide in many contemporary Western societies, because 
they open up a possibility to come to terms with their non-linguistic and 
non-significational dimensions. Analysing the role of language in an affec-
tive arrangement is of course a non-trivial endeavor, since affect is posi-
tioned as in some sense being beyond language and conceptual thought. 
However, a number of theories are instructive here. Butler’s (1997) work 
on excitable speech offers ways of understanding the performative rather 
than the conceptual and structural aspects of language and how they con-
tribute to arousing, exciting and affecting bodies.
Aside from the difficulties of linking affect to language, affective arrange-
ments are also comprised of actions, objects or images, and their potential to 
affect bodies in different ways still has to be theorised more comprehensively. 
Whether caricatures of Mohammed or the artistic ridiculing of the pope during 
the Cologne carnival actually elicit specific (religious) emotions is debatable. 
However, that these portrayals affect bodies in specific ways can hardly be 
questioned. Needless to say, different bodies will be affected in different ways, 
but as Wetherell (2012) and Seyfert (2011) have suggested, bodies ‘learn’, dur-
ing enculturation and socialisation, to be affected in specific ways. These ‘ways 
of being affected’ (as a dimension of subjectivation) form the backdrop for 
any political or strategic attempt at inciting collective (religious) emotions and 
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are essential elements for thoroughly understanding political cleavages such as 
contested constellations of the religious and the secular. In the following, we 
discuss two concrete examples of how controversies between the religious and 
the secular can meaningfully be investigated using concepts of emotions, affect 
and affective arrangements.
Cases and discourses
In this section we discuss two legal cases in France and Germany that concern 
Muslim cultural practices. Contrary to many studies that focus on the offense of 
religious sentiments of Muslims, for example, in the search of comprehension 
and prevention of religious injury, we seek to focus on the legislative processes 
related to Muslim practices in Europe to better understand the public sentiments 
and the underlying affective arrangements associated with said controversies. 
We will look at two controversies in Germany and in France, those over male 
circumcision and the wearing of ‘Burkinis’.
Our choice of controversies is motivated by the fact that the legal bans 
on the specific practices they involved were implemented over the course of 
the controversies, but then rapidly repealed. One of our theses is that these 
revocations resulted from conflicting emotional regimes and affective registers 
with respect to the bans. Affects generated in these examples certainly are not 
detached from previous legal rules concerning Muslims that are still in effect 
or in preparation in Europe. Yet, the rapid alteration of certain rules helps to 
unveil the paradoxes related to the freedom of religion and core liberal prin-
ciples in relation to the public order and collective sentiments, which are key 
concepts in the legal justifications of the bans.
The controversy of ritual male circumcision was sparked in 2012 when the 
district court (Landgericht) in Cologne, Germany issued a decree rendering ‘reli-
giously motivated’ circumcision illegal. The court declared ritual circumcision 
to be a form of ‘bodily injury’ following a judicial case of a Muslim boy who, 
after circumcision was carried out, suffered from medical complications. The 
court ruling has incited a lively discussion involving various actors, for instance 
politicians, religious representatives, NGOs and political representatives from 
Muslim countries and Israel alike. The debate thus was not only prominent 
in Germany, but also in Turkey and Israel where people expressed concerns 
regarding the rights of Muslims and Jews in Germany. In countless TV shows, 
pros and cons of ritual male circumcision were discussed with medical doctors, 
psychologists, lawyers, religious dignitaries and secular Muslim public figures 
as defenders and opponents of the court’s ruling. In these discussions, defend-
ers of the ban plead for religious actors to think and act rationally and not 
emotionally for once. On the other hand, religious representatives, who are 
usually considered the only legitimate opponents of the ban, were constantly 
asked within mainstream media in talk shows, journal articles and magazines 
to account for their (Muslim) feelings, experiences and immediate reactions to 
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the court’s decision. Regarding these debates, to which we will return further 
in this section, Amir-Moazami (2016) argues that the ‘secular bodies’ operate 
through a ‘self-differentiation as a mode of unmarking the secular through the 
gaze on the marked body of the other’, the religious one (p. 166).
Contrary to the circumcision debate that focused on religious practices 
involving infant male bodies, the ban on the Burkini in France was concerned 
with adolescent and adult female bodies and their clothing. In July 2016, David 
Lisnard, mayor of Cannes in France, issued a municipal decree temporarily ban-
ning the Burkini from the city’s beaches, describing the garment as being ‘of a 
certain nature that would create risks of disturbances to the public order (crowd-
ing, skirmishes, etc.)’. He justified his decision as part of the state of exception 
measures in France, drawing parallels between the terrorist attacks that had taken 
place in Nice two weeks earlier, leaving 86 dead, and the Burkini, denouncing 
the latter as a political symbol and a provocation. The Burkini was a ‘beachwear 
ostentatiously showing a religious affiliation while France and places of reli-
gious significance are the target of terror attacks’, Lisnard held (Sims 2016). The 
Cannes decree was adopted in approximately 30 other French municipalities, 
not only by conservative mayors but also by socialist ones.
Contrary to many of the legal regulations that go largely unnoticed, the 
bans on circumcision and the Burkini rapidly became national and even inter-
national affairs involving high-ranking politicians and government officials and 
the engagement of international media commenting on the (il)legitimacy of 
the bans. Manuel Valls, then prime minister of France, expressed his under-
standing and support for the mayor of Cannes and other municipalities. At the 
same time, however, he emphasised that there would be no application of these 
rules for the entire French republic. German chancellor Angela Merkel was 
also involved in the circumcision debate, although, contrary to Valls, she was 
not supportive of the ban, the implications of which we will discuss shortly. 
In both debates, secularism as a fundamental value of both states was placed at 
the core of the controversies. Two prominent intellectuals in both countries 
reacted to the discussion, Jürgen Habermas and Jean Baubérot, criticising the 
ban and repeatedly emphasising the necessity for dialogue and public discussion.
Despite many ambitions to construct ‘the secular’ as a religiously neutral 
practice or a way of being in the world that is free of affect and emotion, in the 
circumcision debate and the Burkini affair, bans were usually justified through 
dominant feelings of love and fear at the same time. ‘If my Jewish education 
leads to a point that my son asks me one day as a mature and convinced Jew to 
get him finally circumcised, I will then fulfil his wish with love, pride and pain. 
But not before’, commented Gil Yaron, in his own words ‘a non-religious 
Jewish doctor’, in an article on the circumcision ritual. This article was written 
as a response to his sister, who desired to go against tradition, not letting her 
son be circumcised (Yaron 2012).
This example provides important insights towards an understanding of 
how emotions such as love, pride and pain play a crucial role not only in 
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‘religious’ reasoning, but also in secular accounts of certain religious prac-
tices enacted on the body. According to Yaron, it is through sensing love 
and with pride and pain with regard to a mature decision of becoming a 
convinced Jew – which can only come after a certain age – that he can 
truly exercise his duty as a father. Obviously, love and respect for the bodily 
integrity and the autonomy of the son also appeared as common secular and 
liberal arguments during the debate.
Contrary to emotions of love and respect, the Burkini ban revolved mainly 
around the collective emotions that were expressed in France after the terrorist 
attacks in Nice. As an example for public intellectuals’ involvement, Jean Baubérot – 
the most prominent expert of French secularism – in an interview takes it for 
granted that citizens are appalled by seeing women wearing Burkinis at beaches, 
but this cannot be a reason to legally ban the Burkini. At the same time, however, 
many commentators have acknowledged that the Burkini has stirred debate for a 
long time and that one needs to take into account the emotional climate of fear, 
anxiety and mistrust that dominated the French public and political discourse after 
the Nice attacks. Under the impression of these collective ‘secular’ emotions, 
the Burkini is easily seen as a political symbol and provocation rather than an 
expression of specific religious beliefs. The ban can thus be interpreted more as an 
outcome of emotions like fear, anxiety and mistrust rather than as a consequence 
of rational deliberation. It also points at the complex ways in which emotions in 
the late modern age become sources of (collective) self-understanding and objects 
of political debate and strategic management at the same time.
These sentimental registers of the secular, as the love and desire for per-
sonal autonomy and bodily integrity of liberal subjects, along with an expressed 
fear of and mistrust in Islam, become fragile in France and Germany through 
the introduction of elements that belong to other affective and memorial 
orders. They produce dissonance in relation to the former historical project: 
the German-Jewish history and women’s emancipation in France. In both 
cases, the initial legal rulings have quickly been revoked. We suggest that this 
revoking was in part due to the increasing salience of conflict and dissonance 
between present and historical emotional regimes, an ambivalence in emotions 
that might be dubbed characteristic of late modernity.
In Germany, the circumcision ban was revoked only a month after the 
court’s ruling. The prohibition of ritual circumcision rapidly shifted its terrain 
and increasingly involved not only Muslim but also Jewish religious practice. 
Some commentators interpreted the ban as an indication of a revival of a dor-
mant German anti-Semitism and it became, even if only implicitly, associated 
with the Shoah (Brumlik 2012). The ban of circumcision and the debate that 
followed therefore began to resonate with the collective trauma and affec-
tive registers of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. German chancellor Angela 
Merkel said that Germany was ridiculing itself as a ‘comedian nation’ (‘Merkel 
spricht’ 2012) and she did not want Germany to be the only nation where Jews 
cannot live their tradition.
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In France, on the other hand, and although the ban was strongly criticised 
by international media from the very beginning, the turning point towards the 
revoking of the decree was an infamous image of armed police standing next 
to a woman wearing a Burkini on a beach in Nice and forcing her to remove 
the garment. Social and mass media were quick to link those images to those 
of a police officer issuing a reprimand to a woman at an Italian beach in 1957 
because of her wearing a bikini. Through references to and connections with 
feminism and the discrimination of women, the controversy gained legitimacy 
as an issue of women’s rights while partially freeing itself from the language of 
terrorism, political symbolism and provocation. In the Burkini affair, shame 
played a prominent role in the emotional vocabulary from then on. ‘They want 
to take her clothes off. But they should take off their uniforms! The police of 
shame’ commented the president of the CCIF (Collective Against Islamophobia 
in France), Marwan Muhammed, on Twitter, gaining broad support.
Both of these alternative framings and interpretations that ultimately lead to 
the revoking of the legal rulings are indicative of the powerful yet often unar-
ticulated affective relations between actors, symbols, images and discourses. The 
change in direction these controversies took can be conceived of as changes in 
an affective arrangement, that is, changes in the material-discursive formations 
that pattern and channel affect in specific and recurrent ways and include actors’ 
mutual affecting and being-affected. Interestingly, the two cases also reveal the 
historicity and deep-seated embodied nature that affective arrangements can 
take. The conjuring and emphasising of affective relations that disturb and 
run counter to a dominant arrangement evoke the strong emotional reactions 
expressed in the above cases. Mistrust, fear and anger in response to terrorist 
attacks and the public visibility of religious symbols become concurrent with 
shame and embarrassment over the legal regulations regarding these symbols 
and, eventually, lead to alterations in the social world. These competing emo-
tional regimes that are established and negotiated through media and public 
discourse can be considered politically motivated attempts at establishing sov-
ereignty over citizens’ emotions.
Conclusion
Controversies surrounding the place of religion and in particular of Islam in 
contemporary Western societies are fueled with references to feelings and 
emotions. More specifically, the hurting and injury of religious feelings and 
emotions have for some time been at the core of these controversies. Not only 
hurt religious feelings, but also more mundane emotions such as outrage, anger 
and fear characterise debates over, for instance, the principles of the freedom of 
expression or the wearing of Islamic attire in public. Although a brief historical 
contextualisation has shown that neither discussions over the injury of religious 
feelings nor the invocation of blasphemy laws in response to certain transgres-
sions are particularly recent phenomena, it is striking that affect and emotion 
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are predominantly attributed to (or expressed by) religious subjects – hardly do 
we find attributions of emotions to non-religious or secular subjects. We have 
argued that this is, empirically speaking, an untenable position and that there 
is a need to understand better the emotional dynamics of these kinds of con-
troversies, on the sides of religious subjects as well as for secular subjects. We 
have argued, on the one hand, that an analysis of articulations of emotions in 
discourse can provide insights into the collective emotional dynamics of these 
(and other) controversies and help understand processes of group formation and 
antagonising. In particular, we suggested that articulations and attributions of 
emotions in discourse contribute to the formation of specific emotional regimes 
that are supposed to serve the political interests of the different actors involved 
in such a controversy. Subsequently, we suggested to not only look at specific 
emotion words and labels in a text, but to try to come to terms with the more 
subtle, unarticulated and bodily affective arrangements that said controversies 
constitute. Using empirical examples of the ritual male circumcision debate in 
Germany in 2012 and the Burkini ban in France in 2016, we have proposed that 
dissonant and even conflicting affective arrangements that are associated with 
alternative interpretations of both controversies can in fact contribute to the 
revoking of changes in legal regulations that emanated from the controversies.
More generally, our proposed approach at reading these and other con-
flicts takes their emotional and affective dimension seriously, without merely 
reproducing what is said and articulated by the different parties in discourse. 
Instead, treating affect and emotion as fundamental building blocks of social 
coexistence, they can never be on only one side of any conflict. However, 
actors articulate and make use of emotions in very different ways and are part 
of different (historical) affective arrangements that need to be investigated 
and understood to achieve better comprehension regarding present lines of 
controversy and antagonism. On a more general account, the changes in and 
contestations of affective arrangements and emotional regimes we discussed 
might be interpreted as epitomes of larger patterns of societal change that 
are evident in late modernity. This would certainly include a multiplicity 
of appropriations of emotions, from intimate lives to global political strug-
gles and the mediatisation of emotional practices and repertoires, as well as 
the entanglement of private emotional experience and collectivised emotion. 
Our approach is first and foremost intended as a methodological position that 
can be implemented using existing qualitative research methods informed by 
theorising in the sociology of emotion as well as in affect studies.
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An affective architectonics  
for climate grief
Thomas Bristow
The chiasmus of hope and catastrophe is what saves hope from being 
unmasked as only catastrophe: as an illusion or unsatisfied movement of 
desire that wrecks everything.
Geoffrey Hartman
Just as we cannot understand bird flight by studying only feathers [. . .] we 
cannot understand emotional experience by studying only the face, the 
eyeball, the ear, the brain.
Daniel Gross
Ambivalence lies at the heart of our post-modern consciousness; anxiety 
regarding the management of emotions is embodied in the question of 
whether we ‘should’ induce behaviour change collectively at a macro scale 
or leverage small groups and individuals. Furthermore, the politics of indi-
vidual mobilisation is rhetorically charged in social media and political fora 
by a lurid poetics of morality. This curious example of emotional govern-
ance in late modernity is cast in the guise of self-reproach in the neoliberal 
discourse of the Anthropocene, alerting us to the necessity for self-reflection 
coupled with a better sense of collective shame and guilt. Necessary not only 
for the grief work required in our climatic present (Head 2016) but in our 
climatic futures (Head 2016; Cunsolo Willox 2012). In light of this model 
of governance and the modes of feeling and mediation it generates and 
exploits, I propose that we begin to evaluate whether morality and ambiva-
lence are keystone feelings in our period of history. As a counterpoint to 
the implicit scribal suggestion that this moment in history can be unpacked, 
critiqued and developed via logos, I offer an array of NASA images in this 
chapter that enforce us to feel out the ways we comprehend the Earth, to 
rethink questions of fragility and wholeness.
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Global affect as an oxymoron, 
or the question of scale
Climate crisis is a huge external force placing unprecedented pressure on our 
emotional wellbeing. If our culture is alert to and anxious about such a global 
phenomenon, might it withdraw into an homogenised public space of grieving? 
In processing irreversible environmental damage of the sixth great extinction 
owing to human agency on a geological scale, might we temper culturally 
specific emotions to this new epistemic mode? How might we best account 
for the birth of a new cultural norm implying regret and sorrow: climate grief 
(Randall 2009; Cunsolo Willox 2012; Head 2016)?
Our governance systems are national, but our human affairs in late modernity – 
health, economy, technology and the environment, for example – have global 
sources and international reach. Our affairs are coloured by our practices within 
which our feelings are private until shared at familial, communal, national or 
bioregional scales. Our sense of self is conflicted in the Anthropocene, raised to 
new levels of hubris while autonomy is scaled back. Grief, however, is not con-
sistent across cultures and history; ‘“we” must do well to remember’, Timothy 
Clark argues, that ‘“Humanity” is not the same grand mega-subject or unitary 
agent in the sense this trope implies’ (Clark 2012, p. 152). In terms of cultural 
ecology, how can we adapt to this new metaphoric perception of our agency 
within the physical environment while remaining sensitive to social and cultural 
processes that contradict this status in their emphasis on disaggregated practices? 
How might personal, felt experience come into play here when grief work 
meets with global phenomena to suggest only the impossibility for resolution, 
consolation and quietude (Roelvink & Zolkos 2011; Cunsolo Willox 2012)? Is 
climate grief, therefore, best understood as an emotional practice watermarked 
by overwhelming emotions that render us powerless to act (Hamilton 2010)?
Birgitte Johansen understands emotions as personally and corporeally felt but 
socially and spatially produced phenomena – the ‘internalisation and embodi-
ment of community norms’ (2015, p. 50). Moreover, as the intensification 
of the relevance of something to us registers profoundly (our food supplies, 
our family, today’s weather), emotions become a part of the process through 
which ‘the sense of the “me” or “us” harbouring the emotion’ is generated, 
consolidated or verified (ibid.). Here, the unavoidable issue of proximity and 
experience turns our thoughts away from inter-level cause and effect (part of 
the local-global ethical dilemma, where action at one scale registers in another) 
and into practice – that is, into social, performative, embodied practices that we 
do (Kuby 2016; Scheer 2012).
Contemporary emotions theory considers affects as primary physiological 
expressions that are biological and innate with the species; emotions are more 
biographically conceived, as fully integrated experiences of feeling within the 
subject’s social meaning structure and private life history (Wetherell 2012; 
Scheer 2012). This model of feeling depends upon the alignment of emotion 
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Figure 21.1 ‘Clouds over coast’, Earth crew observations (copyright NASA)
with subjectivity. Alongside this biographical dualism lies a biological dualism. 
Environmental philosophy has argued that separating humans and the mate-
rial basis for their life is part of the world picture that supports the pursuits of 
our economies and the sense of freedom that arises within them.1 There are 
two challenges within this problem-space that might help us to understand a 
climate-literate architectonics of affect in our epoch: a shift in thinking away 
from individualistic rights-based notions of personhood, and cultural support 
for collective feelings privatised at bottom. Hans Jonas has outlined the ways 
that our post-enlightenment models of planning and neoliberal values still rest 
on a fallacy of ‘non-accumulative behaviour’ (1984, p. 7), which was common 
currency in economic and health discourses before environmental issues entered 
the national imaginaries of the West and posited the ethical consequences of 
our energy consumption practices alongside the need to think beyond indi-
viduation. Recently, thinking on economies and emotion, at least within the 
humanities, has been upgraded to consider relational, interdependent under-
standings of reality. These follow on from the sense of an unstable subject over 
a sovereign self, but they often come up short in imagining ‘radical non-duality’ 
implicating a ‘unitive dimension of being’ (Spretnak 1997, p. 425).
Right now, the difficulty of dealing with difference within unity (individ-
ual agents in the face of the need for collective action on global crises) might 
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be addressed by an ecological perception of life; such a view might yield the 
reframing of life within a restricted field of immanence to help us organise our 
responses to the ways materiality exhibits affectivity. And that issue, I intuit, 
is key to reorganising our thoughts around affective commitments to climate 
change, especially if it were mobilised to articulate what we might term ‘keystone 
feelings’ – emotional dispositions upon which other affects depend, potentially 
viewed as survival mechanisms upon which our culture at large rests precari-
ously. From here we could attend to the difficulty of situating our self-reflective 
practices as generative of other practices, not merely descriptions of our state.
The (affective) politics of commitment
With respect to the distinct challenges to current models and modes of com-
munication and representation (above), Barbara Adam as understood by 
Richard Kerridge, notes that ‘environmental problems are frequently invis-
ible, deferred, gradual, too small, too large, and subject to radical uncertainty. 
As such, they are un-representable by our customary forms of narrative, verbal 
and visual’ (2006, p. 534). As Kerridge explains, Adam argues that culture, 
lacking the complex multiple perspectives of time and space these hazards call 
for, cannot find symbols, visual images or stories of individual lives to give 
them adequate representation. For Kerridge (2000, p. 243), ‘consequences 
such as global warming do not register as immediate changes in life around 
us, but must be projected, uncertainly, onto the world fifty years hence’. 
Emotions theorists might have something to say here: to project, ‘uncertainly’ 
is more than a curious turn of phrase.2
To act uncertainly, is to act without full confidence; this meaning is implied 
within ‘uncertain’, which from the fourteenth century onwards suggests an 
indeterminate time or occurrence. Uncertainty is part of the affective spectrum 
within anxiety: the emotional state characterised by concern about the future 
(Grupe & Nitschke 2013). Worry is anxiety’s cousin, as is fear; like trust, they 
are both bedfellows of confidence. Confidence has positive connotations in 
respect of action and thus is valuable for both our inquiry into emotional prac-
tices and the interdependent relationship between these practices and environ-
mental morality as we are on the way to defining keystone feelings.
Confidence in one’s judgment is inflected by degrees of positivity as an 
aspect of one’s sense of self; as with a climate scientist, a professional depended 
upon by people, confidence is a keystone emotion: present in their sense of 
self like letters running through a stick of rock (candy). However, in the case 
of individuals picking up on the science through their everyday contact with 
the media, confidence is something different; it places pressure on domestic 
practices, amplifying our sense of ‘muddling through’; it can lead to different 
senses and uses of confidence than in professional arenas. For example, con-
fidence about something bad happening in the future allows one to fear it in 
the present; if one is uncertain about its eventuality, one is anxious about it. 
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And climate change, even for the professional scientist, exerts anxiety upon us. 
Research shows that given the high uncertainty and future-bound orientation 
of many climate change impacts, anxiety is a common affective response to 
climate change (Brugger et al. 2013; Cunsolo Willox et al. 2013; Ojala 2012; 
Weintrobe 2013; Wright & Nyberg 2012). Furthermore, climate change is 
highly unpredictable, due to the non-linear intra-acting agencies of the hydro-
sphere, lithosphere, cryosphere, atmosphere and biosphere, including the 
wide-ranging possibilities of what our fossil burning practices might entail 
(Harrison 2013); thus, climate futures are expressed in terms of probabilities 
(Mastrandrea et  al. 2010). The alt-right and climate change denial lobbyists 
have exploited the emphasis on probability.
Practices, moods and modes
Emotional tension between humans as adaptive on one hand and goal-oriented 
on the other is understated in the literature on cultures of climate change. In 
social science studies this tension has been bifurcated into distinct modes of 
practices: between resilience and activism, which are based on a curious politics 
of representation:
[Anticipatory representations] can have a motivational, axiological, or 
deontic nature. In fact, these representations can be used as goals and drive 
the behaviour of the organism. Whereas a merely adaptive organism may 
tend to adjust its epistemic representations (knowledge, beliefs) to the 
world, to make them as accurate as possible, a goal-directed system tries 
to adjust the external world to its endogenous representations (which also 
paves the way for both hallucinations and utopias).
(Castlefranchi & Miceli 2005, p. 484)
Climate change challenges us to consider multiple timescales simultaneously – 
from the prevailing pattern of weather in a region over days, months and years, 
to a view on average seasonal temperatures this century. One’s feelings for the 
impacts of climate change largely depend upon the capacity to exercise a histor-
ical and comparative lens to read these data taken since the Great Acceleration 
last century, and since industrialisation in the nineteenth century; additionally, 
we must contrast this with even more long-term climate-dominated eras such 
as the Little Ice Age and how they fit into Earth’s long story (Williams 2016). 
Emotions scholars are to undertake this work while noting how the function 
and process of emotions has changed over time, particularly late modernity’s 
critical inflection with regard to uncertainty, anxiety and potentiality. It is a lot 
to ask. Fortunately, climate justice draws from our endogenous sense of being 
human and caring for others. We have long internalised these as keystone feel-
ings for society and only last century reframed these as cornerstones of moral 
pedagogy, but we are yet to broadcast these as survival mechanisms for our 
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species and other species. Equilibrium is a strange notion to bring into climate 
change discourse as it denotes stability when climate changes and evolves; 
however, it is a useful ideal to have in view as it brings into relief our emo-
tional practices. Rather than ‘revenge’ (of activists, moralists and government 
taxation policies on carbon emitters, the petro-chemical industry and nuclear 
lobbyists, for example) resolving an equilibrium that has been displaced by 
offensive acts, ‘climate justice’ seeks retribution and balance driven by a sense 
of injustice; it pursues our desire to address the differential affects of climate 
change and settle things more equitably whenever possible, drawing from a 
central Western belief of equality under the sign of justice.3
Anthropocene anxiety and anticipation
Cognitive theory understands that emotions can trigger anticipatory behav-
iours; an example might be storing food owing to anxiety over access to 
dependable supplies in the near future. Additionally, the experience of emo-
tions (or a certain emotion) may induce anticipatory belief, such as that a 
feeling of anxiety being somewhat negated by storing food might make us 
feel safe and secure in this particular mode of domesticity. In the first case, 
preparatory emotions can be understood to mediate relationships between a 
stimulus and a response; in the second, premonitory emotions ‘accomplish 
the function of signalling underlying states’ (Castelfranchi & Miceli 2005, 
p. 483). Kerridge (2000) explicitly refers to legible warning signs that are not 
easily represented within a narrative of behavioural change; in so doing he 
implicitly invokes the breakdown or instability of preparatory emotions in late 
modernity (the mediation between climate change and pro-environmental 
behaviour) while explicitly naming the premonitory state as ‘uncertain’. From 
this we ascertain that if we experienced more secure emotions, we might take 
these as motivation to more clearly defined action.
Adam’s ‘timescape perspective’ offers curious light on the problem of antici-
pation: ‘the timespans of ordinary life, onto which we map our personal hopes 
and plans, are viewed alongside drastically longer and shorter distances’ (the 
instantaneous reception of an infection as well as the drawn-out process of its 
incubation) (Kerridge 2000, p. 243). We return to public understanding of sci-
ence hamstrung by representational problems of ‘potentiality [rather] than of 
actuality’, the emphasis on ‘tomorrow rather than now’, ‘elsewhere rather than 
here’ and ‘crisis building rather than revealed’. For Kerridge, all these intangi-
ble elements undermine preparatory emotions and goal-oriented action; emo-
tional practices in this context can be ‘postponed’ (2000, p. 244), he writes, and 
thus climate action deferred.
Sheldon Ungar (2000, p. 298) further proposed that the difference in the 
public’s ethical response to the issues of ozone depletion and climate change 
crisis were due to issues of metaphor and risk. Studies on the speed and depth by 
which chlorofluorocarbon release was substantially reduced during the 1970s 
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Figure 21.2  ‘Flood image after Hurricane Katrina’, International Space Station  
(copyright NASA)
and 1980s suggest that ozone was easy to understand as it mobilised bridging 
metaphors from popular culture, and it proposed immediate and concrete risk 
with everyday relevance.
The bridging metaphors of the ozone – most notably the penetration meta-
phor consonant with science fiction movies and computer games – offered 
low-entry costs to understanding: ‘encompassed in common sense understand-
ings that are deeply ingrained and widely shared’ (Ungar 2000, p. 305); its 
success owing to this fact, that it was linked in the cultural psyche to the 
theory of a comet wiping out the dinosaurs, and as a ‘hot crisis’ to exposure 
and skin cancer. On the other hand, climate change was viewed as ‘future-
oriented’, less-immediate and ‘not readily tied to concrete events capable of 
operating as a beacon or sustaining a hot-crisis’ (Ungar 2000, p. 307); while 
the greenhouse effect appears benign, the ozone hole is easily cognised as an 
aberration. This lack of critical purchase on the cultural imaginary for long-
term, deferred events was compounded by the ‘hedging and uncertainty’ of the 
scientific community regarding a consensus on whether or not current weather 
is linked to climate change last century (Ungar 2000, p. 308), despite consensus 
on anthropogenic climate change since 1995.4
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The uses and disadvantages of metaphor for life
The metaphor ‘carbon footprint’ attempts to bring to mind planetary injustice 
dispersed over great distances and time while bringing its effects back to the 
body. Overuse without emotion in news media has transformed this once-
exciting visual and bodily meme into a dead metaphor. A subtle advance on 
this is the term ‘ecological footprint’, which also speaks to a ‘load’: ‘imposed 
by a given population on nature or, in other words, the amount of nature 
that humans are thought to occupy in order to live using existing technolo-
gies’ (Wackernagel & Rees 1996, p. 4). While a static snapshot in time, the 
footprint metaphor for Karlsson, ‘flows from an ecologically subtractive logic 
by which pre-human nature is thought to have been in a state of ecological 
balance’ (2016, p. 28), thus registering something more than a unidirectional 
black mark on the planet’s surface in its emphasis on change. Change sug-
gests the potential for new futures, and thus might trigger survival instincts 
and governance mechanisms for well-established emotions. In the context of 
Princen (2011), both footprint images lend themselves to radical consumption 
critiques and to ‘learn to tread softly on the Earth by reducing their aggregate 
environmental impact’ (Karlsson 2016, p. 27); they also veil the political and 
sociological barriers to new economies. Karlsson remarks that ‘metaphorical 
reasoning is widely recognised for its fundamental role in policy-making and 
public debates’ (2016, p. 23; cf. Schlesinger & Lau 2000) but it is also known 
for its role in shaping the possibilities for sustainable development or even 
science itself (Brown 2003; Larson 2011).
For today’s emotions theorists it might be useful to see how, at the turn of 
the century, cultural studies of climate change negotiated pro-environmental 
behaviour change agendas (largely underwritten by late modernity’s individual-
ism bequeathing the privatisation of environmental morality), concluding that 
information ‘in’ the system does not necessarily lead to good behaviour ‘out’ 
of the system (Coope 2008). Moreover, research in the public understanding 
of science suggests that the volume of information in the knowledge economy 
mitigates the acquisition of scientific knowledge – that there is a ratio of the 
information the human individual and society can handle to the volume of 
information available. It is worth making a blunt comment here: a lot depends 
upon our understanding of the capacity of society to process data. This prob-
lem was evident before the proliferation of social media platforms in recent 
decades; however, the rise in the cultural economy of these platforms might 
not only exacerbate one problem of late modernity that we have identified 
here; the system neither dynamically responding to information nor rebooting 
moral consciousness in response to affective pedagogical images invoking our 
plight. Our collective failure to trigger an appropriate survival response, these 
studies argue, is related to personal and social motivations as well as technologi-
cal developments, which impact on the types of knowledge people are likely 
to acquire, avoid, resist and overlook. The Anthropocene is one case in point.
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The ‘age of humans’ is a contested narrative in which figurative and literal 
uses of words engage in a battle to best articulate a coherent sense of humans as a 
geological force. For Noel Castree, the Anthropocene metaphor is ‘a new, more 
graphic way’ to frame global environmental change (2014, p. 6). Summarising 
Clive Hamilton’s position on the word, Lauren Rickards reads a ‘radical idea’ 
in his understanding of the Anthropocene, which is the converse of Castree’s 
understanding owing to Hamilton ‘stem[ming] away from “global environ-
mental change” towards thinking in terms of a single dynamic and phase-shifted 
Earth System’ (Rickards 2015, p. 281; Hamilton 2015; Hamilton & Grinevald 
2015). Extended mind scholars, continental philosophers and emotions scholars 
alike might find it interesting that Earth as a body or organ is coming into view. 
Likewise for Robbins, the metaphor ‘invert[s] our perspective about human life 
and environmental order’ (2013, p. 307). More alarmingly, Wilkinson asserts: 
‘humans are now an order of magnitude more important at moving sediment 
than the sum of all other natural processes operating on the surface of the planet’ 
(2005, p. 161) and ‘the most important geomorphic agent on the planet’s sur-
face’ (Wilkinson & McElroy 2007, p. 140).
Rickards’ study on the work of the Anthropocene metaphor within sustain-
ability discourse contributes to sociology’s attempts to understand and chart 
some basic categories with which to think about the social imaginaries of cli-
mate change. Rickards discloses numerous variations of meaning depending on 
the interpretations of the word ‘human’, ‘geological’ and ‘force’, the extent to 
which the focus is on ‘materiality or immateriality’ and the ways that stratigra-
phy and Earth system science are deployed:
variations stem from whether the phrase [Anthropocene] is read: as empir-
ical fact (relying on metaphorical explanation) or purely metaphorical; as 
an observation about the contemporary period or as a (newly exposed) 
universal truth about the world; and as a statement about human effects or 
about humans themselves and their cosmological significance.
(2015, p. 283)
It is of use to locate groups of persons unified by distinctive and system-
atic sets of normative relations within our climate futures, as there must 
be something in this that trumps the hyper-individualised emotions of late 
modernity, or privatised environmental morality. From within the world of 
geosciences, fluency and precision are not always maintained when it comes to 
the Anthropocene. Linguistic habits reaching for heuristic models that might 
make sense with a little pathos, however, do appear. And yet, science’s appeal 
to the emotions ordinarily triggers polar responses, as suggested by Hamilton 
(2010), above: guilt for what we have done (Ferguson & Branscombe 2014) 
or hope for what we can do (Head 2016; Ojala 2012). Might there not be 
an alternative approach that thinks through the question of bodies for under-
standing our feelings at scale?
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Towards a conclusion
At present, climate change models neither consider transpersonal affect nor address 
questions of risk and choice that sit within states of anxiety and anticipation. Over 
the last ten years we have come to learn that fluctuations in ecological conditions can 
be experienced affectively (Albrecht et al. 2007; Cunsolo Willox et al. 2013; Head 
2016; Cunsolo Willox 2012) leading to feelings of sorrow (Roelvink & Zolkos 
2011), loss (Drew 2013) and anxiety (Brugger, Dunbar, Jurt & Orlove 2013). 
Moreover, fear, sadness, anger, frustration, helplessness, uncertainty, depression 
and worry all register in the cultural climate of environmental crises. Ambivalence 
dominates the way we frame emotions (Hamilton, above), and how we respond 
to representations of the crises on earth (Adam, Kerrdge, Lowe, Rickards, Ungar; 
cf. NASA images). To say that emotions and affect are therefore direct impacts of 
phenomena such as climate change (Cunsolo Willox et al. 2013, p. 17) is to make 
a large claim; however, this might be one of many starting points up for considera-
tion as we approach new emotions theories for our Anthropocene futures. Might 
we draw some hope from evidence of this project coming into maturity: (i) the 
locus of the problem of representation having shifted from deferred events (Adam 
1988; Buser 2014; Kerridge 2000) to new imaginaries of material events and dis-
course on bodily metaphors (Rickards 2015; Karlsson 2016; Larson 2011); (ii) that 
rational behaviourist models interfacing with cultural studies (Lowe 2006; Lowe 
et. al. 2005) are finding ways to argue for greater research into emotion (Coope 
2008; Cunsolo Willox 2012; Head 2016; Ojala 2012; Wright & Nyberg 2012); 
and (iii) the historical emphasis that grips the academy’s understanding of human 
culture has been spatialised and opened up for a conversation with Indigenous 
knowledges (Abram 1997; Graham 2009; Morris 2015; Rose 2004; Spretnak 
1997) that might entail a shift from private emotion to public affect, which would 
help with the problem of scale in climate change discourse.
Perhaps, as we move towards better understanding of adaptation to our 
environmental futures, we will feel more comfortable with the view that 
sometimes deliberately, sometimes accidentally, human adjustment appears to 
be subject to the ways that each culture is able to construct more-than-human 
imaginaries that match geological time and the chronology of human history. 
The problem that I outline in this chapter is the way we currently respond to 
cultural apprehension and anxiety, which does not seem to address the prob-
lem of channelling our affective commitments. Our moods and our practices 
could be analysed within a climate change context to understand better ‘where 
they might go and what potential modes of knowing, relating, and attending 
to things are already somehow present in them in a state of potentiality and 
resonance’ (Stewart 2007, p. 3). From here, we could construct idiosyncratic 
maps detailing connections between others, the interdependencies between 
singularities, weather and governments, in a range of affective fields where 
we witness and contribute to the ‘intensity of circuits, surges and sensations’ 
(Stewart 2007, p. 7) across society and species.5
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Figure 21.3 ‘Storm shot’, crew observation (copyright NASA)
Postscript (a word on keystone feelings)
Now, as we unpack and apply a new metaphor for the age of humans, our 
criticism is tasked with directly pointing to the historical time of one species’ 
technological advantage over nature – a force on the planet turned toxic since 
the plough and amplified in the Great Acceleration.6 As Larson argues: ‘The 
metaphors we adopt today have significant repercussions for our current and 
future approaches to environmental sustainability’ (2011, p. 20). One avenue 
of inquiry that might counteract this fall: to consider a dialogue between what 
I have tentatively framed as keystone feelings with the metaphor ‘keystone spe-
cies’, the latter taking the focus away from humans as the dominant force of the 
Anthropocene and positioning us within a co-dependent system. This metaphor 
for a species’ effect on its environment, relative to its abundance, speaks clearly 
to the structure of an ecological community and it might invoke a sense of global 
climate affect. This in turn might attune our psychology to keystone emotions 
identified above. Analogous to the role of a keystone in an arch, the abundant 
species is under the least pressure of any of the components in the structure, 
but the community/arch collapses without it. A broader affective understand-
ing of ‘keystone species’ – already popular in both conservation discourse and 
the science of ecology – could help with an imaginary struggling to accumulate 
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our local actions within a vision of emergent, spatially broad transactions of our 
continents’ ecosystems over many thousands of years.7 And it might help us 
rethink the current position in mainstream psychology and emotions theory that 
posits co-dependency as a form of entrapment and fixed role definition under-
pinning dysfunctional helping relationships that affect an individual’s ability to 
have a healthy, mutually satisfying relationship.8
With interdisciplinary emotions scholarship, we can clarify how our keystone 
species’ emotional makeup might not only point to co-dependency relevant for 
climate change discourse but underline the need to draw emotions theory away 
from anthropocentric models of feeling. This new front for emotions theory, 
while shifting our sense of what constitutes health for the individual to the scale 
of species wellbeing. Might this ultimately realise the representation of affect 
as required for climate change discourse – one relationally produced through 
assemblages, and active at different scales (Watkins 2016), producing new and 
emergent embodied connections and relationships (Gregg & Seigworth 2010; 
Mulcahy 2012)? The ontological dimensions articulated here disrupt the desire 
for control that models of post-enlightenment selfhood has cemented deep in 
our psyches (Head 2016; Randall 2009; Robbins & Moore 2013; Weintrobe 
2013). This chapter has taken a step towards asking whether macro-reflexively 
managed emotions can link environmental crisis and the governance of self and 
transpersonal affect, particularly in the context of Western cultural representa-
tions of climate change, a phenomenon that is anticipated and present but not 
always seen and felt.
I take a telephone call from the Royal Society of the Protection of Birds as 
I edit this chapter; the starvation of puffins in the British Isles owing to numer-
ous ecological impacts of climate change is the topic of conversation. The 
hope that it is possible to reverse the decline of species visiting our locales not 
only animates the Society and its receptive public; it reminds us of the effective 
measures we can take in an age of uncertainty about the future. There is doubt 
as to whether this work will be enough; perplexity over the best way forward 
casts its shadow over our conversation; yet within the gap between the present 
and the future, the practice of affective commitment persists.
Notes
1 See Plumwood, V 2002, Environmental culture: the ecological crises of reason, 
Routledge, London; Plumwood, V 1993, Feminism and the mastery of nature, 
Routledge, New York; and Merchant, C 1980, The death of nature: women, ecology 
and the scientific revolution, Harper and Row, San Francisco, CA.
2 For example, trust as a ‘primary emotion for coping with uncertainties about the inten-
tions, honesty, ability and promises of officials’ in private and public sectors (Pixley 
2012, p. 17), and trust and distrust as ways to project (financial) futures as controllable 
within the state of economic disequilibrium (Pixley, McCarthy & Wilson 2014).
3 Class, race and gender, alongside political representation and economic stability, 
impact on populations’ abilities to adapt to and mitigate climate change. See Article 18 
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of Bali Principles of Climate Justice (August 2002); see also the People’s Agreement, 
World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, 
Bolivia (April 2010).
4 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Second Assessment, www.ipcc.ch/
pdf/climate-changes-1995/ipcc-2nd-assessment/2nd-assessment-en.pdf.
5 See White, L Jnr 1967, ‘The historical roots of our ecological crisis, Science, vol. 155, 
pp. 1203–7.
6 See Rajchman, J 2000, The Deleuze connections, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, especially 
pp. 4–13.
7 These ideas are inspired by Bruce Pascoe’s reading of Tim Flannery. See Flannery, T 
2010, Here on Earth, Text Publishing, Melbourne, p. 100; Pascoe, B 2014, Dark emu: 
black Seeds, agriculture or accident, Magbala Books, Broome, p. 122. The planet’s longest-
lasting pan-continental stability of Indigenous Australians is also known as ‘the great 
Australian peace’ (Pascoe 2014, p. 132).
8 For example: Hemfelt, R, Hawkins, D, Paul, M 1989, Love is a choice: recovery for code-
pendent relationships, Thomas Nelson, Nashville, TN; Lancer, D 2015, Codependency for 
dummies, John Wiley and Sons, Hoboken, NJ; Burn, S M 2016, Unhealthy helping: a psy-
chological guide to overcoming codependence, enabling, and other dysfunctional giving, Createspace 
Independent Publishing.
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Emotions in late modernity
Roger Patulny, Rebecca E. Olson, Sukhmani Khorana, 
Jordan McKenzie, Alberto Bellocchi and Michelle Peterie
This collection is evidence that the theoretical tools used by sociologists to 
make sense of contemporary times can be used effectively to understand the 
social dynamics of emotions in late modernity.
The chapters in this collection are drawn from sociology and cognate disci-
plines, and they provide evidence both for and against the idea that emotions 
are experienced and operate differently in late modernity. For example, work-
ing against the late modernity thesis, some authors suggest that emotions are still 
often perceived in simplistic terms in opposition to rationality (Wettergren). 
Others point out how many feelings remain public and collectivised in areas 
such as legal settings (Karstedt) and classrooms (Davis & Bellocchi). Others 
still imply emotions have always been mediated, as demonstrated through an 
analysis of gender and emotion in medieval texts (Lynch) or in describing 
‘affective genealogy’ approaches to understanding history and society and the 
mediation of emotions and affect through bodies (Stephens).
On the other hand, supporting the late modernity thesis, the collection showcases 
a number of sociological theories and studies identifying substantial complexity in 
contemporary understandings of emotions (Hookway et al.; McKenzie; Bellocchi 
& Turner; Lively). There are also chapters identifying a rise in individualisation 
in teaching practices supporting individualised ‘achievement emotions’ (Pekrun) 
and in legal arguments about taking self-responsibility for angry behaviour (Sorial). 
Other contributions identify the increasing mediation of emotions, including the 
investigation of emotions through the use of new technologies (Mills et al.) and the 
use of digital media and film to convey and influence emotions (Harding; Pribram; 
Khorana). And numerous chapters point to the increasing reflexivity and require-
ment to manage emotions, both as individuals in legal contexts (Roach Anleu & 
Mack) and in the health profession (Olson & Dadich) and in the macro-social 
world in the contexts of migration (Peterie), religion (von Scheve) and the envi-
ronmental movement (Bristow).
Although these chapters as a whole do not demonstrate complete consensus 
around the late modern idea, they do (for the most part) support arguments 
that contemporary society has witnessed greatly increased change and complex-
ity; a decline in traditional social structures; an increasing mediation of human 
328 Patulny et al. 
activity through technology and digital mediums; and growing flexibility, 
freedom and autonomy – but also self-responsibility and increased reflexivity – 
in relation to one’s role as a social actor and a consumer. Reflexivity has become 
part of the fabric of late modernity, as the institutional touchstones to which 
identities attach have rapidly multiplied and changed. These changes have had 
a far-reaching impact on emotions, and the chapters herein have identified and 
challenged many instances in which this is the case. Also, whilst primarily soci-
ological, the chapters canvass a diverse range of topics and disciplines. They 
not only engage with the core theoretical concept of ‘late modernity’ from 
sociology, but also open up the consequences of transitioning into this era for 
emotions researchers across the broader social sciences and humanities.
This collection represents a timely contribution to emotions research. The 
popularity of emotions research has exploded in recent years across a range of 
disciplines, and no single theoretical paradigm has been successful in bringing 
together these differing perspectives and research in the manner undertaken 
here. This collection begins to advance this process of understanding the trans-
formation of emotions in late modernity, though it does not claim to have the 
final word on the topic.
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